Even in its tenth year, the War on Terror still engages the American military and  monopolizes the attention of our intelligence community. The attempted airplane bomb plot discovered on October 29 emphasizes the continued threat. Evidence suggests that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), an off-shoot of Osama bin Laden’s organization with a strong presence in Yemen, is responsible for the failed attack. Recently, the CIA has been conducting a targeted bombing campaign in Yemen, which some have called a “secret war.” Yemen faces a range of internal problems that hamper its own ability to fight AQAP. Given the challenges posed by AQAP and the Yemeni government’s struggles to control it, the United States should focus its efforts on uniting Yemenis against AQAP and increasing cooperation with the Yemeni military and intelligence agencies.

AQAP is an elusive terrorist organization that poses a significant threat to America and its interests. While never under the direct control of bin Laden or the al-Qaeda parent organization, the current AQAP traces its roots to two regional Al Qaeda affiliated groups that launched such attacks as that against the U.S.S. Cole, suicide bombings at a Western housing compound, and the 2008 assault on the American embassy in Yemen. These groups merged in 2009 with the intention of establishing a new Islamic caliphate in the Arabian Peninsula by overthrowing the Saudi and Yemeni governments and forcing Western nations from the region. Intelligence agencies also claim that the group was responsible for the failed “underwear bomber” suicide plot on a Detroit-bound plane last Christmas.

The organization’s leaders recruit experienced fighters from Saudi, Yemeni, Somali, Afghan, Iraqi, and Pakistani cells.  Although experts and intelligence agencies know the names of several of the group’s most prominent members, including an American national, they have not published information on how large the group is or how far its influence is known to extend. Estimates range from dozens to hundreds, demonstrating that the group’s full potential is still unknown. The Yemeni government, however, is poorly equipped and cannot easily restrain AQAP. The nation’s economy is the poorest in the Middle East per capita and dependent on its dwindling oil supplies. Since Yemen’s 1990 unification, President Ali Abdullah Saleh has struggled to exert influence beyond the major cities. As part of this effort, Saleh has not only fought AQAP but also countered separatists and rebels that have spread the government’s meager resources thin and obscured AQAP’s actions amid widespread violence. Much of Yemen’s territory, especially in the mountains and desert, is virtually autonomous tribal areas that oppose heavy government involvement. While most of these tribes reject AQAP, experts like Gregory Johnsen of Princeton University hold that some tolerate AQAP and allow it to build bases in their territory. This sympathy is greater in areas with other anti-government movements. Additionally, the Saudi-Yemeni border is extremely porous, allowing AQAP members to attack targets in both nations. As Saudi forces have prevented terrorist groups from forming in its territory, AQAP’s situation parallels the Taliban’s use of uncontrolled Pakistani tribal regions as bases from which to attack Afghan targets. The parts of the country Saleh’s government does control are often corrupt and ineffective, especially as Saleh appoints family members to political positions and seems focused on consolidating his family’s power.

American success in Yemen has been limited. The War on Terror’s early years saw initial gains against AQAP as the United States helped train and support Yemeni forces and launched Yemeni-approved missile strikes. Utilizing what President Obama’s top counterterrorism expert referred to as a “scalpel” rather than a “hammer,” the United States has increased its involvement in Yemen since 2009 through covert action, cruise missiles, and drone attacks that fall under the CIA’s, rather than the military’s, command. Both American and Yemeni officials say these operations occur with the Yemeni government’s approval. Despite successfully hitting several AQAP targets, the campaign’s impact is questionable partially due to Yemenis’ suspicion about Saleh’s motives and concern over American intervention. There have also been reports of civilian casualties, earning condemnation from human rights groups and sparking tribal conflicts. Considering the bomb plot uncovered October 29, it appears that this effort has so far failed to decisively undermine AQAP’s strength, and the CIA must reevaluate its approach.

The U.S. should strengthen the Yemeni government’s influence. A top priority should be unifying the tribal regions against AQAP. To do this, America should set up discussions between Saleh and his nation’s tribal leaders so that they can reach policy compromises and convince the tribal leaders that AQAP is a mutual enemy. To cement tribal loyalties in the current push against AQAP, America and Yemen should follow the tribal motto “My state is anyone who fills my pocket with money”: the U.S. should give Saleh the financial backing he would need to buy tribal loyalty. This might be expensive, but current estimates expect U.S. military aid to approach the enormous sum of $1.2 billion in the next five years anyway. Buying tribes’ loyalty would not be a long-term solution, nor would it ensure that tribes remain loyal, but expanding support for the Yemeni government would limit where AQAP could operate and allow American and Yemeni forces to concentrate their energies on smaller areas.

