Iran’s nuclear program has been a major concern for the West since the beginning of the millennium. Iran has repeatedly violated both UN and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sanctions, suggested that Israel be wiped off the map, and supported terrorism based in Iraq, the Gaza Strip, and Lebanon. The United States’ unilateral strategy of negotiations and sanctions has been unsuccessful in achieving a sustainable settlement.Washington should consider other options in order to successfully deal with the crisis. To move negotiations forward, the U.S. should proceed with a regimen of multilateral sanctions to put pressure on Iran to negotiate seriously. Sanctions, along with focused and serious negotiations, are America’s best chance to disarm Iran and prevent military action.

The United States should study its previous attempts to end the Iranian nuclear crisis before moving forward. Under the Bush administration, the U.S. applied unilateral financial and economic sanctions against Iran, but with limited success. In the past, countries such as Russia and China provided many of the financial services that the U.S. sanctions denied Iran, and a number of international oil companies continue to do business with Iran in spite of the sanctions. Moreover, China, who seems driven foremost by its concern for feeding its massive appetite for oil, continues to invest in Iran’s energy and refining infrastructure.

Similarly, UN sanctions on weaponry and weapons technology were largely ineffective because Russia and China refused to meaningfully cooperate. In 2008, Russia negotiated a contract to sell Iran advanced anti-aircraft missile battery system—though Russia has yet to deliver the system—insisting that it was for defensive purposes and did not violate the sanctions. While in theory it is indeed a defensive system, the delivery of such weaponry can only harden Iran’s position in the negotiations because it enhances Iran’s ability to defend its nuclear facilities. In sum, for Russia and China, security and proliferation concerns take a back seat to economic gain.

Negotiations have been largely ineffective as well. While many in the West have praised the “agreement in principle” reached at recent talks in Vienna as a step forward, Western countries should be cautious of this perceived success. Under the Vienna Agreement, Iran would ship its stock of enriched uranium to Russia. The Russians and the French would then enrich the uranium into a form that could not be easily re-processed into weapons-grade material but could be used for non-military purposes. This plan, however, is subject to the approval of Ayatollah Khameini, the Iranian Supreme Leader, who is rumored to be against the agreement. In addition, many close to him, including the speaker of the Iranian Parliament, have criticized the framework as an attempt to deceive Iran.

Nonetheless, even if the Vienna Agreement were approved, the accord would still not prevent Iran from enriching uranium. If Iran chose, it could restock its supplies of enriched uranium again within a year. The agreement also does not prevent Iran from continuing research and development of its delivery capabilities. In addition, the agreement does nothing to address the fundamental question, which is how to alter incentives such that it is not in the current regime’s best interest to develop nuclear weapons. If adopted, the proposal would simply provide a temporary stopgap. The Vienna Agreement would give Iran the chance to stall and continue developing nuclear weapons, taking the West back to square one.

Even if a deal could be reached, a simple agreement with Iran will not be enough. The Iranian regime has a history of neither adhering to its international obligations nor cooperating with international authority. Iran, as a signatory nation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, is obligated to report to the IAEA any intention to build any nuclear facility. The regime did not report its uranium enrichment facility in Natanz until 2002, after it was fully operational. Iran likewise did not report the facility in Qom to the IAEA until Tehran realized that Western governments had discovered the facility’s existence. Furthermore, the regime has refused to allow its nuclear scientists to be questioned by the IAEA. If the U.S. and its allies are serious about preventing Iranian proliferation, they must insist on an enforceable agreement with a robust inspections regime.

The unsuccessful attempts at preventing Iran from continued development of nuclear weapons indicate that any response to Iran requires unified, international support. This summer’s election riots have presented the West with new options. The regime’s leaders appear not to want to confront external pressure and internal threats simultaneously. While Tehran has used negotiations to buy time, this new, unstable situation might make the regime amenable to meaningful settlement, especially if it faces multilateral pressure. There are a number of options available to entice and pressure the Iranians to submit to the will of the international community.

