The Houthis, a rebel group in northern Yemen, have been fighting against the Yemeni government since 2004. But only recently, in the aftermath of the attempted Christmas day bombing by Yemeni national Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, has the conflict captured the attention of the Western world. Observers increasingly fear that the Houthi conflict has diverted Yemen’s limited resources away from combating al-Qaeda and other extremist groups in the Arabian Peninsula. Spectators also fear that the conflict may morph into a new front in the struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia for regional hegemony.

This is not the first time that an internal conflict in Yemen has become the epicenter of regional power tensions between major Middle Eastern states. In 1962, a coup d’état carried out by republican forces in Yemen overthrew the ruling Zaydi imamate. This coup sparked a civil war that lasted until 1970 and drew in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the major Middle East powers of the day. While the scale of the present day conflict cannot compare to the Yemen Civil War, a vicious, drawn-out clash that resulted in over 100,000 deaths, policymakers would do well to study the lessons of Yemeni history. As the United States helps Yemen in its counter-terrorist campaign against al-Qaeda, it must pay close attention to these lessons to ensure that the country’s internal conflicts do not morph into a costly and destabilizing regional power struggle.

Yemen already shows signs of becoming a battleground for Middle Eastern powers. This past November, Houthi rebels crossed into Saudi territory and attacked a Saudi patrol, claiming that Saudi Arabia was assisting Yemen in its counter-Houthi offensive. This raid precipitated a wider Saudi campaign to crush the Houthi forces that has resulted in hundreds of deaths on both sides. Saudi Arabia also fears that Iran is supporting the Houthis to undermine Saudi Arabia’s regional position. This belief is bolstered by the rebels’ sympathetic portrayal in the Iranian media and their use of Katyusha rockets, weapons Iran has also provided to Hezbollah and Hamas, its other proxy groups in the region. Al-Arabiya similarly reports that Yemeni authorities have captured unmarked ships with Iranian crews carrying weapons bound for the rebels.

Iran’s support for the Houthis is particularly significant because the rebels are Zaydis, a small, heterodox sect of Shia Islam highly distinct from the Iranian Twelver Shi’ism. Iran’s support of not merely the Houthi Zaydis but also radical Sunni groups like al-Qaeda and Hamas demonstrates that the nation’s policy choices are dictated not by only religious doctrine but by an attempt to undermine and destabilize competing governments of the region.

This provides a striking parallel to the Civil War in North Yemen. Then, as now, Yemen served as a battleground for regional hegemony. Egypt, under the leadership of Abdel Nasser, sought to extend its influence over Saudi Arabia by supporting the republican forces in Yemen. These forces overthrew the Zaydi royalists, who received support from Saudi Arabia despite the clear doctrinal differences between the faith of the Zaydis and Saudi Arabia’s conservative Wahhabi brand of Sunni Islam. Ultimately, religious considerations took a backseat to the threat posed by revolutionary Egypt to the Saudi monarchy. Though the current Yemeni conflict has not yet resulted in war, Yemen continues to serve as a crucial hot spot for regional power struggles, and the United States must understand that forces greater than religion are at play.

The past conflict also provides important lessons about how impermanent and tenuous alliances in the region can be. In the past war, the Houthi rebels, now viewed as an Iranian proxy, received support from Saudi Arabia. Iran also supported the Zaydi royalists, sharing the Saudis’ fear of the growing power of revolutionary Egypt. Because alliances in this troubled area are clearly motivated by strategic convenience rather than, as some in the West believe, religion, these alliances can change radically over the course of mere decades.

The potential danger of growing Iranian influence is perhaps the greatest specific lesson for the US. At the beginning of February, the Houthi rebels and Yemeni government signed a cease-fire. While this cease-fire has admittedly been breached on occasion, the United States now has an opportunity to capitalize on the relative lapse in violence and take steps to prevent Iran from turning the conflict into a proxy war that could disintegrate into a second Yemeni civil war. One important step that the US can take in order to prevent the Yemeni conflict from becoming part of this growing trend is to devote its naval resources in the Gulf of Aden to assisting the Yemeni government in preventing Iranian weapons from reaching Houthi rebels. A concurrent effort to convince Saudi Arabia, a nation in which the US stations troops, to lessen its direct involvement in Yemen could also have important long-term consequences in lessening the scope of the conflict.

