Even in its tenth year, the War on Terror still engages the American military and  monopolizes the attention of our intelligence community. The attempted airplane bomb plot discovered on October 29 emphasizes the continued threat. Evidence suggests that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), an off-shoot of Osama bin Laden’s organization with a strong presence in Yemen, is responsible for the failed attack. Recently, the CIA has been conducting a targeted bombing campaign in Yemen, which some have called a “secret war.” Yemen faces a range of internal problems that hamper its own ability to fight AQAP. Given the challenges posed by AQAP and the Yemeni government’s struggles to control it, the United States should focus its efforts on uniting Yemenis against AQAP and increasing cooperation with the Yemeni military and intelligence agencies.

AQAP is an elusive terrorist organization that poses a significant threat to America and its interests. While never under the direct control of bin Laden or the al-Qaeda parent organization, the current AQAP traces its roots to two regional Al Qaeda affiliated groups that launched such attacks as that against the U.S.S. Cole, suicide bombings at a Western housing compound, and the 2008 assault on the American embassy in Yemen. These groups merged in 2009 with the intention of establishing a new Islamic caliphate in the Arabian Peninsula by overthrowing the Saudi and Yemeni governments and forcing Western nations from the region. Intelligence agencies also claim that the group was responsible for the failed “underwear bomber” suicide plot on a Detroit-bound plane last Christmas.

The organization’s leaders recruit experienced fighters from Saudi, Yemeni, Somali, Afghan, Iraqi, and Pakistani cells.  Although experts and intelligence agencies know the names of several of the group’s most prominent members, including an American national, they have not published information on how large the group is or how far its influence is known to extend. Estimates range from dozens to hundreds, demonstrating that the group’s full potential is still unknown. The Yemeni government, however, is poorly equipped and cannot easily restrain AQAP. The nation’s economy is the poorest in the Middle East per capita and dependent on its dwindling oil supplies. Since Yemen’s 1990 unification, President Ali Abdullah Saleh has struggled to exert influence beyond the major cities. As part of this effort, Saleh has not only fought AQAP but also countered separatists and rebels that have spread the government’s meager resources thin and obscured AQAP’s actions amid widespread violence. Much of Yemen’s territory, especially in the mountains and desert, is virtually autonomous tribal areas that oppose heavy government involvement. While most of these tribes reject AQAP, experts like Gregory Johnsen of Princeton University hold that some tolerate AQAP and allow it to build bases in their territory. This sympathy is greater in areas with other anti-government movements. Additionally, the Saudi-Yemeni border is extremely porous, allowing AQAP members to attack targets in both nations. As Saudi forces have prevented terrorist groups from forming in its territory, AQAP’s situation parallels the Taliban’s use of uncontrolled Pakistani tribal regions as bases from which to attack Afghan targets. The parts of the country Saleh’s government does control are often corrupt and ineffective, especially as Saleh appoints family members to political positions and seems focused on consolidating his family’s power.

American success in Yemen has been limited. The War on Terror’s early years saw initial gains against AQAP as the United States helped train and support Yemeni forces and launched Yemeni-approved missile strikes. Utilizing what President Obama’s top counterterrorism expert referred to as a “scalpel” rather than a “hammer,” the United States has increased its involvement in Yemen since 2009 through covert action, cruise missiles, and drone attacks that fall under the CIA’s, rather than the military’s, command. Both American and Yemeni officials say these operations occur with the Yemeni government’s approval. Despite successfully hitting several AQAP targets, the campaign’s impact is questionable partially due to Yemenis’ suspicion about Saleh’s motives and concern over American intervention. There have also been reports of civilian casualties, earning condemnation from human rights groups and sparking tribal conflicts. Considering the bomb plot uncovered October 29, it appears that this effort has so far failed to decisively undermine AQAP’s strength, and the CIA must reevaluate its approach.

The U.S. should strengthen the Yemeni government’s influence. A top priority should be unifying the tribal regions against AQAP. To do this, America should set up discussions between Saleh and his nation’s tribal leaders so that they can reach policy compromises and convince the tribal leaders that AQAP is a mutual enemy. To cement tribal loyalties in the current push against AQAP, America and Yemen should follow the tribal motto “My state is anyone who fills my pocket with money”: the U.S. should give Saleh the financial backing he would need to buy tribal loyalty. This might be expensive, but current estimates expect U.S. military aid to approach the enormous sum of $1.2 billion in the next five years anyway. Buying tribes’ loyalty would not be a long-term solution, nor would it ensure that tribes remain loyal, but expanding support for the Yemeni government would limit where AQAP could operate and allow American and Yemeni forces to concentrate their energies on smaller areas.

Focusing American resources on intelligence gathering is also a critical step. The U.S. should bolster its intelligence network in Yemen and work to strengthen cooperation with Yemeni intelligence resources. This would render covert operations more effective, reducing civilian and unintended casualties. Cooperating with Yemeni authorities would also assure that Saleh and his government play an integral role in long-term stability. While increasing the number of intelligence-gathering resources, though, the U.S. should not follow what some State Department officials propose and give the Yemeni army a cache of expensive weaponry. Given the number of weapons proposed, the Yemeni government’s corruption could allow insurgents to acquire some of these weapons. There is also the possibility of government misuse, as the Yemeni government could use resources intended for fighting AQAP to fight other insurgent groups or suppress political dissent.

Yemen presents a new front in the War on Terror and a new opportunity to improve on what lessons the U.S. has already learned. In a political climate where troop deployment in Afghanistan and Iraq has led to public outcry and where the current administration campaigned on an anti-war platform, the operations in Yemen can signify a new strategy in which intelligence-gathering and cooperation with an existing society replace the alternate focus on military efforts, troop number, and nation building. Fully embracing this new approach by winning tribal support and improving intelligence networks will change how the U.S. fights the war and will replace the hammer with the scalpel. By focusing on practical measures, policymakers can use Yemen as a turning point in the War on Terror.

The War on Terror, which began in Afghanistan and grew to encompass Iraq, is now making its way to Yemen. The Obama administration’s actions so far have been limited to providing monetary aid, ordering drone strikes, and dispatching a small number of intelligence officers to the area, but this strategy insufficiently addresses the lack of effective governance in Yemen. As the effort in Afghanistan has made evident, no amount of American expenditure will be enough to defeat al-Qaeda if there is not a strong central government ready to take over once the region has been stabilized. The US should focus on establishing a legitimately functional government in Yemen that can both govern the nation and combat al-Qaeda with minimal external assistance.

Because the US military is already heavily engaged in two countries, it cannot hope to fight successfully in yet another region. Nevertheless, Yemen will need assistance from the US to address its political and economic issues. The US recently raised the budget for military aid to Yemen from $67 million to $150 million. The American money will be used to finance military operations and train Yemeni soldiers, but an increase in military aid treats the symptoms rather than the disease. al-Qaeda occupies nations that are susceptible to its influence; its presence, therefore, is a symptom of the government’s ineffectiveness. The US government needs to recognize that al-Qaeda’s presence in Yemen demonstrates that the problems that allowed al-Qaeda to move into Yemen in the first place have yet to be resolved.

Yemen is already the poorest nation in the Arab world, and its oil—which accounts for 90 percent of its exports—is set to run out within the next decade. Yemen’s economic infrastructure needs restructuring from the ground up, but various financial crises have cut off foreign investments at crucial junctures, and internal strife has crippled the government’s own programs. Unfortunately, weapons sales have been one of its most consistent sources of revenue. There are approximately 60 guns for every 100 people in the nation, and streets are crowded with dealers selling everything from pistols to rockets. But even this limited, damaging economic activity is being threatened—Sana’a is in danger of becoming the first world capital to run out of water.

