“With Allah’s permission, we will come to you from where you do not expect.” This declaration by the Yemeni branch of al-Qaeda is not just a warning of future attacks, it is a truth of global security. The Christmas Day terror attempt by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian who had been in Yemen since August, was stopped not by American preparation, but by luck. While the barely-averted attack creates temptation to take dramatic action, a visible American military presence in Yemen would overtax our armed forces and create a backlash counterproductive to American interests. America should prevent future attacks by fully acknowledging the threat posed by Yemeni terrorists, ensuring their prosecution when captured, and by continuing current American policy in support of the Yemeni government.

The Yemeni offshoot of al-Qaeda has steadily grown more potent in recent years, merging with its Saudi progenitor to form al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. This organization’s targets are both local and global. In October 2000, al-Qaeda attacked the Navy destroyer U.S.S. Cole in the port of Aden with predominantly Yemeni explosives, attackers, and accomplices. Yemen was also linked to the 1998 East African embassy bombings, the strike on the French oil tanker Limburg, the September 11th attacks, and the assassination attempt against Prince Mohammed bin Nayef in Saudi Arabia last August. That assassination attempt used the same tactics and explosives (pentaerythritol tetranitrate sewn into the bomber’s underwear) as the attempted Christmas attack.
Yemen’s location, geography, and fractured polity make it a paradise for al-Qaeda. At the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen is close to Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; its porous borders and extensive coastline are far from secure, while its rugged mountains provide apt hiding places for terrorists. With oil reserves running dry, Yemen’s arms market is among its few economic strengths—it trails only the U.S. in gun ownership per capita. Meanwhile, a strong, conservative religious population is a solid support base for al Qaeda’s propaganda, and tribal groups with relations to al-Qaeda control much of the borderlands. There is a separatist movement in the south and an insurgency in the north, and the unified Yemen is less than two decades old. Yemen is a near-ideal base of operations for Al-Qaeda, combining Afghanistan and Pakistan’s formidable terrain with Somalia’s near-anarchy.

In 2005, the terrorists responsible for the Cole bombing were in prison. Today, however, many of them are free, including confessed bombers Jamal al-Badawi, Fahd al-Quso, and Naser Abdel-Karim al-Wahishi. All three escaped from maximum-security prisons in Yemen. Badawi turned himself in after a year, but was released for good behavior; Quso is a re-established terrorist operative, conducting interviews for al Qaeda; and Wahishi is the head of al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula. In 2008, FBI special agent Ali Soufan warned Senate staff members “unless the American government sent a united message to the Yemenis to act against Al Qaeda, the terrorists responsible for the Cole would remain free and there would be future attacks against the United States connected to Yemen.” Soufan observes, “Today, the terrorists behind the Cole are still free, and an attack connected to Yemen has been attempted.”

Current U.S. policy towards Yemen is based on counterterrorism support, limited special operations, and drone strikes. In 2009, US expenditures for counterterrorism support were $70 million; according to a senior military official, President Obama plans to increase that amount to $190 million. The U.S. coordinates much of its effort with Western-friendly Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. But President Saleh has often used American aid against local insurgencies rather than against al-Qaeda. The local insurgencies more directly threaten Saleh’s sovereign authority, and he wants to maintain at least minimal support from the conservative Islamist population. Unconditional aid is therefore ineffective—Yemeni authorities can divert resources from counter-terrorism to counterinsurgency.

The U.S. should make an all-or-nothing deal on foreign aid to Yemen: America should offer more financial support under the condition that Yemeni courts imprison those responsible for the Cole bombing. Some might argue that incarceration would be ineffective because new recruits would replace those imprisoned. But anything short of life imprisonment means effective impunity for terrorists; prosecution would send a message to al-Qaeda that the U.S. and Arab governments will not tolerate acts of terror. If these conditions are met, the U.S. should stay its present course of providing counter-terrorist aid. Admittedly, this solution may not be immediately effective, but any sustainable, forward-looking strategy against an asymmetrical threat will require patience.
Senator Joe Lieberman (I-CT) has suggested that Yemen will be “tomorrow’s war” if the U.S. does not act preemptively. Preemptive military engagement, however, is simply not feasible, with the U.S. military already overstretched in Afghanistan and Iraq. America is still fighting two wars, and escalating one of them; we cannot realistically expect victory in a third, especially after taking into account the counterinsurgency efforts that U.S. troops would inherit from the Yemeni government. Even if preemptive military intervention were feasible, it would likely provoke a popular backlash, destabilizing the Western-friendly regime. Al-Qaeda feeds on Western interventions; the risk of backlash is especially high in Yemen’s tribal north with widespread poverty, illiteracy, and resentment of the central government. Intelligence, logistical support, and foreign aid should be the extent of American involvement in an effort that only Yemen can achieve. As Marc Lynch, a counter-terrorism expert at George Washington University, has suggested, the U.S. should not fall into the trap of overcommitment in a rush to “just do something.”