US policymakers must recognize that, as in the past, the alignments between regional powers and their proxies in Yemen are not based primarily on a religious Sunni-Shia divide but are instead grounded in strategic concerns. While current regional alignments in the Middle East may seem to be set in stone, they in fact may undergo dramatic and unexpected shifts as the strategic environment on the ground fluctuates. Therefore, when US policy makers confront Yemen and the Middle East as a whole, they must strive to remain a step ahead of the game, drawing lessons from the North Yemeni Civil War about the mutability and ever-changing nature of alliances and hostilities in the region.

Iran’s nuclear program has been a major concern for the West since the beginning of the millennium. Iran has repeatedly violated both UN and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sanctions, suggested that Israel be wiped off the map, and supported terrorism based in Iraq, the Gaza Strip, and Lebanon. The United States’ unilateral strategy of negotiations and sanctions has been unsuccessful in achieving a sustainable settlement.Washington should consider other options in order to successfully deal with the crisis. To move negotiations forward, the U.S. should proceed with a regimen of multilateral sanctions to put pressure on Iran to negotiate seriously. Sanctions, along with focused and serious negotiations, are America’s best chance to disarm Iran and prevent military action.

The United States should study its previous attempts to end the Iranian nuclear crisis before moving forward. Under the Bush administration, the U.S. applied unilateral financial and economic sanctions against Iran, but with limited success. In the past, countries such as Russia and China provided many of the financial services that the U.S. sanctions denied Iran, and a number of international oil companies continue to do business with Iran in spite of the sanctions. Moreover, China, who seems driven foremost by its concern for feeding its massive appetite for oil, continues to invest in Iran’s energy and refining infrastructure.

Similarly, UN sanctions on weaponry and weapons technology were largely ineffective because Russia and China refused to meaningfully cooperate. In 2008, Russia negotiated a contract to sell Iran advanced anti-aircraft missile battery system—though Russia has yet to deliver the system—insisting that it was for defensive purposes and did not violate the sanctions. While in theory it is indeed a defensive system, the delivery of such weaponry can only harden Iran’s position in the negotiations because it enhances Iran’s ability to defend its nuclear facilities. In sum, for Russia and China, security and proliferation concerns take a back seat to economic gain.

Negotiations have been largely ineffective as well. While many in the West have praised the “agreement in principle” reached at recent talks in Vienna as a step forward, Western countries should be cautious of this perceived success. Under the Vienna Agreement, Iran would ship its stock of enriched uranium to Russia. The Russians and the French would then enrich the uranium into a form that could not be easily re-processed into weapons-grade material but could be used for non-military purposes. This plan, however, is subject to the approval of Ayatollah Khameini, the Iranian Supreme Leader, who is rumored to be against the agreement. In addition, many close to him, including the speaker of the Iranian Parliament, have criticized the framework as an attempt to deceive Iran.

Nonetheless, even if the Vienna Agreement were approved, the accord would still not prevent Iran from enriching uranium. If Iran chose, it could restock its supplies of enriched uranium again within a year. The agreement also does not prevent Iran from continuing research and development of its delivery capabilities. In addition, the agreement does nothing to address the fundamental question, which is how to alter incentives such that it is not in the current regime’s best interest to develop nuclear weapons. If adopted, the proposal would simply provide a temporary stopgap. The Vienna Agreement would give Iran the chance to stall and continue developing nuclear weapons, taking the West back to square one.

Even if a deal could be reached, a simple agreement with Iran will not be enough. The Iranian regime has a history of neither adhering to its international obligations nor cooperating with international authority. Iran, as a signatory nation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, is obligated to report to the IAEA any intention to build any nuclear facility. The regime did not report its uranium enrichment facility in Natanz until 2002, after it was fully operational. Iran likewise did not report the facility in Qom to the IAEA until Tehran realized that Western governments had discovered the facility’s existence. Furthermore, the regime has refused to allow its nuclear scientists to be questioned by the IAEA. If the U.S. and its allies are serious about preventing Iranian proliferation, they must insist on an enforceable agreement with a robust inspections regime.

The unsuccessful attempts at preventing Iran from continued development of nuclear weapons indicate that any response to Iran requires unified, international support. This summer’s election riots have presented the West with new options. The regime’s leaders appear not to want to confront external pressure and internal threats simultaneously. While Tehran has used negotiations to buy time, this new, unstable situation might make the regime amenable to meaningful settlement, especially if it faces multilateral pressure. There are a number of options available to entice and pressure the Iranians to submit to the will of the international community.

