Despite General Stanley McChrystal’s call for additional troops in Afghanistan, President Barack Obama has avoided decisive action on his administration’s most pressing foreign policy issue. While Obama’s caution is laudable, every moment of indecision contributes to a deteriorating political and military situation in Afghanistan. After weeks of deliberation, the time has come for strong presidential leadership to inject new hope into the flagging war effort. Obama should endorse McChrystal’s call for more troops and augment it with a shift in political strategy that emphasizes strengthening Afghanistan’s failing government from the ground up.
A successful strategy for Afghanistan must first target the endemic complications caused by the country’s dispersed tribal societies. The clear-and-hold strategy employed successfully in Iraq’s cities would be a logistical nightmare in the disconnected and remote villages of Afghanistan. Shifting tribal alliances often render the progress of successful operations irrelevant; soldiers secure one area and move to a second, only to find that Taliban forces have reemerged in the first.
Problems plaguing Afghanistan’s government worsen the situation in the field. Pervasive corruption and a lack of provincial governance have allowed insurgents to entrench themselves within everyday Afghan life. The Taliban maintains its strength through kickbacks and bribes from both government officials and private citizens. In some areas, the government is so weak and inept that Taliban members have essentially assumed all governing authority. In other areas, political leaders are so corrupt that there is no functional difference between the Taliban and the government, making the complete eradication of insurgents in those areas all but impossible.
In light of these challenges, the only solution for American forces lies in the combination of a full-throttle political and military surge. Obama should not simply replicate his predecessor’s strategies in Iraq.
Instead, the main component of the strategy should be engaging the Afghan government more rigorously, sending a message of partnership rather than occupation. The more that American officials complain in public about Karzai’s government and try to make policy unilaterally, the more difficult it becomes for the two governments to develop a productive relationship. Geographic challenges and corruption can best be addressed by including provincial and tribal leaders in central government discussions; the regions most in need of stable governance are those farthest removed from Kabul’s reach. The U.S. should help local leaders maintain legitimate rule while also facilitating dialogue with Karzai’s government. This approach would include providing security, conflict mediation, and economic support to tribal areas. Gradually, power-sharing between these groups could rein in politically distant regions as local leaders trade power for government support. By involving more Afghans in the decision-making process, this strategy would also help shed the perception that Karzai is simply a puppet of the West and enhance the central government’s legitimacy. To many Afghan people, the war is a struggle over who will govern them, and much of the battle involves perceptually defeating the Taliban and gaining the Afghans’ favor.
The Taliban should also be included in the governing process. The label “Taliban” is too often used as an umbrella term to describe all Pashtun insurgents in the region, and it obscures the fact that these insurgents are not a homogenous group. There are moderates within the Taliban who fight not for religious extremism but for economic survival. Negotiating with and providing alternatives for Afghans to make a living is crucial, since many currently join the Taliban in exchange for promises of profits from illegal trading and debt collection. Winning over these moderates would fragment the insurgency and weaken its military capabilities.
All of these solutions, however, require a troop commitment to improve security. The goal of elevating troop levels is not to stage a dramatic occupation but instead to stabilize and build local capacity. Currently, Taliban forces frequently threaten Afghans with violence and destroy infrastructure the moment it is built. Not only have the insurgents crippled the border regions, but they have also instilled a sense of paralysis among the people. Most Afghans, fearing retribution from the Taliban, do nothing to improve conditions in the region and thus further hamper foreign military operations. Troop deployment focused in Afghanistan’s rural South and East would decrease security risks, but equally importantly, it would allow for cooperation between American and Afghan armies. Training and equipping local forces increases American forces’ legitimacy in the eyes of the people and prepares Afghanistan for self-sufficiency.
Counterterrorism vs. Counterinsurgency
A False Dichotomy
Opponents of a troop increase advocate a scaled-down counterterrorism approach that targets only al-Qaeda members rather than the entire Taliban. Vice President Joe Biden, chief among these opponents, has called for surgical unmanned drone strikes in addition to special forces operations. Yet policymakers like Biden err in treating al-Qaeda as an entity separate from the Taliban. A March 2009 review ordered by President Obama portrayed the two groups as intertwined. Defeating both groups will require more combat troops. Assassinating al-Qaeda officials will only encourage further extremism among Taliban members who will move to fill the power vacuum.
Counterterrorism in Afghanistan must include components of counterinsurgency, the resource-intensive military doctrine that calls for extensive manpower to pacify dangerous regions. Special Forces operations rely heavily on intelligence and local bases from which to launch, assets that only a counterinsurgency campaign in the volatile regions of Afghanistan can provide. More importantly, surgical strikes exact a heavy toll on Afghan civilians. The inevitable cost of unmanned drone bombings is civilian deaths, which alienate the population and pose ethical concerns. The seeming cruelty of U.S. bombings creates tension between soldiers and civilians while further spreading anti-Americanism. In addition, even successful missions usually fail to alter the dynamic between Afghan locals and Taliban thugs, who continue to terrorize villages.
No More Delay
The War Must Be Won
The biggest challenge for Obama will be to strike a balance between an increased American presence and hostility toward further intervention. Doing so will largely depend on the attitude that both the administration and the soldiers themselves adopt. The Afghan people do not intrinsically loathe American soldiers. In fact, most prefer to interact with U.S. troops than with the Taliban. However, Afghans are tiring of failed promises and undue American aggression. Obama should therefore deploy Americans in tandem with local units and strengthen guidelines discouraging unnecessary loss of civilian life.
Despite the growing quagmire, the fight in Afghanistan is not impossible to win. Karzai’s recent acquiescence to the Independent Election Commission’s call for a runoff election demonstrates that the Afghan government is responsive to third-party pressure. In his first speech since winning the election, President Karzai committed to “launch[ing] a campaign to clean the government of corruption.” Though unlikely to result in immediate reform, Karzai’s speech opens the door for guarded optimism.
Obama must act decisively and approve a troop increase in Afghanistan. As McChrystal’s report confirms, “resources will not win this war, but under-resourcing could lose it.” Any inclusive approach requires more security and thus more resources. These commitments are a small price to pay compared to the potential dangers of a Taliban-dominated Afghanistan.