In short, the U.S. should largely stay the course in Yemen, but must put more diplomatic pressure on the Yemeni government to ensure our plans are carried through. Although the Yemeni government is weak, it has achieved success in counterterrorist operations in the past few weeks. We have recently seen an unprecedentedly successful offensive against jihadist commanders in the south and center of the nation; five raids in the Abyan and Shabwa provinces have killed more than 60 fighters. Of course, an avowedly pro-Western government faces grave dangers in the Middle East, but a puppeteer is better than a hegemon. The United States should provide further assistance to Yemen before resorting to direct military engagement.

In April of 2009, pirates off the coast of Somalia seized an American ship, the Maersk Alabama, and took Captain Richard Philips hostage. U.S. Navy SEALs staged a dramatic rescue: Snipers aboard a Navy vessel shot the three pirates on the bobbing lifeboat where Captain Philips was being held, ending a five-day standoff. The suspenseful rescue, tailor-made for the era of 24/7 cable news, brought national attention to the issue of piracy off Somalia’s coast. But the roots of Somali piracy took hold years earlier, and the problem is getting worse. In the first nine months of 2009, there were 100 pirate attacks in the waters surrounding Somalia, compared to 51 in the same period the year before. Piracy is a product of a power vacuum in Somalia; overfishing and chemical dumping in Somali seas have set the stage for these modern-day marauders. To gain some measure of control over the pirate problem, the United States and its partners must address the environmental crises pirates use to justify their actions and create a Somali coast guard to help control piracy in the long-term.

The costs of piracy in this region are clear. Somalia lies along some of the world’s most important shipping lanes, and piracy in these lanes raises the cost of international commerce. Eleven percent of the world’s petroleum passes through the region, which is colloquially known as “Pirate Alley.” Ships making that journey today pay nearly twice what they would have paid a year ago for ransom insurance, in addition to the cost of increased onboard security. Furthermore, attacks on oil tankers and other ships carrying hazardous materials raise the possibility of a serious environmental disaster in the region. Finally, the possibility that piracy could fund terrorism represents a significant threat to the U.S.

But how exactly did the current era of Somali piracy begin? In 1991, Somalia’s government collapsed, and the lack of authority allowed pirates to take control of the seas. Today, the country is nominally ruled by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), but other groups, such as the Islamic militia al-Shabbab, constantly challenge the TFG for control. In such conditions, poverty has driven many to piracy. The World Bank reports that 73 percent of Somalia’s population lives on less than $2 a day. Primary school enrollment stands at 22 percent, among the lowest in the world. In the absence of government, there is an absence of opportunity, and for many in Somalia, the profitable life of piracy holds understandable appeal. In 2008 alone, pirates collected more than $150 million in ransom.

Overfishing off the coast of Somalia has also pushed many Somalis to take part in piracy. The earliest pirates were fishermen who sought to force out commercial ships that plundered Somali waters. Somalia’s Gulf of Aden is one of the most fertile fishing grounds in the world, and without a coast guard, Somalia’s territorial waters are unprotected. Boats from Europe and Asia illegally reap over $300 million worth of fish per year from Somali seas, depriving local fishermen of the livelihood of which they once relied. The foreigners often utilize invasive and illegal methods of fishing, such as nets with tight meshes that catch small and young fish. Without regulation, fish populations have been decimated, creating a classic “tragedy of the commons.” When too many individuals fish the same waters, the ecosystem collapses, and Somalis who could have once made their living fishing turn to piracy as an alternative.
The illegal dumping of toxic waste off Somalia’s coast by European and Asian corporations has only aggravated the problem. The UN Environmental Program notes that dumping hazardous waste in Somalia can cost as little as $2.50 a ton, while disposing of that same waste in Europe can cost $250 a ton. Following the great tsunami of 2004, a significant amount of waste washed up on Somali shores and sickened the local population. By damaging local fisheries, waste dumping makes piracy a more attractive career option. Yet Somalia lacks the resources and institutions needed to prevent this problem, and the international community has done little to help.

