Iran’s nuclear program has been a major concern for the West since the beginning of the millennium. Iran has repeatedly violated both UN and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sanctions, suggested that Israel be wiped off the map, and supported terrorism based in Iraq, the Gaza Strip, and Lebanon. The United States’ unilateral strategy of negotiations and sanctions has been unsuccessful in achieving a sustainable settlement.Washington should consider other options in order to successfully deal with the crisis. To move negotiations forward, the U.S. should proceed with a regimen of multilateral sanctions to put pressure on Iran to negotiate seriously. Sanctions, along with focused and serious negotiations, are America’s best chance to disarm Iran and prevent military action.

The United States should study its previous attempts to end the Iranian nuclear crisis before moving forward. Under the Bush administration, the U.S. applied unilateral financial and economic sanctions against Iran, but with limited success. In the past, countries such as Russia and China provided many of the financial services that the U.S. sanctions denied Iran, and a number of international oil companies continue to do business with Iran in spite of the sanctions. Moreover, China, who seems driven foremost by its concern for feeding its massive appetite for oil, continues to invest in Iran’s energy and refining infrastructure.

Similarly, UN sanctions on weaponry and weapons technology were largely ineffective because Russia and China refused to meaningfully cooperate. In 2008, Russia negotiated a contract to sell Iran advanced anti-aircraft missile battery system—though Russia has yet to deliver the system—insisting that it was for defensive purposes and did not violate the sanctions. While in theory it is indeed a defensive system, the delivery of such weaponry can only harden Iran’s position in the negotiations because it enhances Iran’s ability to defend its nuclear facilities. In sum, for Russia and China, security and proliferation concerns take a back seat to economic gain.

Negotiations have been largely ineffective as well. While many in the West have praised the “agreement in principle” reached at recent talks in Vienna as a step forward, Western countries should be cautious of this perceived success. Under the Vienna Agreement, Iran would ship its stock of enriched uranium to Russia. The Russians and the French would then enrich the uranium into a form that could not be easily re-processed into weapons-grade material but could be used for non-military purposes. This plan, however, is subject to the approval of Ayatollah Khameini, the Iranian Supreme Leader, who is rumored to be against the agreement. In addition, many close to him, including the speaker of the Iranian Parliament, have criticized the framework as an attempt to deceive Iran.

Nonetheless, even if the Vienna Agreement were approved, the accord would still not prevent Iran from enriching uranium. If Iran chose, it could restock its supplies of enriched uranium again within a year. The agreement also does not prevent Iran from continuing research and development of its delivery capabilities. In addition, the agreement does nothing to address the fundamental question, which is how to alter incentives such that it is not in the current regime’s best interest to develop nuclear weapons. If adopted, the proposal would simply provide a temporary stopgap. The Vienna Agreement would give Iran the chance to stall and continue developing nuclear weapons, taking the West back to square one.

Even if a deal could be reached, a simple agreement with Iran will not be enough. The Iranian regime has a history of neither adhering to its international obligations nor cooperating with international authority. Iran, as a signatory nation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, is obligated to report to the IAEA any intention to build any nuclear facility. The regime did not report its uranium enrichment facility in Natanz until 2002, after it was fully operational. Iran likewise did not report the facility in Qom to the IAEA until Tehran realized that Western governments had discovered the facility’s existence. Furthermore, the regime has refused to allow its nuclear scientists to be questioned by the IAEA. If the U.S. and its allies are serious about preventing Iranian proliferation, they must insist on an enforceable agreement with a robust inspections regime.

The unsuccessful attempts at preventing Iran from continued development of nuclear weapons indicate that any response to Iran requires unified, international support. This summer’s election riots have presented the West with new options. The regime’s leaders appear not to want to confront external pressure and internal threats simultaneously. While Tehran has used negotiations to buy time, this new, unstable situation might make the regime amenable to meaningful settlement, especially if it faces multilateral pressure. There are a number of options available to entice and pressure the Iranians to submit to the will of the international community.

