Can a prisoner exchange of 1,027 men and women ever be considered a victory for both sides? On October 18th, citizens of the state of Israel poured onto the streets and uncorked their champagne bottles in celebration of this calculation, one that had brought back home a symbol of national pride and military strength. Simultaneously, across the West Bank and Gaza, hundreds of Palestinian families tearfully reunited with long-imprisoned loved ones, returned due to that same calculation which, to them, appeared an obvious victory.

In the aftermath of the exchange, in which Israel freed Palestinians,imprisoned for everything from dissent to violence in return for the release of Gilad Shalit, an Israeli Defense Force soldier captured in the July War with Lebanon’s Hizballah, Israeli opinion is divided, but only slightly: according to polls taken immediately after the release, between 74 and 80 percent of the Israeli public support the exchange. Indeed, addressing concerns as to the inequality of the exchange, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu quoted from the Talmud: “He who saves one soul, it is as though he saved an entire world.” Meanwhile, Palestinians are jubilant at the prospect of having secured the release of so many, for what they consider so little. It seems that for once, a solution has been brokered in the endlessly intractable conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people that somewhat satisfies everyone.

Yet the prisoner exchange, seemingly a one-shot, no-strings-attached PR boon for the Israeli government and Hamas alike, will have far-reaching consequences for which neither party is prepared. The exchange, brokered in secret by Egypt between the two parties, failed to engage either the Israeli or Palestinian public in a way that would have given them a sense of future potential for open cooperation. The concept of negotiation between Israel and Hamas has been thrust upon both publics quite suddenly, giving them little stake in the talks or the possibility of others in the future. Moreover, as the initial joy fades, the exchange serves to remind both parties of the tense relationship that created the need to exchange such prisoners—captured in times of conflict, imprisoned for political dissent and terrorism—in the first place. Indeed, both sides view this act as one of just compensation rather than one of reconciliation. The impact it will have for both Israeli security prospects and Palestinian aspirations is minimal at best and costly at worst.

While the deal has received much praise from the Israeli public, it is mysterious that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other senior government officials dealing with the exchange would believe such a security risk to be wise. It seems illogical that, a government and, moreover, a nation so concerned with the threat of terrorism of which they consider Hamas a key breeder, would broker a deal that releases men and women whose involvement included but was not limited to a 2001 Jerusalem pizzeria bombing, the 2002 “Passover Massacre” in Netanya, and a 2004 shooting attack on the Trans-Israel Highway. To the Israelis, these incidents no doubt represent profound threats to their security, and the release of those who committed them seems an odd risk to take considering the importance they place on that existence. Israeli opposition leader Tzipi Livni, among others, has pointed out this discrepancy.

Yet while Israeli’s security interests have been imperiled by the prisoner exchange, Palestinians aspirations for statehood have been dealt a far greater blow. The release, while celebrated by those families whose loved ones had come home, some of whom had been imprisoned since 1987′s first intifada, was quickly hailed by Hamas themselves as evidence of the need to take more Israeli soldiers hostage since, clearly, it had proven effective. “The people want a new Gilad!” protesters chanted at a Hamas rally in Gaza City, shortly after the exchange. And while the capture of Gilad Shalit does appear to have paid dividends for Hamas, it has become painfully evident to Palestinians that violent action against the state of Israel only results in increased security measures and repression. Hamas’ citing of this exchange as a success, then, has the potential to derail the non-violent Palestinian opposition to Israel that has become more widespread in recent years.

Moreover, the exchange has increased the legitimacy and popularity of Hamas at the expense of the West Bank’s Fatah, whose influence has been called into question and weakened by the deal. Israel and the international community alike generally regard Fatah as the more legitimate Palestinian government; any substantive peace deal, therefore, would necessitate their involvement. Relations between Israel and Fatah, however, are tenuous at best, and an upsurge in violence by Hamas, by taking prisoners or using similar means would most likely reflect poorly on the Palestinian cause as a whole, and therefore Fatah by association. Moreover, historically, this sort of violence has led to increasingly repressive Israeli security measures, which would set Palestinian expectations back substantially.