In the political sphere, the U.S., through Radio Farda—a Persian-language radio station based in Washington, D.C. and Prague—could amplify the voices of dissent with programming that provides a platform for Iranian exiles and expatriates. Internally, dissidents could be supplied with communication equipment not susceptible to jamming and other interference (such as satellite phones and sophisticated encryption equipment). The importance of communication within Iran is validated by the behavior of the theocratic regime—which moves swiftly to disrupt cellular and Internet communications at any sign of unrest.
In the economic sphere, multilateral leverage has significant potential. It is no secret that Iran’s economic situation is dire: It faces high unemployment (12 percent, according to the Iranian government), rampant inflation (28 percent, according to the Iranian government), corruption, and a lack of basic services. Iran’s economy depends heavily on petroleum exports, but without Western technological expertise, Iran’s oil production has steadily declined. According to a 2007 National Academy of Science study, Iran’s consumption of refined petroleum will outstrip its production of crude oil by 2015, effectively halting petroleum exports altogether. Furthermore, Iran lacks the capacity to refine petroleum and, as a result, imports 40 percent of its petroleum. The U.S. House of Representatives has already passed the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act, which would limit Iran’s ability to import gasoline. The Senate will likely approve the legislation in coming weeks. The U.S., through similar restrictions, should strengthen economic sanctions by convincing others to jump on board. European nations such as France, Germany, and Britain have expressed interest in such sanctions. In addition, Iran’s recent agreement to supply Turkmenistan with natural gas, which will ultimately supply all of Europe, competes with the Russian monopoly on gas, giving the Russians an incentive to support sanctions. This agreement would also give the Europeans more economic leverage over Tehran. Finally, a multilateral regimen of sanctions would force companies and financial institutions that do business in Iran to choose between continuing their transactions with Iran and doing business in the U.S. and in whichever European nations sign on to sanctions and few companies can afford to choose the former. While some have argued that enhanced sanctions might rally the Iranian people around the regime, only the opposite has happened thus far, as Iranians have blamed their regime for the country’s economic woes.

While proceeding with this new approach to Iran, however, the United States must try to ensure China and Russia’s support. While Chinese-Iranian economic interests are substantial, Chinese-U.S. economic ties are even more vital. China could be amenable to enforcing sanctions against Iran, as Beijing does not wish to deal with the economic consequences of a potential war between the U.S. and Iran that could result if the Iranian nuclear program is not stopped. In addition, the Russians, who are anxious about NATO, may be willing to enforce sanctions against Iran if the U.S. provides concessions on Russian security interests. A recent controversial overture by the U.S. to scale back missile shield deployment in Poland could be responsible for Russian officials more vocally supporting sanctions against Iran. Securing Chinese and Russian support for sanctions should be a top priority for the U.S.

Of course, the U.S. has never taken the military option off the table, and Israel has strongly hinted that it would consider using military force against Iran as well. Air strikes on Iran’s nuclear targets present a difficult tactical challenge, however. Iran’s nuclear facilities are distributed across the country, with some installations hidden underground, heavily fortified. Moreover, Iran has military assets throughout the Middle East with which it could retaliate against such a strike. In Iraq, Iran would almost certainly intensify support for the insurgency, endangering American troops and the already unstable democracy. In Gaza, Hamas could, at Iran’s instigation, unleash missile strikes into densely populated areas of Israel. Indeed, Iran itself has ballistic capability and could retaliate with its own missile strikes. Additionally, Iran could, in retaliation, finally make good on its threat to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40 percent of the world’s sea-transported oil and 90 percent of the Gulf’s oil output flows. Even if the U.S. were able to open the straits quickly, insurers would refuse to cover oil tankers passing through a conflict zone, effectively closing it to international commerce. Thus, superior firepower simply may not provide an effective solution to this problem, and could provoke a harsh response from the international community against the U.S. or Israel. As such, it is imperative that multilateral economic and political sanctions be applied instead of a military option.

To persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear program, the United States must employ multilateral cooperation and sanctions to convince Iran’s leaders that it is highly disadvantageous to continue nuclear development. A combination of economic, political, and social pressures could finally push Iran to accept an agreement. Iran has always used negotiations to stall because the price for delaying a negotiated settlement was significant but not crippling. The U.S. should make the price for stalling unacceptably high for Iran, in economic and political terms.

