This past April, President Obama and President Dmitri Medvedev of Russia met in Prague to sign “New Start,” a bilateral nuclear arms-control agreement to replace the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) that expired at the end of 2009. Although the treaty has been credited by some observers as Obama’s most tangible foreign policy achievement, its ratification is less than certain in the face of substantial opposition from prominent Republicans, including Senators Jon Kyl and John McCain and former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney. Failure to ratify New Start would set back nuclear arms control efforts while creating a new element of uncertainty in US-Russian relations that would lead to a substantially less stable world.

New Start is fairly similar to START I. Both treaties limit each nation’s arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons and establish procedures for verifying treaty compliance. New Start differs from the original treaty in three primary areas: it lowers the limit on each nation’s strategic nuclear arsenal, imposes fewer verification measures, and adjusts rules for counting nuclear weapons. In spite of the general similarity between New Start and START I, which was ratified by a 93 to 6 vote in the US Senate and counted John McCain among its supporters, critics of the new treaty have found no shortage of reasons to oppose it.

Opponents’ criticism of New Start has generally fallen into four main areas. Critics argue, first, that the treaty will unacceptably restrict the development of American missile defense systems. Second, its omission of any limits on smaller, non-strategic nuclear weapons, in which Russia possesses a numerical advantage over the United States, has also drawn fire. Third, some opponents claim that the treaty’s verification measures are inadequate and question whether Russia will uphold New Start. Finally, treaty skeptics insist that New Start cannot be ratified unless the United States simultaneously makes an adequate commitment to modernizing its nuclear weapons. None of these criticisms, either alone or in tandem, are valid reasons for the Senate to refuse to ratify New Start.
Critics of New Start vastly exaggerate the restrictions the agreement places on American missile defense systems. The treaty’s preamble states that the United States and Russia recognize “the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms.” This statement, effectively a diplomatic gesture to assuage Russian concerns about American missile defense systems, is not a binding treaty provision. Russian diplomats could argue that further American missile defense plans would violate the spirit of the New Start preamble, but they could not argue that the United States is legally barred from developing missile defenses. Treaty opponents also complain that one part of the treaty prohibits the placement of missile interceptors in existing ballistic missile silos. It is important to realize that American missile defense plans do not involve missile silo conversion, and Lt. General Patrick O’Reilly, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, testified that the high cost of redesigning interceptors for existing silos would actually make silo conversion “a major setback to the development of [American] missile defenses.” New Start simply places no meaningful restrictions on the United States’ plans to develop missile defense systems.

The treaty skeptics’ argument that New Start is dangerous because it does not address smaller non-strategic, or tactical, nuclear weapons is counterintuitive. Certainly, Russia does possess more tactical nuclear weapons than the United States. However, neither START I nor any other U.S.-Russia arms control treaty contained limits on tactical weapons, so New Start will merely preserve the status quo in this matter. Furthermore, the new treaty was intended as a quick, uncontroversial replacement for START I that would merely be the prelude to a more comprehensive nuclear arms control agreement in the near future. By souring diplomatic relations between the two nations, refusing to ratify New Start would probably reduce the chances of the United States and Russia negotiating an agreement to limit tactical weapons.

Opponents of New Start further argue that Russia cannot be trusted to uphold the treaty and that the treaty’s verification measures will be inadequate to ensure Russian compliance. Granted, a State Department report released this summer found that Russia violated some of the verification provisions of START I. This report, however, also concluded that Russia upheld the “central limits” of START I. Given Russia’s record of general compliance with START I and the diplomatic costs Russia might suffer from committing major violations of New Start, it is highly unlikely that Russia would exceed the treaty’s limit on strategic warheads or largely ignore verification measures. Under New Start, the United States would have much more information about Russian nuclear weapons than it would otherwise have and so would be better able to detect expansions of Russia’s arsenal. Russia must retire much of its aging arsenal and has been unable to produce more than a small number of new strategic weapons over the past decade, so any significant, illicit expansion of Russia’s strategic arsenal would take years to achieve and be hard to miss. The United States would simply be much better off having some degree of information on Russia’s arsenal than it would be having no information at all, even if this does come with the cost of dismantling some American warheads.

Finally, a number of New Start skeptics insist that the treaty cannot be ratified without an accompanying commitment by the Obama administration to modernize America’s nuclear arsenal. However, this issue lacks any logical connection to New Start ratification. Considering the importance of the treaty to ensuring continued arms control negotiations, the Senate cannot afford to hold its ratification hostage to a largely unrelated policy debate.