Focusing American resources on intelligence gathering is also a critical step. The U.S. should bolster its intelligence network in Yemen and work to strengthen cooperation with Yemeni intelligence resources. This would render covert operations more effective, reducing civilian and unintended casualties. Cooperating with Yemeni authorities would also assure that Saleh and his government play an integral role in long-term stability. While increasing the number of intelligence-gathering resources, though, the U.S. should not follow what some State Department officials propose and give the Yemeni army a cache of expensive weaponry. Given the number of weapons proposed, the Yemeni government’s corruption could allow insurgents to acquire some of these weapons. There is also the possibility of government misuse, as the Yemeni government could use resources intended for fighting AQAP to fight other insurgent groups or suppress political dissent.

Yemen presents a new front in the War on Terror and a new opportunity to improve on what lessons the U.S. has already learned. In a political climate where troop deployment in Afghanistan and Iraq has led to public outcry and where the current administration campaigned on an anti-war platform, the operations in Yemen can signify a new strategy in which intelligence-gathering and cooperation with an existing society replace the alternate focus on military efforts, troop number, and nation building. Fully embracing this new approach by winning tribal support and improving intelligence networks will change how the U.S. fights the war and will replace the hammer with the scalpel. By focusing on practical measures, policymakers can use Yemen as a turning point in the War on Terror.

The War on Terror, which began in Afghanistan and grew to encompass Iraq, is now making its way to Yemen. The Obama administration’s actions so far have been limited to providing monetary aid, ordering drone strikes, and dispatching a small number of intelligence officers to the area, but this strategy insufficiently addresses the lack of effective governance in Yemen. As the effort in Afghanistan has made evident, no amount of American expenditure will be enough to defeat al-Qaeda if there is not a strong central government ready to take over once the region has been stabilized. The US should focus on establishing a legitimately functional government in Yemen that can both govern the nation and combat al-Qaeda with minimal external assistance.

Because the US military is already heavily engaged in two countries, it cannot hope to fight successfully in yet another region. Nevertheless, Yemen will need assistance from the US to address its political and economic issues. The US recently raised the budget for military aid to Yemen from $67 million to $150 million. The American money will be used to finance military operations and train Yemeni soldiers, but an increase in military aid treats the symptoms rather than the disease. al-Qaeda occupies nations that are susceptible to its influence; its presence, therefore, is a symptom of the government’s ineffectiveness. The US government needs to recognize that al-Qaeda’s presence in Yemen demonstrates that the problems that allowed al-Qaeda to move into Yemen in the first place have yet to be resolved.

Yemen is already the poorest nation in the Arab world, and its oil—which accounts for 90 percent of its exports—is set to run out within the next decade. Yemen’s economic infrastructure needs restructuring from the ground up, but various financial crises have cut off foreign investments at crucial junctures, and internal strife has crippled the government’s own programs. Unfortunately, weapons sales have been one of its most consistent sources of revenue. There are approximately 60 guns for every 100 people in the nation, and streets are crowded with dealers selling everything from pistols to rockets. But even this limited, damaging economic activity is being threatened—Sana’a is in danger of becoming the first world capital to run out of water.

Yemen’s economic weakness is only one of the problems that allow for the presence of al-Qaeda. Another major factor is the weakness of the federal government, which many blame for the country’s frail economy. President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who has held the office since Yemen’s reunification in 1990, has squandered much of the nation’s wealth playing patronage politics; even now, he is trying to do so to assure his son’s succession to his position. He has also often used US aid that was expressly intended for counterterrorism to combat two insurgencies. Despite his flaunting of its authority, the US is unwilling to risk alienating one of its few supporters in the Middle East and has not confronted Saleh.

Those insurgencies are the other visible symptoms of the pervasive disease in Yemen’s government. In the north, the government has been fighting a civil war for six years against rebels known as the Houthis. Although their openly extremist views have raised concerns that their goal is to establish a fundamentalist Muslim state, the Houthis claim that their main goal is to mount a secular opposition to Saleh’s corrupt presidency. Their conflict with Saleh dates back to their failure to attain power after Yemen was unified in the 1990s. They then settled in the impoverished Sa’dah region, where the poor economic conditions have allowed them to cultivate support.
More recently, a secessionist movement has emerged in south Yemen due to various economic grievances against the north. People in the south claim that, since unification, the north has exploited their oil fields and given them nothing in return. This corruption can be traced back to Saleh, who has used money to retain control of the state.