Yemen’s economic weakness is only one of the problems that allow for the presence of al-Qaeda. Another major factor is the weakness of the federal government, which many blame for the country’s frail economy. President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who has held the office since Yemen’s reunification in 1990, has squandered much of the nation’s wealth playing patronage politics; even now, he is trying to do so to assure his son’s succession to his position. He has also often used US aid that was expressly intended for counterterrorism to combat two insurgencies. Despite his flaunting of its authority, the US is unwilling to risk alienating one of its few supporters in the Middle East and has not confronted Saleh.

Those insurgencies are the other visible symptoms of the pervasive disease in Yemen’s government. In the north, the government has been fighting a civil war for six years against rebels known as the Houthis. Although their openly extremist views have raised concerns that their goal is to establish a fundamentalist Muslim state, the Houthis claim that their main goal is to mount a secular opposition to Saleh’s corrupt presidency. Their conflict with Saleh dates back to their failure to attain power after Yemen was unified in the 1990s. They then settled in the impoverished Sa’dah region, where the poor economic conditions have allowed them to cultivate support.
More recently, a secessionist movement has emerged in south Yemen due to various economic grievances against the north. People in the south claim that, since unification, the north has exploited their oil fields and given them nothing in return. This corruption can be traced back to Saleh, who has used money to retain control of the state.

These symptoms show precisely what is ailing Yemen: The people do not respect the government. This is largely because the Yemeni people no longer see Saleh as a legitimate leader. His influence has always been limited to a small radius around Sana’a; various tribal groups control the majority of the nation. Furthermore, Saleh has never managed to really connect with these tribes, and he has not been effective in stopping the Houthis. If Islamic fundamentalism and sectarian violence were avoided, there would still be a lack of faith in Saleh’s government. Regardless of al-Qaeda’s presence, Yemen is on the verge of state failure. Ridding it of al-Qaeda now will not prevent the return of al-Qaeda after the collapse of the state, and a civil war, which would inevitably follow the collapse of the state, would make it even more difficult to purge Yemen of the terrorist organization.

The recent operation in Marja, Afghanistan demonstrates the US military’s recognition of their primary failure in Afghanistan: By ignoring the state-building aspect of the operation, the US military negated the positive effects of training a local military and driving out terrorists. Reports coming out of Marja suggest that despite their training, the Afghani military is playing a much smaller part in the offensive than the American army. Lessons from Afghanistan are crucial for Yemen. The impulse for action has to come from within the country, and in order for that to happen, there must be a strong central government controlling the situation.

Although the US seems primarily concerned with counterterrorism in Yemen, US aid given for this purpose will be of little use, as the ineffectiveness of the Yemeni military and intelligence operatives will continue to hinder US efforts. Furthermore, any operations successful in eliminating al-Qaeda will simply leave a vacuum that will be filled by new terrorists. The solution is to fill that vacuum with a stronger Yemeni government now that can effectively unify the nation. In order to ensure that this happens, the US must direct its aid towards nation building. Because Yemen already has a government structure in place, the US must find a way to encourage the Yemeni people to recognize its legitimacy. Easing the southerners’ lack of faith may be aided by moving the capital, which may prove necessary in any case due to the water situation in Sana’a. In addition, the current distribution of seats in Yemen’s legislative body favors the region that was originally North Yemen, so redistricting would provide further amends. The US should also fund education and other social programs. To ensure cooperation, the continuation of American aid should depend on adherence to previous objectives.

The success of this plan may require that the US withdraw its unconditional support of Saleh. While the US may prefer a pro-Western leader, the cost simply may be too high. A truly authoritative government requires a high level of support within the nation that Saleh is unlikely to attain.

Ultimately, even if Al-Qaeda is eliminated now, allowing Yemen to remain a fragmented nation will leave the door open for al-Qaeda’s return. The past eight years in Afghanistan have demonstrated the futility of trying to remove al-Qaeda without also addressing the more fundamental problems of the country. The key to successfully driving al-Qaeda out of Yemen is not to continue attacking its strongholds. The means of finding a lasting solution for Yemen is to help stabilize the government, which would allow it to deal with the local faction of al-Qaeda on its own.

The Houthis, a rebel group in northern Yemen, have been fighting against the Yemeni government since 2004. But only recently, in the aftermath of the attempted Christmas day bombing by Yemeni national Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, has the conflict captured the attention of the Western world. Observers increasingly fear that the Houthi conflict has diverted Yemen’s limited resources away from combating al-Qaeda and other extremist groups in the Arabian Peninsula. Spectators also fear that the conflict may morph into a new front in the struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia for regional hegemony.

This is not the first time that an internal conflict in Yemen has become the epicenter of regional power tensions between major Middle Eastern states. In 1962, a coup d’état carried out by republican forces in Yemen overthrew the ruling Zaydi imamate. This coup sparked a civil war that lasted until 1970 and drew in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the major Middle East powers of the day. While the scale of the present day conflict cannot compare to the Yemen Civil War, a vicious, drawn-out clash that resulted in over 100,000 deaths, policymakers would do well to study the lessons of Yemeni history. As the United States helps Yemen in its counter-terrorist campaign against al-Qaeda, it must pay close attention to these lessons to ensure that the country’s internal conflicts do not morph into a costly and destabilizing regional power struggle.

Yemen already shows signs of becoming a battleground for Middle Eastern powers. This past November, Houthi rebels crossed into Saudi territory and attacked a Saudi patrol, claiming that Saudi Arabia was assisting Yemen in its counter-Houthi offensive. This raid precipitated a wider Saudi campaign to crush the Houthi forces that has resulted in hundreds of deaths on both sides. Saudi Arabia also fears that Iran is supporting the Houthis to undermine Saudi Arabia’s regional position. This belief is bolstered by the rebels’ sympathetic portrayal in the Iranian media and their use of Katyusha rockets, weapons Iran has also provided to Hezbollah and Hamas, its other proxy groups in the region. Al-Arabiya similarly reports that Yemeni authorities have captured unmarked ships with Iranian crews carrying weapons bound for the rebels.

Iran’s support for the Houthis is particularly significant because the rebels are Zaydis, a small, heterodox sect of Shia Islam highly distinct from the Iranian Twelver Shi’ism. Iran’s support of not merely the Houthi Zaydis but also radical Sunni groups like al-Qaeda and Hamas demonstrates that the nation’s policy choices are dictated not by only religious doctrine but by an attempt to undermine and destabilize competing governments of the region.

This provides a striking parallel to the Civil War in North Yemen. Then, as now, Yemen served as a battleground for regional hegemony. Egypt, under the leadership of Abdel Nasser, sought to extend its influence over Saudi Arabia by supporting the republican forces in Yemen. These forces overthrew the Zaydi royalists, who received support from Saudi Arabia despite the clear doctrinal differences between the faith of the Zaydis and Saudi Arabia’s conservative Wahhabi brand of Sunni Islam. Ultimately, religious considerations took a backseat to the threat posed by revolutionary Egypt to the Saudi monarchy. Though the current Yemeni conflict has not yet resulted in war, Yemen continues to serve as a crucial hot spot for regional power struggles, and the United States must understand that forces greater than religion are at play.

The past conflict also provides important lessons about how impermanent and tenuous alliances in the region can be. In the past war, the Houthi rebels, now viewed as an Iranian proxy, received support from Saudi Arabia. Iran also supported the Zaydi royalists, sharing the Saudis’ fear of the growing power of revolutionary Egypt. Because alliances in this troubled area are clearly motivated by strategic convenience rather than, as some in the West believe, religion, these alliances can change radically over the course of mere decades.