With the price of grain increasing by 154 percent between 2006 and 2008, food prices have become a pressing issue in the developing world. Despite the global recession, prices rose again in 2009, and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization predicts that prices will remain well above the long-term average throughout the decade. The increases in food prices exposed serious deficiencies in the world food market; exporters have abandoned trade and importers are desperately searching for alternatives. Food insecurity in the developing world induces inefficient responses by both exporters and importers, causing enormous human suffering due to price spikes and food shortages in importing countries.

Importing countries in the developing world and the U.S. should enhance the food security of the developing world by creating an open and predictable market. Such efforts should advance on two fronts. First, the developed world should recognize its distortionary role in world food markets and eliminate biofuel and agricultural subsidies. Second, the U.S. should work through international institutions and with exporting countries to mitigate the price increases in ways that do not hamper trade.

The dysfunctional food market has caused extreme food shortages and political conflict. When food prices spike, the poor and those who feed them cannot afford as much food. The UN’s World Food Program and the U.S. Agency for International Development have announced cutbacks in food aid in response to rising prices, while undernourishment has increased globally by roughly 20 percent since 2006. Rising food prices have also caused political instability in the developing world. In 2009 riots against food and fuel prices left nearly 40 dead in Cameroon, and food-related instability led to the Haiti’s prime minister and Madagascar’s president.
The food market faces two obstacles: long-term structural distortions stemming from Western policy, and short-term instability caused by exporting nations. A properly functioning global food market could allow direct investment in the most productive land and let net-importing countries focus on their comparative advantages. While the rise in food prices is partly due to growth in demand from developing nations, the recent drastic price increases owe much to misguided policies.

The West’s agricultural policies play a large part in the troubles of the global food market. The primary culprits are agricultural subsidies and biofuel subsidies. While subsidies are supposed to increase output and decrease global food prices, they divert private investment toward Western agriculture and away from underdeveloped countries, where the potential gains in productivity are greater. This counterproductive diversion of resources distorts investment patterns and reduces spare production capacity when prices are high. Biofuel subsidies encourage farmers to shift production away from food and toward ethanol, decreasing the supply of food and driving up prices. The U.S., by far the world’s largest producer and exporter of corn, may soon use half of its crop for ethanol.

These subsidies are also wasteful for Western countries. Subsidies are a blatantly inefficient case of special interest favoritism; the government will spend over $21 billion next year on “farm income stabilization.” Biofuel subsidies and regulations have become a boondoggle—estimated to cost the U.S. between $5 billion and $9 billion—that fails to reduce CO2 emissions.
The heart of the problem is the enormous political importance of food prices in developing countries. In countries where food makes up a large part of household expenditures, price increases can be devastating for voters and treacherous for governments. While facing political pressure to reduce food prices, several major food producers, including Argentina, Thailand, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam, restricted exports to ensure adequate domestic supplies. These restrictions further increased the price of food traded on the international market, causing additional pain to importing nations.

The trade restrictions have important disadvantages. First, they reduce income to farmers while their products’ prices are high, thus stifling investment and production when greater supply is most needed. Second and more damaging is that importing nations begin to fear that the market will no longer suffice to meet their needs. They rush toward panicked and inefficient responses, particularly those that increase production on their own land. Saudi Arabia, an extreme example, spent billions to achieve self-sufficiency in wheat production by turning desert into farmland; the drain on the country’s aquifers and its pocketbook forced Saudi Arabia to abandon the experiments.

Both of these trends steer investment toward unproductive land in importing countries and away from fertile land in exporting countries. Saudi Arabia, with enormous oil reserves and virtually no water, could export oil and import food rather than try to grow wheat in the desert. Its newest strategy for food security, along with countries such as China, the United Arab Emirates, and South Korea, has been to buy huge tracts of land in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe to assure long-term food security in fertile lands. While this may be an efficient investment in certain cases, the opacity and size of the deals has led to complaints of neocolonialism and corruption. Furthermore, this trend demonstrates the strategic disadvantages of global food insecurity for the United States.

