While America imagines itself to be locked in a deadly cage match in the War on Terror, there is a substantial chance that we will later look back on the current era as the quaint and quiet good old days in that fight – the time before the bad guys had nukes. Similarly, after a weary decade of counter-insurgency intervention in Afghanistan, America is likely to withdraw its forces well before a stable government and civil society can take hold. Therefore, the “peace” following the American pull-out is likely to be a much more hazardous period than the “war,” with a distinct prospect of renewed civil war and a pronounced drift toward failed statehood and warlord rule. While a failed state north of the Hindu Kush would render meaningless America’s long Afghan intervention, a failed state south of the Kush in nuclearized Pakistan would be far worse of a disaster in the global War on Terror. Worryingly, the Zardari government today is struggling to fend off a coup from the same security forces that apparently harbored Osama Bin Laden for years in a safe house near the capital. In each of these nightmares, our worst fears would be realized in Pakistan.

Given all of that, stabilizing the U.S. relationship with Pakistan is likely to be one the most important challenges this country faces on the international stage in the next ten years. And yet, as critical as Pakistan is to U.S. foreign policy, it is a country that we poorly understand and therefore struggle to influence. If there is any country that understands Pakistan, it is its behemoth neighbor and estranged fraternal twin, India. While the enmity between these two nations can hardly be overstated, no nation on earth has expended more effort analyzing, cajoling, and indeed obsessing over Pakistan than India. With that in mind, I met with a senior diplomat in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs on a recent trip to New Delhi.

Such expert relationship counseling is necessary because sadly the history of the U.S.-Pakistani relationship has not been encouraging. During the Cold War, Pakistan was the United State’s staunch ally in the region against Soviet-aligned India, and Pakistan received billions of dollars in economic and military assistance. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, relations soured over Pakistan’s nuclear program. Pakistan developed nuclear weapons in 1998 despite strong U.S. opposition, and remains the only Muslim state in the nuclear club. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan was a key supporter of the Taliban. After 9/11, however, President Bush convinced former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf to join the War on Terror, and the U.S. has given large amounts of economic and military aid to Pakistan over the past ten years. In return, Pakistan has made efforts to aid in the war, for example by letting the U.S. use a base in their territory for drone strikes. Nevertheless, Pakistan is still plagued by numerous terrorist groups, and many of its provinces are completely out of the control of the central government in Islamabad and are run entirely by the Taliban.

This past year has seen relations fall to an all-time low. It began with the incident of Ray Davis, a CIA contractor who shot dead two Pakistanis on the streets of Lahore whom he thought were attempting to rob him (the U.S. then tried to keep a straight face while claiming diplomatic immunity). Next there was the clandestine May raid by Navy Seals to kill Osama bin Laden, which infuriated diplomats both in Islamabad (for Pakistan’s lack of foreknowledge, let alone permission) and in Washington (for Pakistan’s either incompetence in not finding or complicity in sheltering bin Laden). This caused criticism of the Pakistani government in Washington to boil over in public, most notably by outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, who in September accused Pakistan’s ISI spy agency of funding and directing terrorist groups. Finally, in December there was the inadvertent killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers in a NATO airstrike, which prompted Pakistani diplomats to boycott a conference at Bonn on the future of Afghanistan.

Nor is the problem due simply to miscommunication and unfounded mistrust; the U.S. and Pakistan have fundamentally opposing interests in the region. While the U.S. obviously wants to stop nuclear proliferation, some members of the Pakistani government likely would not mind if more Muslim nations became nuclear armed. In the War on Terror, George Bush committed America to fighting terrorism wherever it crops up. The Pakistanis, on the other hand, have perceived great utility in sponsoring terrorist groups in their struggle with India over Kashmir and use terrorist groups like the Haqqani network and Lashkar-e-Taiba (responsible for the 2008 Mumbai bombings) as, in the words of Admiral Mullen, a “veritable arm” of the ISI. In the theater of Afghanistan, no peace agreement or successful exit strategy can be concluded without Pakistan, mostly because Pakistan controls many proxy forces in Afghanistan which could either sustain or bring down the central government in Kabul. As long as the mountains of Pakistan are a haven for anti-Kabul terrorists, Pakistan can keep Afghanistan completely destabilized. While the U.S. wants Afghanistan to develop into a peaceful democracy, Pakistan would be happy to see a weak, corruptible Muslim theocracy, destroying everything U.S. soldiers have fought for over the past ten years. To put it bluntly, Washington wants an American puppet state, while Islamabad wants a Pakistani puppet state. These goals are not compatible.

Given that as soon as the Afghan war is over, the U.S. will want to disengage from the Middle Eastern quagmire and will no longer need Pakistan as a strategic partner, many commentators in both countries have urged patience and forgiveness for Pakistan’s ever more apparent unfaithfulness and double-dealing. This argument, however, is fundamentally flawed. It fails to account for the most crucial factor in the U.S.-Pakistani relationship: aid money. Between 2002 and 2010, Pakistan received roughly $18 billion in economic and military aid from the United States. Towards the end of the decade, this amounted to almost 10 percent of the Pakistani government’s budget. The U.S. is by far Pakistan’s largest foreign donor, and Pakistani leaders know that no other country could provide more than a small fraction of the largesse that U.S. friendship guarantees.

Clearly the U.S. has a troubled relationship with Pakistan and needs to find a new way forward to prevent the partnership from falling apart. I sat down with a senior diplomat (who would prefer to remain anonymous) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the country with the most experience of all in building a relationship with Pakistan – India. Although the two countries share a troubled past, India has learned to build a stable relationship with Pakistan and relations have been improving dramatically over the past ten years. When asked how the U.S. could improve its relationship with Pakistan, my contact jumped immediately to a simple, yet prudent conclusion: “The United States must benchmark assistance to Pakistan to achieve its objectives.” Over the past ten years, the U.S. has poured aid money into Pakistan to be used more or less at Pakistan’s discretion, and in return asked for Pakistani help – or at least non-interference – in combating terrorism.

