Political stability hardly seemed possible in Kenya in the aftermath of its 2007 presidential elections. Following long delays in the announcement of the next president, incumbent Mwai Kibaki was accused of manipulating election results. Violent protests broke out across the country, claiming 1,300 lives. As the situation deteriorated, the international community stepped in to broker a power-sharing agreement between Kibaki and the challenger, Raila Odinga, who would serve as president and prime minister, respectively.

Few would have expected the partnership to accomplish so much in just two years. Despite the externally imposed leadership structure, between former political rivals no less, Kibaki and Odinga collaborated to finally bring about long-awaited constitutional reform. On August 4th, 2010, nearly 70% of Kenyans went to the polls and participated in free, fair and peaceful voting on the constitutional referendum that was the product of Kibaki and Odinga’s great compromise. The results of the referendum were announced on time; the camp that had opposed the proposed constitution conceded their loss without protest; and Kenya’s government is now working on enacting the reforms the constitution outlines.

But what Kenya’s constitution-watchers have largely ignored thus far is that this is not the first time they have been promised reform. When elected in 2002, Kibaki was seen as a reformer, promising to end corruption; corruption continued, however, and Kibaki was implicated in the disputed 2007 elections that led to violent protest throughout the country. As such, one new and overlooked aspect of the referendum process that does not depend on Kenyan politicians following through gains additional significance. This critical element is Ushahidi, an innovative locally-based election monitoring program. By offering the promise of ensuring equally fair and peaceful elections in the future, Ushahidi may be as important of a legacy to the Constitutional process as any political reform.

This should not be seen as an undervaluing of the promises made in the referendum. The new constitution aims to balance power within government by creating a more effective judiciary, including a new Supreme Court and a better system for identifying and removing corrupt judges, and expanding the legislative branch’s powers. The reforms endorsed in the referendum also include a broader devolution of power to local institutions. In addition to these institutional changes, the new Constitution also calls for the passage of over 49 worthy new laws aimed at limiting presidential power, corruption, patronage, land-grabbing, and ethnic tribalism.

These goals present a tall order under the best of circumstances, even more so given the fact that Kenya’s people have been demanding constitutional reforms for the past 20 years. Also, this referendum was required as part of the 2008 power-sharing deal, not as an organic product of the political process in Kenya. While not necessarily a fatal flaw, this makes it much less likely that Kenya’s politicians will be motivated to swiftly enact the reforms people are demanding – especially as many of those laws will involve limiting their own power.

If this seems a pessimistic take on Kenya’s prospects, it ignores perhaps the most important takeaway from the recent referendum – that of peaceful and fair voting, which was anything but assured. While the specific reforms implemented in the new Constitution are extremely important, even more critical is the legitimization of elections, of the political leadership, and of the state itself. Without state legitimacy, supposed reforms will have no real power. The referendum’s greatest achievement, therefore, may simply be the precedent it has set for legitimacy in the voting process and the government as a whole.

A key reason the day of the vote was not tainted by violence or accusations of manipulated results was the Ushahidi program, which gave Kenyans the responsibility and effective means for monitoring their elections. The program, set up with assistance from the UN Development Program, gave Kenyans the ability to report any potential referendum-related problems by text message. The texts were received by both the Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security and an NGO overseeing the project.

The legitimacy stemming from the program helped overcome the stark divides in voting along ethnic lines. The Luo and Kikuyu regions in western and central Kenya voted almost exclusively “yes,” while the Kalenjin areas, also in western Kenya, voted uniformly “no.” When voting is so sharply ethnic, concerns over the legitimacy of the counting are natural, as was the case in 2007. And while Kenyans are becoming more conscious of the potential problems that accompany such strong ethnic politics, it seems this system will continue to be the norm, at least in the near future. Legitimizing measures like Ushahidi can therefore help negate some of the possible negative fallout from such ethnic politics.

Ushahidi is viable and sustainable as a means of monitoring corruption because it avoids placing the full burden on the international community. Rather than relying on outside assistance that invariably spawns cries of tampering and bias, the Ushahidi program gives the citizens primary responsibility while guaranteeing that if issues are reported, those with the power to act will be listening. Because the people themselves will have the direct ability to report whether the constitutional reforms are not proceeding as planned, any problems will likely be reported before international observers would have been able to identify them, ideally allowing for faster, easier fixes than those achievable by diplomatic means.

