A person who walks from Casablanca to Beijing today will pass through more than a dozen countries that have faced civil unrest since the start of 2011. Some, like Egypt and Tunisia, have exploded only in recent months, whereas others, like Iraq and Afghanistan, have been ongoing conflicts. The most dangerous of these situations, however, lies to the east of those countries: Pakistan. Pakistan has undergone decades of tumult and is now on a trajectory toward disaster following the assassinations of two high-ranking reformers. Given Pakistan’s status as a nuclear power and a NATO ally, the U.S. must step up its efforts to maintain stability in the country. If Pakistan falls into disarray, then the U.S. will lose a strategic regional partner and, even worse, its credibility as a reliable ally towards other countries.

The cornerstone of any American policy toward Pakistan should be a careful balancing act between long-term and short-term interests. The former is a central reason why President Obama recently asked for a significant increase in aid to Pakistan to help provide basic government services like education. Considering Pakistan’s 50 percent literacy rate and the strong presence of religiously conservative and militaristic madrassa (schools), American support for government-run schools is a terrific idea for improving Pakistan’s prospects down the road. Standard humanitarian gifts like these, however, fail to address problems like government corruption, which might divert well-intentioned public funds into private pockets. They also fail to address the short-term problems already fermenting, such as Pakistan’s increasingly radical middle class. If this burgeoning radicalism leads to an anti-American government, then long-term American-funded investments will not yield the desired returns of stable and moderate politics. The U.S. must act decisively and soon, then, with an eye on achieving short-term goals.

At the same time, any policy should aim to genuinely benefit the Pakistani people and, more importantly, provide them the means to help themselves. In addition to the immediate benefits to Pakistanis, this course of action would improve America’s standing with the Pakistani government and populace. Such improvement would make Pakistan more likely to support American initiatives such as counterterrorism, aiding its efforts in the region.
This was the position that former Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke advocated. He argued that Pakistani organizations should spend their aid money quickly, instead of allowing it to circulate among American contractors or within the American government. In 2009, Congress allocated $1.51 billion a year, for a period of five years solely for civilian aid to Pakistan. Out of the $1.51 billion allocated in the 2010 fiscal year, a GAO report showed that only $179.5 million (less than 12 percent) was actually spent. Such a discrepancy between America’s promises and actions is unacceptable. Before Congress debates whether or not to allocate additional funding, the U.S. should use the remaining 88 percent.

However, it is important that the U.S. provide Pakistan with this financial backing while not dictating policy; the U.S. cannot afford to be perceived as trying to manipulate Pakistan’s internal affairs. A few years ago, heavy-handed American policies triggered anti-American resentment, led extremist clerics to rally anti-government support, and fueled tensions between Washington and Islamabad. The clearest solution to this potential problem is to allow Pakistanis themselves to decide how to enact policies, with Americans offering only general directions or recommendations. This would require the U.S. to provide aid and funding with fewer strings attached.

The best way for America to help Pakistan is to use a carrot-and-stick model with civilian and military support. The American government should give a higher-than-normal amount of aid this year and outline a handful of modest policy goals for the Pakistani government, such as building a certain number of new highways or reducing corruption by a certain percent (to be determined by international standards and an organization affiliated with neither nation’s government). If the Pakistanis succeed in meeting these goals, the U.S. should continue providing a large amount of aid along with a set of more ambitious goals. If Pakistan fails to meet these goals, the U.S. should reduce its support to levels lower than the current ones and wait until the goals are met. During this waiting period, the support should not drop so low that there is danger of a government collapse. Current levels of aid like the GAO-estimated $179.5 million could provide an approximation of this lower limit; Pakistan’s current situation is precarious, yet it is unlikely that the government will fall in the next few months.

These goals should begin by aiming for as little controversy as possible. In this way, such goals would support government effectiveness rather than the fight against the Taliban: the latter would likely draw accusations of American heavy-handedness and imperialism. Only after a few rounds of goals should the Taliban even enter the list of top priorities. The benefit of this model is that it allows the Pakistanis, the people who best know their country, to decide how to achieve the goals and build an independent and effective government.
A key early step would be to work with Pakistanis to build a well-funded anti-corruption agency modeled on similar agencies in other countries. Developing this organization does not have to be combative, with Americans pressuring a resistant Pakistani government. For example, the U.S. could stress that favorable reviews from the agency could open the door to more aid to Pakistan in the future. Some corruption is inevitable in the interim, especially if the amount of American money reaching Pakistan increases, but the U.S. should have realistic rather than idealistic goals for lost funds; well-intentioned efforts to monitor aid spending is what is preventing America from fulfilling its promised contributions, and an under-funded Pakistani government cannot build the administrative infrastructure necessary to root out corruption. A more flexible carrot-and-stick approach, mixed with realistic goals, should break the existing vicious cycle.

By encouraging the Pakistani government as a whole to improve, the goals can also become a trial by fire for Pakistan’s policymakers and help identify whom the U.S. and the Pakistani people can trust as effective leaders. The Pakistani government’s incentivized yet organic improvement would turn the tide against radicalism by providing a viable alternative. At the same time, the stick part of the model would encourage Pakistan not to actively work against American interests (as it now does by supporting certain terrorist groups).

