The cornerstone of any American policy toward Pakistan should be a careful balancing act between long-term and short-term interests. The former is a central reason why President Obama recently asked for a significant increase in aid to Pakistan to help provide basic government services like education. Considering Pakistan’s 50 percent literacy rate and the strong presence of religiously conservative and militaristic madrassa (schools), American support for government-run schools is a terrific idea for improving Pakistan’s prospects down the road. Standard humanitarian gifts like these, however, fail to address problems like government corruption, which might divert well-intentioned public funds into private pockets. They also fail to address the short-term problems already fermenting, such as Pakistan’s increasingly radical middle class. If this burgeoning radicalism leads to an anti-American government, then long-term American-funded investments will not yield the desired returns of stable and moderate politics. The U.S. must act decisively and soon, then, with an eye on achieving short-term goals.

At the same time, any policy should aim to genuinely benefit the Pakistani people and, more importantly, provide them the means to help themselves. In addition to the immediate benefits to Pakistanis, this course of action would improve America’s standing with the Pakistani government and populace. Such improvement would make Pakistan more likely to support American initiatives such as counterterrorism, aiding its efforts in the region.
This was the position that former Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke advocated. He argued that Pakistani organizations should spend their aid money quickly, instead of allowing it to circulate among American contractors or within the American government. In 2009, Congress allocated $1.51 billion a year, for a period of five years solely for civilian aid to Pakistan. Out of the $1.51 billion allocated in the 2010 fiscal year, a GAO report showed that only $179.5 million (less than 12 percent) was actually spent. Such a discrepancy between America’s promises and actions is unacceptable. Before Congress debates whether or not to allocate additional funding, the U.S. should use the remaining 88 percent.

However, it is important that the U.S. provide Pakistan with this financial backing while not dictating policy; the U.S. cannot afford to be perceived as trying to manipulate Pakistan’s internal affairs. A few years ago, heavy-handed American policies triggered anti-American resentment, led extremist clerics to rally anti-government support, and fueled tensions between Washington and Islamabad. The clearest solution to this potential problem is to allow Pakistanis themselves to decide how to enact policies, with Americans offering only general directions or recommendations. This would require the U.S. to provide aid and funding with fewer strings attached.

The best way for America to help Pakistan is to use a carrot-and-stick model with civilian and military support. The American government should give a higher-than-normal amount of aid this year and outline a handful of modest policy goals for the Pakistani government, such as building a certain number of new highways or reducing corruption by a certain percent (to be determined by international standards and an organization affiliated with neither nation’s government). If the Pakistanis succeed in meeting these goals, the U.S. should continue providing a large amount of aid along with a set of more ambitious goals. If Pakistan fails to meet these goals, the U.S. should reduce its support to levels lower than the current ones and wait until the goals are met. During this waiting period, the support should not drop so low that there is danger of a government collapse. Current levels of aid like the GAO-estimated $179.5 million could provide an approximation of this lower limit; Pakistan’s current situation is precarious, yet it is unlikely that the government will fall in the next few months.

These goals should begin by aiming for as little controversy as possible. In this way, such goals would support government effectiveness rather than the fight against the Taliban: the latter would likely draw accusations of American heavy-handedness and imperialism. Only after a few rounds of goals should the Taliban even enter the list of top priorities. The benefit of this model is that it allows the Pakistanis, the people who best know their country, to decide how to achieve the goals and build an independent and effective government.
A key early step would be to work with Pakistanis to build a well-funded anti-corruption agency modeled on similar agencies in other countries. Developing this organization does not have to be combative, with Americans pressuring a resistant Pakistani government. For example, the U.S. could stress that favorable reviews from the agency could open the door to more aid to Pakistan in the future. Some corruption is inevitable in the interim, especially if the amount of American money reaching Pakistan increases, but the U.S. should have realistic rather than idealistic goals for lost funds; well-intentioned efforts to monitor aid spending is what is preventing America from fulfilling its promised contributions, and an under-funded Pakistani government cannot build the administrative infrastructure necessary to root out corruption. A more flexible carrot-and-stick approach, mixed with realistic goals, should break the existing vicious cycle.

By encouraging the Pakistani government as a whole to improve, the goals can also become a trial by fire for Pakistan’s policymakers and help identify whom the U.S. and the Pakistani people can trust as effective leaders. The Pakistani government’s incentivized yet organic improvement would turn the tide against radicalism by providing a viable alternative. At the same time, the stick part of the model would encourage Pakistan not to actively work against American interests (as it now does by supporting certain terrorist groups).

