Former Mexican President Porfiro Díaz once lamented “Poor Mexico, so far from God, so close to the United States.” Although Díaz spoke these words around the turn of the last century, they reflect many Central Americans’ feelings about the U.S. today. Despite the recent upswing in international approval for the U.S. following President Obama’s election, there is still significant skepticism about America’s intentions in Latin America. Many Latin Americans, accustomed to Washington’s imperialistic tendencies in the region, hold the United States responsible for the region’s political instability and lack of development. The United States needs to prove through its actions that the excesses of the Cold War will never resurface, and that it can begin to fully collaborate and engage with Latin America.

Today, the United States has an opportunity to take action and redefine its Central and South American policy through its response to the ousting of Honduran President Manuel Zelaya. By conditionally acknowledging the new Honduran election and punishing the Honduran military for its actions, the United States can defuse a dangerous situation without evoking the legacy of American imperialism.

Although Honduras has had a peaceful democracy for years, it remains haunted by the ghost of the Cold War. During the 1980’s, the United States used Honduras as a staging ground in its efforts to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Washington’s footprint remained even after the Cold War ended. Up until the Zelaya coup, the United States was still providing hefty military assistance to Honduras, the most recent package totaling $16.5 million. Despite Washington’s support, Honduras has remained one of Central America’s poorest countries. Out of an estimated 8 million Hondurans, more than a third live on less than $2 a day.

Many commentators saw President Zelaya’s election in 2005 as a revolt against the oligarchy that still controls much of the country. Zelaya represented the interests of unions and the working class and developed ties to other leftist leaders, including Hugo Chavez and Raúl Castro. He made Honduras a member of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, a purported alternative to free trade deals which has been promoted by Venezuela and Cuba. Predictably, many Hondurans, especially members of the armed forces, felt that the President went too far in his left-leaning tendencies. Zelaya’s attempt to modify the constitution so that he could run for an additional term, a page lifted from Chavez’s book, was the final straw for the conservative establishment. Before long, Zelaya was ousted from power by the military under accusations of an unconstitutional power grab.

If anything was undemocratic, though, it was the expulsion of the Zelaya administration. In the early hours of June 28th, soldiers stormed the presidential palace, kidnapped the President, took his cell phone, and flew him out of the country. He eventually arrived in Costa Rica, where, still in his pajamas, he angrily protested the coup. After a failed attempt to fly back into Honduras, President Zelaya managed to secretly re-enter the country and is currently residing in the Brazilian embassy.

An international coalition swiftly emerged to oppose the coup, making old enemies into bedfellows. The United States and Cuba were in agreement that Mr. Zelaya was wrongfully removed from power. The UN and the Organization of American States issued warnings to the new Honduran administration. The Obama administration vocally supported a power-sharing agreement, the San Jose Accords, which would have returned President Zelaya to power before the November election. A deal was eventually made, but it fell through shortly after being finalized. Unsurprisingly, this unity of opinion was short lived. The Honduran election that took place on November 29th exposed rifts in the international coalition that insisted on Zelaya’s reinstatement. The United States recognized the results of the election of conservative candidate Porfiro Lobo, but only Colombia and a few smaller states have followed suit. Other powers with significant regional influence, namely Spain and Brazil, refuse to recognize the results and demand that Zelaya be returned to his post.

The decision to recognize the November election could compromise the United State’s legitimacy if not handled correctly. As recently as September, the Obama administration was threatening to reject any vote held without first returning Zelaya to power. Now that the U.S. has reversed course, Obama must maintain his calls for a congressional vote to reinstate Zelaya or risk looking the fool. If the administration unconditionally recognizes the vote and fails to punish the people responsible for the coup, it could look like Washington is offering tacit approval for the Honduran military’s actions. This would smack of American imperialism and remind many of past U.S. support for the ousting of leftist leaders. Therefore, President Obama should go through with recognizing the election, but only if necessary conditions are met.

First, the election must prove to have been free and fair. If strong evidence of electoral fraud emerges, the Obama administration should not hesitate to deem the elections illegitimate and withdraw its tentative backing. Second, Lobo should only be recognized as the new head of state if the intimidation of dissident groups ceases. Amnesty International has reported that factions affiliated with the government have unlawfully suppressed Zelaya supporters in preparation for the election. If the Honduran government did indeed hold a clean election and successfully ends the thuggish behavior of some government-affiliated groups, it will merit the recognition of the vote, and the United States should provide it. By making this recognition conditional, the United States can make clear that it only approves of the restoration of the democratic election process, not of the coup.