This strategy, however, has plainly failed, and this senior diplomat therefore implored the U.S. to pursue what he deemed a “transactional” relationship with Pakistan. “Pakistan can’t survive without U.S. aid,” he continued, “and the government knows this. The U.S. needs to be clear and direct [and say] for example if you pursue these terrorists in Waziristan, we’ll give you X in military aid. Otherwise it’s going to be another ten years of billions of dollars down the drain.” The U.S. needs to be clear and direct about what its objectives are and what help it needs from the Pakistani government, and then pursue those objectives relentlessly using aid money as leverage.

Although this strategy is bold and would represent a radical change in U.S.-Pakistani relations, it is likely the only possible way forward if the U.S. is to achieve its goals in the region. With the end of the war in Afghanistan in sight, failure is not an option. For the past ten years the U.S. has showered Pakistan with aid money and not gotten what it paid for. Every U.S. diplomat travelling to Pakistan should remember that the Pakistanis need our aid money just as much as we need their help in the war.

The U.S. needs to make aid to this troubled South Asian nation contingent on achieving real results, both in pursuing terrorists and internal reform. While this transactional approach risks being perceived as blunt and short-sighted, our unstable ally in Islamabad is the precarious fulcrum on which the outcome of our Afghan war is hinged. We need their unambiguous cooperation, and we need it immediately. Despite our long military adventure in Afghanistan, that war is still just as likely to become another Vietnam in which our allies and interests are devastated following our exit as it is another Kuwait in which the regime we install survives our departure. Pakistan holds the key to that outcome. Perhaps ultimately the analogy for the Afghan war will become the Gulf Wars, of which, ominously, there were not one, but two.

Still in his twenties and having only a few years of experience within the government’s highest echelons, Kim Jong Eun’s legitimacy will depend largely on his ability to emulate his predecessors. It is important to note that the new leader’s position and dominance are by no means guaranteed; Kim Jong Il’s relatives continually vie for influence, several of which are generals in the military, with experience dating back to Kim Il Sung’s reign. Although Kim Jong Eun is securing the official positions left by his father, North Korea is a society that, according to the Wall Street Journal, generally follows “a seniority-based hierarchical ideal.” This means that youth and inexperience could jeopardize Kim Jong Eun’s ability to command officials twice his age. In comparison, his father had far more experience when he took power yet still ruled for three years in his predecessor’s name. Not only that, but Kim Jong Il maintained his father’s role as the “eternal President” who accomplished “immortal achievements,” and always stressed how his policies continued Kim Il Sung’s. As such, it is hardly shocking that the new ruler has begun to appropriate this rhetoric, as seen in how the North Korean government’s website says Mr. Kim is “identical to [sic] idea, leadership and personality of Kim Jong Il.” Information published in the New York Times suggests that Kim Jong Il may have appointed Kim Jong Eun as his successor because he would continue Kim Jong Il’s policies. In defiance of traditional inheritance practices that would pass a father’s estate to the eldest son, Kim Jong Il selected his third and youngest son. While the oldest son contrasted Kim Jong Il’s personality and the second son experienced a relatively public rift with his father, Kim Jong Eun reportedly demonstrated an affinity for North Korea’s official philosophy since childhood. Kim Jong Eun’s actions will not be the only force pushing for continuity, though. The lack of change among subordinates will also prevent policy shifts.

Since Kim Jong Eun is still in the process of securing his footing, he may not yet have the power or desire necessary to brush aside the current officials. By avoiding a shake-up in the near future, he will avoid alienating needed allies and inherit an intact and experienced government. While an expert quoted in the New York Times recently predicted that it will be only a matter of months before the government passes to a younger generation, one scenario that The Economist describes seems more likely in the near future: the seasoned and experienced officials will keep Mr. Kim in check. Once he consolidates power, he will have the chance to oversee a generational shift among North Korean officials, however this will by no means give him free rein. There is a strong likelihood that current officials will pass their positions to similarly-minded relatives, which means the new leader will be hard pressed to wipe the slate clean and thereby steer his government in a new direction. Mr. Kim’s inner circle will be the clearest representation of this personnel continuity since the inner circle of relatives and generals that aided Kim Jong Il is carrying over to Kim Jong Eun’s reign. This offers Kim Jong Eun several advantages, like how would support claims of continuity with Kim Jong Il’s example. On top of that, these officials are politically savvy and have ties to various political and military factions. Since the military has significant influence economically and politically, and a small elite class dominates the government, these individuals will be essential allies as Kim Jong Eun’s reign gains traction. At the same time, he does not yet have the influence necessary to clean house without jeopardizing his control over his country’s power brokers. While those nearest Kim Jong Eun’s seat of power will pressure his actions, those in North Korea’s chief economic and military ally will do likewise.