In the political sphere, the U.S., through Radio Farda—a Persian-language radio station based in Washington, D.C. and Prague—could amplify the voices of dissent with programming that provides a platform for Iranian exiles and expatriates. Internally, dissidents could be supplied with communication equipment not susceptible to jamming and other interference (such as satellite phones and sophisticated encryption equipment). The importance of communication within Iran is validated by the behavior of the theocratic regime—which moves swiftly to disrupt cellular and Internet communications at any sign of unrest.
In the economic sphere, multilateral leverage has significant potential. It is no secret that Iran’s economic situation is dire: It faces high unemployment (12 percent, according to the Iranian government), rampant inflation (28 percent, according to the Iranian government), corruption, and a lack of basic services. Iran’s economy depends heavily on petroleum exports, but without Western technological expertise, Iran’s oil production has steadily declined. According to a 2007 National Academy of Science study, Iran’s consumption of refined petroleum will outstrip its production of crude oil by 2015, effectively halting petroleum exports altogether. Furthermore, Iran lacks the capacity to refine petroleum and, as a result, imports 40 percent of its petroleum. The U.S. House of Representatives has already passed the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act, which would limit Iran’s ability to import gasoline. The Senate will likely approve the legislation in coming weeks. The U.S., through similar restrictions, should strengthen economic sanctions by convincing others to jump on board. European nations such as France, Germany, and Britain have expressed interest in such sanctions. In addition, Iran’s recent agreement to supply Turkmenistan with natural gas, which will ultimately supply all of Europe, competes with the Russian monopoly on gas, giving the Russians an incentive to support sanctions. This agreement would also give the Europeans more economic leverage over Tehran. Finally, a multilateral regimen of sanctions would force companies and financial institutions that do business in Iran to choose between continuing their transactions with Iran and doing business in the U.S. and in whichever European nations sign on to sanctions and few companies can afford to choose the former. While some have argued that enhanced sanctions might rally the Iranian people around the regime, only the opposite has happened thus far, as Iranians have blamed their regime for the country’s economic woes.

While proceeding with this new approach to Iran, however, the United States must try to ensure China and Russia’s support. While Chinese-Iranian economic interests are substantial, Chinese-U.S. economic ties are even more vital. China could be amenable to enforcing sanctions against Iran, as Beijing does not wish to deal with the economic consequences of a potential war between the U.S. and Iran that could result if the Iranian nuclear program is not stopped. In addition, the Russians, who are anxious about NATO, may be willing to enforce sanctions against Iran if the U.S. provides concessions on Russian security interests. A recent controversial overture by the U.S. to scale back missile shield deployment in Poland could be responsible for Russian officials more vocally supporting sanctions against Iran. Securing Chinese and Russian support for sanctions should be a top priority for the U.S.

Of course, the U.S. has never taken the military option off the table, and Israel has strongly hinted that it would consider using military force against Iran as well. Air strikes on Iran’s nuclear targets present a difficult tactical challenge, however. Iran’s nuclear facilities are distributed across the country, with some installations hidden underground, heavily fortified. Moreover, Iran has military assets throughout the Middle East with which it could retaliate against such a strike. In Iraq, Iran would almost certainly intensify support for the insurgency, endangering American troops and the already unstable democracy. In Gaza, Hamas could, at Iran’s instigation, unleash missile strikes into densely populated areas of Israel. Indeed, Iran itself has ballistic capability and could retaliate with its own missile strikes. Additionally, Iran could, in retaliation, finally make good on its threat to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40 percent of the world’s sea-transported oil and 90 percent of the Gulf’s oil output flows. Even if the U.S. were able to open the straits quickly, insurers would refuse to cover oil tankers passing through a conflict zone, effectively closing it to international commerce. Thus, superior firepower simply may not provide an effective solution to this problem, and could provoke a harsh response from the international community against the U.S. or Israel. As such, it is imperative that multilateral economic and political sanctions be applied instead of a military option.

To persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear program, the United States must employ multilateral cooperation and sanctions to convince Iran’s leaders that it is highly disadvantageous to continue nuclear development. A combination of economic, political, and social pressures could finally push Iran to accept an agreement. Iran has always used negotiations to stall because the price for delaying a negotiated settlement was significant but not crippling. The U.S. should make the price for stalling unacceptably high for Iran, in economic and political terms.