Kenya seems to be at a tipping point, where successful implementation of constitutional reforms could lead to real progress and promote stability in a troubled region. While the US should not repeat the mistake of turning away from events in Kenya too soon, as it did after the 2002 elections, the US should also not let international oversight backfire and stunt the developing democracy. Based on the role Ushahidi played in the achievement of a peaceful endorsement of the reformed constitution, a similar system designed for technology already in place and optimized for the way Kenyans use it could finally give citizens a way of making their government live up to the promises of the referendum. It may not be the standard approach, but it’s time the international community looked to unconventional methods to get uncommon results.

In April of 2009, pirates off the coast of Somalia seized an American ship, the Maersk Alabama, and took Captain Richard Philips hostage. U.S. Navy SEALs staged a dramatic rescue: Snipers aboard a Navy vessel shot the three pirates on the bobbing lifeboat where Captain Philips was being held, ending a five-day standoff. The suspenseful rescue, tailor-made for the era of 24/7 cable news, brought national attention to the issue of piracy off Somalia’s coast. But the roots of Somali piracy took hold years earlier, and the problem is getting worse. In the first nine months of 2009, there were 100 pirate attacks in the waters surrounding Somalia, compared to 51 in the same period the year before. Piracy is a product of a power vacuum in Somalia; overfishing and chemical dumping in Somali seas have set the stage for these modern-day marauders. To gain some measure of control over the pirate problem, the United States and its partners must address the environmental crises pirates use to justify their actions and create a Somali coast guard to help control piracy in the long-term.

The costs of piracy in this region are clear. Somalia lies along some of the world’s most important shipping lanes, and piracy in these lanes raises the cost of international commerce. Eleven percent of the world’s petroleum passes through the region, which is colloquially known as “Pirate Alley.” Ships making that journey today pay nearly twice what they would have paid a year ago for ransom insurance, in addition to the cost of increased onboard security. Furthermore, attacks on oil tankers and other ships carrying hazardous materials raise the possibility of a serious environmental disaster in the region. Finally, the possibility that piracy could fund terrorism represents a significant threat to the U.S.

But how exactly did the current era of Somali piracy begin? In 1991, Somalia’s government collapsed, and the lack of authority allowed pirates to take control of the seas. Today, the country is nominally ruled by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), but other groups, such as the Islamic militia al-Shabbab, constantly challenge the TFG for control. In such conditions, poverty has driven many to piracy. The World Bank reports that 73 percent of Somalia’s population lives on less than $2 a day. Primary school enrollment stands at 22 percent, among the lowest in the world. In the absence of government, there is an absence of opportunity, and for many in Somalia, the profitable life of piracy holds understandable appeal. In 2008 alone, pirates collected more than $150 million in ransom.

Overfishing off the coast of Somalia has also pushed many Somalis to take part in piracy. The earliest pirates were fishermen who sought to force out commercial ships that plundered Somali waters. Somalia’s Gulf of Aden is one of the most fertile fishing grounds in the world, and without a coast guard, Somalia’s territorial waters are unprotected. Boats from Europe and Asia illegally reap over $300 million worth of fish per year from Somali seas, depriving local fishermen of the livelihood of which they once relied. The foreigners often utilize invasive and illegal methods of fishing, such as nets with tight meshes that catch small and young fish. Without regulation, fish populations have been decimated, creating a classic “tragedy of the commons.” When too many individuals fish the same waters, the ecosystem collapses, and Somalis who could have once made their living fishing turn to piracy as an alternative.
The illegal dumping of toxic waste off Somalia’s coast by European and Asian corporations has only aggravated the problem. The UN Environmental Program notes that dumping hazardous waste in Somalia can cost as little as $2.50 a ton, while disposing of that same waste in Europe can cost $250 a ton. Following the great tsunami of 2004, a significant amount of waste washed up on Somali shores and sickened the local population. By damaging local fisheries, waste dumping makes piracy a more attractive career option. Yet Somalia lacks the resources and institutions needed to prevent this problem, and the international community has done little to help.

