Traditionally, the Persian Gulf had been a region of realpolitik power balancing, with Iraq, Iran, and the Arabian Peninsula dominating a tripolar system. The U.S. invasion of Iraq destroyed this arrangement, and the continued U.S. military presence in a number of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations makes its return unlikely. A resurgent Iraq, however, could do much to reduce regional tensions, especially between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Both of these nations have treated Iraq as somewhat of a proxy battlefield in recent years, supporting the Sunni and Shiite factions respectively in an effort to gain a friendly, rather than inimical, national neighbor. This contestation continues to destabilize the Persian Gulf and is detrimental to America’s broader regional agenda. Iraq’s great strategic value is its potential to mediate this tension; its strong religious ties with Iran and cultural ties with Saudi Arabia grant it a presence in both camps unmatched by any other country. To maximize this potential, the U.S. must begin to play a nuanced balancing game, allowing Iraq sufficient freedom to assert itself as an autonomous regional player, but remaining close enough to the country to influence and direct the repercussions of Iraq’s resurgence. Such a policy will be defined by three primary characteristics: the absence of U.S. involvement in Iraqi national politics, increased cooperation with the Iraqi government on a normalized international level, and American efforts to develop a strong relationship between Iraq and the GCC.

It would be wise for the U.S. to avoid involvement in Iraqi national politics for two reasons. First, for Iraq to balance relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran, both of those nations will have to trust in Iraq’s stability; unless those nations consider Iraq a credible threat and a credible ally, they will not enter a security framework dependent on it. Iraq can best prove its self-sufficiency by demonstrating an ability to solve its own domestic problems without foreign assistance. This will require the U.S. to sit responsibly on the sidelines of Iraqi politics. At times, doing so will be painful, but so long as a U.S. hand is seen to be steering Iraq, the rest of the region, especially Iran, will consider it an arm of the U.S. rather than an independent nation. For the U.S. to realize the potential benefits of a strong, internationally responsible Iraq, it must allow that nation to set and follow its own course.

Second, staying out of Iraqi politics is a wise strategy in consideration of America’s broader diplomatic agenda. The U.S. needs credibility to deal effectively with Near Eastern governments, and even appearing to intervene in Iraqi politics would damage America’s ability to act as an honest broker. A perception of America as a hypocritical, imperialist hegemon that pursues its own interests in the Near East already exists among some in the Arab world. Future American attempts to re-involve itself in Iraqi politics would only exacerbate fears that the U.S. is the second coming of the British Empire. Such a development would undermine the American capacity to constructively support reform-minded political factions across the Near East. It would also enhance the credibility of the anti-American narratives propagated by Islamic extremist groups and terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda. Conversely, minimizing U.S. involvement in Iraq improves our credibility and strengthens our ability to promote peace and stability in the Near East. Detractors will argue that Iraq’s currently weakened state makes its ascension to regional power a distant hope, and consequently, makes a hands-off American approach unwise. The U.S., however, is in the Persian Gulf for the long haul, and its Iraq policy needs to reflect a complementary level of strategic patience.

At the same time, it is not in the interest of the U.S. to give Iraq free reign. To maintain the ability to indirectly influence Iraq, America should work to increase political, economic, and social ties between the two nations. Importantly, it should pursue these aims at a level of normalized international relations, just as the U.S. would with Germany, India, or Brazil. The benefits of such an approach are twofold, bringing Iraq and the U.S. closer, while also improving Iraq’s international reputation. Strengthening economic and political ties with Iraq, the U.S. gains important leverage, giving it the ability to pressure the country outside of a military context. Social and cultural exchange programs, like encouraging Iraqi students to study in America, will also improve relations between the two nations. Strong ties between the U.S. and Iraq will allow American leaders to help shape future Gulf security relationships. They will also provide the U.S. with the option to call for Iraqi support on critical diplomatic issues, like slowing Iran’s quest for nuclear technology.

It might seem logical at this point to contend that if the U.S. wants to manipulate Iraq in the future, it should simply remain as intimately tied to it as possible. Such an arrangement, however, would ultimately limit Iraq’s value to the U.S., not increase it. Although American leaders could heavily employ Iraqi support on a few choice issues, Iraq’s ability to be a significant diplomatic actor on the regional and global stage would be severely diminished. The U.S. needs an Iraq that can lobby for it, but with the credibility of independence, not of a proxy. In the pursuit of such a future relationship, America should begin to afford Iraq the same respect that it would any responsible nation. Doing so offers a second benefit: when the U.S. treats Iraq as such the Iraqi government gains international prestige and the respect of other countries. This could do much to convince Iran and the GCC of Iraq’s autonomy and stability.

Finally, in the case that Iraq returns successfully to the regional stage, but is prevented from playing a balancing role by an uncooperative Iran, the U.S. should work to ensure that Iraq aligns itself with the American-allied nations of the GCC. To this end, the U.S. should encourage its Arabian Peninsula allies to foster economic and political ties with Iraq, especially in areas of mutual interest, like counterterrorism. At the same time, however, the U.S. should not deter Iraq from developing a relationship with Iran. Currently, without a diplomatic presence, American Tehran-watchers are essentially blind; even if Iraq can offer the U.S. only a small and cloudy window into the Iranian mentality, it will still be a marked improvement on the status quo.

The day is swiftly approaching when the U.S. will no longer be responsible for the day-to-day governing of Iraq. In consideration of this impending cleavage, it is time for American policymakers to begin considering the structure of a post-Iraq War Near East. The unique relationship the U.S. has developed with Iraq during its reconstruction will serve America well in the future, but the benefits of such a relationship can only be maximized if the U.S. is willing to treat Iraq as an autonomous international equal. If American leaders can smartly and efficiently make that transition, enduring peace in the Persian Gulf just may be attainable.