Perhaps the most daunting feature of Pakistan’s problems is their interconnectedness. The U.S. must help solve multiple problems at once in order to solve any, yet this also means that improving one aspect of the nation requires improvements in several others. Consequently, the Pakistani government has struggled and radical fundamentalism has grown more popular. Left unchecked, this fundamentalism will endanger American interests in Pakistan and threaten regional stability. It is therefore critical that America and Pakistan work together to prevent Pakistanis from plunging into instability. If the U.S. defers its duty to other countries or to international organizations, it will renege on its commitment to the Pakistani government and run the risk that less or even no additional support reaches Pakistan. Because of America’s alliance with Pakistan, access to resources, power on the international stage, and ability to act more efficiently than some large international group, it therefore falls to the U.S. to help Pakistan keep its democracy and its hopes of modernization alive.

In order to build a stronger Pakistan, the resource in shortest supply is time. Pakistan’s historic instability, governmental weaknesses, and increasing radicalization threaten to depose the current leaders. If that happens, the replacement would likely tolerate, if not support, the Taliban and its repressive ideology in a country with nuclear weapons and more than five times Afghanistan’s population. Therefore, America cannot afford to ignore Pakistan amidst the flaring regional unrest or wait until other nations stabilize. It should move Pakistan off the back burner as soon as possible, or the decade-old alliance could explode in America’s face.

To be clear, this article will not engage in the domestic policy debate from which California has recently emerged.  It will not weigh in on the morality of legalizing marijuana, its impacts on Americans’ health, or on its potential tax revenues. Smokers and libertarians can square off against moralists and health advocates in some other forum.  This article will instead explore the impacts that the federal legalization of marijuana would have on U.S.-Mexican relations, and will argue that legalization would yield gross benefits for both nations.

Any analysis of the drug trade must start with a candid admission: U.S. attempts to defeat domestic consumption have been – and forever will be – a dismal failure.  Despite four decades of tough law enforcement and draconian criminal penalties, lifetime consumption rates of illegal drugs among adults continue to hover around 45 percent, and are even rising for some drugs, according to the Office of National Drug Control Policy.  Youth education policies have also failed: the percentage of high school seniors who say they use cannabis is now close to 50 percent, according to the same study.  Some states, like Massachusetts, are ignoring the federal ban entirely by decriminalizing possession, while others are using medical marijuana as a way to skirt the federal ban (a few states such as California and Maine do both).  The prohibition of alcohol in the 1920s failed, and the prohibition of cannabis has and will fail for the same reason: domestic demand is simply too great and too resilient.  Accordingly, it is unfair and hypocritical for the U.S. to let Mexico bear the brunt of enforcing its ban on marijuana, simply because the U.S. is unable to enforce it.

In recognition of the failure to curb domestic consumption, the second President Bush declared a renewed “War on Drugs” in an effort to target the importation of drugs into the U.S.  In other words, Bush sought to shift the focus from decreasing demand to cutting off supply.  Although enforcement agencies have had measured successes in the seizure of imports, domestic consumption remains strong.  Moreover, viewed from south of the border, the drug busts have only increased the ingenuity and deadliness of the Mexican cartels.  The border is too vast and American demand too immense  for policy watchers to have any great faith that the federal government will be able to the stem the torrent of contraband gushing northward by out-witting or out-gunning the drug gangs.

The American policy of exporting drug policy enforcement to Mexico has had disastrous consequences.  Although the Mexican government is still in charge of its capital, Mexico City, it is clearly not in charge of all of the border regions.  Corruption runs rampant at all levels of government; according to The Economist, half of all police officers in the northern states regularly receive bribes.  The narco-gangs therefore operate with legal impunity, as evidenced by the ubiquitous SUVs filled with armed mobsters that roam the streets of Juarez and Tijuana.  Civil society has started to break down as the narcotics gangs become the de facto governments in some areas; in September, a front page editorial appeared in a popular Mexican newspaper, El Diario de Juarez, asking for direct guidelines from the cartels on what it could publish without the abduction and murder of its journalists.  The homicide rates have become staggering; 28,000 people have lost their lives since Felipe Calderón assumed the presidency in 2006, a murder rate more than three times higher than that in the U.S.  The northern border regions of Mexico have come to resemble Somalia or pre-invasion Afghanistan more than their southern counterparts.  The Mexican government reacts angrily to statements of this kind, especially the use of the phrase “failed state.” The anger is probably justified.  For the moment, Mexico does not warrant the designation “failed state,” for although the northern border regions may resemble lawless Somalia, the rest of the country clearly does not.  A more appropriate comparison would be to Pakistan, where the central government is in control of Islamabad, but clearly has no clout in regions such as Waziristan and the Northwest Frontier Provence.  The risk is that Mexico will end up in the same position, with a government that controls the capital but not the borders.  To remind the reader, these borders are our borders.