The potential danger of growing Iranian influence is perhaps the greatest specific lesson for the US. At the beginning of February, the Houthi rebels and Yemeni government signed a cease-fire. While this cease-fire has admittedly been breached on occasion, the United States now has an opportunity to capitalize on the relative lapse in violence and take steps to prevent Iran from turning the conflict into a proxy war that could disintegrate into a second Yemeni civil war. One important step that the US can take in order to prevent the Yemeni conflict from becoming part of this growing trend is to devote its naval resources in the Gulf of Aden to assisting the Yemeni government in preventing Iranian weapons from reaching Houthi rebels. A concurrent effort to convince Saudi Arabia, a nation in which the US stations troops, to lessen its direct involvement in Yemen could also have important long-term consequences in lessening the scope of the conflict.

US policymakers must recognize that, as in the past, the alignments between regional powers and their proxies in Yemen are not based primarily on a religious Sunni-Shia divide but are instead grounded in strategic concerns. While current regional alignments in the Middle East may seem to be set in stone, they in fact may undergo dramatic and unexpected shifts as the strategic environment on the ground fluctuates. Therefore, when US policy makers confront Yemen and the Middle East as a whole, they must strive to remain a step ahead of the game, drawing lessons from the North Yemeni Civil War about the mutability and ever-changing nature of alliances and hostilities in the region.

“We must reach out to all of our countrymen, even our disenchanted brothers,” affirms Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Mr. Karzai isn’t just echoing the counterinsurgency truism that victory requires winning over the population. Instead, he supports actively reaching out to the Taliban, including to its infamous leader, the one-eyed Mullah Omar. And though Pakistan stands squarely behind Karzai on this issue, the United States should not. On the contrary, the US should denounce reconciliation in the current Afghan climate as a genuinely unpalatable course. The Afghan government and its supporters need to exercise patience and focus on military operations, material incentives to undercut Taliban influence, and Pakistani cooperation for the time being. Only when the Taliban has been left in an unequivocally inferior negotiating position should reconciliation be considered.

At present, the Taliban leadership is in no mood to negotiate; its position is too strong. Even if, however, the Taliban leadership were somehow swayed in the coming weeks, and the government managed to produce a set of policies—amnesty, political participation, material incentives—sufficiently favorable as to induce Taliban cooperation, this would mean that an already unpopular, distrusted government would openly reward the very group that ruled tyrannically over the Afghani people before the American invasion, the group that has been at war with its own country since 2001.

This policy would doubtless run into serious backlash. Afghanis remain fundamentally bitter towards the United States; Americans were largely welcomed in 2001 as a hopeful improvement over the Taliban, but the gains for average Afghanis thus far have been small. If the American-backed Afghan government offers material incentives to the Taliban—that is, provides for the Taliban in a way that society as a whole has not been provided for—resentment towards the occupiers and the government will understandably deepen, especially amongst the ethnic Tajiks and Hazaras who have fought against the ethnically Pashtun Taliban. This is resentment, which a tenuous, disastrously corrupt government can ill afford. Indeed, by losing the support of the population, this would be to break counterinsurgency rule number one.

The even greater worry is that reconciliation would risk inviting a return to Taliban rule. The weak, unpopular Afghan government will only become exponentially more unstable when the United States and NATO inevitably reduce their presence. If reconciliation brings an intact Taliban back into the societal fabric—and, indeed, into the political process—there is a real danger that the progress made over the last eight years will be subverted by a gradual reentry of Taliban influence. Even if the Taliban agree to cut a deal and put down the guns, it cannot be expected to rethink or renounce the militant, retrograde, and repressive ideology which lies at the very heart of their movement. Any leader who renounces that ideology in favor of a bribe or the democratic process would not just risk his leadership status, he would also risk his head.

This has sinister implications for the Afghan state should the Taliban gain any real foothold in the government. If, in five years, for instance, education is once again forbidden for women above age eight, the US will have failed. Moreover, the Taliban can scarcely be expected to faithfully renounce its alliance with al-Qaeda, because that alliance has long been a fundamental power source and would, in the event of reintegration, provide fervid support for the resurgence of Taliban dominance. Should this resurgence occur and al-Qaeda begin to regain its position in Afghanistan, the US will be markedly less secure.

That said, this speculation is presently moot, because any real concessions from the Taliban leadership simply aren’t credible until the American and Afghan forces have gained more ground. The Afghan government is weak and corrupt, and the Afghan security apparatus is inept. American involvement has an expiration date, and Mr. Karzai himself has voiced skepticism about the government’s survival given the drawdown plans. Two dozen Afghan police officers recently disappeared, taking their trucks, guns, and heavy weaponry with them; it’s suspected they defected to the Taliban, following in the footsteps of hundreds of its colleagues. Certainly no progress will be made as long as Afghanis keep seeing greener pastures in the Taliban camp, because the Taliban will continue to think it can win, and it may be right.

Therefore, the coalition’s strategy in Afghanistan centers on gaining the upper hand to loosen the Taliban’s grip on the country while gaining popular support to make sure the grip stays loosened. This begins with operations like the present offensive in the Taliban stronghold of Marja. General Petraeus’ recent proposition that the current work in Marja is but the “initial salvo” in a campaign that may take 12 to 18 months underlines what will be an indispensable American asset in the coming years: patience. Americans need to recognize the potential for drawn out commitment in cases like Marja, where we simply cannot leave until a durable government is in place. We need to be prepared to exercise the utmost patience and to defer to military judgment as we approach the drawdown date in 2011. The risks of withdrawing prematurely will be monumentally greater than the risks of remaining to bolster stability.

Allied forces need to ramp up the sacrifices in another sphere as well; they need to be willing to contribute money, and a lot of it. The ability to provide for the Afghani people will be pivotal. Legitimate leadership in Afghanistan has always—dating back centuries to times when tribes ruled themselves, autonomous of any formal state—rested on the ability to accumulate and redistribute wealth to subjects. In order for Mr. Karzai’s government to gain support, allies need to be ready to finance poverty alleviation programs, rural development, and investment in irrigation canals and roads in order to help craft the image of a government that is a meaningful improvement on its predecessors. The US should also be directing money as aggressively as possible towards the bottom-up subversion of the Taliban, both by offering monetary incentives to the rank and file members—those driven by desperation, not by ideology—and by orchestrating more operations like the recent outreach to the Shinwari tribe, whereby the tribe received aid in exchange for committing to take an aggressive stand against the Taliban and all who harbored its fighters.

In a time of severe recession, providing substantial aid is naturally a gut-wrenching prospect. Yet the future of Afghanistan needs to be viewed as an investment, one into which hundreds of billions of dollars and thousands of lives have already been poured, and one whose collapse could be a considerable setback in the global war against terrorism.

The US needs to tread very carefully in neighboring Pakistan, which will ultimately be pivotal in maintaining stability after American withdrawal. Pakistan has recently shown what appears to be an increased willingness to strike aggressively at the Afghan Taliban on its own soil, capturing several senior Taliban leaders, including Mullah Baradar and Mullah Kabir. Perhaps these recent arrests underscore a new Pakistani resolve to abandon the strategy of controlling Afghanistan through support for the Taliban. Yet Islamabad is simultaneously pushing to take a leading role in reconciliation attempts, and it could be that the increased cooperation is intended to earn, in American eyes, a seat at the head of the negotiations table. The US must remain acutely cognizant of the fact that Islamabad’s overwhelming priority is to maintain influence in Afghanistan, and that if the Taliban remain strong, it may choose to favor the terrorist group regardless of its current antagonistic posture.