These symptoms show precisely what is ailing Yemen: The people do not respect the government. This is largely because the Yemeni people no longer see Saleh as a legitimate leader. His influence has always been limited to a small radius around Sana’a; various tribal groups control the majority of the nation. Furthermore, Saleh has never managed to really connect with these tribes, and he has not been effective in stopping the Houthis. If Islamic fundamentalism and sectarian violence were avoided, there would still be a lack of faith in Saleh’s government. Regardless of al-Qaeda’s presence, Yemen is on the verge of state failure. Ridding it of al-Qaeda now will not prevent the return of al-Qaeda after the collapse of the state, and a civil war, which would inevitably follow the collapse of the state, would make it even more difficult to purge Yemen of the terrorist organization.

The recent operation in Marja, Afghanistan demonstrates the US military’s recognition of their primary failure in Afghanistan: By ignoring the state-building aspect of the operation, the US military negated the positive effects of training a local military and driving out terrorists. Reports coming out of Marja suggest that despite their training, the Afghani military is playing a much smaller part in the offensive than the American army. Lessons from Afghanistan are crucial for Yemen. The impulse for action has to come from within the country, and in order for that to happen, there must be a strong central government controlling the situation.

Although the US seems primarily concerned with counterterrorism in Yemen, US aid given for this purpose will be of little use, as the ineffectiveness of the Yemeni military and intelligence operatives will continue to hinder US efforts. Furthermore, any operations successful in eliminating al-Qaeda will simply leave a vacuum that will be filled by new terrorists. The solution is to fill that vacuum with a stronger Yemeni government now that can effectively unify the nation. In order to ensure that this happens, the US must direct its aid towards nation building. Because Yemen already has a government structure in place, the US must find a way to encourage the Yemeni people to recognize its legitimacy. Easing the southerners’ lack of faith may be aided by moving the capital, which may prove necessary in any case due to the water situation in Sana’a. In addition, the current distribution of seats in Yemen’s legislative body favors the region that was originally North Yemen, so redistricting would provide further amends. The US should also fund education and other social programs. To ensure cooperation, the continuation of American aid should depend on adherence to previous objectives.

The success of this plan may require that the US withdraw its unconditional support of Saleh. While the US may prefer a pro-Western leader, the cost simply may be too high. A truly authoritative government requires a high level of support within the nation that Saleh is unlikely to attain.

Ultimately, even if Al-Qaeda is eliminated now, allowing Yemen to remain a fragmented nation will leave the door open for al-Qaeda’s return. The past eight years in Afghanistan have demonstrated the futility of trying to remove al-Qaeda without also addressing the more fundamental problems of the country. The key to successfully driving al-Qaeda out of Yemen is not to continue attacking its strongholds. The means of finding a lasting solution for Yemen is to help stabilize the government, which would allow it to deal with the local faction of al-Qaeda on its own.

“With Allah’s permission, we will come to you from where you do not expect.” This declaration by the Yemeni branch of al-Qaeda is not just a warning of future attacks, it is a truth of global security. The Christmas Day terror attempt by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian who had been in Yemen since August, was stopped not by American preparation, but by luck. While the barely-averted attack creates temptation to take dramatic action, a visible American military presence in Yemen would overtax our armed forces and create a backlash counterproductive to American interests. America should prevent future attacks by fully acknowledging the threat posed by Yemeni terrorists, ensuring their prosecution when captured, and by continuing current American policy in support of the Yemeni government.