In pursuit of its self-interest, China will also push Mr. Kim toward policies that will maintain his government’s stability. A Time article recently noted China’s concern that turmoil in North Korea would send huge numbers of refugees across its border. From the Chinese state’s perspective, it would be particularly bad if China’s government and society faced this strain in the near future since the government is presently intensifying efforts to maintain its own stability. Some articles have postulated that the recent protests in the village of Wukan may indicate more widespread social ills, and that recent efforts to censor television programs suggest concerns about the nation’s ideological fortitude. Developments among China’s political elite further increase its interest in North Korean stability. With a change of “some 70% of China’s leadership” early next year, a crisis could harm the new officials’ political capital. Another important factor is that China is in the process of stretching its military power and regional influence. According to Time, Beijing fears that a political collapse in North Korea would likely cause Korean unification under the Seoul government. For an aspiring regional power like China, it would be a painful setback if a U.S. ally gained ground at a fallen ally’s expense. Intelligence reports and news articles agree that China wants North Korea to undergo certain reforms in order to boost regional stability, so China will not be Mr. Kim’s most conservative influence. China’s overriding interest, though, is that Mr. Kim’s government does not fall. Therefore, in the event that Chinese leaders see the young leader’s policies as erratic or dangerous, they will use whatever influence they have to correct his course. This could potentially happen if, for example, Mr. Kim proposes a major internal shake-up, drastic social reform, or an inconsistent foreign policy, which could cause China to regard Mr. Kim as an incompetent leader and a liability for his regime’s stability. Thus, North Korea’s untested ruler must prove his leadership ability and his government’s functionality to audiences at home and abroad. Despite some alignment between North Korean and Chinese interests, they do not fully overlap, so they will at times push Mr. Kim in contradictory directions.

In particular, the philosophy of emulation that Mr. Kim plans to employ will direct North Korea’s short-term nuclear policy. Because North Korea’s nuclear weapons program began decades ago, Kim Jong Eun has little choice but to continue supporting nuclear development or else he would undermine his own legitimacy as his father’s and grandfather’s heir. Since the West, South Korea, and even China all oppose North Korea’s efforts to develop a nuclear arsenal, any efforts to scale back the program or even enter serious negotiations to that end would jeopardize Mr. Kim’s credibility as a strong anti-Western leader among his population, especially among senior officials old enough to have lived during the country’s formation and the 1950s Korean Conflict. North Korea’s state philosophy, which stresses self-reliance and was created by Mr. Kim’s grandfather, would underscore this issue. One might argue that Mr. Kim can compromise to win incentives from the West and free up his own domestic budget. However, this appears unlikely. The new leader’s connection to his predecessors is the cornerstone of his legitimacy, and past rewards have had little influence on North Korean policymakers. In North Korea, greater loyalty, power, and service to the state correlate with a better livelihood, so the ideologues among the political and military elite do not feel the impact of food shortages like the masses who work outside the state do. These ideologues pose a greater threat to Mr. Kim since they could fragment his power or spark an ideological schism. With this in mind, it is not surprising that the North Korean government recently announced that it would not change its foreign policy and would maintain an aggressive stance toward South Korea.

The U.S. now finds itself in an uncomfortable position as it looks towards the future. In these circumstances, it would be unwise to attempt to manipulate the present situation since Mr. Kim and his top officials would rebuff any suspected American intervention. In addition, any U.S. involvement would also irritate the U.S.’s complex relationship with China. Therefore, the potential price of either overt or covert action with the intention of influencing North Korea is tremendous. This means that the U.S. should expect a continuation of the same challenges, policies, and obstinateness seen in Kim Jong Il’s final years. In light of this fact, the U.S. should offer Kim Jong Eun the same deals it offered his father and also not oppose Mr. Kim as he consolidates power. To this effect, the Obama Administration has been wise to call for a “peaceful, stable transition” but should not have officially suspended the ongoing discussions. Resuming such discussions as quickly as possible will minimize any increase in U.S.-North Korea tension caused by the transition. It would also indicate that the U.S. recognizes that Kim Jong Il’s death is not indicative of a North Korean paradigm shift. There are several reasons why countries around the world have responded to Kim Jong Il’s death with somber messages and heightened wariness rather than the excitement seen among the characters in “Wicked.” Perhaps the most significant is that reality’s Wicked Witch has a successor who has every reason to grab a broomstick and pointy hat. As such, the death of Kim Jong Il is heralding Kim Jong Eun’s rise as the leader of continued anti-U.S. policy and resistance to political change.

The region’s waterways are vital to the global economic supply chain and free-navigability is key to continued prosperity in the immediate area and beyond. Approximately a quarter of the world’s oil passes through the Malacca Straits, destined to supply China and Indonesia as well as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Over $5 trillion worth of trade is conducted in the region every year—with more than a fifth of which is American. Moreover, much of the world’s computer manufacturing is performed in the region, with factories in each nation performing complementary tasks towards a final product. The important trade routes in this area thus make it vital from both an economic and geopolitical standpoint.

One of the most important developments in the region has been the increasingly contentious dispute over sovereignty in the South China Sea. Vietnam, the Philippines, and China continue to tussle over control of the Sea and the small islands lying above potential oil and gas reserves —estimated to match Kuwait’s. China, contrary to the conventional understanding of territorial waters (which is based upon distance from the continental shelf under the Law of the Sea), has claimed the entire sea for itself based on its asserted historical sovereignty. While other nations have made such claims in the past, Beijing has shown a startling willingness to enforce them aggressively in recent years. The Chinese navy has had no compunction about sinking Vietnamese fishing vessels and has even warned oil giant Exxon Mobil last year not to explore for oil and gas resources with Vietnamese licenses and grants. Chinese forces have also been deployed to islands disputed by the Philippines, further demonstrating their aggressive commitment to using military prowess to claim control.

Most analysts agree that these moves represent just the beginning of China’s expansion of regional influence as Beijing’s economic power increases. China has backed up its aggressive territorial claims with a military strategy to project its rising power. In August, the Chinese military began sea trials for its first aircraft carrier (refitted from an older Soviet model) and has started to test its first stealth bomber. In addition, to counterbalance American defense strategy, Beijing is also developing anti-aircraft systems and satellites (which underpin communications and guidance systems) that potentially target American bases in the Philippines, South Korea, Australia, Japan, and elsewhere in the Pacific. In addition, the Chinese military has also invested in area denial weapons systems to counter American air superiority and hinder the movement of American forces. Moreover, defense experts warn that Beijing is honing cyber warfare capabilities that have already been used to successfully access U.S. defense contractors’ sites as well as commercial sites. The intellectual yields of such intrusions have already gone into China’s new stealth bomber design. Recent reports also suggest that China’s cyber attacks targeted two American weather satellites and briefly gained command of one of them, further illustrating Beijing’s increased capability to interfere with American military communication and surveillance infrastructure.