This outcome would be terrible for the United States for four reasons.  First of all, the lack of security could eventually destroy foreign investment in Mexico and hamper if not reverse growth in the economy overall.  Large, modern businesses, including American business, cannot operate and certainly will not invest if commercial law evaporates.  Since Mexico is America’s third-largest trading partner, slow or negative growth in Mexico will directly impact U.S. economic prospects.  Second, the most assured long-term solution to America’s immigration problems involves growing the Mexican economy and thereby reducing the economic pressure for migrants to head northward.  A declining Mexican economy will face the U.S. with unprecedented levels of illegal immigrants seeking to escape both economic hardships and violence, which would put even further strain on the American labor market.  Third, the violence engulfing northern Mexico will undoubtedly spread into the U.S. (the main narcotics gangs are known to be operating in 195 American cities), creating new nightmares for the federal enforcement agencies.  Finally, the existence of Mexican democracy itself would come in to question, which would create significant problems for U.S.-Mexican relations.  American foreign policy interests tend to coincide with those of other democracies, and if democracy in Mexico falters (whether due to the gangs or far-right militarists), the United States may face awkward diplomatic rows with Mexico, much as it does now with states like Venezuela.

Given the grave consequences of Mexico becoming akin to Pakistan, the U.S. must use every means at its disposal to avoid this situation.  The current American policies of limiting domestic demand and the importation of narcotics, however, are clearly ineffective.  This article posits, therefore, that the best solution is to legalize marijuana nation-wide.  As the least harmful and most widely used of illegal narcotics, cannabis is the best candidate for legalization. If legalization were to occur, domestic production would become legitimate, which would force Mexican gangs out of the American marijuana market for two reasons: first, due to economies of scale and reduced transportation costs, domestically produced marijuana would be far cheaper than its Mexican counterpart, according to a recent report by the NGO RAND.  Secondly, American producers would be able to focus their efforts on producing higher-grade marijuana (of the type that is currently used for medical purposes), which is both more potent and longer lasting.  Faced with competition from American firms supplying cheaper and higher-grade cannabis, Mexican cartels would effectively be priced out of the U.S. market.

Given the secrecy with which the cartels operate, the proportion of their revenues that come from the exportation of marijuana is not precisely known; credible estimates range from 25% to 40%.  However, even a reduction in profits of 25% is likely to have a sizeable effect on both sides of the border.  In Mexico, a decline in revenue would correspond to a decline in the power of the gangs, in at least three areas: first, since the gangs do not seem to exhibit product specialization (the only distinguishing factor is geography), U.S. legalization would force all gangs to downsize their operations and lay off workers.  The gangs would also be obliged to offer less enticing economic incentives to young Mexicans considering joining their operations, which would reduce their influence in Mexican society.  Second, reduced profits from the loss of U.S. market share would hinder the ability of the cartels to bribe police officials, politicians,  and journalists, which would allow for better law enforcement and increase public awareness of the gangs’ atrocities.  Third, decreased revenues would simply mean decreased working capital, both for the maintenance and expansion of the gangs’ activities, and for the purchase of weapons.  Each of the above factors would likely contribute to lower levels of violence in the long term, reports RAND, as a decline in the cartels’ power would allow the government to regain control of the situation, although it has been suggested that violence might increase in the short term while the drug markets stabilize.

North of the border, the legalization of marijuana would have many positive spillover effects from Mexico, in addition to the direct elimination of the crime problem.  As a byproduct of the declining ability of the cartels to export to the United States, the existing domestic supply routes that have been established (which smuggle marijuana within the U.S. once it has crossed the border) would wither and die.  This would eliminate a further source of revenue for the cartels and decrease the possibility of “spillover violence” in the U.S.  Additionally, better security in the long term will ensure a more robust Mexican economy with higher GDP growth, which will entice more Mexican workers to seek jobs in their own country rather than in the U.S., thus alleviating strain on the American labor market and border patrol.  It is therefore clear that the federal legalization of marijuana would yield sizeable benefits in both the United States and Mexico.