Washington must also hold the perpetrators of the coup responsible. The stream of military aid flowing into Honduras from the U.S. before the coup made the army extremely powerful, and its actions during the coup prove that it has wielded that power irresponsibly. As a punishment for the coup, the United States should cut off all military aid and restore it only once the events of the coup have been thoroughly investigated, as was promised in the power-sharing deal. Continuing to provide military aid would be a slap in the face of the Hondurans who saw their democratically-elected president whisked away by well-armed soldiers.

Washington also provides more than $180 million in miscellaneous aid to Honduras each year. Some have suggested that this aid should be withheld along with military aid, as punishment for the coup. Honduras is extremely reliant on American dollars, the argument goes, so shutting off aid could send a powerful message. Withholding the aid, however, would be ill-advised, and would only reflect the Cold War mentality that prioritized American interests over foreign lives. The people that have already suffered the most from the coup, the working poor, are those most likely to be affected by a reduction in aid. This could turn people against the United States and would punish the victims of the coup more than its perpetrators.

The United States needs to keep in mind the legacy of foreign intervention in Central America as it continues to address the aftermath of the Zelaya coup. Any significant misstep will undoubtedly reinvigorate anti-American sentiments that have been waning in recent months as a result of President Obama’s diplomatic endeavors. By handling Latin America’s first post-Cold War coup in a way that affirms that the war against communism is indeed over, the United States can take further legitimacy away from its critics and foster stable and prosperous ties across Latin America. Then, perhaps, Porfiro Díaz’s words can finally be laid to rest.

Until its final moments, the recent coup in Honduras was both constitutional and democratic. However, the final complication led the United States to condemn the removal of then-President Manuel Zelaya, and so lose sight of its longer-term strategic goals in Latin America. The U.S. needs to reconsider its stance on the matter and start pursuing a wiser policy.

The story started when former president Zelaya called a referendum, in March of this year, to alter the constitution and allow him to run for a second term. Article 239 of the Honduran Constitution limits presidents to one term, and this article is one of a very limited, important group that cannot be amended as per Article 374. Those who attempt an amendment are automatically and immediately prohibited from holding public office for ten years.

The Supreme Court dutifully declared the referendum unconstitutional, but Zelaya ignored the court and ordered the military to provide security for his referendum. When top military official General Romeo Vasquez refused, Zelaya fired him, prompting the resignations of the service chiefs of the army, marines, and air force. On June 25, the Supreme Court ordered Zelaya to reinstate Vasquez and the National Congress began to investigate Zelaya.

At last, the court issued an arrest warrant for President Zelaya. Again in accordance with the constitution, it ordered the military to enforce the order. By this point, the Supreme Court, the top Honduran electoral body, the human rights ombudsman, and the National Congress had all opposed Zelaya’s referendum. The National Congress removed him from office and named Roberto Micheletti as the new president, in accordance with the rules of succession. All this was, until the final stage, a perfect example of constitutional democracy stopping potential abuse of power.

The crucial misstep came when, instead of arresting Zelaya, the military deported him. The U.S. joined much of the world, including sudden friends of democracy like Venezuela and Cuba, in declaring the events a breach of democracy at the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS). Zelaya should have been arrested and tried in the sunlight, not deported in a manner reminiscent of darker periods in Latin American history, but this misstep should not be allowed to spoil the entire process.

The U.S. seems fixated on that final wrench thrown in by the military, and in doing so, has ignored both liberal – in the international relations sense – and realist logic. President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton are correct that the Honduran military did not follow the letter of the law. But as President Obama frequently remarks, the U.S. cannot let the perfect be the enemy of the good.

The constitution and the other branches of government stopped an abuse of power in a nation and a region all too familiar with such abuses. Zelaya’s removal, with the exception of the military’s decision to deport and not detain, was the proper functioning of a constitutional system of checks and balances. Unlike previous generations of strongmen, Zelaya did not seek to abolish the constitution, but he did attempt to tinker with it in violation of the will of its democratic authors. Observers must resist being taken in by the democratic façade of this new authoritarianism that Zelaya was pursuing. The Honduran constitution is strict about term limits precisely to prevent power grabs like Zelaya’s. As such, his removal from office should be cause for the United States’ support.

