Imagine nation-state X.  It is a small country, a cultural and religious misfit among the dozens of larger nations that surround it.  Despite its size, X has amassed a disproportionately large military force to protect itself from potential threats from its unstable neighbors – one of which, Y, is a controversial theocracy that openly opposes the existence of X.

Y is known to be developing nuclear technology, a prospect that clearly threatens X.  Fearing that Y will develop weaponry capabilities, X develops a piece of malware – surreptitious software designed to interfere with another computer’s normal functions – to infect computers in Y’s nuclear plants and delay its production of nuclear technology.  Computers in Y and other nations around the world are temporarily crippled by the sophisticated contagion of X’s malware.

Years ago, such a crisis would have seemed to be an excerpt from a preposterous piece of science fiction kitsch, grounded in fanciful perceptions of computer capabilities.  Last month, however, the inevitable occurred – a piece of malware, Stuxnet, demonstrated that such futuristic fantasies have already become reality.

It is not hard to guess that X is Israel and that its suspected aggressor, Y, is Iran, set within a turbulent Middle East.  Although roughly 62,000 computers in Iran were recently attacked by “the most complex piece of malware in the history of computing,” it cannot be confirmed that the engineer of the malware was Israel. According to Graham Cluley, a computer security expert at the British firm Sophos, it is “very hard to prove 100 percent who created a piece of malware, unless you are able to gather evidence from the computer they created it on.”

Still, Ralph Langner, a computer scientist at Langner Communications, points out that “because the development requires much more resources than any … hacker group could afford,” Stuxnet must have been constructed by a wealthy and resourceful government with “insider information” concerning the computers targeted.  The list of governments with the motive and the capability is not very long.

Identity of the perpetrator aside, this incident raises an important possibility – that such malware should in fact be used to sabotage malevolent nations’ facilities when international sanctions and other methods of warning fail to suffice.  A more professionally designed malware program, under careful management, could serve as an excellent last resort to prevent violent actions from aggressor states, as well as threatened states who might take preemptive military actions.

How advanced could this malicious software be, and how do its capabilities inform the perpetrators’ motivation behind its production?  Sean McGurk, the head of the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, demonstrates that the Stuxnet virus can be contained in a single “blue rubber-clad swivel-style USB thumb drive.” This virus could, he explains, infiltrate any software that uses Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, or SCADA.

Most automated plants, including oil refineries, food production facilities, and nuclear reactors, use such software and are thus susceptible to the virus.  Once planted in these computers, Stuxnet can modify the programs’ functions while remaining hidden, rendering any changes invisible.

Given that over 60 percent of the computers infected by Stuxnet were located in Iran, it is plausible that the virus’ engineers had targeted the nuclear facilities at Bushehr and Natanz, which, according to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, its president, are being used strictly for civilian energy purposes.  Siemens AG, the German control systems conglomerate that built the Bushehr facility for the Shah of Iran in the 1970s, has confirmed the Iranian government’s claim that no significant harm was inflicted upon the facilities.  Although no permanent damage was done, Alan Bentley of Lumension said that the Bushehr plant “was not working properly for months.” Stuxnet’s perpetrator had therefore been successful in disabling the epicenter of Iranian nuclear innovation.

According to computer security experts, the Stuxnet virus is under control and no longer poses a threat.  The question that remains in its wake, however, is whether such cyberwarfare ought to become an accepted tool in the arsenal of warring states.

Indeed, other potential aggressors, from national governments to multinational corporations, could potentially use Stuxnet as a platform to build and launch their own malware.  Such tactics could ultimately become commonplace methods of espionage and sabotage from state and non-state actors alike.

Given its insidious ease and speed in “infecting” computers on a global scale, cyber sabotage is often decried as dangerous and cowardly.  But the Stuxnet incident also opens a provocative angle: if the malware is used to reduce the aggressive capabilities of a government that is internationally recognized as structurally backwards, defiant, and malevolent in its policy, then non-militaristic means of sabotage such as Stuxnet should perhaps be applauded for their ability to temporarily cripple their military potential.

With the advent of government-funded malware, aggressive or defiant nations could be neutralized without violence when diplomacy has failed.  North Korea, a nation that has flagrantly defied international sanctions and diplomatic agreements, could be paralyzed with advanced malware.  This would bypass the violence and almost certain loss of life associated with military force.

Naturally, such an approach remains contentious, and this must be addressed at both the national and international levels.  Leaders must weigh carefully the implications of such a frighteningly effective method of preventive action.  Governments should work together on joint regulations, which could be modeled after nuclear disarmament treaties.

Domestically, America should improve its cyber security to ensure that it is not susceptible to sabotage from abroad or within.  Bugs must be ironed out of any malware to prevent civilian computers from being accidentally attacked.

