Although it is a rising economic powerhouse in a shifting global order, Brazil has been neglected in U.S. foreign policy in recent years. Given Brazil’s strategic significance, the U.S. must embrace closer relations with its Latin American neighbor, granting it some long-due political and economic compromises in order to consolidate a crucial inter-American relationship. By ending the Cuban embargo, pushing for Brazil to receive a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, and partially opening the American market to Brazilian biofuels, the U.S. can strengthen this crucial partnership.
By neglecting to cultivate America’s relationship with Brazil, the Obama Administration risks unsavory comparisons with the Bush Administration, which was heavily criticized for all but ignoring South America. With memories of a (supposedly) U.S.-supported military coup d’etat that instituted a ruling military dictatorship for twenty years still fresh in the minds of many Brazilians, the U.S. must offer political gestures and concrete economic compromises that show that its relationship with Brazil is as valued as when the U.S. became the first nation to recognize Brazil’s independence in 1822. Latin American expert David Rothkopf implores the current presidency to pursue this special relationship which has been neglected until now. Despite Obama’s warm remarks about President Lula at the recent G20 London summit—Obama declared, “He’s my man”—Rothkopf urges that Obama demonstrate commitment beyond just “lip service.” He writes, “[If the Obama Administration] only pays lip service to Brazil but slow walks the most important issues while seeking disproportionate payment in turn from the Brazilians… then tension and distrust are likely to manifest themselves.”
As noted by President Lula in his March 14th meeting with President Obama, reform of the American embargo on Cuba presents a golden opportunity to send a palpable signal not just to Brazil, but also to all of Latin America. The embargo on Cuba remains an antiquated and intolerant blemish on the U.S.’s relationship with the region—a relic from a war of ideas long since won. The U.S. must initiate a new campaign of ideas for a revitalized North-South relationship built on equality and respect in order to counter the efforts of populist leaders like Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, and Rafael Correa to vilify the U.S. As Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim notes, “…It’s impossible not to talk about the Cuban embargo. It’s indicative of U.S. policy toward the region.” The repeal of the Cuban embargo would stand as a powerful symbol of goodwill and new beginnings, with all parties standing to gain, from the isolated Cuban public to the countless American multinationals chomping at the bit for a piece of the virgin Cuban market.
Moreover, enlisting the Brazilian President as a mediator in Cuban-American negotiations would be a brilliant choice for the U.S., not only because Lula is skilled at reaching compromise, but also because the move gives Brazil what it seems to want so badly these days: prestige. Brazil’s recent generous renegotiations to pay more for natural gas contracts with Bolivia and hydroelectric agreements with Paraguay, along with its successful leadership of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Haiti, indicate that Lula is maneuvering Brazil to be the torchbearer for Latin America. And as Brazil cements and expands this leadership role, it wants a say in international affairs commensurate with its growing economic power.
Though the United States has officially “recognized” Brazil’s candidacy for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, it can shoot a safe shot across the bow of the international order by announcing strong support for the bid. As Lula rightly ascertained in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly, “Today’s structure has been frozen for six decades and does not relate to the challenges of today’s world. Its distorted form of representation stands between us and the multilateral world to which we aspire.” A firm American statement of approval for Brazil’s Security Council eligibility would help strengthen a crucial alliance in Latin America. In addition, the United States stands to lose little political capital by expressing public support for Brazil. Unlike the G4 Security Council candidacies of India and Japan whose bids are opposed by important American allies such as Pakistan and China, respectively, and Germany, whose bid could be considered disadvantageous for the U.S., support for Brazil risks very little. Mexico and Argentina, the two countries most vehemently opposed to Brazil’s U.N. aspiration, are sturdy American allies who could be placated with little effort.
A final gesture that the U.S. should make to Brazil is opening up the U.S. market to Brazilian ethanol. Brazilian biofuel companies look at the American market with unequaled lust, as an astounding 54-cent tariff on Brazilian sugarcane ethanol makes exporting to the American market economically uncompetitive and unviable. Although repealing this tariff, which protects the comparably inefficient U.S. domestic corn-based ethanol industry, would be politically unpopular in the U.S., it is crucial to establishing a closer relationship with Brazil and would confer economic benefits on both countries. Given that the U.S. and Brazil account for almost 90 percent of the world’s biofuel production, developing a global ethanol market would be a mutually beneficial endeavor.
Also, such action is not without historical precedent. The Washington-based think tank Council on Hemispheric Affairs notes that officials in the Obama Administration could look to the International Trade Commission’s 1986 ruling on imported Brazilian iron ore as a historical blueprint to pleasing the elected officials in America’s Corn belt, as well as their Brazilian counterparts. Just as the 1986 accord legally isolated the American Midwest market so as to insulate the Great Lakes’ vulnerable iron industry, a similar ethanol agreement could institute an analogous protected trade area for American corn ethanol in western and central U.S., opening the East Coast to Brazilian ethanol. Since American ethanol consumption is concentrated in the West, the economic impact of such a policy change would not be dramatic, but it would be a crucial gesture of support to Brazil.
Over the years, many countries have claimed to possess a “special” relationship with the U.S. There has perhaps been no country more or longer deserving of that designation than Brazil. One of the last countries to enter the world recession and poised to be one of the first to exit it, as Jonathan Wheatley wrote in the Financial Times, “this is the Brazil that finally, after years of unfulfilled promise, is catching the world’s attention.” The three-pronged mix of political and economic gestures described above would allow the current Administration to make some much-needed overtures to its longtime rising star Latin American neighbor and possible long-lasting Latin American advocate. As for reciprocation, any Brazilian knows that once someone bestows an abraço on you, it is only good manners to return the favor.