Opponents of New Start ultimately seem to be criticizing the treaty on the grounds that American negotiators were unable to dictate the treaty terms. However, instead of asking whether New Start is ideal, Senators need to be asking whether the United States will be more secure with it than without it. If the treaty is ratified, the US will be entitled to information on Russia’s nuclear arsenal and have means of verifying this information. The ratification of New Start would also serve as a stepping stone to a more comprehensive arms control agreement that could address issues such as tactical weapons. At the very least, New Start could be expected to continue the fifteen years of nuclear arms cuts and strategic stability brought about by START I.

The future will be far less certain if the Senate does not ratify the treaty. Concerned about its ability to keep its arsenal and intent on maintaining equivalence with the United States, Russia could conceivably agree to concessions in a new treaty. An American refusal to ratify New Start, however, could also enrage Russia and vastly complicate any further efforts to negotiate a new nuclear arms control agreement. With fraying diplomatic relations, no nuclear arms control agreement, and no clear prospect for such a treaty, the United States and Russia could find themselves gradually expanding their nuclear arsenals and initiating a new nuclear arms race. In short, failure to ratify New Start would make the world less stable and more dangerous.

New Start is ultimately too important to American national security and international stability for the Senate to not ratify. Failing to ratify the treaty would be a major foreign policy blunder that could seriously damage diplomatic relations with Russia and even open the door for a renewed nuclear arms race. Unless the Senate wishes to create new challenges to American security and international stability, it must ratify New Start.

Iran’s nuclear program has been a major concern for the West since the beginning of the millennium. Iran has repeatedly violated both UN and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sanctions, suggested that Israel be wiped off the map, and supported terrorism based in Iraq, the Gaza Strip, and Lebanon. The United States’ unilateral strategy of negotiations and sanctions has been unsuccessful in achieving a sustainable settlement.Washington should consider other options in order to successfully deal with the crisis. To move negotiations forward, the U.S. should proceed with a regimen of multilateral sanctions to put pressure on Iran to negotiate seriously. Sanctions, along with focused and serious negotiations, are America’s best chance to disarm Iran and prevent military action.

The United States should study its previous attempts to end the Iranian nuclear crisis before moving forward. Under the Bush administration, the U.S. applied unilateral financial and economic sanctions against Iran, but with limited success. In the past, countries such as Russia and China provided many of the financial services that the U.S. sanctions denied Iran, and a number of international oil companies continue to do business with Iran in spite of the sanctions. Moreover, China, who seems driven foremost by its concern for feeding its massive appetite for oil, continues to invest in Iran’s energy and refining infrastructure.

Similarly, UN sanctions on weaponry and weapons technology were largely ineffective because Russia and China refused to meaningfully cooperate. In 2008, Russia negotiated a contract to sell Iran advanced anti-aircraft missile battery system—though Russia has yet to deliver the system—insisting that it was for defensive purposes and did not violate the sanctions. While in theory it is indeed a defensive system, the delivery of such weaponry can only harden Iran’s position in the negotiations because it enhances Iran’s ability to defend its nuclear facilities. In sum, for Russia and China, security and proliferation concerns take a back seat to economic gain.

Negotiations have been largely ineffective as well. While many in the West have praised the “agreement in principle” reached at recent talks in Vienna as a step forward, Western countries should be cautious of this perceived success. Under the Vienna Agreement, Iran would ship its stock of enriched uranium to Russia. The Russians and the French would then enrich the uranium into a form that could not be easily re-processed into weapons-grade material but could be used for non-military purposes. This plan, however, is subject to the approval of Ayatollah Khameini, the Iranian Supreme Leader, who is rumored to be against the agreement. In addition, many close to him, including the speaker of the Iranian Parliament, have criticized the framework as an attempt to deceive Iran.

Nonetheless, even if the Vienna Agreement were approved, the accord would still not prevent Iran from enriching uranium. If Iran chose, it could restock its supplies of enriched uranium again within a year. The agreement also does not prevent Iran from continuing research and development of its delivery capabilities. In addition, the agreement does nothing to address the fundamental question, which is how to alter incentives such that it is not in the current regime’s best interest to develop nuclear weapons. If adopted, the proposal would simply provide a temporary stopgap. The Vienna Agreement would give Iran the chance to stall and continue developing nuclear weapons, taking the West back to square one.

Even if a deal could be reached, a simple agreement with Iran will not be enough. The Iranian regime has a history of neither adhering to its international obligations nor cooperating with international authority. Iran, as a signatory nation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, is obligated to report to the IAEA any intention to build any nuclear facility. The regime did not report its uranium enrichment facility in Natanz until 2002, after it was fully operational. Iran likewise did not report the facility in Qom to the IAEA until Tehran realized that Western governments had discovered the facility’s existence. Furthermore, the regime has refused to allow its nuclear scientists to be questioned by the IAEA. If the U.S. and its allies are serious about preventing Iranian proliferation, they must insist on an enforceable agreement with a robust inspections regime.