Furthermore, even if Hamas’ rhetoric fails to derail the Palestinian cause, the deal they brokered with Israel has taken the spotlight away from the issues that concern Palestinians the most. While Shalit’s release and the role Hamas’ played in it has caused a stir in the media, little attention has been paid to the underlying causes of the conflict, dizzying in scope and, as of late, unaddressed by either party through negotiation. Any attempts at peace talks have stalled and a UN bid, while symbolically significant, has been doomed to failure. Palestinians continue to exist in an oddly bifurcated, quasi-independent non-state, which they view as imminently threatened by Israel’s persistent creation of “facts on the ground” in the form of illegal settlements. Yet international attention regarding the conflict has been distracted from the unabated settlement construction in East Jerusalem, supported by PM Netanyahu, among others, by a high-publicity event with little implication for the larger issues at stake.

Some will argue that the joy and relief that both sides have felt in the days following the exchange will promote a mutual spirit of goodwill, inciting reconciliation and future peace. Others argue that the negotiation necessary to cut the Israel-Hamas deal served to break the ice between the two parties, laying a path for future talks. “This is a sign of a good deal,” wrote Uri Dromi, former spokesman for previous Israeli PM’s Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, “when both sides walk away equally dissatisfied.” This might have been true if a deal containing any substance had been reached.

Yet the fact that talks that did not address the underlying issues concerning Palestinian statehood and its implications—for Jerusalem— water issues, the return of refugees and Israeli security, to name a few—yet still require outside mediation does not bode well for any future relationship. Furthermore, neither the Palestinian nor Israeli public saw the talks as such: to each side, the deal represented the long-awaited return of men and women, imprisoned by an unjust party for fighting a just cause. Indeed, the Israeli government did not even attempt to portray it as such. “I have brought your son home to you,” Netanyahu announced, upon bringing Shalit to his parents’ home in northern Israel. The bravado and simplicity of his statement brushed aside any acknowledgment of the complexity of the deal he had just made, as well as its implications for his nation and another’s future.

For Hamas, the prisoner deal seemed too good to be true. For the Israeli and Palestinian public, it is. If the exchange served any purpose, it was to remind people from both societies of another type of prisoner—the one that they themselves have become, held hostage by directionless leadership willing to make long-term sacrifices for short-term popularity.

Since its founding in 1923, the Turkish Republic has largely aligned itself with the West. A NATO member since 1952, the nation served as a lynchpin in American Cold War and Middle East policy. Turkey still provides essential logistical support to American forces in the Afghan and Iraq Wars by allowing American aid and cargo to pass through the country.

Recent developments, however, indicate that the country’s foreign policy has begun to shift away from the West as Turkey strengthens its relationships with rogue regimes, such as Syria and Iran. While there are many reasons for this realignment, one of the most pressing has been the lethargic pace of talks regarding Turkish accession into the European Union (EU). To counter these trends, European leaders need American backing in re-engaging Turkey and offering incentives to remain allied with the West, for a Turkish realignment would detrimentally affect the dynamics of the region.

The unsustainable status quo between Turkey and the EU could drive Turkey away from the American-European alliance. Although initially promising, the Turkish bid for full EU membership has become mired in controversy. The Union’s two most powerful members, France and Germany, have expressed reservations over full Turkish membership, fearing a flood of impoverished workers into Europe from Turkey. The Turkish occupation of Cyprus, in addition, places Turkey in conflict with several other EU members, including Greece. In fact, the conflict over Cyprus has already stalled negotiations on several of the 35 chapters that Turkey and EU states must agree upon before accession.

Public support for the EU in Turkey is also highly volatile and closely tracks domestic developments. Commitment to joining the EU has waned under the currently ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), and other foreign policy interests, those in the Middle East, have taken priority. Before negotiations completely collapse, both Turkey and the West must agree to change course.