Despite these difficulties, we should consider the potential peaceful efficiency afforded by cyber sabotage.  Imagine a world in which defiant and malicious military actions can be stopped before they have begun.  Warfare fought by lifeless computers with viruses may ultimately prove to be better for us all than war fought by young men and women with guns.

The War on Terror, which began in Afghanistan and grew to encompass Iraq, is now making its way to Yemen. The Obama administration’s actions so far have been limited to providing monetary aid, ordering drone strikes, and dispatching a small number of intelligence officers to the area, but this strategy insufficiently addresses the lack of effective governance in Yemen. As the effort in Afghanistan has made evident, no amount of American expenditure will be enough to defeat al-Qaeda if there is not a strong central government ready to take over once the region has been stabilized. The US should focus on establishing a legitimately functional government in Yemen that can both govern the nation and combat al-Qaeda with minimal external assistance.

Because the US military is already heavily engaged in two countries, it cannot hope to fight successfully in yet another region. Nevertheless, Yemen will need assistance from the US to address its political and economic issues. The US recently raised the budget for military aid to Yemen from $67 million to $150 million. The American money will be used to finance military operations and train Yemeni soldiers, but an increase in military aid treats the symptoms rather than the disease. al-Qaeda occupies nations that are susceptible to its influence; its presence, therefore, is a symptom of the government’s ineffectiveness. The US government needs to recognize that al-Qaeda’s presence in Yemen demonstrates that the problems that allowed al-Qaeda to move into Yemen in the first place have yet to be resolved.

Yemen is already the poorest nation in the Arab world, and its oil—which accounts for 90 percent of its exports—is set to run out within the next decade. Yemen’s economic infrastructure needs restructuring from the ground up, but various financial crises have cut off foreign investments at crucial junctures, and internal strife has crippled the government’s own programs. Unfortunately, weapons sales have been one of its most consistent sources of revenue. There are approximately 60 guns for every 100 people in the nation, and streets are crowded with dealers selling everything from pistols to rockets. But even this limited, damaging economic activity is being threatened—Sana’a is in danger of becoming the first world capital to run out of water.

Yemen’s economic weakness is only one of the problems that allow for the presence of al-Qaeda. Another major factor is the weakness of the federal government, which many blame for the country’s frail economy. President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who has held the office since Yemen’s reunification in 1990, has squandered much of the nation’s wealth playing patronage politics; even now, he is trying to do so to assure his son’s succession to his position. He has also often used US aid that was expressly intended for counterterrorism to combat two insurgencies. Despite his flaunting of its authority, the US is unwilling to risk alienating one of its few supporters in the Middle East and has not confronted Saleh.

Those insurgencies are the other visible symptoms of the pervasive disease in Yemen’s government. In the north, the government has been fighting a civil war for six years against rebels known as the Houthis. Although their openly extremist views have raised concerns that their goal is to establish a fundamentalist Muslim state, the Houthis claim that their main goal is to mount a secular opposition to Saleh’s corrupt presidency. Their conflict with Saleh dates back to their failure to attain power after Yemen was unified in the 1990s. They then settled in the impoverished Sa’dah region, where the poor economic conditions have allowed them to cultivate support.
More recently, a secessionist movement has emerged in south Yemen due to various economic grievances against the north. People in the south claim that, since unification, the north has exploited their oil fields and given them nothing in return. This corruption can be traced back to Saleh, who has used money to retain control of the state.

These symptoms show precisely what is ailing Yemen: The people do not respect the government. This is largely because the Yemeni people no longer see Saleh as a legitimate leader. His influence has always been limited to a small radius around Sana’a; various tribal groups control the majority of the nation. Furthermore, Saleh has never managed to really connect with these tribes, and he has not been effective in stopping the Houthis. If Islamic fundamentalism and sectarian violence were avoided, there would still be a lack of faith in Saleh’s government. Regardless of al-Qaeda’s presence, Yemen is on the verge of state failure. Ridding it of al-Qaeda now will not prevent the return of al-Qaeda after the collapse of the state, and a civil war, which would inevitably follow the collapse of the state, would make it even more difficult to purge Yemen of the terrorist organization.

The recent operation in Marja, Afghanistan demonstrates the US military’s recognition of their primary failure in Afghanistan: By ignoring the state-building aspect of the operation, the US military negated the positive effects of training a local military and driving out terrorists. Reports coming out of Marja suggest that despite their training, the Afghani military is playing a much smaller part in the offensive than the American army. Lessons from Afghanistan are crucial for Yemen. The impulse for action has to come from within the country, and in order for that to happen, there must be a strong central government controlling the situation.

