Examining the history of America’s interaction with the rest of the world provides context for the actions of the Obama administration. Hand wringing about America’s image abroad dates back to at least the 1960s, and has intensified in recent decades. Cold War era conflicts, such as the Vietnam War and the nuclear arms race, drew massive protests in Europe. In the aftermath of the downfall of the Soviet Union, observers derided the U.S. as a “hyperpower,” a critique that encompassed not only America’s political moves, but also its economic and cultural might in an increasingly globalized, unipolar world.

Tensions between the U.S. and its traditional allies mounted in 2002 when Bush announced his intention to invade Iraq, a campaign he planned to launch unilaterally once the UN refused to endorse it. European leaders, most prominently Jacques Chirac of France and Gerhard Schroeder of Germany, denounced America’s behavior as aggressive, echoing a sentiment expressed by an overwhelming majority of European citizens.

Yet, as in the past, America’s partners maintained a schizophrenic attitude toward their benefactor. For all its faults, America offered protection for European countries that had largely demilitarized in the years since World War II. Hence, whenever an outside threat appeared on the horizon, all talk of a post-American world suddenly vanished, and the transatlantic alliance appeared to be just as strong as ever. This was the case in the summer of 2008, when Russia’s invasion of Georgia inspired fear in the hearts of European publics. In response, their leaders quickly modified their stance to reflect closer alignment with the U.S. on issues such as missile defense shields in Poland and the Czech Republic.

Even as America saw its ratings decline under Bush in what Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld dubbed “old Europe,” the story was different elsewhere. The U.S. continued to enjoy favorable relations with the countries of the former Soviet bloc, who still remain thankful to the U.S. for defeating their former communist oppressors. Several Eastern European nations, most prominently Poland, contributed troops to the U.S. mission in Iraq. Ties with rising powers in Asia, such as India and Japan, improved on Bush’s watch, as demonstrated by a series of joint military exercises as well as a landmark nuclear treaty with India. These bonds appear likely to remain strong even with the recent election of the Democratic Party of Japan, which has occasionally indulged in anti-American rhetoric, but has also announced a commitment of $5 billion for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, a critical U.S. priority. Humanitarian aid to areas afflicted by poverty, disease, and natural disaster won plaudits among the President’s harshest critics. In Latin America, where populist politicians like Hugo Chavez gained ground throughout the past decade, local issues such as income disparity far outweighed the role of anti-American grandstanding in determining their success.

As has been established, America was by no means universally unpopular on the eve of President Obama’s inauguration. Nevertheless, during the campaign, Obama frequently sounded the theme of America’s deteriorating reputation abroad. To indicate that reversing anti-American sentiment was one of his top priorities, he sought to portray himself as a global citizen in a way that is perhaps unprecedented in American history: by emphasizing his multicultural background. He addressed an enormous, cheering crowd in Berlin during a tour of Europe and the Middle East in July 2008, and met with foreign leaders who demonstrated their eagerness to work with him.

The contrast between Obama and Bush became immediately apparently in the first few months of Obama’s presidency, as he began to overturn policies that, in the past, have incited denunciation of the U.S. Fulfilling a campaign promise, he issued an executive order mandating that the Guantanamo Bay prison be closed within a year, a directive that later ran into logistical problems. He renounced the use of torture against terrorist suspects. In speeches to foreign nations, he extended his criticisms of America to include unsavory elements of its history, such as mistreatment of immigrants and minority groups, and heavy-handed interventionism during the Cold War.

All of these measures represented an attempt to “reset” America’s relations with the rest of the world. Various missteps, however, have tarnished that campaign. Obama was criticized for being deliberately rude to British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, one of America’s closest allies, during Brown’s visit to Washington. Meanwhile, in the Middle East, Obama’s goal of achieving peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians has been set back by his frosty relations with hawkish Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has refused Obama’s demand to halt settlements in the West Bank.