The developed world must take the first steps to bolster the global food market, by eliminating agricultural and biofuel subsidies to enhance the food security of developing countries. More importantly, the United States must prevent nervous exporters from diverting food supplies inward. The first step is to alter the terms of the World Trade Organization compact to explicitly declare export bans (or extremely high export taxes) to be contrary to the principles of free trade and subject to penalty. While many exporting countries would oppose such a move, they might make this concession if the U.S. eliminates its agricultural subsidies—a long-sought goal that would make their own exports more competitive in return. Removing the subsidies could advance trade talks, since these subsidies were largely responsible for the breakdown in 2008 of the World Trade Organization’s Doha Development Round of negotiations to lower trade barriers.

It will be difficult to design international rules sufficiently compelling to overcome the political pressures attendant with rising food prices. Equally important will be policy advice to developing exporter nations to mitigate the effects of price increases as an alternative to market manipulation. As food prices rise, exporting nations gain income overall. The downside for such countries lies in the transfer of income from consumers to farmers. Governments, during times of high-prices, should assess farmers a lump-sum tax and distribute the revenue to the poor. Carefully calibrated redistributive measures could keep countries satisfied. A push for global regulation and policy changes would give less developed countries and their citizens the stability they need for security and economic growth and development.

Though few are optimistic that the community of nations will reach a substantive international agreement at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen this December, a renewed sense of urgency has prompted much discussion about the future of climate change control. An overwhelming majority of scientists agree that human-emitted greenhouse gases have caused the Earth to warm throughout the past half-century and will continue to raise global temperatures to dangerously high levels if emission rates do not slow. These warnings have created a general agreement among the international community that something needs to be done, but few countries have actually committed to substantive measures. The U.S. is no exception; it, too, has been, choosing to wait for others rather than bear the burden of leadership. As a nation with both the resources and responsibility to reduce carbon output, the US should, instead, lead by example, clearing existing domestic hurdles to fighting climate change. Doing so will motivate the rest of the world to follow suit.

Any movement toward reduced emissions cannot ignore the two largest emitters in the world: China and the US. Both industrial powerhouses produce a combined 40% of all greenhouse gases. If neither country is at the heart of climate change efforts from the beginning, global attempts to reduce emissions will be useless. By taking the lead, however, tangible US and Chinese carbon reduction policies will provide the international community with a workable goal. Of the two nations, the US, rather than China, is best positioned to take the lead on climate change. China, then, will do its best to follow the United States. Underdeveloped nations similarly turn towards the US for tangible greenhouse gas emissions reductions, realizing that, without the US, any emission reductions on their part will be a drop in the bucket. Without US leadership, an international climate change movement is impossible.

If the U.S. leads by example, the rest of the world will follow. The EU has already pushed Washington to set clear emissions reduction targets for the next few years and has pressured President Obama to take a more hard-line approach to climate change; they are on board. More importantly, China, surprisingly to some, has also shown its willingness to cooperate. Just a day after Obama announced concrete targets on emissions reductions, President Hu Jintao followed up with China’s own pledge. In the coming years, China will have to walk a fine line between environmental protection and economic growth. China has realized, however, that the two are not mutually exclusive but are, in fact, intertwined; without limiting the effects of climate change now, China stands, as all countries stand, to limit long term growth. As the world’s single largest emitter of carbon, China recognizes that it will shoulder much of the blame for—as well as the negative natural effects of—climate change if it does tangibly limit greenhouse gas emissions. The U.S. can expect an increasingly cooperative partner in Europe and China on the issue of climate change.