Although the US seems primarily concerned with counterterrorism in Yemen, US aid given for this purpose will be of little use, as the ineffectiveness of the Yemeni military and intelligence operatives will continue to hinder US efforts. Furthermore, any operations successful in eliminating al-Qaeda will simply leave a vacuum that will be filled by new terrorists. The solution is to fill that vacuum with a stronger Yemeni government now that can effectively unify the nation. In order to ensure that this happens, the US must direct its aid towards nation building. Because Yemen already has a government structure in place, the US must find a way to encourage the Yemeni people to recognize its legitimacy. Easing the southerners’ lack of faith may be aided by moving the capital, which may prove necessary in any case due to the water situation in Sana’a. In addition, the current distribution of seats in Yemen’s legislative body favors the region that was originally North Yemen, so redistricting would provide further amends. The US should also fund education and other social programs. To ensure cooperation, the continuation of American aid should depend on adherence to previous objectives.

The success of this plan may require that the US withdraw its unconditional support of Saleh. While the US may prefer a pro-Western leader, the cost simply may be too high. A truly authoritative government requires a high level of support within the nation that Saleh is unlikely to attain.

Ultimately, even if Al-Qaeda is eliminated now, allowing Yemen to remain a fragmented nation will leave the door open for al-Qaeda’s return. The past eight years in Afghanistan have demonstrated the futility of trying to remove al-Qaeda without also addressing the more fundamental problems of the country. The key to successfully driving al-Qaeda out of Yemen is not to continue attacking its strongholds. The means of finding a lasting solution for Yemen is to help stabilize the government, which would allow it to deal with the local faction of al-Qaeda on its own.

“We must reach out to all of our countrymen, even our disenchanted brothers,” affirms Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Mr. Karzai isn’t just echoing the counterinsurgency truism that victory requires winning over the population. Instead, he supports actively reaching out to the Taliban, including to its infamous leader, the one-eyed Mullah Omar. And though Pakistan stands squarely behind Karzai on this issue, the United States should not. On the contrary, the US should denounce reconciliation in the current Afghan climate as a genuinely unpalatable course. The Afghan government and its supporters need to exercise patience and focus on military operations, material incentives to undercut Taliban influence, and Pakistani cooperation for the time being. Only when the Taliban has been left in an unequivocally inferior negotiating position should reconciliation be considered.

At present, the Taliban leadership is in no mood to negotiate; its position is too strong. Even if, however, the Taliban leadership were somehow swayed in the coming weeks, and the government managed to produce a set of policies—amnesty, political participation, material incentives—sufficiently favorable as to induce Taliban cooperation, this would mean that an already unpopular, distrusted government would openly reward the very group that ruled tyrannically over the Afghani people before the American invasion, the group that has been at war with its own country since 2001.

This policy would doubtless run into serious backlash. Afghanis remain fundamentally bitter towards the United States; Americans were largely welcomed in 2001 as a hopeful improvement over the Taliban, but the gains for average Afghanis thus far have been small. If the American-backed Afghan government offers material incentives to the Taliban—that is, provides for the Taliban in a way that society as a whole has not been provided for—resentment towards the occupiers and the government will understandably deepen, especially amongst the ethnic Tajiks and Hazaras who have fought against the ethnically Pashtun Taliban. This is resentment, which a tenuous, disastrously corrupt government can ill afford. Indeed, by losing the support of the population, this would be to break counterinsurgency rule number one.

The even greater worry is that reconciliation would risk inviting a return to Taliban rule. The weak, unpopular Afghan government will only become exponentially more unstable when the United States and NATO inevitably reduce their presence. If reconciliation brings an intact Taliban back into the societal fabric—and, indeed, into the political process—there is a real danger that the progress made over the last eight years will be subverted by a gradual reentry of Taliban influence. Even if the Taliban agree to cut a deal and put down the guns, it cannot be expected to rethink or renounce the militant, retrograde, and repressive ideology which lies at the very heart of their movement. Any leader who renounces that ideology in favor of a bribe or the democratic process would not just risk his leadership status, he would also risk his head.

This has sinister implications for the Afghan state should the Taliban gain any real foothold in the government. If, in five years, for instance, education is once again forbidden for women above age eight, the US will have failed. Moreover, the Taliban can scarcely be expected to faithfully renounce its alliance with al-Qaeda, because that alliance has long been a fundamental power source and would, in the event of reintegration, provide fervid support for the resurgence of Taliban dominance. Should this resurgence occur and al-Qaeda begin to regain its position in Afghanistan, the US will be markedly less secure.