The Yemeni offshoot of al-Qaeda has steadily grown more potent in recent years, merging with its Saudi progenitor to form al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. This organization’s targets are both local and global. In October 2000, al-Qaeda attacked the Navy destroyer U.S.S. Cole in the port of Aden with predominantly Yemeni explosives, attackers, and accomplices. Yemen was also linked to the 1998 East African embassy bombings, the strike on the French oil tanker Limburg, the September 11th attacks, and the assassination attempt against Prince Mohammed bin Nayef in Saudi Arabia last August. That assassination attempt used the same tactics and explosives (pentaerythritol tetranitrate sewn into the bomber’s underwear) as the attempted Christmas attack.
Yemen’s location, geography, and fractured polity make it a paradise for al-Qaeda. At the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen is close to Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; its porous borders and extensive coastline are far from secure, while its rugged mountains provide apt hiding places for terrorists. With oil reserves running dry, Yemen’s arms market is among its few economic strengths—it trails only the U.S. in gun ownership per capita. Meanwhile, a strong, conservative religious population is a solid support base for al Qaeda’s propaganda, and tribal groups with relations to al-Qaeda control much of the borderlands. There is a separatist movement in the south and an insurgency in the north, and the unified Yemen is less than two decades old. Yemen is a near-ideal base of operations for Al-Qaeda, combining Afghanistan and Pakistan’s formidable terrain with Somalia’s near-anarchy.

In 2005, the terrorists responsible for the Cole bombing were in prison. Today, however, many of them are free, including confessed bombers Jamal al-Badawi, Fahd al-Quso, and Naser Abdel-Karim al-Wahishi. All three escaped from maximum-security prisons in Yemen. Badawi turned himself in after a year, but was released for good behavior; Quso is a re-established terrorist operative, conducting interviews for al Qaeda; and Wahishi is the head of al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula. In 2008, FBI special agent Ali Soufan warned Senate staff members “unless the American government sent a united message to the Yemenis to act against Al Qaeda, the terrorists responsible for the Cole would remain free and there would be future attacks against the United States connected to Yemen.” Soufan observes, “Today, the terrorists behind the Cole are still free, and an attack connected to Yemen has been attempted.”

Current U.S. policy towards Yemen is based on counterterrorism support, limited special operations, and drone strikes. In 2009, US expenditures for counterterrorism support were $70 million; according to a senior military official, President Obama plans to increase that amount to $190 million. The U.S. coordinates much of its effort with Western-friendly Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. But President Saleh has often used American aid against local insurgencies rather than against al-Qaeda. The local insurgencies more directly threaten Saleh’s sovereign authority, and he wants to maintain at least minimal support from the conservative Islamist population. Unconditional aid is therefore ineffective—Yemeni authorities can divert resources from counter-terrorism to counterinsurgency.

The U.S. should make an all-or-nothing deal on foreign aid to Yemen: America should offer more financial support under the condition that Yemeni courts imprison those responsible for the Cole bombing. Some might argue that incarceration would be ineffective because new recruits would replace those imprisoned. But anything short of life imprisonment means effective impunity for terrorists; prosecution would send a message to al-Qaeda that the U.S. and Arab governments will not tolerate acts of terror. If these conditions are met, the U.S. should stay its present course of providing counter-terrorist aid. Admittedly, this solution may not be immediately effective, but any sustainable, forward-looking strategy against an asymmetrical threat will require patience.
Senator Joe Lieberman (I-CT) has suggested that Yemen will be “tomorrow’s war” if the U.S. does not act preemptively. Preemptive military engagement, however, is simply not feasible, with the U.S. military already overstretched in Afghanistan and Iraq. America is still fighting two wars, and escalating one of them; we cannot realistically expect victory in a third, especially after taking into account the counterinsurgency efforts that U.S. troops would inherit from the Yemeni government. Even if preemptive military intervention were feasible, it would likely provoke a popular backlash, destabilizing the Western-friendly regime. Al-Qaeda feeds on Western interventions; the risk of backlash is especially high in Yemen’s tribal north with widespread poverty, illiteracy, and resentment of the central government. Intelligence, logistical support, and foreign aid should be the extent of American involvement in an effort that only Yemen can achieve. As Marc Lynch, a counter-terrorism expert at George Washington University, has suggested, the U.S. should not fall into the trap of overcommitment in a rush to “just do something.”

In short, the U.S. should largely stay the course in Yemen, but must put more diplomatic pressure on the Yemeni government to ensure our plans are carried through. Although the Yemeni government is weak, it has achieved success in counterterrorist operations in the past few weeks. We have recently seen an unprecedentedly successful offensive against jihadist commanders in the south and center of the nation; five raids in the Abyan and Shabwa provinces have killed more than 60 fighters. Of course, an avowedly pro-Western government faces grave dangers in the Middle East, but a puppeteer is better than a hegemon. The United States should provide further assistance to Yemen before resorting to direct military engagement.