The US should thus aggressively encourage, with aid and equipment, further efforts like those which captured Baradar and Kabir. We should denounce reconciliation at the current status quo, and promise Pakistan a central position in reconciliation that may occur in the future with a drastically weakened Taliban. We should offer the Karzai government incentives to forge a close, cooperative relationship with the Pakistani government, and we should be highly explicit in warning Islamabad that any identifiable complicity in a future Taliban resurgence will be met with severe diplomatic repercussions, including the full withdrawal of American aid.

With these tactics in place, the time may come when the government can claim the upper hand in settling with the enemy. Even then, Afghanistan will remain desperately poor and widespread satisfaction with the government will be difficult to obtain. Reconciliation in this environment will first and foremost demand a purging of figures like Mullah Omar. These charismatic, ideologically-driven leaders, remarkably adept at transforming popular disillusionment into violence, must be permanently isolated from the Afghan populace. A tenable reconciliation plan might therefore include a hierarchy of reintegration, whereby the foot soldiers are fully embraced into society, the mid-level leadership are reintegrated but permanently barred from holding political office, and the top tier leadership like Omar are granted amnesty but rejected from the fabric of Afghan society, and perhaps even forbidden on Afghan soil.

These sorts of restrictions will be fundamental in preserving the order as the dust over Afghanistan settles, but they will obviously be rejected outright until the day when the Taliban can no longer see victory on the horizon. The Afghan government must reach the point where it can negotiate with a Taliban that is very much defeated and that will remain so—lest popular unrest, Pakistani (or al-Qaeda) support, or some combination thereof subvert the progress that has been so costly in blood and treasure.

“With Allah’s permission, we will come to you from where you do not expect.” This declaration by the Yemeni branch of al-Qaeda is not just a warning of future attacks, it is a truth of global security. The Christmas Day terror attempt by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian who had been in Yemen since August, was stopped not by American preparation, but by luck. While the barely-averted attack creates temptation to take dramatic action, a visible American military presence in Yemen would overtax our armed forces and create a backlash counterproductive to American interests. America should prevent future attacks by fully acknowledging the threat posed by Yemeni terrorists, ensuring their prosecution when captured, and by continuing current American policy in support of the Yemeni government.

The Yemeni offshoot of al-Qaeda has steadily grown more potent in recent years, merging with its Saudi progenitor to form al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. This organization’s targets are both local and global. In October 2000, al-Qaeda attacked the Navy destroyer U.S.S. Cole in the port of Aden with predominantly Yemeni explosives, attackers, and accomplices. Yemen was also linked to the 1998 East African embassy bombings, the strike on the French oil tanker Limburg, the September 11th attacks, and the assassination attempt against Prince Mohammed bin Nayef in Saudi Arabia last August. That assassination attempt used the same tactics and explosives (pentaerythritol tetranitrate sewn into the bomber’s underwear) as the attempted Christmas attack.
Yemen’s location, geography, and fractured polity make it a paradise for al-Qaeda. At the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen is close to Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; its porous borders and extensive coastline are far from secure, while its rugged mountains provide apt hiding places for terrorists. With oil reserves running dry, Yemen’s arms market is among its few economic strengths—it trails only the U.S. in gun ownership per capita. Meanwhile, a strong, conservative religious population is a solid support base for al Qaeda’s propaganda, and tribal groups with relations to al-Qaeda control much of the borderlands. There is a separatist movement in the south and an insurgency in the north, and the unified Yemen is less than two decades old. Yemen is a near-ideal base of operations for Al-Qaeda, combining Afghanistan and Pakistan’s formidable terrain with Somalia’s near-anarchy.

In 2005, the terrorists responsible for the Cole bombing were in prison. Today, however, many of them are free, including confessed bombers Jamal al-Badawi, Fahd al-Quso, and Naser Abdel-Karim al-Wahishi. All three escaped from maximum-security prisons in Yemen. Badawi turned himself in after a year, but was released for good behavior; Quso is a re-established terrorist operative, conducting interviews for al Qaeda; and Wahishi is the head of al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula. In 2008, FBI special agent Ali Soufan warned Senate staff members “unless the American government sent a united message to the Yemenis to act against Al Qaeda, the terrorists responsible for the Cole would remain free and there would be future attacks against the United States connected to Yemen.” Soufan observes, “Today, the terrorists behind the Cole are still free, and an attack connected to Yemen has been attempted.”

Current U.S. policy towards Yemen is based on counterterrorism support, limited special operations, and drone strikes. In 2009, US expenditures for counterterrorism support were $70 million; according to a senior military official, President Obama plans to increase that amount to $190 million. The U.S. coordinates much of its effort with Western-friendly Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. But President Saleh has often used American aid against local insurgencies rather than against al-Qaeda. The local insurgencies more directly threaten Saleh’s sovereign authority, and he wants to maintain at least minimal support from the conservative Islamist population. Unconditional aid is therefore ineffective—Yemeni authorities can divert resources from counter-terrorism to counterinsurgency.

The U.S. should make an all-or-nothing deal on foreign aid to Yemen: America should offer more financial support under the condition that Yemeni courts imprison those responsible for the Cole bombing. Some might argue that incarceration would be ineffective because new recruits would replace those imprisoned. But anything short of life imprisonment means effective impunity for terrorists; prosecution would send a message to al-Qaeda that the U.S. and Arab governments will not tolerate acts of terror. If these conditions are met, the U.S. should stay its present course of providing counter-terrorist aid. Admittedly, this solution may not be immediately effective, but any sustainable, forward-looking strategy against an asymmetrical threat will require patience.
Senator Joe Lieberman (I-CT) has suggested that Yemen will be “tomorrow’s war” if the U.S. does not act preemptively. Preemptive military engagement, however, is simply not feasible, with the U.S. military already overstretched in Afghanistan and Iraq. America is still fighting two wars, and escalating one of them; we cannot realistically expect victory in a third, especially after taking into account the counterinsurgency efforts that U.S. troops would inherit from the Yemeni government. Even if preemptive military intervention were feasible, it would likely provoke a popular backlash, destabilizing the Western-friendly regime. Al-Qaeda feeds on Western interventions; the risk of backlash is especially high in Yemen’s tribal north with widespread poverty, illiteracy, and resentment of the central government. Intelligence, logistical support, and foreign aid should be the extent of American involvement in an effort that only Yemen can achieve. As Marc Lynch, a counter-terrorism expert at George Washington University, has suggested, the U.S. should not fall into the trap of overcommitment in a rush to “just do something.”

In short, the U.S. should largely stay the course in Yemen, but must put more diplomatic pressure on the Yemeni government to ensure our plans are carried through. Although the Yemeni government is weak, it has achieved success in counterterrorist operations in the past few weeks. We have recently seen an unprecedentedly successful offensive against jihadist commanders in the south and center of the nation; five raids in the Abyan and Shabwa provinces have killed more than 60 fighters. Of course, an avowedly pro-Western government faces grave dangers in the Middle East, but a puppeteer is better than a hegemon. The United States should provide further assistance to Yemen before resorting to direct military engagement.

One of the most documented aspects of President Obama’s 2008 campaign and subsequent meteoric rise to the presidency has been the incredible support awarded him by the international community. Despite his thin foreign policy resume, consisting largely of his now-popular decision to oppose the Iraq War from the start, Obama enjoyed a unique connection with both leaders and citizens around the world—a connection that offered the promise of strengthened American leadership abroad. In the months after his election, President Obama’s popularity rose by close to 10 percentage points in the 11 countries surveyed by the Pew Research Center. Building on the idea of a more international-focused presidency, President Obama has repeatedly articulated the belief that he is responsible not only to the country that he governs, but also to the global community. The global community has welcomed his commitment with open arms. This presents President Obama, however, with the insurmountable task of fulfilling the policy aspirations of citizens in other countries while not undercutting America’s own interests.