Unfortunately, the recent debate in California over Proposition 19 focused only on the domestic aspects of the legalization of marijuana, and as this article shows, one of the most important impacts it would have is on U.S.-Mexican relations.  It is plainly in America’s best interests to help Mexico combat the narcotics gangs, as well as our responsibility to the extent that U.S. demand is the reason for their existence.  As it stands, the rule of law in Mexico is not strong enough to withstand the economic hurricane of U.S. drug demand, and if we do not radically alter our strategies, the rule of law in our southern neighbor may be blown away.

While the Copenhagen conference produced clear answers as to how much member nations are expected to donate in climate aid, it did not make explicit precisely which nations would be benefitting from the aid. As the wealthier nations begin to determine where aid will be distributed, it is clear that it is in the United States’ interest to direct climate change mitigation aid towards India.

In the past, environmental aid has been directed toward major emerging nations – namely, China, India and Brazil – in large part because these nations have enough political and economic clout to demand the attention of donors in the developed world.  These nations also possess the infrastructure necessary to navigate the complex application process required to access aid. The global aid group Oxfam found that over the past ten years, one-third of the international money aimed at climate programs went to these three nations, while the world’s poorest 49 countries received just one-eighth. Moreover, even among these three emerging economies aid is not distributed equally:  the majority of the money from the United Nations’ Clean Development Mechanism, for example, goes to projects in China.

To effectively reduce future greenhouse gas emissions, mitigation aid from developed countries like the United States must continue to flow to major developing nations like China, India, and Brazil, rather than to the world’s poorest countries. The emerging economic giants have seen the greatest rise in emissions over the past 20 years. Since they are large, industrializing nations, their future emissions will have a greater effect on global warming than the undersized emissions from poorer countries.

But why does the United States favor China over India and Brazil in terms of environmental aid?  The United States should direct more of its aid towards environmental projects in India. If invested in India, this aid will not only produce global environmental benefits but also further the United States’ strategic interests. Although investing in renewable energy in China will have roughly the same global, climactic effect as investing in Indian energy projects, investment in India is strategically better for the U.S. Over the past ten years, China has become an economic powerhouse, a fact that has greatly increased its political clout. China’s economic superiority and continued growth gives it more leisure to pursue its foreign policy initiatives.  This has led to an asymmetry.

It is in the interest of the United States that India, a democratic ally, keep pace with China, a Communist dictatorship pursuing an aggressive foreign policy. As a populous Asian nation with a well-educated upper middle class, India serves as a counterweight to China’s increasing dominance in the region. Unlike China, India has vibrant and open political debate and is rarely criticized for its human rights record. Investment in India will strengthen the allegiance between the U.S. and this important regional ally.

India is also strategically located. Sharing a border with Pakistan, India is a gateway to the Middle East, and has cooperated with the U.S. in the past on counterterrorism efforts.  During his November visit to India, President Obama went as far as to endorse India’s bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, hoping to elevate the nation of over a billion people to “its rightful place in the world.” But Obama also reaffirmed the importance of Indian cooperation in counterterrorism efforts, and the two nations agreed to launch new joint projects in Africa and Afghanistan.

While U.S.-Indian relations are already friendly, further U.S. investment in the nation will serve to bolster existing ties. Strategic investment in Indian green technology will not only mitigate global CO2 emissions, but such investment will also enrich Indian development efforts.  India is desperately poor: an astonishing 400 million Indians do not have regular access to electricity. According to the CIA World Factbook, 25 percent of Indians live below their poverty line while the same is true of only 3 percent of Chinese. China no longer needs aid, while India still does.  The donation of such aid would not only stimulate the Indian economy and counter Chinese economic dominance, but also set India on a path toward lower carbon emissions.

Despite high initial investment costs, renewable energy can be profitable. Carbon-emitting technologies are not sustainable, since fossil fuel resources will eventually run out. Renewable sources of energy are starting to play an increasingly important role in global energy markets. Future demand for renewable power must grow as our collective non-renewable sources become further depleted. Even oil-rich nations like the United Arab Emirates have come to this realization and have started to invest in green technology: the nation’s capital, Abu Dhabi, is revamping its infrastructure to become a “zero carbon” city.  In 2009, researchers at Trent University published a paper in the International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies showing that higher economic development is associated with more environmental aid.  If we want to stimulate the Indian economy, investments in green projects in India are the way to go.

At present, China dominates the production of components necessary for the construction of renewable energy facilities. According to Bloomberg New Energy Finance, Chinese manufacturers, who have the ability to price their products as much as 20 percent cheaper than their European counterparts, have taken over more than 43 percent of the global solar panel market in the last six years.  Stimulating India’s economy through green investments would temper China’s ascendancy in this area and decrease the United States’ reliance on one nation — China — for its renewable energy needs.

