There are those who argue the Copenhagen Accord did produce notable victories. Indeed, the accord does acknowledge the seriousness of the threat posed by climate change, state that cuts should be made “with a view to reduce global emissions so as to hold the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius,” and agree to raise $100 billion per year by 2020 to help developing countries adapt to climate change and reduce deforestation. It also calls for further negotiations to set targets for emissions reduction and develop the details of implementation.
A majority of environmentalists, however, view the accord as fatally insufficient: Its statements of principle are commendable, but it suffers from fundamental deficiencies that are likely to render it ineffectual. In addition, historical precedent does not bode well for the widely celebrated pledge to raise funds for climate change adaptation in developing nations. In 2005, the G8 pledged to increase annual aid funds to all developing countries to $50 billion by 2010 with half of these funds designated for Africa. What became of this commitment? In 2009, the UN reported that the G8 needed to increase total aid spending by $29.3 billion and increase African aid by $20.6 billion to reach the original 2010 target. This once lauded pledge remains an empty promise, and there is no reason to believe that the Copenhagen aid commitment will meet a different fate.

In addition, the weaknesses of the Copenhagen Accord will stifle emission-targeting legislation in the U.S. The two major objections offered by opponents of the “cap-and-trade” emissions reduction bill passed by the House of Representatives this past July centered on expanding economies, and both are certain to reappear if the bill progresses to the Senate. At the time, a press release from the office of House Minority Leader John Boehner (R-OH) stated, “Even supporters of the national energy tax concede that unilateral American action will do nothing to improve Earth’s environment unless global competitors like China and India curb their emissions, too.” While the U.S., the world’s second largest emitter of greenhouse gases, could certainly have a significant effect on worldwide greenhouse gas emissions, rapid emission increases in developing countries do pose a significant challenge to mitigating climate change. The failure of the Copenhagen Accord to set global emission targets has weakened proponents of climate change legislation in the U.S.

Additionally, “cap-and-trade” opponents argue, with some validity, that American businesses will be harmed unless other nations make similar commitments to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Rep. Boehner’s press release objects that climate change legislation “will impose tough new requirements and increased costs on American manufacturers.” The release goes on to state that these costs will affect American jobs in one of two ways: “Either domestic manufacturers will move overseas directly, or American companies in energy-intensive industries will be driven out of business by overseas rivals that undercut their prices.” It is accurate that American businesses would be harmed by bearing the costs of buying carbon credits or paying carbon taxes while their foreign competitors enjoy a cheap supply of coal-generated electricity. In this regard then, the Copenhagen Accord does nothing to assuage the concerns of senators worried about the economic consequences of climate change legislation.

Perhaps most importantly, the conference demonstrated the serious problems plaguing the current UN climate change negotiation framework, and highlighted the difficulties the U.S. will face in attempting to lead the development of climate change legislation. The developing countries who comprise the Group of 77 threatened to walk out of the conference after stating that they were being treated unfairly in the negotiations. Furthermore, the conference was on the verge of complete failure until President Obama met with leaders from China, India, Brazil, and South Africa to craft the accord that was then presented to other nations on a take-it-or-leave it basis. The sharp divisions between developed and developing countries, and the fact that nations could only come to agreement through smaller, more isolated negotiations, raises serious questions about whether all-inclusive U.N. negotiations can ever establish meaningful emissions targets.

Although the United States did, in some respects, emerge from Copenhagen as a global leader on climate change, the more important development was the global realization that the U.S. is unlikely to be the nation that will determine the future course of climate change negotiations. Instead, it seems China and India, representing the developing Group of 77, will be the determinants of climate change legislation progress. India and China signed a five-year memo of understanding in October to present a united front in climate change talks, and they were the two primary players in directing the pace of negotiations in Copenhagen.

Unfortunately, the ascendancy of China and India does not bode well for those with a firm commitment to preventing climate change. Both nations prioritize economic growth above all else, and refuse to commit to restrictive emissions targets that could impede their rapid economic expansion. China and India will probably hamper efforts to produce a strong international commitment to preventing climate change; it seems likely that future international climate treaties will be severely limited by the recalcitrance of large developing nations eager to raise the living standards of their citizens, despite the increasing costs of substantial greenhouse gas emissions on everyone else.

The Copenhagen Accord contains admirable sentiments, but in itself does nothing to prevent climate change. The future of climate change prevention rests with further negotiations, and unfortunately, it is becoming increasingly evident that those nations likely to be most influential are those least likely to support meaningful emissions limits. At the same time, Copenhagen’s failure has made it less likely that the U.S. will make a serious commitment to reducing its own greenhouse gas emissions. The prospects for a serious global agreement on climate change mitigation are dim, and national governments may not substantially cooperate until they recognize the serious economic and ecological damage climate change could cause. They must also recognize the substantial economic benefits the development and expansion of “green” industries could bring. Hopefully, this day will not come too late.