Although Obama’s “new era of responsibility” has found many supporters, its vagueness has also created an opening for critics who view Obama as a better speaker than policymaker. The reality of the President’s spirit of international good will lends credence to such critics. While some of his popularity is certainly attributable to his rhetoric, the bulk of it is due to the basic phenomenon that other nations expect him to pursue policies in their own self-interest.

There is no more fitting example of this disconcerting fact than the difference between President Obama’s popularity in the Middle East and President Bush’s at the end of his second term in office. The president’s tone of cooperation and reconciliation with Arab states has led to higher support in states such as Egypt, where approval for the U.S. increased from 22 to 27 percent, and in Jordan, where it rose from 19 to 25 percent, according to the Pew Research Center. Yet support for America remains unchanged in areas such as the Palestinian territories and Pakistan, which have historically maintained distant relations with the United States throughout the terms of many presidents. Such opinions are unlikely to change despite President Obama’s election and new tone towards some Arab states. In Israel, on the other hand, America’s popularity has dropped from 78 percent in 2007 to 71 percent in 2009. This is attributable to several of President Obama’s statements and policies, both during his campaign and in office, that indicate he may be less willing to support all Israeli policies unconditionally than was the Bush administration. Obama’s speech in Cairo during the summer of 2009 and his insistence on the cessation of all settlement building have instilled doubts among Israelis that he will be as accommodating as his predecessor. Nor, for that matter, should he be; the region requires a mediator who will be unafraid to demand the termination of both Israeli settlement expansion and of many Arab countries’ funding and harboring of Islamist groups that wish to disrupt the peace process within the region.

The President may soon find that in other regions, as well as the Middle East, his political capital is based primarily on what foreign nations perceive as his commitment to their own best interests, rather than those of the global community. Many see Europe as the base of the President’s international support, an idea traced to then-senator Obama’s campaign foray into Germany the summer before he was elected. At the same time, Obama’s visit to Europe revealed that he is well aware of the true factors that lie at the root of his international support. In a speech, Obama appealed to the nation’s individual needs in articulating his political vision, saying, “The poppies in Afghanistan become the heroin in Berlin.” In this way, President Obama captured the essence of a more effective manner in which to leverage his extraordinary popularity: He appealed to individual nations’ self-interest in a way that gains their respect and helps Washington’s cause as well.

The President should stop focusing on maintaining his popularity as an end in and of itself and start making substantive policy decisions even if they disappoint some members of the international community. The recent Copenhagen Climate Summit in December of 2009 represents a perfect example of the way in which President Obama’s wish to satisfy all members of the international community led to intangible progress toward policy goals. Widely regarded as what the EU termed a “great failure,” the Climate Summit ended in various participants reaching a nonbinding political agreement that advocated emissions cuts and other environmental reforms at standards far below those hoped for by environmental experts. At the end of the conference, who was to blame for what and why—with the EU unhappy with China and China unhappy with the U.S.—was more publicized than the conference’s actual accomplishments. The idea of gathering any number of nations into a room and hoping that America’s newfound popularity in the world will inspire cooperation apparently has its limits.

Some might argue that President Obama, by brushing aside international criticism, puts himself in danger of falling into the same trap as the previous administration. Yet in doing so, one assumes that President Obama and the previous administration have a similar attitude toward foreign relations. They do not. President Bush treated the idea of diplomacy as a one-dimensional spectrum, expecting support for his forays into Iraq and Afghanistan while disregarding recommendations made by the United Nations and other international organizations. Yet President Obama has demonstrated a vision of the world in which the global community has substantial importance at various levels; he is familiar with international relations and cites Cold War diplomats George Marshall and George Kennan, supporters of a multilateral foreign policy, as sources of influence. The President embodies a combination of intellectual idealism and pragmatism that distinguish him ideologically from his predecessor.

It is clear that both Europe and the Obama administration share a spirit of cooperation and dialogue. But, to quote former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, “America does not have friends; it has interests.” President Obama will inevitably have to make tough decisions that will alienate global citizens whose support he once enjoyed. In order for President Obama to gain the respect he lacks as a relatively inexperienced leader, he must be willing make such decisions publicly and forcefully, or face appearing subservient to the political desires of other countries. As President Obama enters into his second year in office, his popularity is dampened but not expired; he still enjoys a fairly clean slate regarding foreign policy as a whole and has maintained a great deal of his international popularity. He can use this advantage as an opportunity to address more contentious issues and gain the respect—not just the popularity—of the international community.

Iran’s nuclear program has been a major concern for the West since the beginning of the millennium. Iran has repeatedly violated both UN and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sanctions, suggested that Israel be wiped off the map, and supported terrorism based in Iraq, the Gaza Strip, and Lebanon. The United States’ unilateral strategy of negotiations and sanctions has been unsuccessful in achieving a sustainable settlement.Washington should consider other options in order to successfully deal with the crisis. To move negotiations forward, the U.S. should proceed with a regimen of multilateral sanctions to put pressure on Iran to negotiate seriously. Sanctions, along with focused and serious negotiations, are America’s best chance to disarm Iran and prevent military action.

The United States should study its previous attempts to end the Iranian nuclear crisis before moving forward. Under the Bush administration, the U.S. applied unilateral financial and economic sanctions against Iran, but with limited success. In the past, countries such as Russia and China provided many of the financial services that the U.S. sanctions denied Iran, and a number of international oil companies continue to do business with Iran in spite of the sanctions. Moreover, China, who seems driven foremost by its concern for feeding its massive appetite for oil, continues to invest in Iran’s energy and refining infrastructure.

Similarly, UN sanctions on weaponry and weapons technology were largely ineffective because Russia and China refused to meaningfully cooperate. In 2008, Russia negotiated a contract to sell Iran advanced anti-aircraft missile battery system—though Russia has yet to deliver the system—insisting that it was for defensive purposes and did not violate the sanctions. While in theory it is indeed a defensive system, the delivery of such weaponry can only harden Iran’s position in the negotiations because it enhances Iran’s ability to defend its nuclear facilities. In sum, for Russia and China, security and proliferation concerns take a back seat to economic gain.

Negotiations have been largely ineffective as well. While many in the West have praised the “agreement in principle” reached at recent talks in Vienna as a step forward, Western countries should be cautious of this perceived success. Under the Vienna Agreement, Iran would ship its stock of enriched uranium to Russia. The Russians and the French would then enrich the uranium into a form that could not be easily re-processed into weapons-grade material but could be used for non-military purposes. This plan, however, is subject to the approval of Ayatollah Khameini, the Iranian Supreme Leader, who is rumored to be against the agreement. In addition, many close to him, including the speaker of the Iranian Parliament, have criticized the framework as an attempt to deceive Iran.

Nonetheless, even if the Vienna Agreement were approved, the accord would still not prevent Iran from enriching uranium. If Iran chose, it could restock its supplies of enriched uranium again within a year. The agreement also does not prevent Iran from continuing research and development of its delivery capabilities. In addition, the agreement does nothing to address the fundamental question, which is how to alter incentives such that it is not in the current regime’s best interest to develop nuclear weapons. If adopted, the proposal would simply provide a temporary stopgap. The Vienna Agreement would give Iran the chance to stall and continue developing nuclear weapons, taking the West back to square one.