If the United States manages to direct climate aid towards India, it will strengthen ties with a rising world power that will help bolster the economic interests of all involved.

Y is known to be developing nuclear technology, a prospect that clearly threatens X.  Fearing that Y will develop weaponry capabilities, X develops a piece of malware – surreptitious software designed to interfere with another computer’s normal functions – to infect computers in Y’s nuclear plants and delay its production of nuclear technology.  Computers in Y and other nations around the world are temporarily crippled by the sophisticated contagion of X’s malware.

Years ago, such a crisis would have seemed to be an excerpt from a preposterous piece of science fiction kitsch, grounded in fanciful perceptions of computer capabilities.  Last month, however, the inevitable occurred – a piece of malware, Stuxnet, demonstrated that such futuristic fantasies have already become reality.

It is not hard to guess that X is Israel and that its suspected aggressor, Y, is Iran, set within a turbulent Middle East.  Although roughly 62,000 computers in Iran were recently attacked by “the most complex piece of malware in the history of computing,” it cannot be confirmed that the engineer of the malware was Israel. According to Graham Cluley, a computer security expert at the British firm Sophos, it is “very hard to prove 100 percent who created a piece of malware, unless you are able to gather evidence from the computer they created it on.”

Still, Ralph Langner, a computer scientist at Langner Communications, points out that “because the development requires much more resources than any … hacker group could afford,” Stuxnet must have been constructed by a wealthy and resourceful government with “insider information” concerning the computers targeted.  The list of governments with the motive and the capability is not very long.

Identity of the perpetrator aside, this incident raises an important possibility – that such malware should in fact be used to sabotage malevolent nations’ facilities when international sanctions and other methods of warning fail to suffice.  A more professionally designed malware program, under careful management, could serve as an excellent last resort to prevent violent actions from aggressor states, as well as threatened states who might take preemptive military actions.

How advanced could this malicious software be, and how do its capabilities inform the perpetrators’ motivation behind its production?  Sean McGurk, the head of the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, demonstrates that the Stuxnet virus can be contained in a single “blue rubber-clad swivel-style USB thumb drive.” This virus could, he explains, infiltrate any software that uses Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, or SCADA.

Most automated plants, including oil refineries, food production facilities, and nuclear reactors, use such software and are thus susceptible to the virus.  Once planted in these computers, Stuxnet can modify the programs’ functions while remaining hidden, rendering any changes invisible.

Given that over 60 percent of the computers infected by Stuxnet were located in Iran, it is plausible that the virus’ engineers had targeted the nuclear facilities at Bushehr and Natanz, which, according to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, its president, are being used strictly for civilian energy purposes.  Siemens AG, the German control systems conglomerate that built the Bushehr facility for the Shah of Iran in the 1970s, has confirmed the Iranian government’s claim that no significant harm was inflicted upon the facilities.  Although no permanent damage was done, Alan Bentley of Lumension said that the Bushehr plant “was not working properly for months.” Stuxnet’s perpetrator had therefore been successful in disabling the epicenter of Iranian nuclear innovation.

According to computer security experts, the Stuxnet virus is under control and no longer poses a threat.  The question that remains in its wake, however, is whether such cyberwarfare ought to become an accepted tool in the arsenal of warring states.

Indeed, other potential aggressors, from national governments to multinational corporations, could potentially use Stuxnet as a platform to build and launch their own malware.  Such tactics could ultimately become commonplace methods of espionage and sabotage from state and non-state actors alike.

Given its insidious ease and speed in “infecting” computers on a global scale, cyber sabotage is often decried as dangerous and cowardly.  But the Stuxnet incident also opens a provocative angle: if the malware is used to reduce the aggressive capabilities of a government that is internationally recognized as structurally backwards, defiant, and malevolent in its policy, then non-militaristic means of sabotage such as Stuxnet should perhaps be applauded for their ability to temporarily cripple their military potential.

With the advent of government-funded malware, aggressive or defiant nations could be neutralized without violence when diplomacy has failed.  North Korea, a nation that has flagrantly defied international sanctions and diplomatic agreements, could be paralyzed with advanced malware.  This would bypass the violence and almost certain loss of life associated with military force.

Naturally, such an approach remains contentious, and this must be addressed at both the national and international levels.  Leaders must weigh carefully the implications of such a frighteningly effective method of preventive action.  Governments should work together on joint regulations, which could be modeled after nuclear disarmament treaties.

Domestically, America should improve its cyber security to ensure that it is not susceptible to sabotage from abroad or within.  Bugs must be ironed out of any malware to prevent civilian computers from being accidentally attacked.