Perhaps the most daunting feature of Pakistan’s problems is their interconnectedness. The U.S. must help solve multiple problems at once in order to solve any, yet this also means that improving one aspect of the nation requires improvements in several others. Consequently, the Pakistani government has struggled and radical fundamentalism has grown more popular. Left unchecked, this fundamentalism will endanger American interests in Pakistan and threaten regional stability. It is therefore critical that America and Pakistan work together to prevent Pakistanis from plunging into instability. If the U.S. defers its duty to other countries or to international organizations, it will renege on its commitment to the Pakistani government and run the risk that less or even no additional support reaches Pakistan. Because of America’s alliance with Pakistan, access to resources, power on the international stage, and ability to act more efficiently than some large international group, it therefore falls to the U.S. to help Pakistan keep its democracy and its hopes of modernization alive.

In order to build a stronger Pakistan, the resource in shortest supply is time. Pakistan’s historic instability, governmental weaknesses, and increasing radicalization threaten to depose the current leaders. If that happens, the replacement would likely tolerate, if not support, the Taliban and its repressive ideology in a country with nuclear weapons and more than five times Afghanistan’s population. Therefore, America cannot afford to ignore Pakistan amidst the flaring regional unrest or wait until other nations stabilize. It should move Pakistan off the back burner as soon as possible, or the decade-old alliance could explode in America’s face.

Termed “the most dangerous place on Earth” by CIA officials in 2007, Pakistan is among the most crucial fronts in the war against Islamic terrorism. The nation’s mountainous Waziristan region is a Taliban stronghold, and the presumed hideout of many high-level al-Qaeda operatives. Unfortunately, the nation’s vested interest in U.S. anti-terror efforts has not translated into successful cooperation. Despite pledges of support, Pakistan’s attempts to supplement U.S. efforts in the region have been largely unsuccessful. As recently as April of this year, Taliban forces were able to capture Pakistan’s Swat Valley, a region within 100 kilometers of Islamabad. Though Swat has since been reclaimed, the episode was yet another example of Pakistan’s historic reluctance to turn fully against Islamic radicalism, and its preference for negotiation and compromise. This year, in a particularly dismaying example, the government attempted to defuse the conflict in Swat by simply meeting the militants’ demands and allowing the establishment of Islamic sharia law within the district. To no one’s surprise, this emboldened, rather than pacified, the militants, who soon occupied the entire Northwestern Frontier Province.

Pakistan has not given the Waziristan conflict the resources or the resolve it requires. A Defense Department official described the situation in these terms: “The government is too worried about its own political survival to take on the militants.” Still, if the U.S. is to salvage its anti-terror partnership with Pakistan, it must emphasize that strategies designed to appease the Taliban are unacceptable. Furthermore, the U.S. must understand that the crisis in Pakistan is not entirely a military endeavor. Current President Asif Ali Zardari heads a fragile, insecure government, the country’s disenfranchised and uneducated youth remain vulnerable to radical strains of Islam, and sympathy for Islamist groups lingers within Pakistan’s intelligence and security institutions. America must use its funds, resources and international clout to promote, first and foremost, a more robust secular educational system, one designed to inculcate democratic virtues and national pride among young Pakistanis.

That education is the only surefire cure for extremism has become a cliché, but in Pakistan it is highly applicable. Pakistan’s public education system has suffered enormous neglect over the past thirty years, and Islamic schools, madrassas, have filled the void. In 2002, approximately 10,000 Pakistani madrassas educated a total of 1.7 million students. Though only a small minority of these schools promote violent, anti-Western ideologies, almost all encourage prioritizing allegiance to the pan-Islamic ummah (community of believers) over national duty. The development of a competent secular educational system, dedicated to teaching not only reading and writing but also the value of democratic participation would help to cultivate a more vibrant and accessible political environment, getting into the non-military roots of the problem.

In 2007, a representative sample of 1,044 Pakistanis found that Osama bin Laden had an approval rating of 46%. Approval ratings of the Taliban and al-Qaeda were similarly high. Perhaps even more jarring, only 4% of respondents believed that the United States had good intentions in its War on Terror. Winning the hearts, minds and loyalties of the Pakistani people is as central to U.S. interests as anything happening in Waziristan; the U.S. must understand that donations to the Pakistani military, however generous, are unlikely to alter public opinion, especially given the historic tendency of the military to carve itself a role in civilian politics.

Thus, while the Pakistani military certainly does deserve continued American support, so too do the Pakistani people and their government. A strong, effective educational system, and more particularly the economic opportunities and civic virtues it would cultivate, would go a long way to fostering the growth of moderation, tolerance, and democracy in Pakistan. America can best improve its regional reputation by demonstrating tangible support for the social, and especially educational, needs of the Pakistani people. Future aid should be directed more towards public programs than military enhancement. Additionally, financial assistance should be targeted not merely at projects of local development, but also towards the Pakistani government’s own attempts at systemic reform.

In June 2009, as Pakistani troops were retaking Swat, Osama bin Laden released an audio recording to Al Jazeera, the Arabic-language television network. He claimed that the Waziristan war was “an American, Jewish and Indian plot”, whose ultimate aim was to weaken Pakistan in the face of Indian aggression and American imperialism. Appealing to historic Pakistani insecurities, bin Laden attempted to deflect attention from the thousands of Pakistanis killed and the millions displaced by the current conflict. Against such an enemy, America must recognize that education is its strongest defense; only with a holistic appreciation of the conflict will Pakistanis be able to recognize that their deadliest foe is extremism itself.