In particular, U.S. leadership on climate change has the potential to capitalize on China’s increasing willingness to cooperate on this particular issue by creating a precedent for further opportunities for more extensive bilateral cooperation in the future. The President’s recent tour of Asia produced little progress in Sino-American relations, as both countires failed to agree on issues ranging from human rights to China’s consistent devaluation of its currency. Obama, however, did make small breakthroughs on climate change. The series of practical measures announced during Obama’s meeting with Hu Jintao —including an electric-vehicles initiative and energy efficiency plan—suggest that emissions regulation may be a bridge towards stronger alliances with China. Leadership, however, must come first from the U.S., as Hu Jintao will likely be unwilling to act without assistance and promises from developed countries. There is strong public sentiment in China that the U.S. is urging its economic rival to embrace clean energy only as a means to undermine the Chinese economy. If Washington takes the first step in this regard, however, it can reassure the Chinese by debunking any suspicions that the U.S. is trying to gain an economic advantage over their country. Strong U.S. leadership on climate change will likely result in better relations between the U.S. and China.

Another concern that other nations have expressed is that unlike China, a relatively young and still developing industrial power, the U.S. has historically emitted more total climate-altering gasses than any other nation in the world. Therefore, the U.S. has the heavier obligation to take the lead on climate regulation especially since underdeveloped nations, which emit the least carbon, would receive the brunt of climate change’s devastating effects. If the worst offender of climate change is unwilling to step up as the leader, it would be difficult to justify the participation of anyone else.

Obama, as well as the Danish Prime Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen, agreed in November that no binding follow-up to Kyoto would be reached in Copenhagen. In reality, what is to be the upcoming failure to act in Copenhagen is just another symptom of general inaction by all countries involved, none of which is willing to make the first move. The U.S. Senate has bound Obama’s hands, refusing to pass the cap-and-trade program unless China and other developing nations make a commitment, too. China and India, on the other hand, will only institute broader and more drastic measures if the U.S. promises substantive emissions reductions. Mutual hesitancy has certainly delayed any prospect of a binding international agreement.

For the U.S. to take leadership, Congress should not make legislation contingent upon the actions of other countries, but instead push the cap-and-trade system through, knowing that other nations will then jump on board. Doing so would demonstrate to the world that the U.S. is serious and committed to combating climate change. The Senate, however, has been particularly resistant to addressing climate change. Obama, already entrenched in difficult battles on health care and Afghanistan, may lack sufficient political capital to persuade reluctant senators. As a result, liberals run the risk of having to water down the current bill even farther than it already has been watered down in order to pass something.

Any reasonable carbon emissions bill that emerges from Congress will provide the U.S. with momentum that will then lead to a global emissions reduction agreement. Copenhagen will test how receptive the world is to American leadership and a global initiative against greenhouse gas emissions, but environmentalists should not expect much. At best, as former vice president Al Gore notes, “a very significant framework … can still be completed.” Instead, policymakers should place their hopes on the US and push for American leadership in a warming world.

Although it is a rising economic powerhouse in a shifting global order, Brazil has been neglected in U.S. foreign policy in recent years. Given Brazil’s strategic significance, the U.S. must embrace closer relations with its Latin American neighbor, granting it some long-due political and economic compromises in order to consolidate a crucial inter-American relationship. By ending the Cuban embargo, pushing for Brazil to receive a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, and partially opening the American market to Brazilian biofuels, the U.S. can strengthen this crucial partnership.

By neglecting to cultivate America’s relationship with Brazil, the Obama Administration risks unsavory comparisons with the Bush Administration, which was heavily criticized for all but ignoring South America. With memories of a (supposedly) U.S.-supported military coup d’etat that instituted a ruling military dictatorship for twenty years still fresh in the minds of many Brazilians, the U.S. must offer political gestures and concrete economic compromises that show that its relationship with Brazil is as valued as when the U.S. became the first nation to recognize Brazil’s independence in 1822. Latin American expert David Rothkopf implores the current presidency to pursue this special relationship which has been neglected until now. Despite Obama’s warm remarks about President Lula at the recent G20 London summit—Obama declared, “He’s my man”—Rothkopf urges that Obama demonstrate commitment beyond just “lip service.” He writes, “[If the Obama Administration] only pays lip service to Brazil but slow walks the most important issues while seeking disproportionate payment in turn from the Brazilians… then tension and distrust are likely to manifest themselves.”