Such tactics, coupled with China’s economic clout, have begun to radically alter the dynamics within the region. Chinese aid, investment, and trade have been increasing in recent years as joint Sino-Vietnamese business ventures and Chinese support for Filipino infrastructure projects have become the norm in the region. This economic power translates into political influence, resulting in pro-China foreign policies emanating from regional governments. In fact, several nations in the region have disregarded the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) conventions by repatriating Uyghur activists and dissidents back to China, where they face nearly certain persecution, imprisonment, and even torture or execution.

Nonetheless, Southeast Asia, through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), has increasingly sought to counterbalance China by fostering ties with other states, most notably the United States—but also India, Japan, and others. In an interesting turn of events, American naval ships have increasingly berthed (and been repaired) in Vietnam, and the nation has become one of the largest recipients of American aid. The United States has also approved sales of defense equipment to Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan, and other states. Regional powers have also stepped up their commitment to the region. Japan has pledged to increase trade and upgrade its submarine fleet and Australia has geared up for a decade-long upgrade to its naval and military assets.
Diplomatic relations between the various players in the region and the United States have warmed significantly as the U.S. remains the dominant sea power and has used its naval prowess to support regional nations against Beijing’s clout. In fact, domestic attitudes in regional nations toward Beijing have begun to turn negative. For instance, in spite of growing trade and economic engagement with Beijing, last year, Vietnam halted a joint Sino-Vietnamese venture to extract bauxite, a mineral essential to China’s industries. The fact that outcry from many Vietnamese (including Buddhist monks, environmentalists, and bloggers) countered Beijing’s pressure is indicative of regional anxiety over China’s influence.. Moreover, one of America’s staunchest allies in the region, Thailand, has strengthened its relations with Washington despite a military coup and riots in recent months. On another front, U.S.-Burma relations have begun to defrost after decades of sanctions, and some progress might be made in establishing democratic institutions and freeing political prisoners. These diplomatic successes have not gone unnoticed by China as Washington and Beijing pursue different objectives.

As Southeast Asia continues to experience high rates of economic growth, the region will become increasingly important in the global economy. At the same time, the area encompasses some of the busiest maritime routes in the world as well as some of the most lucrative and promising natural resources. Both factors guarantee that China, other Southeast Asian countries, and the U.S. will jockey for regional influence. China has made a strong showing in the region and undoubtedly exerts a strong hand in the affairs of the region. Nonetheless, as many Southeast nations have expressed, there must be a “balance” to maintain peace and prosperity. China’s willingness to use its economic clout, aggression, and coercion further hint at the urgency of maintaining a balanced power structure in the region.

The United States is in a unique position to counterbalance Beijing growing aggression. Washington has the opportunity to increase engagement with regional nations through military and economic cooperation. Increased American naval presence can reassure regional governments of the U.S.’s commitment to countering Chinese intimidation and pressure. Encouraging Japan and India to also establish and strengthen relationships in the region will give those nations an incentive to counter Beijing to protect their interests. Moreover, highlighting Beijing’s continued horrendous human rights violations and supporting dissidents will weaken China’s prestige and force officials to turn inwards rather than pressure neighbors.

The rising boldness of Beijing in pursuit of its interests suggests that the American presence must increase. Although domestic debates in the United States threaten to cut defense budgets, defense spending represents an investment in future stability to develop more ties to Southeast Asia. Along with military support, increased economic and political engagement with Thailand, Vietnam, Burma, the Philippines, and other nations is necessary to cement ties with regional capitals. While India and Japan have essential parts to play in maintaining peace in the region, the United States, on account of its military and economic power, is uniquely positioned to preserve its national interest and that of its allies by maintaining the freedom of the seas, open shipping lanes, and an independent Southeast Asia.

In 2002, the moderate Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by Istanbul mayor Recep Tayyip Erdogan swept to power. The AKP embraced economic reforms that opened up Turkey’s economy to foreign and private investment, breaking up the state’s control over major industries. Erdogan also ushered in a series of constitutional reforms to protect the rights of prisoners and journalists, ensure religious freedom, and reined in the power of the military that dominated Turkish society since the country’s founding following the First World War. Erdogan’s actions helped cement civilian control over the military and strengthened the power of Turkey’s elected government.

Turkey’s success could make it a model for the nations involved in the Arab Spring. Tunisia would likely stand the best chance of successfully implementing Turkish-style reforms given its relative economic prosperity, the emergence of a moderate Islamist party, Ennhada, which views the AKP as its mentor and possess a history of adopting moderate positions, and a strong tradition of secular thought and a powerful liberal lobby. A relatively impoverished Egypt could still follow Turkey’s path if provided with the right guidance and resources. While the emergence of the fundamentalist Salafi party al-Nour and the failure of new secular parties to organize in time to be competitive in parliamentary elections remain causes for concern, the Muslim Brotherhood’s moderate platform and willingness to form a coalition with secular parties as it becomes the largest party in parliament is promising.

Turkey stands out as an example of a secular democracy with an Islamic heritage, a model Tunisia and Egypt could follow. The AKP’s ability to appeal to voters’ desire for a government acknowledging Islamic values while ensuring a separation between religion and politics represents a possible method in which moderate Islamic political movements can provide their populations with the freedoms often attributed to Western society and the values of an Islamic one. Furthermore, the AKP’s excellent record of economic development and liberalization provides a blueprint for how the economic integration of Middle Eastern nations can lead to prosperity for their citizens. Finally, the emergence of Turkey illustrates the necessity of establishing civilian control of the military. Politicians in countries such as Egypt, where the military continues to play an overbearing role in the transition to democracy, will likely take note of the techniques used by Prime Minister Erdogan to curb the once all-mighty Turkish military. Turkey’s prominence as a democratic, prosperous Middle Eastern power serves as a beacon of hope for newly emerging democracies.