Even democratically elected leaders can become threats to democracy by abusing their power. Hugo Chavez, the democratically elected president of Venezuela, has sought to dress up authoritarian rule in the guise of democracy by amending his own country’s constitution to expand the executive’s power and extend term limits. Zelaya received both the idea and the tools for his assault on democracy from Chavez; Venezuela provided the very ballots to be used in his referendum. In so doing, Zelaya joined Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Cuba as an ally of Chavez and his model of authoritarianism.

The U.S. goal of promoting democracy, whether for strategic or altruistic purposes, demands that Washington discourage Latin American politicians from this path. Imperfect but constitutionally minded processes like the coup in Honduras can defend democracy against attacks like Zelaya’s power grab.

It must be reaffirmed that the U.S. has disgracefully supported anti-democratic Latin American coups in years past, but the real threat to democracy today is from Latin American strongmen, not the United States. Obama deserves credit for taking pains to avoid behaving in a way that reinforces the specter of the imperialist yanqui. Unfortunately, President Obama seems to have worried too much about how he would look and not enough about how he should act. When governments like Honduras’ seek to stem abuses of power and when the U.S. can responsibly support them, Washington should firmly stand with its ideological allies. This does not mean the U.S. should offer full-throated approval of the flawed actions, but it does mean that we should provide assistance to a government that chose democracy in a region where self-proclaimed enemies of the United States stifle representative government.

Questions of alliances should also concern realists looking at the situation. President Obama linked arms with Chavez, who has slowly but explicitly sought to marshal allies and resources against US policies in Latin America. Chavez has amassed arms and nationalized natural resources like oil, directly challenging the U.S. and its allies. He allied Venezuela with the regime in Iran (the same one seeking a nuclear weapon) in a quest to counterbalance U.S. strength, and sought economic arrangements in Latin America to counter U.S. economic interests. President Obama should have no illusions about Chavez’s dreams. After all, he told the United States to “go to hell” in 2007.

If cold-blooded realism actually held sway in Washington, as some claim it does, then the State Department would not be seeking to reinstate an enemy who has allied himself with Chavez – and, according to new reports, with the Colombian narco-terrorist group FARC – while Chavez seeks to counter U.S. power with allies, arms, and oil. The situation in Honduras offers an uncommon opportunity where liberal principles and realism agree and point to one policy – that very policy which America has eschewed.

In spite of these arguments, the Obama administration reacted to the “coup” by cutting aid to Honduras, revoking the visas of some of its officials, and joining hands with rogue regimes in repeatedly condemning Honduras for standing up to its president. It is not too late for the United States to reverse that course and follow good practice and great ideals to sound policy by increasing aid. Of course, given the self-assured position already taken by President Obama, such a reversal will not be easy.

First, in the short-term, the U.S. should make its goal pragmatic cooperation with the interim government. Obama and Clinton have unwisely boxed themselves in by supporting the OAS and UN condemnation. For self-identified realists, they left themselves with little strategic — or even tactical — flexibility. What little leeway they still have should be used to switch to cooperation. This is not a self-serving, hypocritical change in tone, but an honest appraisal of a delicate situation that requires more than knee-jerk condemnation.

Obama should also resume normal aid to Honduras, stop ignoring Honduran diplomats, and accelerate cooperation with the interim government. President Obama has offered engagement to true enemies of the United States, so a democracy like Honduras should be no problem. In fact, Obama should seek additional aid for Honduras. The interim government is the one recognized by the legislature, in line with the actions of the judicial branch. Zelaya is a man who has been removed from office, as the constitution requires. Neither a true realist, nor a true friend of democracies in the region, could ignore those facts.

In the longer term, Obama needs to steer the international community to diplomatic recognition of the Micheletti government. The U.S. and other governments cannot continue to ignore what is an imperfect but democratic state, which deserves a functioning government and redemption from its unfair pariah status on the world stage.

From both realist and liberal perspectives, it seems unwise to support a foe in the face of a growing threat to U.S. interests in the region and condemn a democracy in a very difficult situation – a democracy which managed to act with considerable poise and which provided an example to other democrats in the region. It is no wonder, then, if the people of Honduras question why President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Ali Khameini in Iran managed to get the benefit of the doubt from Obama this summer during their rigged elections, but the Micheletti government gets no patience.