The EU agreement, however, may be difficult. The Turkish have compromised on policies to appease the European Union, but some of these “reforms” have allowed AKP to consolidate its power over the government. For instance, while recently-passed constitutional amendments bar gender discrimination, AKP also pressed through a judicial reorganization that expands the size of the nation’s highest constitutional court — allowing the government to pack the courts with pro-AKP judges. As the courts have represented AKP’s main opposition (the constitutional court considered banning the party several years ago), AKP has cemented its power in the country. Unchecked, the government is free to depart from Turkey’s traditional foreign policy goals, drawing the nation ever closer to Syria and Iran.

If ties do not strengthen, Turkey’s increasing engagement with rogue regimes will damage American, European, and Israeli interests. A harbinger of the potential consequences of this shift can be seen in the recent Gaza flotilla incident. Historically, Turkey has maintained peaceful and relatively cooperative relations with Israel. The nations, in fact, have provided each other mutual assistance in the past: Israel has supplied arms to the Turkish military, the two countries have engaged in joint military exercises, and Turkey helped mediate Israeli-Syrian peace talks in 2008.

In the aftermath of the flotilla incident, however, relations have sunk to an historic low. Investigations have found that one of the boats was purchased with the assistance of the AKP-controlled Istanbul municipality, and AKP Turkish Prime Minister, RecepTayyipErdoğan, has been increasingly critical of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. Turkey also canceled Israel’s participation in new multinational military exercises due to concerns that Israel might be training for a strike against Iran.

On the other hand, Turkish-Iranian relations seem stronger than ever. By means of its nonpermanent seat on the UN Security Council, Turkey has attempted to undercut U.S. efforts to impose sanctions on Iran, weakening the international response to the Iranian nuclear program. The recently scuttled Turkish-Brazilian deal that would have allowed Iran to obtain enriched uranium in return for some of its less refined nuclear material would have legitimized Iran’s drive for nuclear weapons as well as further damaged American and European efforts to halt Iranian nuclear armament. Such a drastic shift in Turkish foreign policy underpins the nation’s increasing sense of estrangement with Europe and the West, with potentially devastating consequences.

A Turkish realignment would also affect American interests in the Middle East. NATO’s Incirlik Air Base in Southeast Turkey is a strategic regional location. U.S. forces have used this asset to supply American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, the base also served as a staging ground for the evacuations of Americans during the Israel-Hezbollah War of 2006.  In recent years, however, Turkey has increased restrictions on use of the base, for example denying American forces transit through the base during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Turkey’s continued alignment with Syria or Iran is expected to make such restrictions more common, depriving the U.S. of a necessary tool to supply forces in the Middle East and project U.S. power in the region.

A further cause for concern for the United States and Europe is Turkey’s strengthening relationship with China. Recently, the two nations performed joint air force maneuvers, worrying NATO members that China might gain access to their military strategies. In October, both nations announced a new bilateral partnership that would triple trade by 2015 and double it again by 2020. As China has been reluctant to support American policies in North Korea and the Middle East, Turkey might soon become a less helpful ally to the United States in the region if it increasingly cooperates with Beijing.

But how can the United States and Europe forestall a Turkish shift? One of the first, and by far the easiest, steps that the EU could take is to suspend accession talks. These negotiations have simply raised tensions among EU members and provided AKP political pretext to attack the secular Turkish military and judiciary under the guise of constitutional reforms. However, in economics and finance, both groups share common interests. The EU has effectively integrated the European continent—and Turkey’s four largest trading partners are in the EU.

Creating a broader customs or tariff union (only a limited agreement between the two groups has existed since 1996) with Turkey would be an effective foreign policy tool and open new markets in the region. Indeed, as Europe seeks to reduce its dependence on Russian natural gas resources, Turkey provides an effective route for a pipeline to the Caucasus nations. Such economic developments, importantly, will stabilize the country’s foreign policy,  providing the Turkish government an incentive to join in isolating rogue regimes, such as Iran and Syria, which threaten the economic interests of the U.S., Europe, and Israel.