Somalia’s dysfunctional government is unable to combat the pirates, and although several nations have dispatched naval patrols to the Gulf of Aden, piracy remains an ever-present threat. The U.S. and the European Union have standing patrols in the region, and China helps escort ships through the treacherous gulf. Yet piracy cannot be eliminated until the Somali government is stable enough to control the problem internally. Unfortunately, calls for good governance are more easily put onto paper than put into practice. In the short term, at least, stable government in Somalia is a fantasy. While lining the Gulf with warships might eliminate piracy, it would be prohibitively expensive. The best option, therefore, is to implement cost-effective measures to control the problem. A moderate expansion of anti-piracy efforts would help limit robbery at sea at reasonable expense.

In order to combat piracy, the U.S. and its partners must combat not only the pirates but also the aggravating factors that encourage them, such as illegal fishing and toxic waste. Anti-piracy forces working to protect the seas and prevent the dumping of hazardous waste will earn some measure of good will from Somalis even as they crack down on pirates. By protecting the region from overfishing, the international community can create economic opportunities for those who might otherwise have turned to piracy. Furthermore, pirates will no longer be able to justify their attacks by claiming that they are simply protecting their fishing waters. Still, piracy is profitable, and managing these environmental issues will not solely eliminate the problem. Most pirates will not lay down their guns and pick up fishing poles as the environmental situation improves. But if U.S. forces and others already in the region begin to protect fisheries, they will deprive pirates of their stated motivation to attack, thus exposing those who continue to board ships as nothing more than common criminals. Pirates need support on land for their operations, and by revealing the pirates’ true motivations, the U.S. can minimize the backing these buccaneers receive from the Somali population.

The creation of a Somali coast guard managed by the United Nations would help quell piracy today and create the infrastructure for Somalia to manage the problem in the long-term. Roger Middleton, of the thinktank Chatham House, proposes the development of such a force, noting, “The cost of running a coast guard could be met, at least in part, from collecting fishing dues and import revenue. The money and the force could be held in trust for Somalia.” Such a force would separate pirates who are out for profit from those who genuinely hope to protect Somalia’s seas. If and when a stable government does take root, it would have a capable navy to police its waters. Unfortunately, recruiting for and managing the group would be no easy task. In the short term, this auxiliary force could not replace the more experienced international force needed to control piracy. In the future, though, such efforts would allow Somalia to take greater responsibility for its own territory.

Piracy in the Gulf of Aden presents a significant threat to global commerce, and there are no simple solutions. Until Somalia has a stable, functional government, pirates will continue to haunt key shipping lanes, threatening American citizens and American interests. But by understanding the circumstances that lead to piracy, the international community can better control these modern-day buccaneers. The lack of central authority in Somalia has paved the way for illegal fishing and the dumping of toxic waste. By controlling these factors, the international community can, over time, undermine Somalia’s pirates.

In light of the security failures that allowed suspected Nigerian terrorist Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to board and attempt to blow up a Detroit-bound plane on Christmas Day, the U.S. Transportation Safety Authority (TSA) released a security directive mandating enhanced screenings for individuals traveling to the U.S. through or from “nations that are state sponsors of terrorism or other countries of interest.” Incongruously, given current U.S. security concerns, Cuba tops the list, followed by Iran, Syria, and Sudan. The TSA’s short-sighted reaction to the attack highlights the obstinate antagonism in U.S.-Cuban relations. This is a misguided hostility; the U.S. government should be trying to de-escalate the confrontation with its Caribbean neighbor, the first step of which is declassifying Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism.

Currently, the U.S. has no formal diplomatic ties with Cuba and has maintained an embargo that makes it illegal for U.S. companies to do business in the country. Although Fidel Castro’s abdication of power in 2006 precipitated shifts in the Cuban power structure that offered the possibility of a gradual thaw in relations, lingering Cold War antagonisms have precluded these possibilities from maturing into real change.

The Obama administration’s Cuba policy has thus far been a mix of inspiring first steps and disappointing stubbornness. In the weeks surrounding the Summit of the Americas, rapprochement looked like a real possibility. President Obama told leaders at the Summit that “the United States seeks a new beginning with Cuba. I know there is a longer journey that must be traveled in overcoming decades of mistrust, but there are critical steps we can take toward a new day.” Since then, however, U.S.-Cuban relations have frozen. After finally removing restrictions on Cuban-Americans’ ability to visit family on the island and send remittances, as well as permitting telecommunication companies to provide cell phone service in Cuba, the White House has disappointingly outlined a “tit-for-tat” approach to further rapprochement. Referring to Cuban leaders, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs told reporters that in order to see more benefits from the U.S., “They’re certainly free to release political prisoners. They’re certainly free to stop skimming money off the top of remittance payments as they come back to the Cuban island. They’re free to institute a greater freedom of the press.” From the Cuban perspective, such reforms would dwarf the concessions the U.S. has offered; issuing token economic reforms and demanding massive political change is not the way to win the trust of leaders in Cuba, or anywhere else in Latin America for that matter.