In the political sphere, the U.S., through Radio Farda—a Persian-language radio station based in Washington, D.C. and Prague—could amplify the voices of dissent with programming that provides a platform for Iranian exiles and expatriates. Internally, dissidents could be supplied with communication equipment not susceptible to jamming and other interference (such as satellite phones and sophisticated encryption equipment). The importance of communication within Iran is validated by the behavior of the theocratic regime—which moves swiftly to disrupt cellular and Internet communications at any sign of unrest.
In the economic sphere, multilateral leverage has significant potential. It is no secret that Iran’s economic situation is dire: It faces high unemployment (12 percent, according to the Iranian government), rampant inflation (28 percent, according to the Iranian government), corruption, and a lack of basic services. Iran’s economy depends heavily on petroleum exports, but without Western technological expertise, Iran’s oil production has steadily declined. According to a 2007 National Academy of Science study, Iran’s consumption of refined petroleum will outstrip its production of crude oil by 2015, effectively halting petroleum exports altogether. Furthermore, Iran lacks the capacity to refine petroleum and, as a result, imports 40 percent of its petroleum. The U.S. House of Representatives has already passed the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act, which would limit Iran’s ability to import gasoline. The Senate will likely approve the legislation in coming weeks. The U.S., through similar restrictions, should strengthen economic sanctions by convincing others to jump on board. European nations such as France, Germany, and Britain have expressed interest in such sanctions. In addition, Iran’s recent agreement to supply Turkmenistan with natural gas, which will ultimately supply all of Europe, competes with the Russian monopoly on gas, giving the Russians an incentive to support sanctions. This agreement would also give the Europeans more economic leverage over Tehran. Finally, a multilateral regimen of sanctions would force companies and financial institutions that do business in Iran to choose between continuing their transactions with Iran and doing business in the U.S. and in whichever European nations sign on to sanctions and few companies can afford to choose the former. While some have argued that enhanced sanctions might rally the Iranian people around the regime, only the opposite has happened thus far, as Iranians have blamed their regime for the country’s economic woes.

While proceeding with this new approach to Iran, however, the United States must try to ensure China and Russia’s support. While Chinese-Iranian economic interests are substantial, Chinese-U.S. economic ties are even more vital. China could be amenable to enforcing sanctions against Iran, as Beijing does not wish to deal with the economic consequences of a potential war between the U.S. and Iran that could result if the Iranian nuclear program is not stopped. In addition, the Russians, who are anxious about NATO, may be willing to enforce sanctions against Iran if the U.S. provides concessions on Russian security interests. A recent controversial overture by the U.S. to scale back missile shield deployment in Poland could be responsible for Russian officials more vocally supporting sanctions against Iran. Securing Chinese and Russian support for sanctions should be a top priority for the U.S.

Of course, the U.S. has never taken the military option off the table, and Israel has strongly hinted that it would consider using military force against Iran as well. Air strikes on Iran’s nuclear targets present a difficult tactical challenge, however. Iran’s nuclear facilities are distributed across the country, with some installations hidden underground, heavily fortified. Moreover, Iran has military assets throughout the Middle East with which it could retaliate against such a strike. In Iraq, Iran would almost certainly intensify support for the insurgency, endangering American troops and the already unstable democracy. In Gaza, Hamas could, at Iran’s instigation, unleash missile strikes into densely populated areas of Israel. Indeed, Iran itself has ballistic capability and could retaliate with its own missile strikes. Additionally, Iran could, in retaliation, finally make good on its threat to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40 percent of the world’s sea-transported oil and 90 percent of the Gulf’s oil output flows. Even if the U.S. were able to open the straits quickly, insurers would refuse to cover oil tankers passing through a conflict zone, effectively closing it to international commerce. Thus, superior firepower simply may not provide an effective solution to this problem, and could provoke a harsh response from the international community against the U.S. or Israel. As such, it is imperative that multilateral economic and political sanctions be applied instead of a military option.

To persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear program, the United States must employ multilateral cooperation and sanctions to convince Iran’s leaders that it is highly disadvantageous to continue nuclear development. A combination of economic, political, and social pressures could finally push Iran to accept an agreement. Iran has always used negotiations to stall because the price for delaying a negotiated settlement was significant but not crippling. The U.S. should make the price for stalling unacceptably high for Iran, in economic and political terms.