Somalia’s dysfunctional government is unable to combat the pirates, and although several nations have dispatched naval patrols to the Gulf of Aden, piracy remains an ever-present threat. The U.S. and the European Union have standing patrols in the region, and China helps escort ships through the treacherous gulf. Yet piracy cannot be eliminated until the Somali government is stable enough to control the problem internally. Unfortunately, calls for good governance are more easily put onto paper than put into practice. In the short term, at least, stable government in Somalia is a fantasy. While lining the Gulf with warships might eliminate piracy, it would be prohibitively expensive. The best option, therefore, is to implement cost-effective measures to control the problem. A moderate expansion of anti-piracy efforts would help limit robbery at sea at reasonable expense.

In order to combat piracy, the U.S. and its partners must combat not only the pirates but also the aggravating factors that encourage them, such as illegal fishing and toxic waste. Anti-piracy forces working to protect the seas and prevent the dumping of hazardous waste will earn some measure of good will from Somalis even as they crack down on pirates. By protecting the region from overfishing, the international community can create economic opportunities for those who might otherwise have turned to piracy. Furthermore, pirates will no longer be able to justify their attacks by claiming that they are simply protecting their fishing waters. Still, piracy is profitable, and managing these environmental issues will not solely eliminate the problem. Most pirates will not lay down their guns and pick up fishing poles as the environmental situation improves. But if U.S. forces and others already in the region begin to protect fisheries, they will deprive pirates of their stated motivation to attack, thus exposing those who continue to board ships as nothing more than common criminals. Pirates need support on land for their operations, and by revealing the pirates’ true motivations, the U.S. can minimize the backing these buccaneers receive from the Somali population.

The creation of a Somali coast guard managed by the United Nations would help quell piracy today and create the infrastructure for Somalia to manage the problem in the long-term. Roger Middleton, of the thinktank Chatham House, proposes the development of such a force, noting, “The cost of running a coast guard could be met, at least in part, from collecting fishing dues and import revenue. The money and the force could be held in trust for Somalia.” Such a force would separate pirates who are out for profit from those who genuinely hope to protect Somalia’s seas. If and when a stable government does take root, it would have a capable navy to police its waters. Unfortunately, recruiting for and managing the group would be no easy task. In the short term, this auxiliary force could not replace the more experienced international force needed to control piracy. In the future, though, such efforts would allow Somalia to take greater responsibility for its own territory.

Piracy in the Gulf of Aden presents a significant threat to global commerce, and there are no simple solutions. Until Somalia has a stable, functional government, pirates will continue to haunt key shipping lanes, threatening American citizens and American interests. But by understanding the circumstances that lead to piracy, the international community can better control these modern-day buccaneers. The lack of central authority in Somalia has paved the way for illegal fishing and the dumping of toxic waste. By controlling these factors, the international community can, over time, undermine Somalia’s pirates.

On November 5th, the world’s conflict diamond monitoring group announced the controversial decision not to suspend Zimbabwe following allegations of human rights abuses, diamond smuggling, and corruption. Although Zimbabwe is responsible for a relatively small portion of the world’s diamond trade, this was an important test of the global effort to monitor the diamond trade — a test that many would argue the international community failed.

The Kimberley Process certification scheme tracks diamonds from the mine to the store by issuing certificates indicating the stones are conflict-free. The process relies on self-regulation by the member nations’ governments. Though an admirable ideal, the Kimberley Process has already shown that it is unreliable in practice. The conflict diamond trade declined in Sierra Leone and Angola following the ends of both countries’ civil wars, but the Kimberley Process acknowledges continued smuggling in both countries, which Human Rights Watch calls “rampant.” The Democratic Republic of Congo has been plagued by conflict diamond problems exacerbated by rising instability, despite the D.R.C.’s Kimberley Process membership.
These ongoing problems show that while the Kimberley Process has been a good first step, a stronger independent body composed of both exporters and importing firms is needed to regulate both sides of the diamond trade. If enforcement is reliable enough, the profits from the legal trade should be the only incentive needed to ensure participation.