Despite these difficulties, we should consider the potential peaceful efficiency afforded by cyber sabotage.  Imagine a world in which defiant and malicious military actions can be stopped before they have begun.  Warfare fought by lifeless computers with viruses may ultimately prove to be better for us all than war fought by young men and women with guns.

Recent developments, however, indicate that the country’s foreign policy has begun to shift away from the West as Turkey strengthens its relationships with rogue regimes, such as Syria and Iran. While there are many reasons for this realignment, one of the most pressing has been the lethargic pace of talks regarding Turkish accession into the European Union (EU). To counter these trends, European leaders need American backing in re-engaging Turkey and offering incentives to remain allied with the West, for a Turkish realignment would detrimentally affect the dynamics of the region.

The unsustainable status quo between Turkey and the EU could drive Turkey away from the American-European alliance. Although initially promising, the Turkish bid for full EU membership has become mired in controversy. The Union’s two most powerful members, France and Germany, have expressed reservations over full Turkish membership, fearing a flood of impoverished workers into Europe from Turkey. The Turkish occupation of Cyprus, in addition, places Turkey in conflict with several other EU members, including Greece. In fact, the conflict over Cyprus has already stalled negotiations on several of the 35 chapters that Turkey and EU states must agree upon before accession.

Public support for the EU in Turkey is also highly volatile and closely tracks domestic developments. Commitment to joining the EU has waned under the currently ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), and other foreign policy interests, those in the Middle East, have taken priority. Before negotiations completely collapse, both Turkey and the West must agree to change course.

The EU agreement, however, may be difficult. The Turkish have compromised on policies to appease the European Union, but some of these “reforms” have allowed AKP to consolidate its power over the government. For instance, while recently-passed constitutional amendments bar gender discrimination, AKP also pressed through a judicial reorganization that expands the size of the nation’s highest constitutional court — allowing the government to pack the courts with pro-AKP judges. As the courts have represented AKP’s main opposition (the constitutional court considered banning the party several years ago), AKP has cemented its power in the country. Unchecked, the government is free to depart from Turkey’s traditional foreign policy goals, drawing the nation ever closer to Syria and Iran.

If ties do not strengthen, Turkey’s increasing engagement with rogue regimes will damage American, European, and Israeli interests. A harbinger of the potential consequences of this shift can be seen in the recent Gaza flotilla incident. Historically, Turkey has maintained peaceful and relatively cooperative relations with Israel. The nations, in fact, have provided each other mutual assistance in the past: Israel has supplied arms to the Turkish military, the two countries have engaged in joint military exercises, and Turkey helped mediate Israeli-Syrian peace talks in 2008.

In the aftermath of the flotilla incident, however, relations have sunk to an historic low. Investigations have found that one of the boats was purchased with the assistance of the AKP-controlled Istanbul municipality, and AKP Turkish Prime Minister, RecepTayyipErdoğan, has been increasingly critical of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. Turkey also canceled Israel’s participation in new multinational military exercises due to concerns that Israel might be training for a strike against Iran.

On the other hand, Turkish-Iranian relations seem stronger than ever. By means of its nonpermanent seat on the UN Security Council, Turkey has attempted to undercut U.S. efforts to impose sanctions on Iran, weakening the international response to the Iranian nuclear program. The recently scuttled Turkish-Brazilian deal that would have allowed Iran to obtain enriched uranium in return for some of its less refined nuclear material would have legitimized Iran’s drive for nuclear weapons as well as further damaged American and European efforts to halt Iranian nuclear armament. Such a drastic shift in Turkish foreign policy underpins the nation’s increasing sense of estrangement with Europe and the West, with potentially devastating consequences.

A Turkish realignment would also affect American interests in the Middle East. NATO’s Incirlik Air Base in Southeast Turkey is a strategic regional location. U.S. forces have used this asset to supply American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, the base also served as a staging ground for the evacuations of Americans during the Israel-Hezbollah War of 2006.  In recent years, however, Turkey has increased restrictions on use of the base, for example denying American forces transit through the base during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Turkey’s continued alignment with Syria or Iran is expected to make such restrictions more common, depriving the U.S. of a necessary tool to supply forces in the Middle East and project U.S. power in the region.

A further cause for concern for the United States and Europe is Turkey’s strengthening relationship with China. Recently, the two nations performed joint air force maneuvers, worrying NATO members that China might gain access to their military strategies. In October, both nations announced a new bilateral partnership that would triple trade by 2015 and double it again by 2020. As China has been reluctant to support American policies in North Korea and the Middle East, Turkey might soon become a less helpful ally to the United States in the region if it increasingly cooperates with Beijing.