Discontent with Obama’s foreign agenda has grown in recent months. An article in the German publication Der Spiegel noted that his new approach to international relations has not worked. European powers remain reluctant to provide significant military support for the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan. French President Nicholas Sarkozy has been particularly adamant in criticizing Obama’s perceived weakness in negotiations with Iran, whose pursuit of nuclear weapons poses a threat to the entire world. China and Russia both continue to exercise their influence as regional powers, and have largely ignored the outreach undertaken by Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

How can Obama reverse course in his quest to revitalize America’s image? To begin, he should seize every possible opportunity to find common ground with America’s allies on issues such as human rights. When he decided against meeting with the Dalai Llama in October, the President aroused suspicions that he would not be as sympathetic to human rights concerns as his predecessors, all of who met with the exiled Tibetan leader during their administrations. His endorsement of the so-called “Green Revolution” in Iran, in which citizens took to the streets to protest the fraudulent re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was seen as less than enthusiastic. In this matter, he should take the advice offered by Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel—“never let a crisis go to waste”—and apply this doctrine to international affairs. Renewing Bush’s emphasis on development and democracy promotion could also help to reinforce the notion that America is a benevolent hegemon.

Trade is another area in which Obama could positively impact both America’s image and interests. Here, he has backpedaled from Bush’s pro-free-trade stance, imposing tariffs on Chinese tires, inserting “Buy American” provisions into the stimulus bill and the “Cash For Clunkers” program, and allowing agreements with South Korea, Colombia, and Panama to languish in the Senate. Such actions hurt the odds of resurrecting the Doha Round of international trade negotiations, which broke down last year. Ever since the end of World War II, removing barriers to global commerce has been a key goal of the U.S. and its allies. Free trade not only contributes to long-term economic growth, but it also ensures closer ties between nations, and thus reduces the possibility of conflict. If Obama were to repudiate his previous positions and commit to reviving the Doha Round, he would remind the world that America is capable of providing global leadership on these sorts of seemingly intractable problems.

But ultimately, Obama must acknowledge that America’s image is a compilation of so many factors, most of them out of his control, that changing it within a short span of time would be an impossible task. Indeed, on some issues, seeking international approval could be detrimental to America’s best interests. Anti-terrorism policy is one example. Measures that have drawn the ire of foreign leaders, including harsh interrogation techniques, extraordinary rendition, and detention facilities such as Guantanamo Bay, are also an important line of defense against future attacks.

The best route to follow lies between the extremes of the Bush era and the early months of the Obama presidency. America’s allies have a lot to offer in the way of diplomatic support and international prestige, and can lend legitimacy to its military ventures. They should not be ignored or marginalized. At the same time, their true concern is security, and if America can no longer ensure their safety, Europeans and others will look elsewhere for protection. Obama needs to balance conciliation with displays of toughness, while employing his personal appeal to rally support for shared causes such as human rights and nuclear non-proliferation. If he takes these steps, he will be able to cultivate increased respect for America abroad without sacrificing its interests.

Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s recent statement regarding the violent conflict between Israel and Palestine alludes not only to the lack of progress from negotiations in recent months, but also to the partisan political moment into which President Obama’s administration has entered with regard to its policies in the Middle East. Lieberman’s comments suggest a lack of initiative within the Israeli government to work toward a lasting peace settlement; indeed, over the last few months, violent conflict surrounding the city of Jerusalem and the failure of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to articulate more than rhetorical support for a “two-state solution” have added to fears that the region has turned its back on negotiation. Most importantly, Israel’s continued settlement building in the West Bank has delegitimized its more conciliatory gestures and will impede negotiations until expansion is frozen.

Under these circumstances, it is no wonder that President Obama and his Cabinet have shied away from addressing this ongoing crisis directly. The contradictory way in which the President has addressed Middle Eastern issues at various speaking engagements has led to a sense of confusion as to the extent to which he will support or reject recent Israeli stances. During his June 2008 appearance before the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee, a powerful pro-Israel lobby group, then-Senator Obama assured the audience that his administration would continue to assist Israel to the tune of roughly $30 billion over the course of ten years – reaffirming a commitment from President George W. Bush. Furthermore, Obama insisted that the U.S. “must never force Israel to the negotiating table.” At his speech in Cairo a year later, however, President Obama condemned Israel’s continued expansion into the occupied territories, declaring that “it is time for these settlements to stop.” It is difficult to imagine how the president can expect settlement expansion to stop without pressing Israel to take part in any form of negotiations.