While Turkey presents a good model in some regards for newly emergent democracies to follow, any country that seeks to emulate the AKP’s success should avoid the pitfalls of the Erdogan regime. In particular, countries should beware of restricting journalistic freedom. In spite of his promises, Erdogan failed to protect the rights of Turkish journalists to question their government. Countless journalists remain detained on trumped-up charges, and some measures suggest that Turkey may incarcerate more journalists per year than more totalitarian regimes such as China. In addition, Turkey’s record on securing rights for ethnic minorities remains abysmal. In spite of Erdogan’s reforms, Kurds remain largely marginalized in Turkish society, fueling the newly resurgent PKK insurgency. Countries with large ethnic or religious minorities such as Egypt, whose Coptic Christian minority has been involved in clashes with Muslims and security forces in recent months following the fall of the Mubarak regime, should refrain from emulating the Turkish model in this regard. Furthermore, the lack of significant political movements opposed to the AKP poses additional concerns for those who view Turkey as a model for future democracies. The opposition remains in disrepute due to its prior corruption and reliance on the military for support. Until a viable opposition party manages to check the power of the AKP, Turkey cannot be classified as the true multi-party democracy it proclaims itself to be.

The emergence of democracy in Middle East raises concerns regarding the effect of the Arab Spring on U.S. power and influence in the Middle East. Many pessimists argue that the replacement of “reliable” autocrats such as Mubarak in Egypt and Ben Ali in Tunisia with potentially “unfriendly” democracies will cripple U.S. power in the region. This line of thinking has shaped U.S. policy in the region dating back to the Cold War. In 1951, the democratically-elected Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammed Mossadegh, attempted to nationalize Iranian oil wells. Fearing that Mossadegh could threaten U.S. economic interests, the U.S. backed a military coup that overthrew Mossadegh in 1953 and restored the Shah. This action fueled a deep-seated mistrust of the United States among the Iranian public, causing the power of the secular, democratic opposition to be co-opted by fundamentalists. The Mossadegh debacle illustrates that the longer a dictatorship remains in power, the harder it will be for a democratic, moderate opposition to take control. When political dissent is repressed, Islamic groups become an outlet for political expression, a key example being the popularity of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood under the Mubarak regime. The United States should embrace efforts by the citizens of Middle Eastern countries to establish democracies of their own.

While U.S. support for dictatorships yields devastating results for U.S. hegemony, the emergence of democracy in the region will greatly enhance U.S. influence in the region by promoting economic liberalization and international humanitarian involvement. The dictatorships overthrown in the Arab Spring utilized cumbersome, closed, state-run economies which they associated with a secular, socialist state. The vast majority of citizens developed a distaste for both; thus, like the AKP, most moderate Islamic parties strongly support the free market. Should these countries open up their economies to foreign investment, the United States and its allies will obtain considerable economic benefits as attested by Turkey’s significant trade with the West. Furthermore, significant economic influence in a democracy yields far greater hegemony than military aid to a dictatorship. While dictatorships can simply request assistance from another power in lieu of a loss of funds, economic realities cannot be altered overnight, as evidenced by the significant influence exerted by Chinese economic investment in the U.S. against the debatable leverage of U.S. aid to Pakistan. In addition, democracies may prove more supportive of more idealistic objectives such as human rights preservation or genocide prevention. Popular support for idealistic endeavors can force democracies to act where dictatorships may have lain dormant. For instance, public outrage prompted Erdogan to call for Gadhafi’s resignation and that of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in spite of strong economic ties. Clearly, democratic regimes will enhance long-run influence in the region of the United States far more effectively than any autocracy.

Turkey’s progress makes it a model for the emerging democracies of the Arab Spring to follow that would meet the needs of their citizens and enhance the influence of the United States. Most newly empowered nations such as Egypt and Tunisia will likely adapt aspects of the Turkish model to suite their own respective circumstances. Turkey’s ability to blend Islamic values with a secular democracy, embrace of free-market principles, and success in establishing civilian control over military forces represent positive aspects of a democracy that emerging democracies would do well to emulate. While certain aspects of the Turkish model such as restrictions journalistic freedom and minority rights remain areas of concern, Turkey nevertheless represents the premier example of a stable, functioning democracy in the Middle East. The success of the Arab Spring bodes well for the United States, whose economic influence will increase on the heels of economic liberalization. Instead of lending its support to increasingly doomed, irrelevant autocracies, the world’s oldest democracy should lend its support to the word’s newest democracies as they secure the benefits of liberty and prosperity for their citizens.

At the back of the stadium lies a view of Bloemfontein’s impoverished townships, a defunct power station towering over them. In the back of many peoples’ minds is a sense that the celebration—at a cost of nearly $12.3 million—was in poor taste, and emblematic not of the ANC’s impressive past, but of its uncertain future, and that of the country it now governs.

One development South Africans feel particularly uncertain about is the Protection of State Information Bill, derogatorily referred to as “the secrecy bill.” It would punish journalists who obtain classified information that reveals government corruption, and those who do not turn that information over to the police. Journalists who possess such material would face up to five years in prison; those who publish it, up to twenty-five. Recipients of such information beyond the journalist would also be vulnerable to prosecution. The government claims that the bill will protect the nation from an “increasing threat of espionage” and “foreign spies” which cannot be sufficiently quashed by existing legislation.