The unsuccessful attempts at preventing Iran from continued development of nuclear weapons indicate that any response to Iran requires unified, international support. This summer’s election riots have presented the West with new options. The regime’s leaders appear not to want to confront external pressure and internal threats simultaneously. While Tehran has used negotiations to buy time, this new, unstable situation might make the regime amenable to meaningful settlement, especially if it faces multilateral pressure. There are a number of options available to entice and pressure the Iranians to submit to the will of the international community.

In the political sphere, the U.S., through Radio Farda—a Persian-language radio station based in Washington, D.C. and Prague—could amplify the voices of dissent with programming that provides a platform for Iranian exiles and expatriates. Internally, dissidents could be supplied with communication equipment not susceptible to jamming and other interference (such as satellite phones and sophisticated encryption equipment). The importance of communication within Iran is validated by the behavior of the theocratic regime—which moves swiftly to disrupt cellular and Internet communications at any sign of unrest.
In the economic sphere, multilateral leverage has significant potential. It is no secret that Iran’s economic situation is dire: It faces high unemployment (12 percent, according to the Iranian government), rampant inflation (28 percent, according to the Iranian government), corruption, and a lack of basic services. Iran’s economy depends heavily on petroleum exports, but without Western technological expertise, Iran’s oil production has steadily declined. According to a 2007 National Academy of Science study, Iran’s consumption of refined petroleum will outstrip its production of crude oil by 2015, effectively halting petroleum exports altogether. Furthermore, Iran lacks the capacity to refine petroleum and, as a result, imports 40 percent of its petroleum. The U.S. House of Representatives has already passed the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act, which would limit Iran’s ability to import gasoline. The Senate will likely approve the legislation in coming weeks. The U.S., through similar restrictions, should strengthen economic sanctions by convincing others to jump on board. European nations such as France, Germany, and Britain have expressed interest in such sanctions. In addition, Iran’s recent agreement to supply Turkmenistan with natural gas, which will ultimately supply all of Europe, competes with the Russian monopoly on gas, giving the Russians an incentive to support sanctions. This agreement would also give the Europeans more economic leverage over Tehran. Finally, a multilateral regimen of sanctions would force companies and financial institutions that do business in Iran to choose between continuing their transactions with Iran and doing business in the U.S. and in whichever European nations sign on to sanctions and few companies can afford to choose the former. While some have argued that enhanced sanctions might rally the Iranian people around the regime, only the opposite has happened thus far, as Iranians have blamed their regime for the country’s economic woes.

While proceeding with this new approach to Iran, however, the United States must try to ensure China and Russia’s support. While Chinese-Iranian economic interests are substantial, Chinese-U.S. economic ties are even more vital. China could be amenable to enforcing sanctions against Iran, as Beijing does not wish to deal with the economic consequences of a potential war between the U.S. and Iran that could result if the Iranian nuclear program is not stopped. In addition, the Russians, who are anxious about NATO, may be willing to enforce sanctions against Iran if the U.S. provides concessions on Russian security interests. A recent controversial overture by the U.S. to scale back missile shield deployment in Poland could be responsible for Russian officials more vocally supporting sanctions against Iran. Securing Chinese and Russian support for sanctions should be a top priority for the U.S.

Of course, the U.S. has never taken the military option off the table, and Israel has strongly hinted that it would consider using military force against Iran as well. Air strikes on Iran’s nuclear targets present a difficult tactical challenge, however. Iran’s nuclear facilities are distributed across the country, with some installations hidden underground, heavily fortified. Moreover, Iran has military assets throughout the Middle East with which it could retaliate against such a strike. In Iraq, Iran would almost certainly intensify support for the insurgency, endangering American troops and the already unstable democracy. In Gaza, Hamas could, at Iran’s instigation, unleash missile strikes into densely populated areas of Israel. Indeed, Iran itself has ballistic capability and could retaliate with its own missile strikes. Additionally, Iran could, in retaliation, finally make good on its threat to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40 percent of the world’s sea-transported oil and 90 percent of the Gulf’s oil output flows. Even if the U.S. were able to open the straits quickly, insurers would refuse to cover oil tankers passing through a conflict zone, effectively closing it to international commerce. Thus, superior firepower simply may not provide an effective solution to this problem, and could provoke a harsh response from the international community against the U.S. or Israel. As such, it is imperative that multilateral economic and political sanctions be applied instead of a military option.

To persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear program, the United States must employ multilateral cooperation and sanctions to convince Iran’s leaders that it is highly disadvantageous to continue nuclear development. A combination of economic, political, and social pressures could finally push Iran to accept an agreement. Iran has always used negotiations to stall because the price for delaying a negotiated settlement was significant but not crippling. The U.S. should make the price for stalling unacceptably high for Iran, in economic and political terms.