The Yemeni offshoot of al-Qaeda has steadily grown more potent in recent years, merging with its Saudi progenitor to form al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. This organization’s targets are both local and global. In October 2000, al-Qaeda attacked the Navy destroyer U.S.S. Cole in the port of Aden with predominantly Yemeni explosives, attackers, and accomplices. Yemen was also linked to the 1998 East African embassy bombings, the strike on the French oil tanker Limburg, the September 11th attacks, and the assassination attempt against Prince Mohammed bin Nayef in Saudi Arabia last August. That assassination attempt used the same tactics and explosives (pentaerythritol tetranitrate sewn into the bomber’s underwear) as the attempted Christmas attack.
Yemen’s location, geography, and fractured polity make it a paradise for al-Qaeda. At the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen is close to Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; its porous borders and extensive coastline are far from secure, while its rugged mountains provide apt hiding places for terrorists. With oil reserves running dry, Yemen’s arms market is among its few economic strengths—it trails only the U.S. in gun ownership per capita. Meanwhile, a strong, conservative religious population is a solid support base for al Qaeda’s propaganda, and tribal groups with relations to al-Qaeda control much of the borderlands. There is a separatist movement in the south and an insurgency in the north, and the unified Yemen is less than two decades old. Yemen is a near-ideal base of operations for Al-Qaeda, combining Afghanistan and Pakistan’s formidable terrain with Somalia’s near-anarchy.

In 2005, the terrorists responsible for the Cole bombing were in prison. Today, however, many of them are free, including confessed bombers Jamal al-Badawi, Fahd al-Quso, and Naser Abdel-Karim al-Wahishi. All three escaped from maximum-security prisons in Yemen. Badawi turned himself in after a year, but was released for good behavior; Quso is a re-established terrorist operative, conducting interviews for al Qaeda; and Wahishi is the head of al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula. In 2008, FBI special agent Ali Soufan warned Senate staff members “unless the American government sent a united message to the Yemenis to act against Al Qaeda, the terrorists responsible for the Cole would remain free and there would be future attacks against the United States connected to Yemen.” Soufan observes, “Today, the terrorists behind the Cole are still free, and an attack connected to Yemen has been attempted.”

Current U.S. policy towards Yemen is based on counterterrorism support, limited special operations, and drone strikes. In 2009, US expenditures for counterterrorism support were $70 million; according to a senior military official, President Obama plans to increase that amount to $190 million. The U.S. coordinates much of its effort with Western-friendly Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. But President Saleh has often used American aid against local insurgencies rather than against al-Qaeda. The local insurgencies more directly threaten Saleh’s sovereign authority, and he wants to maintain at least minimal support from the conservative Islamist population. Unconditional aid is therefore ineffective—Yemeni authorities can divert resources from counter-terrorism to counterinsurgency.

The U.S. should make an all-or-nothing deal on foreign aid to Yemen: America should offer more financial support under the condition that Yemeni courts imprison those responsible for the Cole bombing. Some might argue that incarceration would be ineffective because new recruits would replace those imprisoned. But anything short of life imprisonment means effective impunity for terrorists; prosecution would send a message to al-Qaeda that the U.S. and Arab governments will not tolerate acts of terror. If these conditions are met, the U.S. should stay its present course of providing counter-terrorist aid. Admittedly, this solution may not be immediately effective, but any sustainable, forward-looking strategy against an asymmetrical threat will require patience.
Senator Joe Lieberman (I-CT) has suggested that Yemen will be “tomorrow’s war” if the U.S. does not act preemptively. Preemptive military engagement, however, is simply not feasible, with the U.S. military already overstretched in Afghanistan and Iraq. America is still fighting two wars, and escalating one of them; we cannot realistically expect victory in a third, especially after taking into account the counterinsurgency efforts that U.S. troops would inherit from the Yemeni government. Even if preemptive military intervention were feasible, it would likely provoke a popular backlash, destabilizing the Western-friendly regime. Al-Qaeda feeds on Western interventions; the risk of backlash is especially high in Yemen’s tribal north with widespread poverty, illiteracy, and resentment of the central government. Intelligence, logistical support, and foreign aid should be the extent of American involvement in an effort that only Yemen can achieve. As Marc Lynch, a counter-terrorism expert at George Washington University, has suggested, the U.S. should not fall into the trap of overcommitment in a rush to “just do something.”

In short, the U.S. should largely stay the course in Yemen, but must put more diplomatic pressure on the Yemeni government to ensure our plans are carried through. Although the Yemeni government is weak, it has achieved success in counterterrorist operations in the past few weeks. We have recently seen an unprecedentedly successful offensive against jihadist commanders in the south and center of the nation; five raids in the Abyan and Shabwa provinces have killed more than 60 fighters. Of course, an avowedly pro-Western government faces grave dangers in the Middle East, but a puppeteer is better than a hegemon. The United States should provide further assistance to Yemen before resorting to direct military engagement.