In a 1990 article, arguing against the repression of information that had long been so common in her country, South African writer and future Nobel Prize laureate Nadine Gordimer wrote, “Censorship is never over for those who have experienced it. It is a brand on the imagination that affects the individual who has suffered it, forever.” In November of 2011, she repeated her accusation, this time against the ANC, a political organization to whom Gordimer once gave her support, before it was legal to do so.

While Gordimer’s is only one of many public criticisms the law has received, the Protection of State Information Bill is merely the latest in a series of controversies that have involved accusations—and often evidence—of corruption and mismanagement within South Africa, much of it involving the ANC. Furthermore, in recent years, concern has increased over the extent to which the ANC has come to dominate political life in South Africa. In effect, it has created a one-party democracy in which the opposition, while free to exist, has little support.

This domination has thus far not resulted in any deterioration of the nation’s fundamentally democratic nature. Yet on the eve of its 100th anniversary as a political organization, it has become increasingly clear that the ANC’s grip on power has burdened South Africa’s fledgling democracy more than it has encouraged it. The nation’s future internal stability and international reputation as an example of successful democratic transition will depend on the willingness of the organization to favor democratic values over its own position of power, if and when the constituency it has so long represented grows tired of its mediocre governance.

The association of the ANC with liberation and democracy within much of South Africa is hard earned, dating back to the founding of the organization in 1912 to protest racial inequality under British rule and its subsequent use of non-violent boycotts, demonstrations, and appeals to the international community following the beginning of apartheid in 1948. Following the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre, however, ANC founded an armed wing, known as the Umkhonto we Size (Spear of the Nation), and began a campaign of violent resistance alongside their nonviolent struggle throughout the 1960’s and 70’s, as much of their leadership—most prominently, Nelson Mandela—was captured and imprisoned. Beginning in the 1980’s, the ANC began negotiations with officials from the National Party, the majority representative of the white government, which eventually resulted in a comprehensive agreement that determined the political and economic post-apartheid order. In 1994, the ANC won 63% of the popular vote in the nation’s first fully free elections, bringing longtime de facto leader and former political prisoner Nelson Mandela to power.

Though Mandela’s time in power was generally regarded positively—his willingness to retire after just one term garnered comparisons to George Washington—the men who have followed him, all from the ANC, have not been looked upon so favorably. In 1999, just as Thabo Mbeki began his term as leader of South Africa, scandal erupted over an arms purchase of roughly $5 billion by the South African Defense Force from Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, Spain, and Canada. Accusations of corruption stemmed from bribes allegedly paid to facilitate the deal—bribes that have been associated with both Mbeki and his successor, Jacob Zuma. Schabir Shaik, Zuma’s personal financial advisor, was convicted in 2005 of connection to bribes associated with the arms deal.

Since the 1999 elections, concern domestically and internationally over corruption within the South African government has increased exponentially. In 2011, the Special Investigating Unit, an organization set up to monitor government corruption, estimated that nearly one-fourth of the national budget was mismanaged due to corruption, and is currently investigating 12 billion rand in questionable government dealings. The South African Social Security Agency is alleged to be rife with corruption and financial chaos. The former head of the South African police force, Jackie Selebi, resigned in disgrace after he was found to be purchasing lavish gifts for his wife using government funds and taking bribes from a convicted drug smuggler.

In response, the ANC has seen a diminishing of its support from former allies. Both of its partners in South Africa’s Tripartite Alliance, the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions, have threatened to dissolve their association due to internal disagreement over economic policies, a move that would threaten a relationship created to strengthen resistance against apartheid. Moreover, prior to the 2009 elections that brought Zuma to power, a number of former ANC supporters split off to form the Congress of the People (COPE), prompting talk of an end to ANC dominance. Though the COPE only garnered 7% of the vote in 2009, they are still regarded as a potential future threat to the ANC’s power.

Despite these developments, the ANC still enjoys the loyalty of many South Africans, who see it as the organization that fought for and eventually won universal suffrage and liberal democracy for their country. Furthermore, the association of Nelson Mandela, a man regarded as both liberator and founder of their young democracy, with the ANC, in addition to his continued support of that organization, has no doubt aided success. But other former supporters of the party, such as Gordimer and Archbishop Demond Tutu, have not been so forgiving. They represent the disillusionment of many with the ANC’s lack of success in encouraging honesty and transparency.

It is only natural that a political party with such vast and total control—one that has in effect become a state and a party all at once—would fall prey to the seduction of easy wealth and luxury. Furthermore, it is equally inevitable that their popular support will diminish over time in the face of such misdeeds.

In 2009, shortly after his party was elected to a fourth term in power, Jacob Zuma announced to a crowd of supporters that the ANC would rule “until Jesus Christ comes.” One can only hope his statement was made in the spirit of hyperbole rather than truth and that, when the time comes, the ANC will give up power in a way that pays respect to both their former leader and the democracy they once helped create.

In the aftermath of the exchange, in which Israel freed Palestinians,imprisoned for everything from dissent to violence in return for the release of Gilad Shalit, an Israeli Defense Force soldier captured in the July War with Lebanon’s Hizballah, Israeli opinion is divided, but only slightly: according to polls taken immediately after the release, between 74 and 80 percent of the Israeli public support the exchange. Indeed, addressing concerns as to the inequality of the exchange, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu quoted from the Talmud: “He who saves one soul, it is as though he saved an entire world.” Meanwhile, Palestinians are jubilant at the prospect of having secured the release of so many, for what they consider so little. It seems that for once, a solution has been brokered in the endlessly intractable conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people that somewhat satisfies everyone.