Even if a deal could be reached, a simple agreement with Iran will not be enough. The Iranian regime has a history of neither adhering to its international obligations nor cooperating with international authority. Iran, as a signatory nation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, is obligated to report to the IAEA any intention to build any nuclear facility. The regime did not report its uranium enrichment facility in Natanz until 2002, after it was fully operational. Iran likewise did not report the facility in Qom to the IAEA until Tehran realized that Western governments had discovered the facility’s existence. Furthermore, the regime has refused to allow its nuclear scientists to be questioned by the IAEA. If the U.S. and its allies are serious about preventing Iranian proliferation, they must insist on an enforceable agreement with a robust inspections regime.

The unsuccessful attempts at preventing Iran from continued development of nuclear weapons indicate that any response to Iran requires unified, international support. This summer’s election riots have presented the West with new options. The regime’s leaders appear not to want to confront external pressure and internal threats simultaneously. While Tehran has used negotiations to buy time, this new, unstable situation might make the regime amenable to meaningful settlement, especially if it faces multilateral pressure. There are a number of options available to entice and pressure the Iranians to submit to the will of the international community.

In the political sphere, the U.S., through Radio Farda—a Persian-language radio station based in Washington, D.C. and Prague—could amplify the voices of dissent with programming that provides a platform for Iranian exiles and expatriates. Internally, dissidents could be supplied with communication equipment not susceptible to jamming and other interference (such as satellite phones and sophisticated encryption equipment). The importance of communication within Iran is validated by the behavior of the theocratic regime—which moves swiftly to disrupt cellular and Internet communications at any sign of unrest.
In the economic sphere, multilateral leverage has significant potential. It is no secret that Iran’s economic situation is dire: It faces high unemployment (12 percent, according to the Iranian government), rampant inflation (28 percent, according to the Iranian government), corruption, and a lack of basic services. Iran’s economy depends heavily on petroleum exports, but without Western technological expertise, Iran’s oil production has steadily declined. According to a 2007 National Academy of Science study, Iran’s consumption of refined petroleum will outstrip its production of crude oil by 2015, effectively halting petroleum exports altogether. Furthermore, Iran lacks the capacity to refine petroleum and, as a result, imports 40 percent of its petroleum. The U.S. House of Representatives has already passed the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act, which would limit Iran’s ability to import gasoline. The Senate will likely approve the legislation in coming weeks. The U.S., through similar restrictions, should strengthen economic sanctions by convincing others to jump on board. European nations such as France, Germany, and Britain have expressed interest in such sanctions. In addition, Iran’s recent agreement to supply Turkmenistan with natural gas, which will ultimately supply all of Europe, competes with the Russian monopoly on gas, giving the Russians an incentive to support sanctions. This agreement would also give the Europeans more economic leverage over Tehran. Finally, a multilateral regimen of sanctions would force companies and financial institutions that do business in Iran to choose between continuing their transactions with Iran and doing business in the U.S. and in whichever European nations sign on to sanctions and few companies can afford to choose the former. While some have argued that enhanced sanctions might rally the Iranian people around the regime, only the opposite has happened thus far, as Iranians have blamed their regime for the country’s economic woes.

While proceeding with this new approach to Iran, however, the United States must try to ensure China and Russia’s support. While Chinese-Iranian economic interests are substantial, Chinese-U.S. economic ties are even more vital. China could be amenable to enforcing sanctions against Iran, as Beijing does not wish to deal with the economic consequences of a potential war between the U.S. and Iran that could result if the Iranian nuclear program is not stopped. In addition, the Russians, who are anxious about NATO, may be willing to enforce sanctions against Iran if the U.S. provides concessions on Russian security interests. A recent controversial overture by the U.S. to scale back missile shield deployment in Poland could be responsible for Russian officials more vocally supporting sanctions against Iran. Securing Chinese and Russian support for sanctions should be a top priority for the U.S.

Of course, the U.S. has never taken the military option off the table, and Israel has strongly hinted that it would consider using military force against Iran as well. Air strikes on Iran’s nuclear targets present a difficult tactical challenge, however. Iran’s nuclear facilities are distributed across the country, with some installations hidden underground, heavily fortified. Moreover, Iran has military assets throughout the Middle East with which it could retaliate against such a strike. In Iraq, Iran would almost certainly intensify support for the insurgency, endangering American troops and the already unstable democracy. In Gaza, Hamas could, at Iran’s instigation, unleash missile strikes into densely populated areas of Israel. Indeed, Iran itself has ballistic capability and could retaliate with its own missile strikes. Additionally, Iran could, in retaliation, finally make good on its threat to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40 percent of the world’s sea-transported oil and 90 percent of the Gulf’s oil output flows. Even if the U.S. were able to open the straits quickly, insurers would refuse to cover oil tankers passing through a conflict zone, effectively closing it to international commerce. Thus, superior firepower simply may not provide an effective solution to this problem, and could provoke a harsh response from the international community against the U.S. or Israel. As such, it is imperative that multilateral economic and political sanctions be applied instead of a military option.

To persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear program, the United States must employ multilateral cooperation and sanctions to convince Iran’s leaders that it is highly disadvantageous to continue nuclear development. A combination of economic, political, and social pressures could finally push Iran to accept an agreement. Iran has always used negotiations to stall because the price for delaying a negotiated settlement was significant but not crippling. The U.S. should make the price for stalling unacceptably high for Iran, in economic and political terms.

“People have learned to live with it.”

Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s recent statement regarding the violent conflict between Israel and Palestine alludes not only to the lack of progress from negotiations in recent months, but also to the partisan political moment into which President Obama’s administration has entered with regard to its policies in the Middle East. Lieberman’s comments suggest a lack of initiative within the Israeli government to work toward a lasting peace settlement; indeed, over the last few months, violent conflict surrounding the city of Jerusalem and the failure of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to articulate more than rhetorical support for a “two-state solution” have added to fears that the region has turned its back on negotiation. Most importantly, Israel’s continued settlement building in the West Bank has delegitimized its more conciliatory gestures and will impede negotiations until expansion is frozen.

Under these circumstances, it is no wonder that President Obama and his Cabinet have shied away from addressing this ongoing crisis directly. The contradictory way in which the President has addressed Middle Eastern issues at various speaking engagements has led to a sense of confusion as to the extent to which he will support or reject recent Israeli stances. During his June 2008 appearance before the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee, a powerful pro-Israel lobby group, then-Senator Obama assured the audience that his administration would continue to assist Israel to the tune of roughly $30 billion over the course of ten years – reaffirming a commitment from President George W. Bush. Furthermore, Obama insisted that the U.S. “must never force Israel to the negotiating table.” At his speech in Cairo a year later, however, President Obama condemned Israel’s continued expansion into the occupied territories, declaring that “it is time for these settlements to stop.” It is difficult to imagine how the president can expect settlement expansion to stop without pressing Israel to take part in any form of negotiations.

President Obama’s relative reticence regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict presents him with an unprecedented opportunity to devise a specific and comprehensive policy in the coming months. Furthermore, two very recent events have left the Middle East a far more vulnerable region, which would make a resumption of active peace negotiations with an American presence all the more timely. First, in September, the United Nations Human Rights Council issued the so-called Goldstone Report, condemning Israeli actions within the Gaza strip during its offensive last winter. Although formally dismissed by both the Israeli government – Prime Minister Netanyahu referred to it as “a mockery of history” – and the United States Congress, its endorsement by the United Nations General Assembly suggests that the report will not be so easily set aside. Defenders of the report argue that it speaks to the extent of Israeli human rights violations in the Gaza strip, while its critics contend that it fails to fully address atrocities committed by Hamas. Yet, in holding both Israeli and Palestinian leaders accountable, the Goldstone Report has helped shed critical and objective light on the seemingly endless regional violence. Obama’s refusal to acknowledge the report has hurt his standing among many Arab nations in which he is usually viewed favorably, or at least more favorably than President Bush. If Obama wishes to attract Arab support for peace negotiations, he must speak publicly about – and in doing so legitimize – the report, even if he temporally weakens him politically.