The costs of piracy in this region are clear. Somalia lies along some of the world’s most important shipping lanes, and piracy in these lanes raises the cost of international commerce. Eleven percent of the world’s petroleum passes through the region, which is colloquially known as “Pirate Alley.” Ships making that journey today pay nearly twice what they would have paid a year ago for ransom insurance, in addition to the cost of increased onboard security. Furthermore, attacks on oil tankers and other ships carrying hazardous materials raise the possibility of a serious environmental disaster in the region. Finally, the possibility that piracy could fund terrorism represents a significant threat to the U.S.

But how exactly did the current era of Somali piracy begin? In 1991, Somalia’s government collapsed, and the lack of authority allowed pirates to take control of the seas. Today, the country is nominally ruled by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), but other groups, such as the Islamic militia al-Shabbab, constantly challenge the TFG for control. In such conditions, poverty has driven many to piracy. The World Bank reports that 73 percent of Somalia’s population lives on less than $2 a day. Primary school enrollment stands at 22 percent, among the lowest in the world. In the absence of government, there is an absence of opportunity, and for many in Somalia, the profitable life of piracy holds understandable appeal. In 2008 alone, pirates collected more than $150 million in ransom.

Overfishing off the coast of Somalia has also pushed many Somalis to take part in piracy. The earliest pirates were fishermen who sought to force out commercial ships that plundered Somali waters. Somalia’s Gulf of Aden is one of the most fertile fishing grounds in the world, and without a coast guard, Somalia’s territorial waters are unprotected. Boats from Europe and Asia illegally reap over $300 million worth of fish per year from Somali seas, depriving local fishermen of the livelihood of which they once relied. The foreigners often utilize invasive and illegal methods of fishing, such as nets with tight meshes that catch small and young fish. Without regulation, fish populations have been decimated, creating a classic “tragedy of the commons.” When too many individuals fish the same waters, the ecosystem collapses, and Somalis who could have once made their living fishing turn to piracy as an alternative.
The illegal dumping of toxic waste off Somalia’s coast by European and Asian corporations has only aggravated the problem. The UN Environmental Program notes that dumping hazardous waste in Somalia can cost as little as $2.50 a ton, while disposing of that same waste in Europe can cost $250 a ton. Following the great tsunami of 2004, a significant amount of waste washed up on Somali shores and sickened the local population. By damaging local fisheries, waste dumping makes piracy a more attractive career option. Yet Somalia lacks the resources and institutions needed to prevent this problem, and the international community has done little to help.

Somalia’s dysfunctional government is unable to combat the pirates, and although several nations have dispatched naval patrols to the Gulf of Aden, piracy remains an ever-present threat. The U.S. and the European Union have standing patrols in the region, and China helps escort ships through the treacherous gulf. Yet piracy cannot be eliminated until the Somali government is stable enough to control the problem internally. Unfortunately, calls for good governance are more easily put onto paper than put into practice. In the short term, at least, stable government in Somalia is a fantasy. While lining the Gulf with warships might eliminate piracy, it would be prohibitively expensive. The best option, therefore, is to implement cost-effective measures to control the problem. A moderate expansion of anti-piracy efforts would help limit robbery at sea at reasonable expense.

In order to combat piracy, the U.S. and its partners must combat not only the pirates but also the aggravating factors that encourage them, such as illegal fishing and toxic waste. Anti-piracy forces working to protect the seas and prevent the dumping of hazardous waste will earn some measure of good will from Somalis even as they crack down on pirates. By protecting the region from overfishing, the international community can create economic opportunities for those who might otherwise have turned to piracy. Furthermore, pirates will no longer be able to justify their attacks by claiming that they are simply protecting their fishing waters. Still, piracy is profitable, and managing these environmental issues will not solely eliminate the problem. Most pirates will not lay down their guns and pick up fishing poles as the environmental situation improves. But if U.S. forces and others already in the region begin to protect fisheries, they will deprive pirates of their stated motivation to attack, thus exposing those who continue to board ships as nothing more than common criminals. Pirates need support on land for their operations, and by revealing the pirates’ true motivations, the U.S. can minimize the backing these buccaneers receive from the Somali population.

The creation of a Somali coast guard managed by the United Nations would help quell piracy today and create the infrastructure for Somalia to manage the problem in the long-term. Roger Middleton, of the thinktank Chatham House, proposes the development of such a force, noting, “The cost of running a coast guard could be met, at least in part, from collecting fishing dues and import revenue. The money and the force could be held in trust for Somalia.” Such a force would separate pirates who are out for profit from those who genuinely hope to protect Somalia’s seas. If and when a stable government does take root, it would have a capable navy to police its waters. Unfortunately, recruiting for and managing the group would be no easy task. In the short term, this auxiliary force could not replace the more experienced international force needed to control piracy. In the future, though, such efforts would allow Somalia to take greater responsibility for its own territory.