Yet the prisoner exchange, seemingly a one-shot, no-strings-attached PR boon for the Israeli government and Hamas alike, will have far-reaching consequences for which neither party is prepared. The exchange, brokered in secret by Egypt between the two parties, failed to engage either the Israeli or Palestinian public in a way that would have given them a sense of future potential for open cooperation. The concept of negotiation between Israel and Hamas has been thrust upon both publics quite suddenly, giving them little stake in the talks or the possibility of others in the future. Moreover, as the initial joy fades, the exchange serves to remind both parties of the tense relationship that created the need to exchange such prisoners—captured in times of conflict, imprisoned for political dissent and terrorism—in the first place. Indeed, both sides view this act as one of just compensation rather than one of reconciliation. The impact it will have for both Israeli security prospects and Palestinian aspirations is minimal at best and costly at worst.

While the deal has received much praise from the Israeli public, it is mysterious that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other senior government officials dealing with the exchange would believe such a security risk to be wise. It seems illogical that, a government and, moreover, a nation so concerned with the threat of terrorism of which they consider Hamas a key breeder, would broker a deal that releases men and women whose involvement included but was not limited to a 2001 Jerusalem pizzeria bombing, the 2002 “Passover Massacre” in Netanya, and a 2004 shooting attack on the Trans-Israel Highway. To the Israelis, these incidents no doubt represent profound threats to their security, and the release of those who committed them seems an odd risk to take considering the importance they place on that existence. Israeli opposition leader Tzipi Livni, among others, has pointed out this discrepancy.

Yet while Israeli’s security interests have been imperiled by the prisoner exchange, Palestinians aspirations for statehood have been dealt a far greater blow. The release, while celebrated by those families whose loved ones had come home, some of whom had been imprisoned since 1987′s first intifada, was quickly hailed by Hamas themselves as evidence of the need to take more Israeli soldiers hostage since, clearly, it had proven effective. “The people want a new Gilad!” protesters chanted at a Hamas rally in Gaza City, shortly after the exchange. And while the capture of Gilad Shalit does appear to have paid dividends for Hamas, it has become painfully evident to Palestinians that violent action against the state of Israel only results in increased security measures and repression. Hamas’ citing of this exchange as a success, then, has the potential to derail the non-violent Palestinian opposition to Israel that has become more widespread in recent years.

Moreover, the exchange has increased the legitimacy and popularity of Hamas at the expense of the West Bank’s Fatah, whose influence has been called into question and weakened by the deal. Israel and the international community alike generally regard Fatah as the more legitimate Palestinian government; any substantive peace deal, therefore, would necessitate their involvement. Relations between Israel and Fatah, however, are tenuous at best, and an upsurge in violence by Hamas, by taking prisoners or using similar means would most likely reflect poorly on the Palestinian cause as a whole, and therefore Fatah by association. Moreover, historically, this sort of violence has led to increasingly repressive Israeli security measures, which would set Palestinian expectations back substantially.

Furthermore, even if Hamas’ rhetoric fails to derail the Palestinian cause, the deal they brokered with Israel has taken the spotlight away from the issues that concern Palestinians the most. While Shalit’s release and the role Hamas’ played in it has caused a stir in the media, little attention has been paid to the underlying causes of the conflict, dizzying in scope and, as of late, unaddressed by either party through negotiation. Any attempts at peace talks have stalled and a UN bid, while symbolically significant, has been doomed to failure. Palestinians continue to exist in an oddly bifurcated, quasi-independent non-state, which they view as imminently threatened by Israel’s persistent creation of “facts on the ground” in the form of illegal settlements. Yet international attention regarding the conflict has been distracted from the unabated settlement construction in East Jerusalem, supported by PM Netanyahu, among others, by a high-publicity event with little implication for the larger issues at stake.

Some will argue that the joy and relief that both sides have felt in the days following the exchange will promote a mutual spirit of goodwill, inciting reconciliation and future peace. Others argue that the negotiation necessary to cut the Israel-Hamas deal served to break the ice between the two parties, laying a path for future talks. “This is a sign of a good deal,” wrote Uri Dromi, former spokesman for previous Israeli PM’s Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, “when both sides walk away equally dissatisfied.” This might have been true if a deal containing any substance had been reached.

Yet the fact that talks that did not address the underlying issues concerning Palestinian statehood and its implications—for Jerusalem— water issues, the return of refugees and Israeli security, to name a few—yet still require outside mediation does not bode well for any future relationship. Furthermore, neither the Palestinian nor Israeli public saw the talks as such: to each side, the deal represented the long-awaited return of men and women, imprisoned by an unjust party for fighting a just cause. Indeed, the Israeli government did not even attempt to portray it as such. “I have brought your son home to you,” Netanyahu announced, upon bringing Shalit to his parents’ home in northern Israel. The bravado and simplicity of his statement brushed aside any acknowledgment of the complexity of the deal he had just made, as well as its implications for his nation and another’s future.

For Hamas, the prisoner deal seemed too good to be true. For the Israeli and Palestinian public, it is. If the exchange served any purpose, it was to remind people from both societies of another type of prisoner—the one that they themselves have become, held hostage by directionless leadership willing to make long-term sacrifices for short-term popularity.