In 2007, a Kimberley Process team was sent to Zimbabwe to review allegations of smuggling, illegal mining, and human rights abuses by the military supervising the mining. The team publicly reported that Zimbabwe was in compliance with the Kimberley Process’s minimum standards. However, a confidential report from the Kimberley team, as well as accounts from Human Rights Watch and other humanitarian organizations, paint a different picture. Miners interviewed by the team said the military attempted to cover up corruption and committed violent acts against workers, including children. The Kimberley Process team’s confidential report also expressed concern over serious discrepancies in Zimbabwe’s statistical data on diamond production. Because many firms will not buy conflict diamonds directly from their country of origin, the diamonds are often smuggled into, and sold by, secondary countries. Conflict diamonds from other countries such as the Congo could easily be mixed in with Zimbabwean diamonds and certified as legal. Although Zimbabwe’s share of the global diamond market is small, the threat to the legitimacy of the Kimberley Process, and therefore to the entire diamond trade, is real.

Obtaining Kimberley Process certificates is the only way to legally trade in diamonds, so there should be a powerful incentive to comply with the process’s requirements. However, there are many opportunities for both importing and exporting nations to evade the rules. Governments looking for extra revenues through increased diamond sales would not find it difficult to pass off smuggled diamonds as legitimate — the governments control the certification process. While companies importing diamonds are legally obligated to purchase only certified, conflict-free stones, Global Witness reports that many firms are known to work around the process.

When corruption and smuggling are suspected, the Kimberley Process requires a consensus of the 75 represented countries to act, making it less likely that abuses will be addressed. Despite a Kimberley Process report stating Zimbabwe did not seem to be complying with the minimum standards for membership, Zimbabwe was allowed to remain a member, provided it adhered to a work plan created by the country itself. Instead of encouraging compliance, this sends the message that abuses will be tolerated.

Under the current system, it is also very difficult to target firms that import diamonds without certificates. The system calls for action by the country, but one cannot reasonably blame a government for one firm’s corruption. The World Diamond Council, the industry’s representative, also cannot be held at fault. The Kimberley Process has few tools to deal with corruption among diamond importers beyond asking governments to implement stricter industry regulations.

This flaw also means that the Kimberley Process currently has almost no way to stop the flow of conflict diamonds from rebel groups. Limiting the rebels’ opportunities to sell the diamonds deters them from creating conflict diamonds. One way to achieve this would be to require diamond-importing firms, as well as the nations that host them, to join the Kimberley Process and trade legal, certified diamonds.

The Kimberley Process would be more powerful and more reliable if it were not self-regulated but run instead by an independent regulatory group needing only a majority to act. Under this system, nations and importing firms would be far more likely to incur effective penalties, such as suspension from the Kimberley Process, if they failed to prevent the proliferation of conflict diamonds. An independent regulatory agency would also encourage more accurate record-keeping, making it more difficult to introduce smuggled diamonds into the legal market and harder for importers to knowingly purchase tainted diamonds. Because the Kimberley Process is the sole way to legally trade diamonds, a reintroduction process for suspended countries would be essential. This tool would ensure that these countries would not simply sell their diamonds to less exacting importers and enter the illegal diamond trade.

Although difficult, obtaining diamond producers’ participation in an organization capable of penalizing them is essential. If diamond traders concluded that the only profitable path was compliance, the legal diamond industry would free itself from the taint of conflict diamonds. An end to these concerns would increase consumers’ demand and increase profits for both importers and exporters. These benefits would reinforce commitment to keeping conflict diamonds out of the legal trade.

The inevitable question is where the responsibility for this independent regulator will fall. The United States is certainly in a position to exercise leadership by showing its commitment to stricter regulations. Yet the credibility of the Kimberley Process would be jeopardized if one nation, particularly one with such a significant share of the imports, took charge. The US cannot monitor the entire diamond trade; this is not one nation’s responsibility. The World Trade Organization is a logical candidate for this role. Its status as the accepted authority on global trade and experience monitoring trade issues would benefit a Kimberley Process group. Both governments and industry members could still be involved through an already-existing organization.

Although the conflict diamond trade may never be entirely eradicated, we should not dismiss the potential for improvement. As a more powerful regulatory agency, the Kimberley Process could harness its strengths to change the incentive structure for trading in diamonds, creating a lasting decline in conflict diamonds, greater revenues for diamond-exporting nations, and an end to the human rights abuses tied to the “blood diamonds.”