In mid-September, the Obama administration announced that it would abandon plans developed under former President Bush to place a radar system in the Czech Republic and missile interceptors in Poland. As an alternative, the administration announced new missile defense measures designed to be implemented quickly and counter threats in the immediate future. The introduction of these new measures is commendable. But Obama’s abandonment of the original missile defense plan has weakened the American diplomatic position in Europe and provided a political victory for Russia.

In announcing the cancellation of the Eastern European missile defense installations, the Obama administration emphasized that it was not abandoning European missile defense entirely, but was instead pursuing an alternative strategy to more effectively address current threats. Long-range missile interceptors are unreliable and frequently ineffective, and neither Iran nor North Korea appears to be close to developing the long-range missiles the cancelled system would have been designed to intercept. Iran instead possesses short- and medium-range missiles that could pose a threat to Israel and parts of Europe, while North Korea’s current technology poses no threat to Europe. To protect Europe and Israel from any potential strikes by short- and medium-range Iranian missiles, the Obama administration’s new plan will use ship-based missile interceptors and an installation of small ground-to-air missiles in Poland.

If the diplomatic ramifications of abandoning the Bush-era missile defense plans are ignored, the administration’s new strategy is logically sound. New installations in Europe are not necessary for improving and testing the currently unreliable technology for intercepting long-range missiles. In addition, constructing, maintaining, and manning the missile defense sites in Europe would impose a financial burden on the United States for the sake of providing unreliable protection against a threat that does not currently exist. Building missile defense sites now would ensure that the United States would be ready if and when North Korea and Iran develop long-range missiles, but intelligence reports should give the United States enough advance warning to prepare for such an occurrence. The canceled long-range interceptor sites also failed to address the danger of the technology that Iran currently possesses, so the addition of new capabilities to the missile defense system is commendable.

In spite of these pragmatic arguments for an adjustment in European missile defense strategy, the United States’ new strategy is short-sighted and ignores the broader diplomatic implications of canceling the planned installations. Poland and the Czech Republic, NATO allies of the U.S., hoped that American military installations in their nations would deter Russian aggression in the region. Their desire to secure a material American commitment beyond a treaty obligation is reasonable, particularly in light of the Russian military occupation of territory in Georgia little more than a year ago. Although a Russian attack on a NATO member seems very unlikely in the foreseeable future, Poland and the Czech Republic are rightly concerned with checking the expansion of Russian influence in the region.

Conversely, one might argue that cancelling the missile defense sites reduces the need for Russia to pursue an aggressive foreign policy, thereby giving Poland and the Czech Republic less reason to fear Russian encroachment in Eastern Europe. This analysis assumes that Russia is seeking a fixed amount of influence with which it will be satisfied attaining—a thesis with little supporting evidence. Russia’s recent foreign policy has been characterized by an aggressive pursuit of power; actions such as gas shutoffs to Ukraine and the armed incursion into Georgia give no indication that Russian leaders will be content with some particular amount of regional influence.

More broadly, the Obama administration’s new missile defense strategy raises questions about the credibility of American commitments in Europe and around the globe. It signals to other nations the United States’ willingness to change policy in pursuit of its own interests, and indicates that American commitments may weaken with changes in administration. While the Obama plan to include smaller interceptors in Poland may assuage Polish concerns to some degree, it remains to be seen if the shift in missile defense policy will make other nations more skeptical of American commitments and less likely to enter into defense agreements.

One could argue that revising missile defense policy presented an opportunity for the United States to improve diplomatic relations with Russia and increase the odds of Russian cooperation on other issues, such as sanctions against Iran or supply lines into Afghanistan. But the Obama administration has repeatedly insisted that its missile defense decision was completely unrelated to U.S.-Russian relations, and there is no evidence that the United States has received any concessions from Russia in return. Clearly, an open agreement between America and Russia on abandoning missile defense in exchange for Russian concessions would have carried high diplomatic penalties for both states. Alternatively, it would have been naïve of the administration to change its missile defense strategy and simply hope for a future Russian concession in return. Russian President Dmitri Medvedev did say, “if our partners hear some of our concerns, we will, of course, be more attentive to theirs.” This supposed attention to American concerns is unlikely to produce actual policy results, however, given Russia’s aggressive foreign policy stance. Simply put, there is no evidence that realigning missile defense policy has motivated Russia to change its positions on issues important to the United States.