Hours after the ultimatum requiring Saddam Hussein’s departure from Iraq had expired, on March 19th, 2003, President Bush ordered the commencement of the Iraq War. The justifications presented were Hussein’s intention to build weapons of mass destruction and a purported link between Iraq and Al Qaeda, the terrorist group responsible for the September 11th attacks. Both of these reasons have since been disputed and have rendered the start of the war a contentious issue to this day. By April 9t,h, 2003, Saddam Hussein’s rule had collapsed, and on May 1, Bush announced an end to major combat in Iraq.
Bush’s announcement was quickly proven premature and was subsequently followed by several mistakes and miscalculations. Members of the Bush administration issued orders to purge the government of Baathists and disband the Iraqi army, and the consequences of these decisions immediately became apparent. With the fall of Hussein’s government, American troops faced a new enemy of Baathists, paramilitary fighters, former Iraqi soldiers and foreign militants opposed to American occupation. Counterinsurgency became the newest tactical approach, causing parallels to be drawn between the war in Iraq and Vietnam War, as U.S. troops were confronted by an enemy who was willing to fight to the death and who often intermingled with civilians. In September 2004, an assault staged by U.S. and Iraqi forces targeting an insurgent stronghold resulted in 38 U.S. deaths and 800 Iraqi civilian deaths in addition to 1,200 insurgent deaths. This effort highlighted the costly nature of the war as gains against the enemy came at high civilian costs. Iraqi civilian deaths peaked in 2006, with estimates ranging from 1,000 to 3,500 per month. On April 28, 2004, evidence of prisoner abuse in Abu Ghraib was uncovered, prompting worldwide criticism of the way that the war was being conducted. Two years later, a CNN survey found that 60 percent of Americans opposed the war, the majority of which also favored the withdrawal of at least some troops from Iraq.

Partially in response to the public criticism of the war and U.S. strategy, President Bush made several significant modifications to U.S. policy in Iraq. In November 2006, he announced Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s resignation. In January 2007, the Bush administration implemented a controversial troop surge in Iraq. The increase in U.S. troops and U.S.-led offensives in Iraq, as outlined in the new strategy, led to an increased number of casualties. Indeed, the deadliest strike yet occurred in August of 2007, when coordinated suicide truck bombings resulted in hundreds of casualties, It also proved to be the most costly year for U.S. soldiers as American casualties reached over nine hundred. Nevertheless, the surge was largely credited with reducing sectarian violence in Iraq.

As the situation in Iraq began to stabilize, plans for the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces were accelerated. The withdrawal deadline set for the end of 2011 dates back to the Status of Forces agreement made in November 2008 by the Bush administration. At the time, the U.S. had intended to maintain a residual force of several thousand American soldiers for security purposes. The continued U.S. presence was opposed by varying Iraqi political factions like the Sadrists. Led by the influential Moktada al-Sadr, they advocated armed resistance if American forces remained past the withdrawal deadline. Shortly after taking office, President Obama began the process of reducing troops in Iraq and moving troops to Afghanistan. He announced plans to remove combat brigades by August 2010, a deadline which he honored with the end of combat missions on August 31, 2010. With the reduction of troops in Iraq, President Obama made it clear that an end to the Iraq war was approaching; however Defense Secretary Robert Gates continued to recommend maintaining troops past the deadline upon Iraqi request. The October 21st announcement to honor previous security agreements and complete troop withdrawal by the end of 2011 came as a surprise to many, as American officials had previously planned to keep a significant force of troops in Iraq under diplomatic immunity. Obama’s decision to honor a prior deadline reflected his desire to fulfill a campaign promise while simultaneously avoiding the prospect of an indefinite American troop commitment.

Withdrawing American troops from Iraq certainly has its consequences, as many of Obama’s Republican critics will be quick to contend. A major issue is the potential resurgence of Al Qaeda, which had suffered major defeats after the American troop surge in 2007. On August 15, 2011, a string of 42 apparently coordinated attacks left 89 dead and 315 wounded in a single day, and Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia warned of further attacks in revenge for bin Laden’s death. Analysts are particularly afraid of ties re-forming between Al Qaeda and members of the former ruling Baath Party. There is also the fear that without American troop support, the currant Iraqi government will collapse or that in the face of American withdrawal, other countries will attempt to invade Iraq. Iran is one such country that poses a threat to Iraqi security; historically it has supported aggressive attacks against American troops in Iraq.
These concerns, while valid, can overestimate the benefits of maintaining U.S. troops in Iraq. Even with the presence of American troops, violence continues to occur in Iraq. Many of the insurgents specifically oppose American intervention, creating reason to believe that attacks will decrease with the withdrawal of American troops, as will the justification for Iranian intervention to expel American troops. Furthermore, maintaining 10,000 troops beyond 2011 forces the U.S. into making an indeterminate commitment. Even with plans for diminishing the U.S. presence, 68,000 troops are expected to remain for at least another year. With troops stationed in Iraq for over eight years, many have grown disillusioned with the benefits of staying. A continued military presence without a set withdrawal deadline can only hurt morale without any tangible benefits for the troops that stay.

The parallels between Iraq and Vietnam abound, and rightly so. As in Vietnam, Americans have tired of intervention in Iraq. According to a poll conducted by Washington Post-ABC, 78 percent of Americans support Obama’s decision. The results of the Vietnam War may not have been consistent with America’s expectations, but diplomatic ties and trade relations eventually followed after American withdrawal and the fears of a domino effect proved unwarranted. There may be costs to withdrawing troops, in the form of a weakened and potentially vulnerable Iraqi government, but there are far more benefits. These include bringing troops home, ending an unpopular war, discouraging foreign attacks against American troops, and forging positive relations with the Iraqi people. America can still work to improve its relations with Iraq, but now is the time to build soft power leverage, which can only be achieved when the U.S. is no longer considered a hostile occupying force.

The U.S. is concerned that upon troop withdrawal, Iraq will be vulnerable and that its neighbors will step in and exert soft power to influence Iraq’s government and people. The US can counter this by matching the efforts made by Iraq’s neighboring countries, constructing schools, contributing to infrastructure, and developing favorable trade relations. These strategies will not only improve America’s world image and its influence over Iraqi policies, but in the long run, will provide for a more sustainable method for cultivating long-term influence and positive relationships within the Middle East. The U.S. has spent more than eight years using hard power in an effort to win Iraq over; now it is time to exercise soft power to create a positive working relationship with the Iraqi government and people.