Despite tensions, improved relations with Cuba are consistent with U.S. interests. Economically, Cuba represents an untapped and desirable trading partner. In an early December lecture at Princeton University, Cuba scholar Julia Sweig hypothesized that, were it not for the American embargo, Cuba could follow Vietnam’s developmental model, and gradually expand its economy through the growth of export markets. This would be of direct benefit to the U.S. economy.

Even more important than encouraging domestic change on the island, rapprochement with Cuba stands to improve U.S. diplomatic relations with all of Latin America. At last year’s Summit of the Americas, leaders from around the region, including relative moderate Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina, berated the U.S. for an “anachronistic” approach to Cuba. America’s insistence on antagonizing the Cuban government undercuts more important regional goals, specifically efforts to demonstrate that U.S. hemispheric hegemony need no longer be consistent with demanding, heavy-handed political relationships. Given the national significance of trade with Latin America, and the need for regional cooperation on issues like the drug trade, undocumented migrations, and human trafficking, the distrust motivated by the U.S. stance towards Cuba is a serious detriment to hemispheric policy. The lessening of hostilities towards Cuba could do much to assist the pursuit of other regional goals.

In this context, the emphasis the TSA recently placed on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism was misguided. The 2008 Country Reports on Terrorism admit that “Cuba no longer actively supports armed struggle in Latin America and other parts of the world.” Current justification for Cuba’s inclusion seems based on its harboring of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna in Spain, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and the National Liberation Army of Colombia, although the Country Reports acknowledge that some individuals visited Cuba in connection with peace negotiations with the governments of Spain and Colombia. The Cuban government has also admitted U.S. fugitives from groups like the Boricua Popular (or Macheteros) and the Black Liberation Army, but the Reports concede that in accordance with the government’s public declarations, Cuba has not granted protection to any new fugitives since 2006.

Given that ongoing Cuban activity does not appear to threaten the U.S., its position on the list of state sponsors of terror is clearly anachronistic. Removing Cuba from the list would not cost the U.S. anything, nor would it represent significant backtracking on the U.S. commitment to political and economic freedoms. It would, however, be a powerful signal to Cubans and other Latin American observers that the U.S. does in fact want to move past the Cold War framework of U.S.-Latin American relations. The removal, while individually insufficient to ease U.S.-Cuban antagonism, would be an important first step in that direction. Until President Obama updates the list accordingly, it is unlikely that Latin American governments will take seriously his overtures for a new era of inter-American relations.

President Obama’s recent state dinner with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the first such dinner of his Presidency, attracted significant international attention. Beneath the façade of pomp and grandeur, the President’s choice to host Indian leaders at such a momentous occasion is an important symbol of his commitment to strong bilateral ties between the world’s two largest democracies. Obama, however, has yet to fully harness the potential of this relationship—one that sags under the weight of numerous concerns including the global press’ preoccupation with a rising China. Although China grabs headlines as the rising power in Asia, India too is quickly becoming a regional power—one from which the U.S. can benefit. The U.S. can cooperate with India on a variety of fronts: including nuclear non-proliferation, extremist violence in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, and the maintenance of a stable balance of power in Asia. If President Obama wishes to truly strengthen the U.S.’s partnership with India, he must go beyond mere symbolism and focus on forwarding the U.S. and India’s shared goals.

In some sense, the state dinner was nothing new; past U.S. presidents have regularly hosted Indian leaders at state dinners. Indeed, in terms of policy substance, the Obama-Singh event is less important than Singh’s dinner with former President Bush in 2005, when they announced a civilian nuclear agreement between the two states. Nevertheless, the state dinner helped allay fears that the Obama administration might deprioritize relations with India in favor of strengthening ties with China. Despite the administration’s globetrotting agendas, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton bypassed India on her trip to Asia in February 2009, and Obama, too, declined to visit during his Asian tour en route to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Singapore in November. Although Clinton did visit India earlier in July, the Obama administration seems to interact with India within a more bilateral framework than one in which they acknowledge its rising power and aspirations on the global stage.

New Delhi has been fretting over the U.S.’s apparent acquiescence to growing Chinese clout and in particular, the recent joint Obama-Hu statement calling for closer “cooperation [between the U.S. and China] on issues related to South Asia.” The statement seemed to open the door to China’s involvement in the longstanding sensitive rivalry between India and Pakistan. Furthermore, the ongoing economic downturn has fueled protectionist tendencies in America, especially with a Democrat-controlled Congress. Obama recently spoke of anti-outsourcing measures and criticized current tax policies which favor companies outsourcing to lower-cost countries like India. Hence some political watchers are predicting some strain in U.S.-India relations on Obama’s watch.