From a purely military standpoint, the decision to immediately implement missile defenses against short and medium-range missiles is a good strategic outcome. Unfortunately, the decision to simultaneously abandon slower-developing plans for long-range missile defenses was a diplomatic misstep. Abandoning the originally planned sites in Poland and the Czech Republic has not only harmed relations with these NATO allies, but may also make other nations skeptical of American commitments and hesitant to reach agreements with the United States. Moreover, the realignment may reduce the number of complaints from the Kremlin, but is unlikely to help secure any real diplomatic concessions from Russia. Ultimately, the Obama administration’s decision to discontinue the Bush administration’s missile defense program damaged American diplomatic credibility without producing any benefits for the United States.

Heading into fall 2009, the United States has unambiguously recognized the threat of Iranian nuclear proliferation. President Obama, Secretary of State Clinton, and other high-level U.S. officials have stated that Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon is unacceptable and have deemed Iranian non-proliferation to be a high priority. For the past few years, however, much of the international community has been less critical than the U.S., and the United States’ near unilateral approach to diplomacy and economic sanctions has been futile. Now, with the true nature of Iran’s regime—an authoritarian regime—on view for the world to see after Iran’s disastrous and violent June 12th elections, more and more international players are realizing the dangers of a nuclear Iran, whose missile range already includes much of southern Europe. Sunni Arab states in the Middle East, too, have become fearful of the potential for Shia regional hegemony; though they have not publicly condemned Iran’s actions, some, like Saudi Arabia, have begun exploring nuclear programs of their own, which will likely spark a Middle Eastern arms race.

The Obama Administration must capitalize on Iran’s diminished international legitimacy by signing the economic sanctions bill to be passed by Congress, if and when upcoming Iranian negotiations fail. Economic sanctions would have a strong effect on the Iranian regime because of its current internal unrest and meaningful economic weaknesses. The administration should pursue multilateral sanctions even without the support of Russia and China, who have been reluctant to cooperate with the U.S. on the issue. Incomplete international cooperation on sanctions would still be sufficient to put significant pressure on the Iranian regime.

Internationally, the Iranian government has been delegitimized because of the seemingly fraudulent reelection of President Ahmadinejad and its bloody aftermath. The numerous accounts of unwarranted arrests, tortured prisoners, and coerced confessions have exposed Iran’s regime for what it truly is: authoritarian. Western countries, including many in Europe, who engaged eagerly with Iran previously have started sending lower-level officials to meet with Iranian leaders in place of typical high-level members of government, a tangible sign of Iran’s decreased standing in the international community. Also, for weeks after the fraudulent election, large groups of protesters decrying Iran’s government could be seen in cities around the world.

Although some nations may have previously been willing to accept a nuclear Iran, or at least concluded that thwarting Iran’s nuclear ambitions would come with too high of a cost, they have concluded differently after the June 12th elections. Britain especially has reason to fear Iran, as it has become the regime’s latest target of aggressive rhetoric. Canada, which is home to 120,000 Iranian-Canadians, has publicly condemned Iran’s violent post-election crackdowns and now sees Iran as an adversary. The post-election fallout over the summer has led nations such as France and Germany, who previously disagreed with the US over how to approach Iran, to jump on the multilateral sanctions bandwagon. As Iran condemns these and other nations that previously supported a soft-line strategy against Iranian nuclear ambitions, it will find itself with increasingly little international support.

Domestically, Iran is divided. Much of the Iranian public is upset over the corrupt elections and the subsequent violent crackdown. There is even disagreement within President Ahmadinejad’s conservative government over cabinet firings and appointments, suggesting that Ahmadinejad and Grand Ayatollah Khameni (who has ultimate sovereignty in the country) are becoming even weaker. For Iran, the combination of the loss of international legitimacy and internal weakness make new sanctions quite promising.

Fortunately, the US Congress will likely pass these proposed sanctions in the form of the Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act sometime this year. These sanctions prevent any company that exports refined petroleum to Iran from doing business with the United States. Although Iran is a well-known oil producer, it does not have sufficient capacity to refine all of its oil and thus imports 40% of the refined petroleum it consumes. The goal of the sanctions would be to prevent Iran from attaining much of its refined petroleum, which could substantially increase fuel and transportation prices in Iran, all of which would put severe pressure on the Iranian government to make concessions concerning its nuclear program.