Turkey has always been caught between the East and the West. Its role as a bridge between the two regions has and will continue to grant the nation importance in international relations. It is essential, then, that Turkey remains a firm Western ally. For the nation’s interests to remain aligned with those of the U.S., Europe, and Israel, efforts must be made to further integrate Turkey into the European and Western community. Economic engagement and coordination represent an essential first step to promoting Turkish welfare and protecting Western interests in the Middle East.

“People have learned to live with it.”

Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s recent statement regarding the violent conflict between Israel and Palestine alludes not only to the lack of progress from negotiations in recent months, but also to the partisan political moment into which President Obama’s administration has entered with regard to its policies in the Middle East. Lieberman’s comments suggest a lack of initiative within the Israeli government to work toward a lasting peace settlement; indeed, over the last few months, violent conflict surrounding the city of Jerusalem and the failure of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to articulate more than rhetorical support for a “two-state solution” have added to fears that the region has turned its back on negotiation. Most importantly, Israel’s continued settlement building in the West Bank has delegitimized its more conciliatory gestures and will impede negotiations until expansion is frozen.

Under these circumstances, it is no wonder that President Obama and his Cabinet have shied away from addressing this ongoing crisis directly. The contradictory way in which the President has addressed Middle Eastern issues at various speaking engagements has led to a sense of confusion as to the extent to which he will support or reject recent Israeli stances. During his June 2008 appearance before the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee, a powerful pro-Israel lobby group, then-Senator Obama assured the audience that his administration would continue to assist Israel to the tune of roughly $30 billion over the course of ten years – reaffirming a commitment from President George W. Bush. Furthermore, Obama insisted that the U.S. “must never force Israel to the negotiating table.” At his speech in Cairo a year later, however, President Obama condemned Israel’s continued expansion into the occupied territories, declaring that “it is time for these settlements to stop.” It is difficult to imagine how the president can expect settlement expansion to stop without pressing Israel to take part in any form of negotiations.

President Obama’s relative reticence regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict presents him with an unprecedented opportunity to devise a specific and comprehensive policy in the coming months. Furthermore, two very recent events have left the Middle East a far more vulnerable region, which would make a resumption of active peace negotiations with an American presence all the more timely. First, in September, the United Nations Human Rights Council issued the so-called Goldstone Report, condemning Israeli actions within the Gaza strip during its offensive last winter. Although formally dismissed by both the Israeli government – Prime Minister Netanyahu referred to it as “a mockery of history” – and the United States Congress, its endorsement by the United Nations General Assembly suggests that the report will not be so easily set aside. Defenders of the report argue that it speaks to the extent of Israeli human rights violations in the Gaza strip, while its critics contend that it fails to fully address atrocities committed by Hamas. Yet, in holding both Israeli and Palestinian leaders accountable, the Goldstone Report has helped shed critical and objective light on the seemingly endless regional violence. Obama’s refusal to acknowledge the report has hurt his standing among many Arab nations in which he is usually viewed favorably, or at least more favorably than President Bush. If Obama wishes to attract Arab support for peace negotiations, he must speak publicly about – and in doing so legitimize – the report, even if he temporally weakens him politically.

In another significant regional development, Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas recently announced that he will not seek re-election in January 2010. Although the U.S. has regarded Abbas as a moderate in the region, his performance has been dissatisfactory to the Israeli leadership and to many Palestinians, who now criticize his wavering commitment to end the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Hamas, the dominant political player within Gaza, has opposed his decision to hold presidential and parliamentary elections next year. Obama’s presence in talks or negotiations could determine whether a moderate or militant leader replaces Abbas. Yet with the elections looming, time is not on the President’s side.

The nature of President Obama’s early forays into the Middle East will no doubt set the tone for his entire tenure in office. If his goal is nothing more than to continue supporting Israel at all costs, then little shift in policy from that of the previous administration is needed. If, however, his goal is to negotiate a peace settlement that will protect Israel’s sovereignty and security while creating a truly autonomous nation for the Palestinians, a more nuanced strategy is essential. The Obama administration has continuously wavered between pressing for an end to settlement construction in the occupied territories and accepting a resumption of peace talks while allowing the Israelis to continue construction. Yet until all settlement building ceases, negotiation will remain a dead-end as the “facts on the ground” continue to compromise Palestinian hopes for a state. As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, the administration “wants to see a stop to settlements, not outposts, not ‘natural growth’ exceptions.”