President Obama’s relative reticence regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict presents him with an unprecedented opportunity to devise a specific and comprehensive policy in the coming months. Furthermore, two very recent events have left the Middle East a far more vulnerable region, which would make a resumption of active peace negotiations with an American presence all the more timely. First, in September, the United Nations Human Rights Council issued the so-called Goldstone Report, condemning Israeli actions within the Gaza strip during its offensive last winter. Although formally dismissed by both the Israeli government – Prime Minister Netanyahu referred to it as “a mockery of history” – and the United States Congress, its endorsement by the United Nations General Assembly suggests that the report will not be so easily set aside. Defenders of the report argue that it speaks to the extent of Israeli human rights violations in the Gaza strip, while its critics contend that it fails to fully address atrocities committed by Hamas. Yet, in holding both Israeli and Palestinian leaders accountable, the Goldstone Report has helped shed critical and objective light on the seemingly endless regional violence. Obama’s refusal to acknowledge the report has hurt his standing among many Arab nations in which he is usually viewed favorably, or at least more favorably than President Bush. If Obama wishes to attract Arab support for peace negotiations, he must speak publicly about – and in doing so legitimize – the report, even if he temporally weakens him politically.

In another significant regional development, Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas recently announced that he will not seek re-election in January 2010. Although the U.S. has regarded Abbas as a moderate in the region, his performance has been dissatisfactory to the Israeli leadership and to many Palestinians, who now criticize his wavering commitment to end the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Hamas, the dominant political player within Gaza, has opposed his decision to hold presidential and parliamentary elections next year. Obama’s presence in talks or negotiations could determine whether a moderate or militant leader replaces Abbas. Yet with the elections looming, time is not on the President’s side.

The nature of President Obama’s early forays into the Middle East will no doubt set the tone for his entire tenure in office. If his goal is nothing more than to continue supporting Israel at all costs, then little shift in policy from that of the previous administration is needed. If, however, his goal is to negotiate a peace settlement that will protect Israel’s sovereignty and security while creating a truly autonomous nation for the Palestinians, a more nuanced strategy is essential. The Obama administration has continuously wavered between pressing for an end to settlement construction in the occupied territories and accepting a resumption of peace talks while allowing the Israelis to continue construction. Yet until all settlement building ceases, negotiation will remain a dead-end as the “facts on the ground” continue to compromise Palestinian hopes for a state. As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, the administration “wants to see a stop to settlements, not outposts, not ‘natural growth’ exceptions.”

The United States, unfortunately, has a history of empty threats against the Israeli government. If the U.S. really wants an end to settlement construction, it must be willing to withhold some material support from the Israeli government. In 1990, during the first Intifada, the Israeli government began building settlements at an unprecedented rate. James Baker and others in the first Bush Administration perceived these settlements as an obstacle to much-publicized peace negotiations going on in Madrid at that time. The U.S. threatened to withdraw some financial support if the Israel government did not desist. Again in 1992, the United States refused to approve a $10 billion loan viewed by Israel as essential to meeting their increasing infrastructure demands. While this resulted in temporary bilateral tensions, the Israelis soon rejected then Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir’s approach and elected more moderate leadership. The settlements were temporarily frozen, the peace negotiations went on, and the loan was eventually granted.
The strategy employed by the Senior Bush administration did not result in a total halt in settlement construction, but the U.S. won considerable concessions by exploiting Israel’s financial dependence as bargaining leverage.

Some might argue that the cessation of all terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians, mostly perpetrated by Hamas and the militant Shiite group Hezbollah, is the first necessary step to achieving a formal compromise in the region. Yet particularly since January, Hamas leadership has signaled a willingness to negotiate a cease-fire treaty with Israel and went on record in 2006 as agreeing to participate in talks working toward a two-state solution. While their recent concessions in no way compensate for their violent actions, they are a necessity to the peace process, and they must be brought to the table for their to be any hope of a lasting peace.

Others claim that pressuring Israel to accept compromise will deter it from participating in formal peace negotiations. Yet the U.S. managed to win a temporary settlement freeze in the early 1990s that coincided with a series of secret negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). These clandestine talks resulted in Oslo I, the first attempt to synthesize a plan for both Palestinian autonomy and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories.

The events of 1990-92, therefore, provide a viable model for the way in which President Obama can negotiate successfully with a Likud-controlled Israeli government. While the President certainly should not discard our history of cooperation with Israel, he must also take into account the degree to which Israeli survival depends on American financial support and our nation’s interest in maintaining stability in the Middle East as a whole. If President Obama wishes to encourage moderate Palestinian leadership and the renewal of negotiations, he must spend his political capital in a manner that reflects the true urgency of the region’s political situation and does not assume, as Mr. Lieberman says, that the region has “learned to live with” violent conflict.