That said, this speculation is presently moot, because any real concessions from the Taliban leadership simply aren’t credible until the American and Afghan forces have gained more ground. The Afghan government is weak and corrupt, and the Afghan security apparatus is inept. American involvement has an expiration date, and Mr. Karzai himself has voiced skepticism about the government’s survival given the drawdown plans. Two dozen Afghan police officers recently disappeared, taking their trucks, guns, and heavy weaponry with them; it’s suspected they defected to the Taliban, following in the footsteps of hundreds of its colleagues. Certainly no progress will be made as long as Afghanis keep seeing greener pastures in the Taliban camp, because the Taliban will continue to think it can win, and it may be right.

Therefore, the coalition’s strategy in Afghanistan centers on gaining the upper hand to loosen the Taliban’s grip on the country while gaining popular support to make sure the grip stays loosened. This begins with operations like the present offensive in the Taliban stronghold of Marja. General Petraeus’ recent proposition that the current work in Marja is but the “initial salvo” in a campaign that may take 12 to 18 months underlines what will be an indispensable American asset in the coming years: patience. Americans need to recognize the potential for drawn out commitment in cases like Marja, where we simply cannot leave until a durable government is in place. We need to be prepared to exercise the utmost patience and to defer to military judgment as we approach the drawdown date in 2011. The risks of withdrawing prematurely will be monumentally greater than the risks of remaining to bolster stability.

Allied forces need to ramp up the sacrifices in another sphere as well; they need to be willing to contribute money, and a lot of it. The ability to provide for the Afghani people will be pivotal. Legitimate leadership in Afghanistan has always—dating back centuries to times when tribes ruled themselves, autonomous of any formal state—rested on the ability to accumulate and redistribute wealth to subjects. In order for Mr. Karzai’s government to gain support, allies need to be ready to finance poverty alleviation programs, rural development, and investment in irrigation canals and roads in order to help craft the image of a government that is a meaningful improvement on its predecessors. The US should also be directing money as aggressively as possible towards the bottom-up subversion of the Taliban, both by offering monetary incentives to the rank and file members—those driven by desperation, not by ideology—and by orchestrating more operations like the recent outreach to the Shinwari tribe, whereby the tribe received aid in exchange for committing to take an aggressive stand against the Taliban and all who harbored its fighters.

In a time of severe recession, providing substantial aid is naturally a gut-wrenching prospect. Yet the future of Afghanistan needs to be viewed as an investment, one into which hundreds of billions of dollars and thousands of lives have already been poured, and one whose collapse could be a considerable setback in the global war against terrorism.

The US needs to tread very carefully in neighboring Pakistan, which will ultimately be pivotal in maintaining stability after American withdrawal. Pakistan has recently shown what appears to be an increased willingness to strike aggressively at the Afghan Taliban on its own soil, capturing several senior Taliban leaders, including Mullah Baradar and Mullah Kabir. Perhaps these recent arrests underscore a new Pakistani resolve to abandon the strategy of controlling Afghanistan through support for the Taliban. Yet Islamabad is simultaneously pushing to take a leading role in reconciliation attempts, and it could be that the increased cooperation is intended to earn, in American eyes, a seat at the head of the negotiations table. The US must remain acutely cognizant of the fact that Islamabad’s overwhelming priority is to maintain influence in Afghanistan, and that if the Taliban remain strong, it may choose to favor the terrorist group regardless of its current antagonistic posture.

The US should thus aggressively encourage, with aid and equipment, further efforts like those which captured Baradar and Kabir. We should denounce reconciliation at the current status quo, and promise Pakistan a central position in reconciliation that may occur in the future with a drastically weakened Taliban. We should offer the Karzai government incentives to forge a close, cooperative relationship with the Pakistani government, and we should be highly explicit in warning Islamabad that any identifiable complicity in a future Taliban resurgence will be met with severe diplomatic repercussions, including the full withdrawal of American aid.

With these tactics in place, the time may come when the government can claim the upper hand in settling with the enemy. Even then, Afghanistan will remain desperately poor and widespread satisfaction with the government will be difficult to obtain. Reconciliation in this environment will first and foremost demand a purging of figures like Mullah Omar. These charismatic, ideologically-driven leaders, remarkably adept at transforming popular disillusionment into violence, must be permanently isolated from the Afghan populace. A tenable reconciliation plan might therefore include a hierarchy of reintegration, whereby the foot soldiers are fully embraced into society, the mid-level leadership are reintegrated but permanently barred from holding political office, and the top tier leadership like Omar are granted amnesty but rejected from the fabric of Afghan society, and perhaps even forbidden on Afghan soil.

These sorts of restrictions will be fundamental in preserving the order as the dust over Afghanistan settles, but they will obviously be rejected outright until the day when the Taliban can no longer see victory on the horizon. The Afghan government must reach the point where it can negotiate with a Taliban that is very much defeated and that will remain so—lest popular unrest, Pakistani (or al-Qaeda) support, or some combination thereof subvert the progress that has been so costly in blood and treasure.