On October 6th, President Barack Obama decided to put off a meeting with the Dalai Lama, who spent a week in Washington late last month. The occasion would have marked the first meeting between President Obama and the Tibetan spiritual leader. Instead, for the first time in eighteen years, the Dalai Lama visited Washington and did not meet with the President. Analysts in Washington were surprised that Obama deferred meeting with the spiritual leader, and his critics on the right harshly criticized him for doing so.

President Obama’s decision not to meet with the Dalai Lama indicates a broader shift in U.S. foreign policy in East Asia. After successfully hosting the Olympics last summer and improving its relationship with Taiwan, China is gaining power and influence and is now a member of the honorary “G2”—the ever-shrinking elite group of superpowers whose only other member is the United States. The Obama administration is working with a new—and potentially more dangerous—China and has calculated that the best way to maintain strong ties with the emerging power is to downplay the issue of Tibet and human rights concerns more generally. As part of this broader policy, Obama put off his visit with the Dalai Lama at least until after he meets with Chinese President, Hu Jintao.

The China-Tibet conflict has been a critical human rights and international relations issue for decades. China claims that Tibet has been part of its territory for four centuries, while Tibetans argue that they have been effectively independent for most of their history and possess their own distinct culture and ethnicity. These contentions turned into violent conflict last year during the Beijing Olympics, when a series of anti-Chinese protests broke out in Tibet. The issue even led to worldwide confrontations between pro-Tibetan and pro-Chinese demonstrators in Paris, London, and San Francisco. The U.S. government, as the leading advocate for human rights in the international community, responded to this incident by urging China to respect “the fundamental and universally recognized rights” set out in the Geneva Conventions.

The United States has generally taken a strong stance against violations of human rights in China. Former President George W. Bush awarded the Dalai Lama with the Congressional Gold Medal in the face of repeated warnings from China, making clear the United States’ support for the ideals of autonomy and freedom. But while Bush unwaveringly supported the expansion of democracy and human rights across the globe, Obama has proven willing to subordinate these ideals to shorter-term concerns. So given China’s meteoric rise to world power, Obama sees a more practical need to win China’s support for crucial economic and environmental policies.

But many in the U.S. rightly oppose this controversial policy shift. Indeed, Obama’s choice to avoid a meeting with the Dalai Lama was harshly criticized at home, especially on the right. Commentators have argued that the Dalai Lama’s visit symbolizes the U.S. influence in the realm of human rights. They claim that by shunning the spiritual leader Obama has demonstrated a lack of concerns for human rights issues, particularly in powerful states like China.

More generally, critics claim that the United States has become too economically dependent on China, and therefore too susceptible to China’s demands. In the current economic climate, this criticism may be the most salient. The economic downturn has created a delicate situation in which the U.S. struggles with national recession while China funds large fiscal deficits by buying U.S. treasury bills. As long as the U.S. remains beholden to China to finance its large national debt, China will have strong leverage over the U.S. on other crucial issues like human rights.

Unsurprisingly, the postponement of Obama’s visit has done nothing to ease tensions between the Chinese government and the Tibetan leader. Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said recently that the White House should not allow the Dalai Lama to engage in separatist activities in the U.S. and called the Dalai Lama a “wolf in monk’s robe.” In response, the Dalai Lama accused China of “acting like a child” and claimed his visits are anything but political. He added that he only sought genuine autonomy for Tibetans in China.

Compromises are an inevitable aspect of policymaking. In choosing to put off his meeting with Dalai Lama, Obama had to decide which foreign policy agenda was more important: pursuing human rights or cultivating a stronger relationship with Beijing. From a realist outlook, a nation acts rationally in pursuit of relative power; if China is steadfast in its policies toward human rights, pandering to them will not change their stance. Furthermore, if the U.S. yields to China’s demands it could give an unwarranted impression in the long-term as kowtowing to both U.S. voters and China itself.

President Obama is known for his diplomacy and commitment to peace. He should have used this skill for diplomacy to convince Chinese officials that the Dalai Lama’s visit was irrelevant to U.S.-China relations or perhaps even beneficial in resolving China’s conflict with Tibet. The Dalai Lama has historically maintained his role as a religious figure and not assumed a political position during his visits to the White House. The Dalai Lama has visited Washington ten times over the past eighteen years with no adverse affects on U.S.-China relations. President Obama should have pointed this out in defending the visit rather than acceding to Chinese interests on the issue.

China now has a powerful voice in international affairs that U.S. should not ignore. And though prudence is a desirable approach in politics sticking to the one’s belief and ideals is equally important. In the wake of his postponed visit with the Dalai Lama, Obama must maintain a balance between these two competing goals. He must not be afraid to stand on principle, even when it has short-term costs in international politics.

After months of deliberation and delay, the Iraqi Parliament has finally passed a new national electoral law, easing concerns that the United States might be forced to push back its intended August 2010 military withdrawal. With this final major obstacle to an American pullout dismissed, it is time for the U.S. to begin to make the most difficult of post-war ideological leaps: viewing Iraq as a normal state in its Near East policy calculations and not as a zone of conflict prioritized above all others. Moving forward, the U.S. should seek to maintain a special relationship with the Iraqi government, but only to an extent that does not cloud perceptions of Iraq’s autonomy. There is real potential for an independent Iraq to help develop a more secure and stable Persian Gulf. To this end, the U.S. should adopt a policy of respectful support, steering Iraq towards general objectives, but ultimately remaining well above the fray of Iraqi national politics.