Recent North Korean missile tests indicate that North Korea is actively pursuing the development of long-range nuclear weapons. Given Kim Jong Il’s bellicosity and the ineffectiveness of UN measures such as Security Council Resolutions 1695, 1718, and 1874, the international community should identify and exploit any weaknesses that could bring North Korea to the negotiating table. In particular, the international community should take steps to police North Korean reinsurance fraud, which has become the regime’s second largest source of foreign currency. Damming this source of hard currency is a viable way of bringing the North Korean leadership to the table that has a number of advantages over the strategies previously employed.

Reinsurance is just what it sounds like—insurance companies such as Lloyd’s of London, Munich Re, and Swiss Re buy the risk held by other insurance companies. There are several aspects of reinsurance that allow North Korea to commit fraud so easily. First, unlike with the usual kind of insurance, with reinsurance the investigation of the original claim is not carried out by the company that ultimately pays. KNIC, for instance, insures a North Korean helicopter. When it crashes, KNIC investigates the claim, puts together the paperwork showing that the claim is legitimate, and then simply passes on the paperwork to its reinsurer, say Lloyd’s of London, and waits. Lloyd’s itself cannot do any investigation unless North Korea allows it to do so, which it often does not. Further, if a claim is made on something that is reinsured, it is in KNIC’s best interest not to deny the claim, because they do not in fact have to pay it and can siphon money off the top when it is paid. A third key point is that KNIC is a state-owned insurance company, and reinsurers such as Lloyd’s generally agree to be bound by North Korean law in administering KNIC’s claims. This is a clear conflict of interest. The same people who are making the laws under which North Korean reinsurance is administered are the people buying and using that reinsurance.

According to Kim Kwang Jin, who left North Korea in 2003 after working as a manager at KNIC for six years, North Korea has made between $50 and $60 million a year from reinsurance fraud – 5% of the regime’s annual revenue. The money is used, says Kim, ‘to scout out potential disasters in North Korea, to buy more reinsurance on the global market, and to pay premiums.’ The money left over after this, about $20 million dollars, is delivered yearly near Kim Jong Il’s birthday as a “present.”

Next to weapon sales, reinsurance fraud is the regime’s second largest source of hard currency revenue. Since North Korea relies so heavily on this source of funding, measures taken to diminish this supply would be highly effective in encouraging the regime to toe the line. Such measures would not only threaten North Korea’s capacity to build weapons, but would also remove the possibility for North Korea to respond, as it has historically, with more bellicosity. The beauty of tightening insurance fraud laws is that North Korea cannot say anything in response—for to do so would be to admit to the fraud. At worst, North Korea might respond with some criticism of new insurance laws as unduly restrictive, or as opposed to a free-market economy. Given their 3000% inflation, their concern will be easy to ignore.

Critics might argue that North Korea will simply switch to other types of financial fraud. But this is a negligible objection. First, nothing prevents North Korea from doing these unspecified other types of fraud in the first place (in fact, North Korea already counterfeits US currency on a noticeable scale). Therefore, presumably if these other frauds were lucrative, North Korea would already be doing them, or doing them to a greater extent than it is. Even supposing North Korea could simply increase its other kinds of fraud and make the same money it now makes, this switch would take several years and a re-tooling of the regime’s expertise in fraud. These several years could buy the US and like-minded countries valuable time in bringing North Korea’s nuclear program to heel.

A further advantage of stemming the flow of reinsurance fraud revenue is that doing so is unlikely to hurt the average North Korean. Cutting off food aid might do so, but since the regime is using the money from fraud to buy itself big guns and fast cars anyway, the North Korean people have little to lose. Lastly, new approaches are needed because UN resolutions have simply not been effective in the past. Although SCR 1718 (2006), which froze assets relating to weapons programs, is often cited as a successful measure, it was not ultimately sufficient to stall North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, as a nuclear device was tested soon after. Overall, UN resolutions are cast in the form of rebukes after North Korea tests a weapon and seem to be more “crying over spilled milk” than impeding North Korea’s aggressive aims.

A measure which forced US banks to cut off all transactions with Banco Delta Asia, a bank which does substantial business with North Korea, illustrates how effective an approach aimed at cutting off North Korea’s supply of foreign currency can be. Kim Kwang Jin called the case “frightening” to the regime, and it was soon after this that North Korea returned to multilateral talks. But tightening reinsurance fraud laws is even better. Whereas North Korea could plausibly argue that US actions in the BDA case were highly prejudicial to its interests, and that the US was demonstrating its typical bullying behavior as the “bad guy,” such arguments do not hold much water for reinsurance. Here, the US can easily claim it is just interested in making sure the reinsurance industry runs as efficiently as possible, and that these new laws are not directed at any one country. This would leave North Korea with little negotiating leverage.