The United States, unfortunately, has a history of empty threats against the Israeli government. If the U.S. really wants an end to settlement construction, it must be willing to withhold some material support from the Israeli government. In 1990, during the first Intifada, the Israeli government began building settlements at an unprecedented rate. James Baker and others in the first Bush Administration perceived these settlements as an obstacle to much-publicized peace negotiations going on in Madrid at that time. The U.S. threatened to withdraw some financial support if the Israel government did not desist. Again in 1992, the United States refused to approve a $10 billion loan viewed by Israel as essential to meeting their increasing infrastructure demands. While this resulted in temporary bilateral tensions, the Israelis soon rejected then Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir’s approach and elected more moderate leadership. The settlements were temporarily frozen, the peace negotiations went on, and the loan was eventually granted.
The strategy employed by the Senior Bush administration did not result in a total halt in settlement construction, but the U.S. won considerable concessions by exploiting Israel’s financial dependence as bargaining leverage.

Some might argue that the cessation of all terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians, mostly perpetrated by Hamas and the militant Shiite group Hezbollah, is the first necessary step to achieving a formal compromise in the region. Yet particularly since January, Hamas leadership has signaled a willingness to negotiate a cease-fire treaty with Israel and went on record in 2006 as agreeing to participate in talks working toward a two-state solution. While their recent concessions in no way compensate for their violent actions, they are a necessity to the peace process, and they must be brought to the table for their to be any hope of a lasting peace.

Others claim that pressuring Israel to accept compromise will deter it from participating in formal peace negotiations. Yet the U.S. managed to win a temporary settlement freeze in the early 1990s that coincided with a series of secret negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). These clandestine talks resulted in Oslo I, the first attempt to synthesize a plan for both Palestinian autonomy and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories.

The events of 1990-92, therefore, provide a viable model for the way in which President Obama can negotiate successfully with a Likud-controlled Israeli government. While the President certainly should not discard our history of cooperation with Israel, he must also take into account the degree to which Israeli survival depends on American financial support and our nation’s interest in maintaining stability in the Middle East as a whole. If President Obama wishes to encourage moderate Palestinian leadership and the renewal of negotiations, he must spend his political capital in a manner that reflects the true urgency of the region’s political situation and does not assume, as Mr. Lieberman says, that the region has “learned to live with” violent conflict.

After enduring 8 years of attacks by over 12,000 Hamas rockets fired indiscriminately into Israeli villages, Israel finally retaliated in December of 2008. The Israeli military’s operation “Cast-Lead” sought to target and eliminate key terrorist leaders of Hamas. Almost immediately, newspapers and governments around the world published claims that Israel was using “disproportionate force” in this operation. The unequal death toll from the fighting—1000 Palestinians to 13 Israelis—led those inclined to anti-Zionism to accuse Israel of targeting civilians and committing war crimes. These charges failed to consider Israel’s unprecedented efforts to avoid civilian casualties. Israel released thousands of flyers and text messages warning Gazans to leave targeted areas and even called people on their cell phones telling them to evacuate potential bombing sites. For those who stayed in the affected areas, Israel sent food and medical equipment and continued to supply water and electricity.

The responsibility for the tragic Palestinian death toll lies not with the Israel Defense Force but with Hamas. Hamas fired from ambulances and hospitals. Hamas stockpiled weapons in civilian buildings. Hamas used human shields. While Israel took care to save as many innocent lives as possible, Hamas is guilty of using terrorist tactics and infringing upon numerous internationally accepted laws of warfare. Because Israel was justified in its defensive military operations against Hamas and because it took such strong measures to avoid civilian casualties, the U.S. should continue to support its ally in the face of international backlash against the conflict.