As noted by President Lula in his March 14th meeting with President Obama, reform of the American embargo on Cuba presents a golden opportunity to send a palpable signal not just to Brazil, but also to all of Latin America. The embargo on Cuba remains an antiquated and intolerant blemish on the U.S.’s relationship with the region—a relic from a war of ideas long since won. The U.S. must initiate a new campaign of ideas for a revitalized North-South relationship built on equality and respect in order to counter the efforts of populist leaders like Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, and Rafael Correa to vilify the U.S. As Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim notes, “…It’s impossible not to talk about the Cuban embargo. It’s indicative of U.S. policy toward the region.” The repeal of the Cuban embargo would stand as a powerful symbol of goodwill and new beginnings, with all parties standing to gain, from the isolated Cuban public to the countless American multinationals chomping at the bit for a piece of the virgin Cuban market.

Moreover, enlisting the Brazilian President as a mediator in Cuban-American negotiations would be a brilliant choice for the U.S., not only because Lula is skilled at reaching compromise, but also because the move gives Brazil what it seems to want so badly these days: prestige. Brazil’s recent generous renegotiations to pay more for natural gas contracts with Bolivia and hydroelectric agreements with Paraguay, along with its successful leadership of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Haiti, indicate that Lula is maneuvering Brazil to be the torchbearer for Latin America. And as Brazil cements and expands this leadership role, it wants a say in international affairs commensurate with its growing economic power.

Though the United States has officially “recognized” Brazil’s candidacy for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, it can shoot a safe shot across the bow of the international order by announcing strong support for the bid. As Lula rightly ascertained in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly, “Today’s structure has been frozen for six decades and does not relate to the challenges of today’s world. Its distorted form of representation stands between us and the multilateral world to which we aspire.” A firm American statement of approval for Brazil’s Security Council eligibility would help strengthen a crucial alliance in Latin America. In addition, the United States stands to lose little political capital by expressing public support for Brazil. Unlike the G4 Security Council candidacies of India and Japan whose bids are opposed by important American allies such as Pakistan and China, respectively, and Germany, whose bid could be considered disadvantageous for the U.S., support for Brazil risks very little. Mexico and Argentina, the two countries most vehemently opposed to Brazil’s U.N. aspiration, are sturdy American allies who could be placated with little effort.

A final gesture that the U.S. should make to Brazil is opening up the U.S. market to Brazilian ethanol. Brazilian biofuel companies look at the American market with unequaled lust, as an astounding 54-cent tariff on Brazilian sugarcane ethanol makes exporting to the American market economically uncompetitive and unviable. Although repealing this tariff, which protects the comparably inefficient U.S. domestic corn-based ethanol industry, would be politically unpopular in the U.S., it is crucial to establishing a closer relationship with Brazil and would confer economic benefits on both countries. Given that the U.S. and Brazil account for almost 90 percent of the world’s biofuel production, developing a global ethanol market would be a mutually beneficial endeavor.

Also, such action is not without historical precedent. The Washington-based think tank Council on Hemispheric Affairs notes that officials in the Obama Administration could look to the International Trade Commission’s 1986 ruling on imported Brazilian iron ore as a historical blueprint to pleasing the elected officials in America’s Corn belt, as well as their Brazilian counterparts. Just as the 1986 accord legally isolated the American Midwest market so as to insulate the Great Lakes’ vulnerable iron industry, a similar ethanol agreement could institute an analogous protected trade area for American corn ethanol in western and central U.S., opening the East Coast to Brazilian ethanol. Since American ethanol consumption is concentrated in the West, the economic impact of such a policy change would not be dramatic, but it would be a crucial gesture of support to Brazil.

Over the years, many countries have claimed to possess a “special” relationship with the U.S. There has perhaps been no country more or longer deserving of that designation than Brazil. One of the last countries to enter the world recession and poised to be one of the first to exit it, as Jonathan Wheatley wrote in the Financial Times, “this is the Brazil that finally, after years of unfulfilled promise, is catching the world’s attention.” The three-pronged mix of political and economic gestures described above would allow the current Administration to make some much-needed overtures to its longtime rising star Latin American neighbor and possible long-lasting Latin American advocate. As for reciprocation, any Brazilian knows that once someone bestows an abraço on you, it is only good manners to return the favor.