In another significant regional development, Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas recently announced that he will not seek re-election in January 2010. Although the U.S. has regarded Abbas as a moderate in the region, his performance has been dissatisfactory to the Israeli leadership and to many Palestinians, who now criticize his wavering commitment to end the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Hamas, the dominant political player within Gaza, has opposed his decision to hold presidential and parliamentary elections next year. Obama’s presence in talks or negotiations could determine whether a moderate or militant leader replaces Abbas. Yet with the elections looming, time is not on the President’s side.

The nature of President Obama’s early forays into the Middle East will no doubt set the tone for his entire tenure in office. If his goal is nothing more than to continue supporting Israel at all costs, then little shift in policy from that of the previous administration is needed. If, however, his goal is to negotiate a peace settlement that will protect Israel’s sovereignty and security while creating a truly autonomous nation for the Palestinians, a more nuanced strategy is essential. The Obama administration has continuously wavered between pressing for an end to settlement construction in the occupied territories and accepting a resumption of peace talks while allowing the Israelis to continue construction. Yet until all settlement building ceases, negotiation will remain a dead-end as the “facts on the ground” continue to compromise Palestinian hopes for a state. As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, the administration “wants to see a stop to settlements, not outposts, not ‘natural growth’ exceptions.”

The United States, unfortunately, has a history of empty threats against the Israeli government. If the U.S. really wants an end to settlement construction, it must be willing to withhold some material support from the Israeli government. In 1990, during the first Intifada, the Israeli government began building settlements at an unprecedented rate. James Baker and others in the first Bush Administration perceived these settlements as an obstacle to much-publicized peace negotiations going on in Madrid at that time. The U.S. threatened to withdraw some financial support if the Israel government did not desist. Again in 1992, the United States refused to approve a $10 billion loan viewed by Israel as essential to meeting their increasing infrastructure demands. While this resulted in temporary bilateral tensions, the Israelis soon rejected then Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir’s approach and elected more moderate leadership. The settlements were temporarily frozen, the peace negotiations went on, and the loan was eventually granted.
The strategy employed by the Senior Bush administration did not result in a total halt in settlement construction, but the U.S. won considerable concessions by exploiting Israel’s financial dependence as bargaining leverage.

Some might argue that the cessation of all terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians, mostly perpetrated by Hamas and the militant Shiite group Hezbollah, is the first necessary step to achieving a formal compromise in the region. Yet particularly since January, Hamas leadership has signaled a willingness to negotiate a cease-fire treaty with Israel and went on record in 2006 as agreeing to participate in talks working toward a two-state solution. While their recent concessions in no way compensate for their violent actions, they are a necessity to the peace process, and they must be brought to the table for their to be any hope of a lasting peace.

Others claim that pressuring Israel to accept compromise will deter it from participating in formal peace negotiations. Yet the U.S. managed to win a temporary settlement freeze in the early 1990s that coincided with a series of secret negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). These clandestine talks resulted in Oslo I, the first attempt to synthesize a plan for both Palestinian autonomy and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories.

The events of 1990-92, therefore, provide a viable model for the way in which President Obama can negotiate successfully with a Likud-controlled Israeli government. While the President certainly should not discard our history of cooperation with Israel, he must also take into account the degree to which Israeli survival depends on American financial support and our nation’s interest in maintaining stability in the Middle East as a whole. If President Obama wishes to encourage moderate Palestinian leadership and the renewal of negotiations, he must spend his political capital in a manner that reflects the true urgency of the region’s political situation and does not assume, as Mr. Lieberman says, that the region has “learned to live with” violent conflict.

After enduring 8 years of attacks by over 12,000 Hamas rockets fired indiscriminately into Israeli villages, Israel finally retaliated in December of 2008. The Israeli military’s operation “Cast-Lead” sought to target and eliminate key terrorist leaders of Hamas. Almost immediately, newspapers and governments around the world published claims that Israel was using “disproportionate force” in this operation. The unequal death toll from the fighting—1000 Palestinians to 13 Israelis—led those inclined to anti-Zionism to accuse Israel of targeting civilians and committing war crimes. These charges failed to consider Israel’s unprecedented efforts to avoid civilian casualties. Israel released thousands of flyers and text messages warning Gazans to leave targeted areas and even called people on their cell phones telling them to evacuate potential bombing sites. For those who stayed in the affected areas, Israel sent food and medical equipment and continued to supply water and electricity.

The responsibility for the tragic Palestinian death toll lies not with the Israel Defense Force but with Hamas. Hamas fired from ambulances and hospitals. Hamas stockpiled weapons in civilian buildings. Hamas used human shields. While Israel took care to save as many innocent lives as possible, Hamas is guilty of using terrorist tactics and infringing upon numerous internationally accepted laws of warfare. Because Israel was justified in its defensive military operations against Hamas and because it took such strong measures to avoid civilian casualties, the U.S. should continue to support its ally in the face of international backlash against the conflict.

Every country has a right to self-defense. In order for Israel to stop the barrage of rocket fire from the Gaza strip, it could not defend itself on its own soil alone. Rather than risk massive Palestinian civilian casualties by firing its own rockets in response, Israel sent in ground troops to seek out terrorists within the Gaza Strip. Its force was the minimum necessary to defend itself. Unfortunately, because of Hamas’ human shield tactics, high numbers of Palestinians were killed.

None of this evidence appears in United Nations Human Rights Council’s “Goldstone Report”, named for the South African head of the “Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict.” The report accuses Israel of purposefully targeting civilians and of committing “crimes against humanity.” In addition to blatant fabrications (such as “there is no evidence that hospitals or ambulances were used for military activities” and “the amount of aid allowed into Gaza by Israel decreased after the end of the fighting”), the report ignores overwhelming evidence of the care Israel showed to Palestinian civilians. Instead, it accepts hearsay and anecdotal evidence from Palestinian eyewitnesses.

The report does accuse Hamas of war conduct infractions, but these minor charges pale in comparison to the zeal with which the report criticizes Israel. U.S. State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said, “Although the report covers both sides of the conflict, it focuses overwhelmingly on Israel’s actions,” and Goldstone opted for “cookie-cutter conclusions about Israel’s actions, while keeping the deplorable actions of Hamas to generalized remarks.” Numerous publications, among them The Wall Street Journal and The Economist dismissed the report as strongly biased.

The UN Human Rights Council, nevertheless, officially endorsed the report on October 16th. The Council includes representatives from such countries as China, Angola, Cuba, and other governments known for oppressive behavior. The vote to endorse the report passed by a margin of 25 to 6.

The Israel must now acquiesce to “transparent” investigations of its military workings, and the Council has recommended that Israel face trial in the International Criminal Court. This decision has tremendous implications for Israel’s long-term self-defense. If the Council could find Israel guilty in this case, it could do so no matter how moral and civilian-conscious Israel’s campaigns to eliminate terrorists might be. Israel’s ability to defend itself from Hamas, Hezbollah, and other hostile neighbors will be severely diminished as long as the United Nations wields the threat to drag its generals in front of the International Criminal Court. Indeed, the greatest threat facing the United States’ strongest ally in the Middle East is being “pressured” out of the right to self-defense by the UN Human Rights Council.