Traditionally, the Persian Gulf had been a region of realpolitik power balancing, with Iraq, Iran, and the Arabian Peninsula dominating a tripolar system. The U.S. invasion of Iraq destroyed this arrangement, and the continued U.S. military presence in a number of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations makes its return unlikely. A resurgent Iraq, however, could do much to reduce regional tensions, especially between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Both of these nations have treated Iraq as somewhat of a proxy battlefield in recent years, supporting the Sunni and Shiite factions respectively in an effort to gain a friendly, rather than inimical, national neighbor. This contestation continues to destabilize the Persian Gulf and is detrimental to America’s broader regional agenda. Iraq’s great strategic value is its potential to mediate this tension; its strong religious ties with Iran and cultural ties with Saudi Arabia grant it a presence in both camps unmatched by any other country. To maximize this potential, the U.S. must begin to play a nuanced balancing game, allowing Iraq sufficient freedom to assert itself as an autonomous regional player, but remaining close enough to the country to influence and direct the repercussions of Iraq’s resurgence. Such a policy will be defined by three primary characteristics: the absence of U.S. involvement in Iraqi national politics, increased cooperation with the Iraqi government on a normalized international level, and American efforts to develop a strong relationship between Iraq and the GCC.

It would be wise for the U.S. to avoid involvement in Iraqi national politics for two reasons. First, for Iraq to balance relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran, both of those nations will have to trust in Iraq’s stability; unless those nations consider Iraq a credible threat and a credible ally, they will not enter a security framework dependent on it. Iraq can best prove its self-sufficiency by demonstrating an ability to solve its own domestic problems without foreign assistance. This will require the U.S. to sit responsibly on the sidelines of Iraqi politics. At times, doing so will be painful, but so long as a U.S. hand is seen to be steering Iraq, the rest of the region, especially Iran, will consider it an arm of the U.S. rather than an independent nation. For the U.S. to realize the potential benefits of a strong, internationally responsible Iraq, it must allow that nation to set and follow its own course.

Second, staying out of Iraqi politics is a wise strategy in consideration of America’s broader diplomatic agenda. The U.S. needs credibility to deal effectively with Near Eastern governments, and even appearing to intervene in Iraqi politics would damage America’s ability to act as an honest broker. A perception of America as a hypocritical, imperialist hegemon that pursues its own interests in the Near East already exists among some in the Arab world. Future American attempts to re-involve itself in Iraqi politics would only exacerbate fears that the U.S. is the second coming of the British Empire. Such a development would undermine the American capacity to constructively support reform-minded political factions across the Near East. It would also enhance the credibility of the anti-American narratives propagated by Islamic extremist groups and terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda. Conversely, minimizing U.S. involvement in Iraq improves our credibility and strengthens our ability to promote peace and stability in the Near East. Detractors will argue that Iraq’s currently weakened state makes its ascension to regional power a distant hope, and consequently, makes a hands-off American approach unwise. The U.S., however, is in the Persian Gulf for the long haul, and its Iraq policy needs to reflect a complementary level of strategic patience.

At the same time, it is not in the interest of the U.S. to give Iraq free reign. To maintain the ability to indirectly influence Iraq, America should work to increase political, economic, and social ties between the two nations. Importantly, it should pursue these aims at a level of normalized international relations, just as the U.S. would with Germany, India, or Brazil. The benefits of such an approach are twofold, bringing Iraq and the U.S. closer, while also improving Iraq’s international reputation. Strengthening economic and political ties with Iraq, the U.S. gains important leverage, giving it the ability to pressure the country outside of a military context. Social and cultural exchange programs, like encouraging Iraqi students to study in America, will also improve relations between the two nations. Strong ties between the U.S. and Iraq will allow American leaders to help shape future Gulf security relationships. They will also provide the U.S. with the option to call for Iraqi support on critical diplomatic issues, like slowing Iran’s quest for nuclear technology.

It might seem logical at this point to contend that if the U.S. wants to manipulate Iraq in the future, it should simply remain as intimately tied to it as possible. Such an arrangement, however, would ultimately limit Iraq’s value to the U.S., not increase it. Although American leaders could heavily employ Iraqi support on a few choice issues, Iraq’s ability to be a significant diplomatic actor on the regional and global stage would be severely diminished. The U.S. needs an Iraq that can lobby for it, but with the credibility of independence, not of a proxy. In the pursuit of such a future relationship, America should begin to afford Iraq the same respect that it would any responsible nation. Doing so offers a second benefit: when the U.S. treats Iraq as such the Iraqi government gains international prestige and the respect of other countries. This could do much to convince Iran and the GCC of Iraq’s autonomy and stability.

Finally, in the case that Iraq returns successfully to the regional stage, but is prevented from playing a balancing role by an uncooperative Iran, the U.S. should work to ensure that Iraq aligns itself with the American-allied nations of the GCC. To this end, the U.S. should encourage its Arabian Peninsula allies to foster economic and political ties with Iraq, especially in areas of mutual interest, like counterterrorism. At the same time, however, the U.S. should not deter Iraq from developing a relationship with Iran. Currently, without a diplomatic presence, American Tehran-watchers are essentially blind; even if Iraq can offer the U.S. only a small and cloudy window into the Iranian mentality, it will still be a marked improvement on the status quo.

The day is swiftly approaching when the U.S. will no longer be responsible for the day-to-day governing of Iraq. In consideration of this impending cleavage, it is time for American policymakers to begin considering the structure of a post-Iraq War Near East. The unique relationship the U.S. has developed with Iraq during its reconstruction will serve America well in the future, but the benefits of such a relationship can only be maximized if the U.S. is willing to treat Iraq as an autonomous international equal. If American leaders can smartly and efficiently make that transition, enduring peace in the Persian Gulf just may be attainable.