Every country has a right to self-defense. In order for Israel to stop the barrage of rocket fire from the Gaza strip, it could not defend itself on its own soil alone. Rather than risk massive Palestinian civilian casualties by firing its own rockets in response, Israel sent in ground troops to seek out terrorists within the Gaza Strip. Its force was the minimum necessary to defend itself. Unfortunately, because of Hamas’ human shield tactics, high numbers of Palestinians were killed.

None of this evidence appears in United Nations Human Rights Council’s “Goldstone Report”, named for the South African head of the “Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict.” The report accuses Israel of purposefully targeting civilians and of committing “crimes against humanity.” In addition to blatant fabrications (such as “there is no evidence that hospitals or ambulances were used for military activities” and “the amount of aid allowed into Gaza by Israel decreased after the end of the fighting”), the report ignores overwhelming evidence of the care Israel showed to Palestinian civilians. Instead, it accepts hearsay and anecdotal evidence from Palestinian eyewitnesses.

The report does accuse Hamas of war conduct infractions, but these minor charges pale in comparison to the zeal with which the report criticizes Israel. U.S. State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said, “Although the report covers both sides of the conflict, it focuses overwhelmingly on Israel’s actions,” and Goldstone opted for “cookie-cutter conclusions about Israel’s actions, while keeping the deplorable actions of Hamas to generalized remarks.” Numerous publications, among them The Wall Street Journal and The Economist dismissed the report as strongly biased.

The UN Human Rights Council, nevertheless, officially endorsed the report on October 16th. The Council includes representatives from such countries as China, Angola, Cuba, and other governments known for oppressive behavior. The vote to endorse the report passed by a margin of 25 to 6.

The Israel must now acquiesce to “transparent” investigations of its military workings, and the Council has recommended that Israel face trial in the International Criminal Court. This decision has tremendous implications for Israel’s long-term self-defense. If the Council could find Israel guilty in this case, it could do so no matter how moral and civilian-conscious Israel’s campaigns to eliminate terrorists might be. Israel’s ability to defend itself from Hamas, Hezbollah, and other hostile neighbors will be severely diminished as long as the United Nations wields the threat to drag its generals in front of the International Criminal Court. Indeed, the greatest threat facing the United States’ strongest ally in the Middle East is being “pressured” out of the right to self-defense by the UN Human Rights Council.

The Council’s decision displays transparent anti-Israeli bias. In response to an article in a widely read Swedish tabloid, which claimed that Israeli soldiers have been killing Palestinians in order to harvest and traffic their organs, the government-controlled press of many countries in the Middle East spent parts of the summer publishing cartoons depicting Jews killing Arabs to drink their blood. Among those countries on the blood libel bandwagon are Jordan and Qatar, who also serve on the United Nations Human Rights Council and voted for the Goldstone Report. Clearly, many of the countries on the Council have an agenda other than the protection of human rights.

This is not a sudden new international conspiracy to eliminate Israel and Middle Eastern Jewry; anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism have been constant realities for Israel since its founding. Now more than ever is the time for the United States to stand firm in Israel’s defense. The United States’ permanent representative to the United Nations, Susan Rice, said, “We have long expressed our very serious concern with the mandate that was given by the Human Rights Council prior to our joining the council, which we viewed as unbalanced, one-sided and basically unacceptable.” The US was one of the six countries who voted against the Goldstone Report, and the House of Representatives recently passed a resolution denouncing the Report by an overwhelming margin of 344-36.

Where has President Obama stood among all this? So far, he has reassured Israel that the Report’s impact will fade and requested that Palestinian Authority President Mahmud Abbas drop his support for it. Abbas did, but then recanted due to pressure from the Palestinian people. Obama cannot afford another diplomatic failure like this in the Middle East. He needs to be clearer that when it comes to facing the threat against Israel, the United States is unwilling to compromise. He needs to rally worldwide support against the Goldstone Report—if enough countries cooperate, the Council’s influence will diminish. Obama needs to condemn the Human Rights Council and encourage the United Nations to better monitor it, if not shut it down altogether. Otherwise, the United States’ only stalwart ally and the only democracy in the Middle East may face further pressure from the Human Rights Council and other international anti-Zionists.