During the 2008 presidential campaign, Barack Obama vowed to “restore America’s standing in the world.” With this pledge, he sought to distinguish himself from George W. Bush, who many believed had alienated the United States from the rest of the world during his two terms in office. Thus far, Obama can claim only limited success in turning the tide of international opinion. In part, this is because the alleged damage to the American image done by Bush was not as great as Obama and other Democrats claimed. But in spite of significant efforts to reach out to global audiences, he has yet to make substantial progress in improving ties with America’s allies. His failure suggests that international popularity is a difficult objective to achieve, and one that is not likely to be worth the costs it entails. Rather than seeking this chimerical goal, Obama ought to shift the focus of his foreign policy toward the advancement of America’s security and economic interests.
Examining the history of America’s interaction with the rest of the world provides context for the actions of the Obama administration. Hand wringing about America’s image abroad dates back to at least the 1960s, and has intensified in recent decades. Cold War era conflicts, such as the Vietnam War and the nuclear arms race, drew massive protests in Europe. In the aftermath of the downfall of the Soviet Union, observers derided the U.S. as a “hyperpower,” a critique that encompassed not only America’s political moves, but also its economic and cultural might in an increasingly globalized, unipolar world.
Tensions between the U.S. and its traditional allies mounted in 2002 when Bush announced his intention to invade Iraq, a campaign he planned to launch unilaterally once the UN refused to endorse it. European leaders, most prominently Jacques Chirac of France and Gerhard Schroeder of Germany, denounced America’s behavior as aggressive, echoing a sentiment expressed by an overwhelming majority of European citizens.
Yet, as in the past, America’s partners maintained a schizophrenic attitude toward their benefactor. For all its faults, America offered protection for European countries that had largely demilitarized in the years since World War II. Hence, whenever an outside threat appeared on the horizon, all talk of a post-American world suddenly vanished, and the transatlantic alliance appeared to be just as strong as ever. This was the case in the summer of 2008, when Russia’s invasion of Georgia inspired fear in the hearts of European publics. In response, their leaders quickly modified their stance to reflect closer alignment with the U.S. on issues such as missile defense shields in Poland and the Czech Republic.
Even as America saw its ratings decline under Bush in what Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld dubbed “old Europe,” the story was different elsewhere. The U.S. continued to enjoy favorable relations with the countries of the former Soviet bloc, who still remain thankful to the U.S. for defeating their former communist oppressors. Several Eastern European nations, most prominently Poland, contributed troops to the U.S. mission in Iraq. Ties with rising powers in Asia, such as India and Japan, improved on Bush’s watch, as demonstrated by a series of joint military exercises as well as a landmark nuclear treaty with India. These bonds appear likely to remain strong even with the recent election of the Democratic Party of Japan, which has occasionally indulged in anti-American rhetoric, but has also announced a commitment of $5 billion for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, a critical U.S. priority. Humanitarian aid to areas afflicted by poverty, disease, and natural disaster won plaudits among the President’s harshest critics. In Latin America, where populist politicians like Hugo Chavez gained ground throughout the past decade, local issues such as income disparity far outweighed the role of anti-American grandstanding in determining their success.
As has been established, America was by no means universally unpopular on the eve of President Obama’s inauguration. Nevertheless, during the campaign, Obama frequently sounded the theme of America’s deteriorating reputation abroad. To indicate that reversing anti-American sentiment was one of his top priorities, he sought to portray himself as a global citizen in a way that is perhaps unprecedented in American history: by emphasizing his multicultural background. He addressed an enormous, cheering crowd in Berlin during a tour of Europe and the Middle East in July 2008, and met with foreign leaders who demonstrated their eagerness to work with him.
The contrast between Obama and Bush became immediately apparently in the first few months of Obama’s presidency, as he began to overturn policies that, in the past, have incited denunciation of the U.S. Fulfilling a campaign promise, he issued an executive order mandating that the Guantanamo Bay prison be closed within a year, a directive that later ran into logistical problems. He renounced the use of torture against terrorist suspects. In speeches to foreign nations, he extended his criticisms of America to include unsavory elements of its history, such as mistreatment of immigrants and minority groups, and heavy-handed interventionism during the Cold War.
All of these measures represented an attempt to “reset” America’s relations with the rest of the world. Various missteps, however, have tarnished that campaign. Obama was criticized for being deliberately rude to British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, one of America’s closest allies, during Brown’s visit to Washington. Meanwhile, in the Middle East, Obama’s goal of achieving peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians has been set back by his frosty relations with hawkish Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has refused Obama’s demand to halt settlements in the West Bank.
Discontent with Obama’s foreign agenda has grown in recent months. An article in the German publication Der Spiegel noted that his new approach to international relations has not worked. European powers remain reluctant to provide significant military support for the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan. French President Nicholas Sarkozy has been particularly adamant in criticizing Obama’s perceived weakness in negotiations with Iran, whose pursuit of nuclear weapons poses a threat to the entire world. China and Russia both continue to exercise their influence as regional powers, and have largely ignored the outreach undertaken by Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
How can Obama reverse course in his quest to revitalize America’s image? To begin, he should seize every possible opportunity to find common ground with America’s allies on issues such as human rights. When he decided against meeting with the Dalai Llama in October, the President aroused suspicions that he would not be as sympathetic to human rights concerns as his predecessors, all of who met with the exiled Tibetan leader during their administrations. His endorsement of the so-called “Green Revolution” in Iran, in which citizens took to the streets to protest the fraudulent re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was seen as less than enthusiastic. In this matter, he should take the advice offered by Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel—“never let a crisis go to waste”—and apply this doctrine to international affairs. Renewing Bush’s emphasis on development and democracy promotion could also help to reinforce the notion that America is a benevolent hegemon.
Trade is another area in which Obama could positively impact both America’s image and interests. Here, he has backpedaled from Bush’s pro-free-trade stance, imposing tariffs on Chinese tires, inserting “Buy American” provisions into the stimulus bill and the “Cash For Clunkers” program, and allowing agreements with South Korea, Colombia, and Panama to languish in the Senate. Such actions hurt the odds of resurrecting the Doha Round of international trade negotiations, which broke down last year. Ever since the end of World War II, removing barriers to global commerce has been a key goal of the U.S. and its allies. Free trade not only contributes to long-term economic growth, but it also ensures closer ties between nations, and thus reduces the possibility of conflict. If Obama were to repudiate his previous positions and commit to reviving the Doha Round, he would remind the world that America is capable of providing global leadership on these sorts of seemingly intractable problems.
But ultimately, Obama must acknowledge that America’s image is a compilation of so many factors, most of them out of his control, that changing it within a short span of time would be an impossible task. Indeed, on some issues, seeking international approval could be detrimental to America’s best interests. Anti-terrorism policy is one example. Measures that have drawn the ire of foreign leaders, including harsh interrogation techniques, extraordinary rendition, and detention facilities such as Guantanamo Bay, are also an important line of defense against future attacks.
The best route to follow lies between the extremes of the Bush era and the early months of the Obama presidency. America’s allies have a lot to offer in the way of diplomatic support and international prestige, and can lend legitimacy to its military ventures. They should not be ignored or marginalized. At the same time, their true concern is security, and if America can no longer ensure their safety, Europeans and others will look elsewhere for protection. Obama needs to balance conciliation with displays of toughness, while employing his personal appeal to rally support for shared causes such as human rights and nuclear non-proliferation. If he takes these steps, he will be able to cultivate increased respect for America abroad without sacrificing its interests.