Officials such as U.S. Under Secretary of State William Burns and Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Robert Blake have nonetheless firmly reiterated America’s commitment to a partnership with India. Prime Minister Singh’s status as the first state guest of honor can be seen as a reaffirmation of the continued strength of U.S.-India ties and a strategic move by the White House to reassure their nervous Indian friends. The pageantry of a state dinner cannot, however, be a replacement for progress toward substantive issues. The Obama administration has been dragging its heels in the implementation of the much-heralded nuclear cooperation agreement, with the President showing little inclination to push through the final modalities and procedures.

Obama is right to engage more closely with China, but sticking too closely to a G2-style “Chimerica” script would risk overemphasizing Chinese influence at the expense of American leverage. China and America are more often than not at loggerheads with each other, from China’s resentment over its past subjugation under Western imperial powers to present-day tensions over Taiwan, Tibet, yuan undervaluation, and ideological differences over human rights and democracy. If Obama realistically wants to realize his grand visions of multilateralism and global cooperation, he needs as many allies on board as possible. An increasingly aggressive and confident China is an unlikely first candidate.

India can serve as a useful counterweight to China’s assertive and occasionally hostile presence in Asia that ensures that the much-touted ‘Asian century’ does not belong exclusively to the Chinese. While it would be overly simplistic to claim that India and the U.S.’s shared traits of being populous multiethnic democracies automatically renders easy cooperation, the fact that India is more likely to have a similar outlook as the U.S. can ease Western fears of a potentially unfriendly Asia-Pacific region based on Chinese-driven values and models. The U.S. should not try to forcefully impose American ideas on Asia, but with India as an ally the U.S. can ensure that its interests in Asia are not compromised. Most of the Southeast Asian countries, being poor and relatively small, are highly susceptible to China’s “checkbook diplomacy”—using its wealth to buy allies. For the U.S., India’s partnership may be more important than its partnership with Japan, as that country, a traditionally staunch U.S. ally, becomes increasingly distant from the U.S. after the recent shift in power to the Democratic Party of Japan under Yukio Hatoyama. India is also keen to work with the U.S. as protection against China. Supporting India’s emergence as a major power need not constitute an antagonistic containment strategy directed against any supposed “China threat.” Instead, it is a reasonable policy designed to ensure that the interests of all players are accommodated to preserve geopolitical stability and inclusiveness in a crucial region of the world.

The U.S. has to make sure it recognizes India’s interests while balancing its own agenda. Unfortunately, relations have been soured by India’s frustrations with America’s perceived reluctance to strongly crack down on Pakistan, which harbors several extremist groups that have targeted India. India is suspicious of ramped-up American military assistance to its neighbor, fearing that Pakistan will channel those resources toward aggression in the disputed Kashmir region and along the Indo-Pakistan border, rather than toward combating Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Obama also flamed controversy early in 2009 when he suggested that resolving the Kashmir dispute would be central to addressing the problems of instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. South Asian politics have long proven to be complex and messy, and tensions have become even more strained in the wake of the 2008 Mumbai bombings by Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). Washington needs to balance its interests in working with both India and Pakistan, as well as Afghanistan, all crucial fronts in the battle against terrorism. During the state dinner, Obama wisely adopted a policy of non-involvement, issuing a neutral statement that “it is not [America’s] place” to get involved in the India-Pakistan conflict. Pakistan and India are partners that the U.S. can ill afford to lose; Washington should tread carefully.

Although the two nations have been increasingly close partners, there remains much potential for closer cooperation on counterterrorism efforts, particularly in the realms of intelligence sharing, joint training, improved institutional frameworks, and enhanced security enforcement measures and responses. India’s previous successful efforts against Sikh terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s were due in no small part to the sharing of intelligence with the U.S. and other countries, and a similar approach may be adopted with regard to global terrorism today. While terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda and the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) do have different objectives, they all cause conflict beyond Pakistan’s borders. A U.S.-India partnership in combating terrorism would underline India’s leadership both regionally and globally and would highlight international commitment to stopping terrorism and increasing stability.

Although President Obama’s ceremony and symbolic gestures are well-intentioned, building a stronger partnership with India will require further action. While China must be considered, the U.S. must engage more deeply with India on the many issues and interests that the two nations share to glean the potential economic and strategic rewards.