Termed “the most dangerous place on Earth” by CIA officials in 2007, Pakistan is among the most crucial fronts in the war against Islamic terrorism. The nation’s mountainous Waziristan region is a Taliban stronghold, and the presumed hideout of many high-level al-Qaeda operatives. Unfortunately, the nation’s vested interest in U.S. anti-terror efforts has not translated into successful cooperation. Despite pledges of support, Pakistan’s attempts to supplement U.S. efforts in the region have been largely unsuccessful. As recently as April of this year, Taliban forces were able to capture Pakistan’s Swat Valley, a region within 100 kilometers of Islamabad. Though Swat has since been reclaimed, the episode was yet another example of Pakistan’s historic reluctance to turn fully against Islamic radicalism, and its preference for negotiation and compromise. This year, in a particularly dismaying example, the government attempted to defuse the conflict in Swat by simply meeting the militants’ demands and allowing the establishment of Islamic sharia law within the district. To no one’s surprise, this emboldened, rather than pacified, the militants, who soon occupied the entire Northwestern Frontier Province.

Pakistan has not given the Waziristan conflict the resources or the resolve it requires. A Defense Department official described the situation in these terms: “The government is too worried about its own political survival to take on the militants.” Still, if the U.S. is to salvage its anti-terror partnership with Pakistan, it must emphasize that strategies designed to appease the Taliban are unacceptable. Furthermore, the U.S. must understand that the crisis in Pakistan is not entirely a military endeavor. Current President Asif Ali Zardari heads a fragile, insecure government, the country’s disenfranchised and uneducated youth remain vulnerable to radical strains of Islam, and sympathy for Islamist groups lingers within Pakistan’s intelligence and security institutions. America must use its funds, resources and international clout to promote, first and foremost, a more robust secular educational system, one designed to inculcate democratic virtues and national pride among young Pakistanis.

That education is the only surefire cure for extremism has become a cliché, but in Pakistan it is highly applicable. Pakistan’s public education system has suffered enormous neglect over the past thirty years, and Islamic schools, madrassas, have filled the void. In 2002, approximately 10,000 Pakistani madrassas educated a total of 1.7 million students. Though only a small minority of these schools promote violent, anti-Western ideologies, almost all encourage prioritizing allegiance to the pan-Islamic ummah (community of believers) over national duty. The development of a competent secular educational system, dedicated to teaching not only reading and writing but also the value of democratic participation would help to cultivate a more vibrant and accessible political environment, getting into the non-military roots of the problem.

In 2007, a representative sample of 1,044 Pakistanis found that Osama bin Laden had an approval rating of 46%. Approval ratings of the Taliban and al-Qaeda were similarly high. Perhaps even more jarring, only 4% of respondents believed that the United States had good intentions in its War on Terror. Winning the hearts, minds and loyalties of the Pakistani people is as central to U.S. interests as anything happening in Waziristan; the U.S. must understand that donations to the Pakistani military, however generous, are unlikely to alter public opinion, especially given the historic tendency of the military to carve itself a role in civilian politics.

Thus, while the Pakistani military certainly does deserve continued American support, so too do the Pakistani people and their government. A strong, effective educational system, and more particularly the economic opportunities and civic virtues it would cultivate, would go a long way to fostering the growth of moderation, tolerance, and democracy in Pakistan. America can best improve its regional reputation by demonstrating tangible support for the social, and especially educational, needs of the Pakistani people. Future aid should be directed more towards public programs than military enhancement. Additionally, financial assistance should be targeted not merely at projects of local development, but also towards the Pakistani government’s own attempts at systemic reform.

In June 2009, as Pakistani troops were retaking Swat, Osama bin Laden released an audio recording to Al Jazeera, the Arabic-language television network. He claimed that the Waziristan war was “an American, Jewish and Indian plot”, whose ultimate aim was to weaken Pakistan in the face of Indian aggression and American imperialism. Appealing to historic Pakistani insecurities, bin Laden attempted to deflect attention from the thousands of Pakistanis killed and the millions displaced by the current conflict. Against such an enemy, America must recognize that education is its strongest defense; only with a holistic appreciation of the conflict will Pakistanis be able to recognize that their deadliest foe is extremism itself.