First, however, it is important to address the critics who say that economic sanctions will not work because they harm the country’s civilians, not its government, and that civilians’ plight usually has no effect on an authoritarian regime. In Iran, dissatisfaction and anger would have a tremendous effect on the government. Iranian civilians already have shown a willingness to protest and put pressure on the regime when they feel harmed, as exhibited in the post-election protests. Although the government managed to crack down on the election unrest, cripplingly high fuel prices may serve as the proverbial “final straw” and cause an uproar in an even larger segment of the population.

For sanctions to work, it is important that the Iranian people be willing to give up their nuclear weapons program. Though a World Public Opinion poll from August 2008 found that around 90% of Iranians supported their country’s development of nuclear energy technology, only 51% wanted their country to obtain nuclear weapons. And about 70% of Iranian would favor giving up nuclear weapons ambitions in exchange for trade and/or technological development assistance. Though there is not recent polling data on the issue, the number of Iranians favoring weapons development has likely decreased following the election as Iranians have become dissatisfied with their government and come to see the nuclear program as a source of isolation, both diplomatic and economic.

Previous U.S. sanctions have had varying degrees of success. Some, such as the 1996 Iran Sanctions Act, forced refined petroleum companies to choose between doing business with Iran and doing business with the United States. Although some companies terminated business with Iran, others preferred to sacrifice their business with the US. For example, the French petroleum company Total chose, in ’96, to divest its US holdings and pursue its business with Iran. Strong multilateral sanctions, however, could force companies to make the opposite choice. Iran’s largest petroleum importers are Vitol, a Swiss firm, Trafigura (Swiss/Dutch), Total (French), Glencore (Swiss), British Petroleum, and Reliance (Indian). These firms all do a lot of business in Western Europe, so that multilateral sanctions including France, Germany, and the U.K. would put pressure on them to cut ties with Iran. Already, German companies are feeling the pressure of existing sanctions against Iran, and new, pan-European sanctions could cause them to sever business ties with Iran completely. And Total, who now does business with both the US and Iran (after President Clinton waved the ’96 sanctions), may choose to sever its ties with Iran this time around.

There is some hope that Russia and China may sign onto such sanctions, or, if not enforcing sanctions themselves, at least not undermine US and European sanctions. Russia’s defiant move last summer in vetoing a fourth set of United Nations sanctions was a result of tense US-Russian relations after the Georgian-Russian war. Now, however, as President Obama has labored to improve relations with Russia, the country seems more willing to cooperate with the US on Iran. Russia has already put an arms deal with Iran on hold, and analysts suggest that this might signal willingness to get on board with new multilateral sanctions. China, aiming to attain trade concessions from the U.S., may support sanctions if properly enticed.

But even if Russia and China do not sign onto sanctions, the decrease in refined petroleum providers will still put pressure on Iran. China and Russia may be markets for crude oil and a source of manufactured goods, but neither country has the technology or knowledge that Iran so desperately needs to expand its petroleum refining capabilities and natural gas production. Neither nation has the refining capacities to supply Iran with refined petroleum if it loses supply from multinational firms. Also, although Iran has the second largest natural gas reserves in the world, it is a net importer of natural gas, partially because the flow of technologies from the West to tap this gas has largely been shut off. Thus, sanctions that further cripple Iran’s access to refined petroleum and natural gas technologies will have significant effects regardless of China and Russia’s cooperation.

Perhaps the threat of these sanctions might force Iran to seriously engage in talks. The Iranian government, wary of a revolutionary unrest caused by a very high oil shortage, might be pressured to make concessions due to fears of being overthrown. Such an outcome is surely hoped for, but Iran’s track record suggests that is not likely. The Obama Administration’s best option going forward is to get members of the international community on board for sweeping economic sanctions, enter negotiations with Iran threatening these sanctions as the outcome for stalled and fruitless negotiations, and vigorously enact the sanctions—all the while implicitly courting the Iranian population as an ally. These steps have the potential to lead Iran to forgo its nuclear ambitions. In fact, that is just the outcome that NYU Professor Bruce Bueno de Mesquita forecasts in his game theory computer analysis, which has been known to successfully predict the outcome of international negotiations. Bueno de Mesquita’s program describes a scenario in which, due to pressure on the Iranian regime, it stops its development of a nuclear bomb in early 2010, when it is just “at the brink” of realizing a nuclear weapon.