How might this strategy be implemented? First, reinsurance corporations need to learn to better detect fraud and avoid it. So far, insurance companies have been remarkably poor at detecting North Korean reinsurance fraud because the North Koreans split their reinsurance up into many small packages to diminish suspicion. For instance, in a 2005 judgment in London, Lloyd’s lost $58 million on a case that was likely fraudulent. North Korea also operates under front companies to conceal the country where the risk originates and moves from country to country, much like a con man moving from town to town before the populace of each town catches on. Governments can play a role in disseminating the information. An international information clearinghouse on reinsurance fraud might be established, so that reinsurers could immediately find out which companies have had large and questionable claims on a regular basis in the past and avoid them. This clearinghouse might also have an arm to investigate currently operating companies and pin down how they are interconnected. This would remedy the fact that the North Koreans often operate using shell companies that appear to be based in other countries.

Second, governments should consider requiring reinsurance companies to administer claims only under the laws of the country where the reinsurance company is based. This would prevent claims being decided under North Korean law, which is a sure-loss situation for any reinsurance company. Another piece of legislation might demand that any reinsurance claim be considered void unless it could be investigated by the reinsurer, which would prevent North Korea from fudging paperwork and then barring investigation by those paying. Finally, reinsurance companies that do choose to work with North Korea should be legally compelled to pay North Korean claims in North Korea won rather than in a hard currency.

In closing, the international community should use tightened reinsurance laws as part of its broad strategy to pressure the North Korean regime. Its current tactics of UN condemnations and broad based sanctions are too clumsy and reactive to handle the dynamic and difficult challenge of containing North Korea’s nuclear program. Reinsurance reform is a more sensible and subtle economic alternative.

Until its final moments, the recent coup in Honduras was both constitutional and democratic. However, the final complication led the United States to condemn the removal of then-President Manuel Zelaya, and so lose sight of its longer-term strategic goals in Latin America. The U.S. needs to reconsider its stance on the matter and start pursuing a wiser policy.

The story started when former president Zelaya called a referendum, in March of this year, to alter the constitution and allow him to run for a second term. Article 239 of the Honduran Constitution limits presidents to one term, and this article is one of a very limited, important group that cannot be amended as per Article 374. Those who attempt an amendment are automatically and immediately prohibited from holding public office for ten years.

The Supreme Court dutifully declared the referendum unconstitutional, but Zelaya ignored the court and ordered the military to provide security for his referendum. When top military official General Romeo Vasquez refused, Zelaya fired him, prompting the resignations of the service chiefs of the army, marines, and air force. On June 25, the Supreme Court ordered Zelaya to reinstate Vasquez and the National Congress began to investigate Zelaya.

At last, the court issued an arrest warrant for President Zelaya. Again in accordance with the constitution, it ordered the military to enforce the order. By this point, the Supreme Court, the top Honduran electoral body, the human rights ombudsman, and the National Congress had all opposed Zelaya’s referendum. The National Congress removed him from office and named Roberto Micheletti as the new president, in accordance with the rules of succession. All this was, until the final stage, a perfect example of constitutional democracy stopping potential abuse of power.

The crucial misstep came when, instead of arresting Zelaya, the military deported him. The U.S. joined much of the world, including sudden friends of democracy like Venezuela and Cuba, in declaring the events a breach of democracy at the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS). Zelaya should have been arrested and tried in the sunlight, not deported in a manner reminiscent of darker periods in Latin American history, but this misstep should not be allowed to spoil the entire process.

The U.S. seems fixated on that final wrench thrown in by the military, and in doing so, has ignored both liberal – in the international relations sense – and realist logic. President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton are correct that the Honduran military did not follow the letter of the law. But as President Obama frequently remarks, the U.S. cannot let the perfect be the enemy of the good.