But how can the United States and Europe forestall a Turkish shift? One of the first, and by far the easiest, steps that the EU could take is to suspend accession talks. These negotiations have simply raised tensions among EU members and provided AKP political pretext to attack the secular Turkish military and judiciary under the guise of constitutional reforms. However, in economics and finance, both groups share common interests. The EU has effectively integrated the European continent—and Turkey’s four largest trading partners are in the EU.

Creating a broader customs or tariff union (only a limited agreement between the two groups has existed since 1996) with Turkey would be an effective foreign policy tool and open new markets in the region. Indeed, as Europe seeks to reduce its dependence on Russian natural gas resources, Turkey provides an effective route for a pipeline to the Caucasus nations. Such economic developments, importantly, will stabilize the country’s foreign policy,  providing the Turkish government an incentive to join in isolating rogue regimes, such as Iran and Syria, which threaten the economic interests of the U.S., Europe, and Israel.

Turkey has always been caught between the East and the West. Its role as a bridge between the two regions has and will continue to grant the nation importance in international relations. It is essential, then, that Turkey remains a firm Western ally. For the nation’s interests to remain aligned with those of the U.S., Europe, and Israel, efforts must be made to further integrate Turkey into the European and Western community. Economic engagement and coordination represent an essential first step to promoting Turkish welfare and protecting Western interests in the Middle East.

The United States should study its previous attempts to end the Iranian nuclear crisis before moving forward. Under the Bush administration, the U.S. applied unilateral financial and economic sanctions against Iran, but with limited success. In the past, countries such as Russia and China provided many of the financial services that the U.S. sanctions denied Iran, and a number of international oil companies continue to do business with Iran in spite of the sanctions. Moreover, China, who seems driven foremost by its concern for feeding its massive appetite for oil, continues to invest in Iran’s energy and refining infrastructure.

Similarly, UN sanctions on weaponry and weapons technology were largely ineffective because Russia and China refused to meaningfully cooperate. In 2008, Russia negotiated a contract to sell Iran advanced anti-aircraft missile battery system—though Russia has yet to deliver the system—insisting that it was for defensive purposes and did not violate the sanctions. While in theory it is indeed a defensive system, the delivery of such weaponry can only harden Iran’s position in the negotiations because it enhances Iran’s ability to defend its nuclear facilities. In sum, for Russia and China, security and proliferation concerns take a back seat to economic gain.

Negotiations have been largely ineffective as well. While many in the West have praised the “agreement in principle” reached at recent talks in Vienna as a step forward, Western countries should be cautious of this perceived success. Under the Vienna Agreement, Iran would ship its stock of enriched uranium to Russia. The Russians and the French would then enrich the uranium into a form that could not be easily re-processed into weapons-grade material but could be used for non-military purposes. This plan, however, is subject to the approval of Ayatollah Khameini, the Iranian Supreme Leader, who is rumored to be against the agreement. In addition, many close to him, including the speaker of the Iranian Parliament, have criticized the framework as an attempt to deceive Iran.

Nonetheless, even if the Vienna Agreement were approved, the accord would still not prevent Iran from enriching uranium. If Iran chose, it could restock its supplies of enriched uranium again within a year. The agreement also does not prevent Iran from continuing research and development of its delivery capabilities. In addition, the agreement does nothing to address the fundamental question, which is how to alter incentives such that it is not in the current regime’s best interest to develop nuclear weapons. If adopted, the proposal would simply provide a temporary stopgap. The Vienna Agreement would give Iran the chance to stall and continue developing nuclear weapons, taking the West back to square one.

Even if a deal could be reached, a simple agreement with Iran will not be enough. The Iranian regime has a history of neither adhering to its international obligations nor cooperating with international authority. Iran, as a signatory nation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, is obligated to report to the IAEA any intention to build any nuclear facility. The regime did not report its uranium enrichment facility in Natanz until 2002, after it was fully operational. Iran likewise did not report the facility in Qom to the IAEA until Tehran realized that Western governments had discovered the facility’s existence. Furthermore, the regime has refused to allow its nuclear scientists to be questioned by the IAEA. If the U.S. and its allies are serious about preventing Iranian proliferation, they must insist on an enforceable agreement with a robust inspections regime.