The Council’s decision displays transparent anti-Israeli bias. In response to an article in a widely read Swedish tabloid, which claimed that Israeli soldiers have been killing Palestinians in order to harvest and traffic their organs, the government-controlled press of many countries in the Middle East spent parts of the summer publishing cartoons depicting Jews killing Arabs to drink their blood. Among those countries on the blood libel bandwagon are Jordan and Qatar, who also serve on the United Nations Human Rights Council and voted for the Goldstone Report. Clearly, many of the countries on the Council have an agenda other than the protection of human rights.

This is not a sudden new international conspiracy to eliminate Israel and Middle Eastern Jewry; anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism have been constant realities for Israel since its founding. Now more than ever is the time for the United States to stand firm in Israel’s defense. The United States’ permanent representative to the United Nations, Susan Rice, said, “We have long expressed our very serious concern with the mandate that was given by the Human Rights Council prior to our joining the council, which we viewed as unbalanced, one-sided and basically unacceptable.” The US was one of the six countries who voted against the Goldstone Report, and the House of Representatives recently passed a resolution denouncing the Report by an overwhelming margin of 344-36.

Where has President Obama stood among all this? So far, he has reassured Israel that the Report’s impact will fade and requested that Palestinian Authority President Mahmud Abbas drop his support for it. Abbas did, but then recanted due to pressure from the Palestinian people. Obama cannot afford another diplomatic failure like this in the Middle East. He needs to be clearer that when it comes to facing the threat against Israel, the United States is unwilling to compromise. He needs to rally worldwide support against the Goldstone Report—if enough countries cooperate, the Council’s influence will diminish. Obama needs to condemn the Human Rights Council and encourage the United Nations to better monitor it, if not shut it down altogether. Otherwise, the United States’ only stalwart ally and the only democracy in the Middle East may face further pressure from the Human Rights Council and other international anti-Zionists.

The war in Afghanistan, which flew under the radar after the quick and successful invasion by U.S. forces in 2001, has reappeared front and center on President Obama’s foreign agenda. The Vietnam-Afghanistan comparison has become a favorite topic of armchair politicians. Parallels between the conflicts certainly exist: the nature of warfare, the corrupt U.S.-backed regimes, and the wars’ unpopularity in the U.S. The question of whether Afghanistan is the new Vietnam, however, is irrelevant. The real challenge for policy makers is to examine the roots of their similarities in order to find a potential solution to the situation in Afghanistan.

Two aspects of the Vietnam conflict are particularly relevant to Afghanistan today: American support for an unpopular regime and irresponsible reconstruction spending. A motivation for U.S. intervention in Vietnam was the desire to bolster America’s reputation as a champion of freedom and friend to democracy, yet the U.S. ended up sponsoring one of the most corrupt and authoritarian regimes in recent history. In 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem declared himself President of Vietnam after winning 600,000 out of 400,000 possible votes. He later won uncontested re-election after two candidates refused American bribes to stand in and create the appearance of legitimacy. Diem was eventually assassinated in a coup tacitly approved by the U.S. In sponsoring an authoritarian regime and later providing implicit support for a coup d’etat against it, the U.S. undermined the viability of subsequent governments and undercut the legitimacy of its intervention in Vietnam.

Another U.S. goal, pacifying Vietnam through economic prosperity, also failed spectacularly. Billions of dollars were poured into Saigon at the expense of rural areas, the very places where American forces needed to win hearts and minds. Traditional businesses were abandoned by Vietnamese civilians in favor of prostitution and drug trafficking. Key industries like agriculture were so woefully ignored by the administration that starting in 1965, South Vietnam actually became a rice importer.

The situation in Afghanistan has similar characteristics. Both Afghanistan and Vietnam were distant, small, and impoverished nations that posed little external threat to the United States. The Karzai administration, like Diem’s, is plagued by corruption, fraudulent elections, and unpopularity. Both administrations depended heavily on American aid, but openly defied American recommendations in order to avoid being branded puppet regimes. American airstrikes have killed many civilians in Afghanistan, in much the same way that Agent Orange devastated South Vietnam. Finally, like in Vietnam, narcotics production is a major industry in Afghanistan. After the 2001 invasion, Afghanistan quickly regained its status as the world’s largest opium producer.

The main distinction between Vietnam and Afghanistan, one that is a blessing for the U.S., is the nature of the resistance. Ho Chi Minh was a charismatic figure fighting for national independence, a cause even his enemies found difficult to criticize. Had Diem not blocked the 1956 election out of fear of losing, Ho would have won by a landslide. The Taliban, however, do not enjoy similar support. Their tyrannical rule was widely unpopular, and their cruel treatment of women, bombing of public facilities, and use of schools as military barracks angered both ordinary Afghans and other extremist factions.

The Obama administration can capitalize on the Taliban’s weakness and win the support of the Afghan people by delivering on nation-building promises. Economic and political failures are the main reasons that natives have turned to the Taliban. Afghanistan does not lack natural resources, foreign aid, or manpower. What it lacks is a competent government capable of using those resources. The U.S. should make a firm and credible threat to withdraw help in all forms if the Karzai administration continues to underperform.
Critics may argue such a strategy will strengthen the Taliban, but history has shown that there is much more to be lost if the U.S. continues to be soft on the Afghan government. The Karzai administration, like that of Diem, could become completely dependent on the U.S., and yet remain unwilling to implement its advice. This would gradually give the Taliban even more momentum than they would gain from the U.S. cutting out Karzai today.

Just as the Vietnamese frowned upon Kennedy’s “relief workers” program, Afghans will not trust nation-building efforts if every American is armed with an M16. In order to foster legitimacy for nation-building, the U.S. needs to focus on training Afghan forces to defend themselves. When Afghan forces are able to stabilize regions without significant American support, they will earn popular legitimacy and improve morale, both important developments for their long-term struggle with the Taliban. Training a primitive army like that of Afghanistan will be difficult, but this task is made easier by the Taliban’s unpopularity and the lessons the U.S. learned training the South Vietnamese security force. U.S. personnel must demonstrate respect, compassion, and a willingness to learn and understand the Afghan culture in order to succeed in their efforts.

In hindsight, American foreign policies in Vietnam were incoherent and lacked a well thought-out strategy. The U.S. limped into Vietnam hoping for a quick victory, but as soon as that proved impossible, its entire agenda collapsed. Where the U.S. had clear goals, like winning hearts and minds, shoddy execution and an ignorance of local culture derailed them. The U.S. was fighting with scare tactics and hypocritical policies, which were exposed by a tough-minded and risk-tolerant opposition. For years, policy makers scrambled for quick fixes and honorable exits. President Obama must avoid these pitfalls by crafting a feasible long-term strategy in Afghanistan.

Deploying more troops seems unsustainable. The U.S. will have to fight a war of attrition with the American public as its own worst enemy. The North Vietnamese were willing to risk an inordinate amount of casualties in order to achieve their objective, and the Taliban’s suicide bombings show that they are capable of the same. In contrast, Americans’ casualty aversion is simply too great for the U.S. military to play the same kind of game.

Deploying additional troops, even for security purposes, will merely lead to a vicious cycle of resistance and reinforcement. Consider that in order to protect ground troops, the U.S. relies heavily on air strikes from high altitude that inevitably affect civilians. Rising civilian hostility coupled with failed nation-building efforts strengthen the Taliban and embolden them to stage attacks against American installations, which then precipitate further troop increases and perpetuate the cycle.

President Obama inherited a mess in Afghanistan but also an opportunity to right the course. He should reject the temptation to deploy more troops and instead focus on rebuilding the economic and political infrastructure of Afghanistan. Building a free and prosperous Afghanistan will undermine the reason for the Taliban’s existence and hopefully conclude the conflict with minimal loss of life.