The constitution and the other branches of government stopped an abuse of power in a nation and a region all too familiar with such abuses. Zelaya’s removal, with the exception of the military’s decision to deport and not detain, was the proper functioning of a constitutional system of checks and balances. Unlike previous generations of strongmen, Zelaya did not seek to abolish the constitution, but he did attempt to tinker with it in violation of the will of its democratic authors. Observers must resist being taken in by the democratic façade of this new authoritarianism that Zelaya was pursuing. The Honduran constitution is strict about term limits precisely to prevent power grabs like Zelaya’s. As such, his removal from office should be cause for the United States’ support.

Even democratically elected leaders can become threats to democracy by abusing their power. Hugo Chavez, the democratically elected president of Venezuela, has sought to dress up authoritarian rule in the guise of democracy by amending his own country’s constitution to expand the executive’s power and extend term limits. Zelaya received both the idea and the tools for his assault on democracy from Chavez; Venezuela provided the very ballots to be used in his referendum. In so doing, Zelaya joined Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Cuba as an ally of Chavez and his model of authoritarianism.

The U.S. goal of promoting democracy, whether for strategic or altruistic purposes, demands that Washington discourage Latin American politicians from this path. Imperfect but constitutionally minded processes like the coup in Honduras can defend democracy against attacks like Zelaya’s power grab.

It must be reaffirmed that the U.S. has disgracefully supported anti-democratic Latin American coups in years past, but the real threat to democracy today is from Latin American strongmen, not the United States. Obama deserves credit for taking pains to avoid behaving in a way that reinforces the specter of the imperialist yanqui. Unfortunately, President Obama seems to have worried too much about how he would look and not enough about how he should act. When governments like Honduras’ seek to stem abuses of power and when the U.S. can responsibly support them, Washington should firmly stand with its ideological allies. This does not mean the U.S. should offer full-throated approval of the flawed actions, but it does mean that we should provide assistance to a government that chose democracy in a region where self-proclaimed enemies of the United States stifle representative government.

Questions of alliances should also concern realists looking at the situation. President Obama linked arms with Chavez, who has slowly but explicitly sought to marshal allies and resources against US policies in Latin America. Chavez has amassed arms and nationalized natural resources like oil, directly challenging the U.S. and its allies. He allied Venezuela with the regime in Iran (the same one seeking a nuclear weapon) in a quest to counterbalance U.S. strength, and sought economic arrangements in Latin America to counter U.S. economic interests. President Obama should have no illusions about Chavez’s dreams. After all, he told the United States to “go to hell” in 2007.

If cold-blooded realism actually held sway in Washington, as some claim it does, then the State Department would not be seeking to reinstate an enemy who has allied himself with Chavez – and, according to new reports, with the Colombian narco-terrorist group FARC – while Chavez seeks to counter U.S. power with allies, arms, and oil. The situation in Honduras offers an uncommon opportunity where liberal principles and realism agree and point to one policy – that very policy which America has eschewed.

In spite of these arguments, the Obama administration reacted to the “coup” by cutting aid to Honduras, revoking the visas of some of its officials, and joining hands with rogue regimes in repeatedly condemning Honduras for standing up to its president. It is not too late for the United States to reverse that course and follow good practice and great ideals to sound policy by increasing aid. Of course, given the self-assured position already taken by President Obama, such a reversal will not be easy.

First, in the short-term, the U.S. should make its goal pragmatic cooperation with the interim government. Obama and Clinton have unwisely boxed themselves in by supporting the OAS and UN condemnation. For self-identified realists, they left themselves with little strategic — or even tactical — flexibility. What little leeway they still have should be used to switch to cooperation. This is not a self-serving, hypocritical change in tone, but an honest appraisal of a delicate situation that requires more than knee-jerk condemnation.

Obama should also resume normal aid to Honduras, stop ignoring Honduran diplomats, and accelerate cooperation with the interim government. President Obama has offered engagement to true enemies of the United States, so a democracy like Honduras should be no problem. In fact, Obama should seek additional aid for Honduras. The interim government is the one recognized by the legislature, in line with the actions of the judicial branch. Zelaya is a man who has been removed from office, as the constitution requires. Neither a true realist, nor a true friend of democracies in the region, could ignore those facts.

In the longer term, Obama needs to steer the international community to diplomatic recognition of the Micheletti government. The U.S. and other governments cannot continue to ignore what is an imperfect but democratic state, which deserves a functioning government and redemption from its unfair pariah status on the world stage.