The unsuccessful attempts at preventing Iran from continued development of nuclear weapons indicate that any response to Iran requires unified, international support. This summer’s election riots have presented the West with new options. The regime’s leaders appear not to want to confront external pressure and internal threats simultaneously. While Tehran has used negotiations to buy time, this new, unstable situation might make the regime amenable to meaningful settlement, especially if it faces multilateral pressure. There are a number of options available to entice and pressure the Iranians to submit to the will of the international community.

In the political sphere, the U.S., through Radio Farda—a Persian-language radio station based in Washington, D.C. and Prague—could amplify the voices of dissent with programming that provides a platform for Iranian exiles and expatriates. Internally, dissidents could be supplied with communication equipment not susceptible to jamming and other interference (such as satellite phones and sophisticated encryption equipment). The importance of communication within Iran is validated by the behavior of the theocratic regime—which moves swiftly to disrupt cellular and Internet communications at any sign of unrest.
In the economic sphere, multilateral leverage has significant potential. It is no secret that Iran’s economic situation is dire: It faces high unemployment (12 percent, according to the Iranian government), rampant inflation (28 percent, according to the Iranian government), corruption, and a lack of basic services. Iran’s economy depends heavily on petroleum exports, but without Western technological expertise, Iran’s oil production has steadily declined. According to a 2007 National Academy of Science study, Iran’s consumption of refined petroleum will outstrip its production of crude oil by 2015, effectively halting petroleum exports altogether. Furthermore, Iran lacks the capacity to refine petroleum and, as a result, imports 40 percent of its petroleum. The U.S. House of Representatives has already passed the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act, which would limit Iran’s ability to import gasoline. The Senate will likely approve the legislation in coming weeks. The U.S., through similar restrictions, should strengthen economic sanctions by convincing others to jump on board. European nations such as France, Germany, and Britain have expressed interest in such sanctions. In addition, Iran’s recent agreement to supply Turkmenistan with natural gas, which will ultimately supply all of Europe, competes with the Russian monopoly on gas, giving the Russians an incentive to support sanctions. This agreement would also give the Europeans more economic leverage over Tehran. Finally, a multilateral regimen of sanctions would force companies and financial institutions that do business in Iran to choose between continuing their transactions with Iran and doing business in the U.S. and in whichever European nations sign on to sanctions and few companies can afford to choose the former. While some have argued that enhanced sanctions might rally the Iranian people around the regime, only the opposite has happened thus far, as Iranians have blamed their regime for the country’s economic woes.

While proceeding with this new approach to Iran, however, the United States must try to ensure China and Russia’s support. While Chinese-Iranian economic interests are substantial, Chinese-U.S. economic ties are even more vital. China could be amenable to enforcing sanctions against Iran, as Beijing does not wish to deal with the economic consequences of a potential war between the U.S. and Iran that could result if the Iranian nuclear program is not stopped. In addition, the Russians, who are anxious about NATO, may be willing to enforce sanctions against Iran if the U.S. provides concessions on Russian security interests. A recent controversial overture by the U.S. to scale back missile shield deployment in Poland could be responsible for Russian officials more vocally supporting sanctions against Iran. Securing Chinese and Russian support for sanctions should be a top priority for the U.S.

Of course, the U.S. has never taken the military option off the table, and Israel has strongly hinted that it would consider using military force against Iran as well. Air strikes on Iran’s nuclear targets present a difficult tactical challenge, however. Iran’s nuclear facilities are distributed across the country, with some installations hidden underground, heavily fortified. Moreover, Iran has military assets throughout the Middle East with which it could retaliate against such a strike. In Iraq, Iran would almost certainly intensify support for the insurgency, endangering American troops and the already unstable democracy. In Gaza, Hamas could, at Iran’s instigation, unleash missile strikes into densely populated areas of Israel. Indeed, Iran itself has ballistic capability and could retaliate with its own missile strikes. Additionally, Iran could, in retaliation, finally make good on its threat to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40 percent of the world’s sea-transported oil and 90 percent of the Gulf’s oil output flows. Even if the U.S. were able to open the straits quickly, insurers would refuse to cover oil tankers passing through a conflict zone, effectively closing it to international commerce. Thus, superior firepower simply may not provide an effective solution to this problem, and could provoke a harsh response from the international community against the U.S. or Israel. As such, it is imperative that multilateral economic and political sanctions be applied instead of a military option.

To persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear program, the United States must employ multilateral cooperation and sanctions to convince Iran’s leaders that it is highly disadvantageous to continue nuclear development. A combination of economic, political, and social pressures could finally push Iran to accept an agreement. Iran has always used negotiations to stall because the price for delaying a negotiated settlement was significant but not crippling. The U.S. should make the price for stalling unacceptably high for Iran, in economic and political terms.