From both realist and liberal perspectives, it seems unwise to support a foe in the face of a growing threat to U.S. interests in the region and condemn a democracy in a very difficult situation – a democracy which managed to act with considerable poise and which provided an example to other democrats in the region. It is no wonder, then, if the people of Honduras question why President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Ali Khameini in Iran managed to get the benefit of the doubt from Obama this summer during their rigged elections, but the Micheletti government gets no patience.

Heading into fall 2009, the United States has unambiguously recognized the threat of Iranian nuclear proliferation. President Obama, Secretary of State Clinton, and other high-level U.S. officials have stated that Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon is unacceptable and have deemed Iranian non-proliferation to be a high priority. For the past few years, however, much of the international community has been less critical than the U.S., and the United States’ near unilateral approach to diplomacy and economic sanctions has been futile. Now, with the true nature of Iran’s regime—an authoritarian regime—on view for the world to see after Iran’s disastrous and violent June 12th elections, more and more international players are realizing the dangers of a nuclear Iran, whose missile range already includes much of southern Europe. Sunni Arab states in the Middle East, too, have become fearful of the potential for Shia regional hegemony; though they have not publicly condemned Iran’s actions, some, like Saudi Arabia, have begun exploring nuclear programs of their own, which will likely spark a Middle Eastern arms race.

The Obama Administration must capitalize on Iran’s diminished international legitimacy by signing the economic sanctions bill to be passed by Congress, if and when upcoming Iranian negotiations fail. Economic sanctions would have a strong effect on the Iranian regime because of its current internal unrest and meaningful economic weaknesses. The administration should pursue multilateral sanctions even without the support of Russia and China, who have been reluctant to cooperate with the U.S. on the issue. Incomplete international cooperation on sanctions would still be sufficient to put significant pressure on the Iranian regime.

Internationally, the Iranian government has been delegitimized because of the seemingly fraudulent reelection of President Ahmadinejad and its bloody aftermath. The numerous accounts of unwarranted arrests, tortured prisoners, and coerced confessions have exposed Iran’s regime for what it truly is: authoritarian. Western countries, including many in Europe, who engaged eagerly with Iran previously have started sending lower-level officials to meet with Iranian leaders in place of typical high-level members of government, a tangible sign of Iran’s decreased standing in the international community. Also, for weeks after the fraudulent election, large groups of protesters decrying Iran’s government could be seen in cities around the world.

Although some nations may have previously been willing to accept a nuclear Iran, or at least concluded that thwarting Iran’s nuclear ambitions would come with too high of a cost, they have concluded differently after the June 12th elections. Britain especially has reason to fear Iran, as it has become the regime’s latest target of aggressive rhetoric. Canada, which is home to 120,000 Iranian-Canadians, has publicly condemned Iran’s violent post-election crackdowns and now sees Iran as an adversary. The post-election fallout over the summer has led nations such as France and Germany, who previously disagreed with the US over how to approach Iran, to jump on the multilateral sanctions bandwagon. As Iran condemns these and other nations that previously supported a soft-line strategy against Iranian nuclear ambitions, it will find itself with increasingly little international support.

Domestically, Iran is divided. Much of the Iranian public is upset over the corrupt elections and the subsequent violent crackdown. There is even disagreement within President Ahmadinejad’s conservative government over cabinet firings and appointments, suggesting that Ahmadinejad and Grand Ayatollah Khameni (who has ultimate sovereignty in the country) are becoming even weaker. For Iran, the combination of the loss of international legitimacy and internal weakness make new sanctions quite promising.

Fortunately, the US Congress will likely pass these proposed sanctions in the form of the Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act sometime this year. These sanctions prevent any company that exports refined petroleum to Iran from doing business with the United States. Although Iran is a well-known oil producer, it does not have sufficient capacity to refine all of its oil and thus imports 40% of the refined petroleum it consumes. The goal of the sanctions would be to prevent Iran from attaining much of its refined petroleum, which could substantially increase fuel and transportation prices in Iran, all of which would put severe pressure on the Iranian government to make concessions concerning its nuclear program.

First, however, it is important to address the critics who say that economic sanctions will not work because they harm the country’s civilians, not its government, and that civilians’ plight usually has no effect on an authoritarian regime. In Iran, dissatisfaction and anger would have a tremendous effect on the government. Iranian civilians already have shown a willingness to protest and put pressure on the regime when they feel harmed, as exhibited in the post-election protests. Although the government managed to crack down on the election unrest, cripplingly high fuel prices may serve as the proverbial “final straw” and cause an uproar in an even larger segment of the population.

For sanctions to work, it is important that the Iranian people be willing to give up their nuclear weapons program. Though a World Public Opinion poll from August 2008 found that around 90% of Iranians supported their country’s development of nuclear energy technology, only 51% wanted their country to obtain nuclear weapons. And about 70% of Iranian would favor giving up nuclear weapons ambitions in exchange for trade and/or technological development assistance. Though there is not recent polling data on the issue, the number of Iranians favoring weapons development has likely decreased following the election as Iranians have become dissatisfied with their government and come to see the nuclear program as a source of isolation, both diplomatic and economic.

Previous U.S. sanctions have had varying degrees of success. Some, such as the 1996 Iran Sanctions Act, forced refined petroleum companies to choose between doing business with Iran and doing business with the United States. Although some companies terminated business with Iran, others preferred to sacrifice their business with the US. For example, the French petroleum company Total chose, in ’96, to divest its US holdings and pursue its business with Iran. Strong multilateral sanctions, however, could force companies to make the opposite choice. Iran’s largest petroleum importers are Vitol, a Swiss firm, Trafigura (Swiss/Dutch), Total (French), Glencore (Swiss), British Petroleum, and Reliance (Indian). These firms all do a lot of business in Western Europe, so that multilateral sanctions including France, Germany, and the U.K. would put pressure on them to cut ties with Iran. Already, German companies are feeling the pressure of existing sanctions against Iran, and new, pan-European sanctions could cause them to sever business ties with Iran completely. And Total, who now does business with both the US and Iran (after President Clinton waved the ’96 sanctions), may choose to sever its ties with Iran this time around.

There is some hope that Russia and China may sign onto such sanctions, or, if not enforcing sanctions themselves, at least not undermine US and European sanctions. Russia’s defiant move last summer in vetoing a fourth set of United Nations sanctions was a result of tense US-Russian relations after the Georgian-Russian war. Now, however, as President Obama has labored to improve relations with Russia, the country seems more willing to cooperate with the US on Iran. Russia has already put an arms deal with Iran on hold, and analysts suggest that this might signal willingness to get on board with new multilateral sanctions. China, aiming to attain trade concessions from the U.S., may support sanctions if properly enticed.

But even if Russia and China do not sign onto sanctions, the decrease in refined petroleum providers will still put pressure on Iran. China and Russia may be markets for crude oil and a source of manufactured goods, but neither country has the technology or knowledge that Iran so desperately needs to expand its petroleum refining capabilities and natural gas production. Neither nation has the refining capacities to supply Iran with refined petroleum if it loses supply from multinational firms. Also, although Iran has the second largest natural gas reserves in the world, it is a net importer of natural gas, partially because the flow of technologies from the West to tap this gas has largely been shut off. Thus, sanctions that further cripple Iran’s access to refined petroleum and natural gas technologies will have significant effects regardless of China and Russia’s cooperation.

Perhaps the threat of these sanctions might force Iran to seriously engage in talks. The Iranian government, wary of a revolutionary unrest caused by a very high oil shortage, might be pressured to make concessions due to fears of being overthrown. Such an outcome is surely hoped for, but Iran’s track record suggests that is not likely. The Obama Administration’s best option going forward is to get members of the international community on board for sweeping economic sanctions, enter negotiations with Iran threatening these sanctions as the outcome for stalled and fruitless negotiations, and vigorously enact the sanctions—all the while implicitly courting the Iranian population as an ally. These steps have the potential to lead Iran to forgo its nuclear ambitions. In fact, that is just the outcome that NYU Professor Bruce Bueno de Mesquita forecasts in his game theory computer analysis, which has been known to successfully predict the outcome of international negotiations. Bueno de Mesquita’s program describes a scenario in which, due to pressure on the Iranian regime, it stops its development of a nuclear bomb in early 2010, when it is just “at the brink” of realizing a nuclear weapon.