Piracy in the Gulf of Aden presents a significant threat to global commerce, and there are no simple solutions. Until Somalia has a stable, functional government, pirates will continue to haunt key shipping lanes, threatening American citizens and American interests. But by understanding the circumstances that lead to piracy, the international community can better control these modern-day buccaneers. The lack of central authority in Somalia has paved the way for illegal fishing and the dumping of toxic waste. By controlling these factors, the international community can, over time, undermine Somalia’s pirates.

Currently, the U.S. has no formal diplomatic ties with Cuba and has maintained an embargo that makes it illegal for U.S. companies to do business in the country. Although Fidel Castro’s abdication of power in 2006 precipitated shifts in the Cuban power structure that offered the possibility of a gradual thaw in relations, lingering Cold War antagonisms have precluded these possibilities from maturing into real change.

The Obama administration’s Cuba policy has thus far been a mix of inspiring first steps and disappointing stubbornness. In the weeks surrounding the Summit of the Americas, rapprochement looked like a real possibility. President Obama told leaders at the Summit that “the United States seeks a new beginning with Cuba. I know there is a longer journey that must be traveled in overcoming decades of mistrust, but there are critical steps we can take toward a new day.” Since then, however, U.S.-Cuban relations have frozen. After finally removing restrictions on Cuban-Americans’ ability to visit family on the island and send remittances, as well as permitting telecommunication companies to provide cell phone service in Cuba, the White House has disappointingly outlined a “tit-for-tat” approach to further rapprochement. Referring to Cuban leaders, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs told reporters that in order to see more benefits from the U.S., “They’re certainly free to release political prisoners. They’re certainly free to stop skimming money off the top of remittance payments as they come back to the Cuban island. They’re free to institute a greater freedom of the press.” From the Cuban perspective, such reforms would dwarf the concessions the U.S. has offered; issuing token economic reforms and demanding massive political change is not the way to win the trust of leaders in Cuba, or anywhere else in Latin America for that matter.

Despite tensions, improved relations with Cuba are consistent with U.S. interests. Economically, Cuba represents an untapped and desirable trading partner. In an early December lecture at Princeton University, Cuba scholar Julia Sweig hypothesized that, were it not for the American embargo, Cuba could follow Vietnam’s developmental model, and gradually expand its economy through the growth of export markets. This would be of direct benefit to the U.S. economy.

Even more important than encouraging domestic change on the island, rapprochement with Cuba stands to improve U.S. diplomatic relations with all of Latin America. At last year’s Summit of the Americas, leaders from around the region, including relative moderate Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina, berated the U.S. for an “anachronistic” approach to Cuba. America’s insistence on antagonizing the Cuban government undercuts more important regional goals, specifically efforts to demonstrate that U.S. hemispheric hegemony need no longer be consistent with demanding, heavy-handed political relationships. Given the national significance of trade with Latin America, and the need for regional cooperation on issues like the drug trade, undocumented migrations, and human trafficking, the distrust motivated by the U.S. stance towards Cuba is a serious detriment to hemispheric policy. The lessening of hostilities towards Cuba could do much to assist the pursuit of other regional goals.

In this context, the emphasis the TSA recently placed on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism was misguided. The 2008 Country Reports on Terrorism admit that “Cuba no longer actively supports armed struggle in Latin America and other parts of the world.” Current justification for Cuba’s inclusion seems based on its harboring of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna in Spain, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and the National Liberation Army of Colombia, although the Country Reports acknowledge that some individuals visited Cuba in connection with peace negotiations with the governments of Spain and Colombia. The Cuban government has also admitted U.S. fugitives from groups like the Boricua Popular (or Macheteros) and the Black Liberation Army, but the Reports concede that in accordance with the government’s public declarations, Cuba has not granted protection to any new fugitives since 2006.

Given that ongoing Cuban activity does not appear to threaten the U.S., its position on the list of state sponsors of terror is clearly anachronistic. Removing Cuba from the list would not cost the U.S. anything, nor would it represent significant backtracking on the U.S. commitment to political and economic freedoms. It would, however, be a powerful signal to Cubans and other Latin American observers that the U.S. does in fact want to move past the Cold War framework of U.S.-Latin American relations. The removal, while individually insufficient to ease U.S.-Cuban antagonism, would be an important first step in that direction. Until President Obama updates the list accordingly, it is unlikely that Latin American governments will take seriously his overtures for a new era of inter-American relations.

In some sense, the state dinner was nothing new; past U.S. presidents have regularly hosted Indian leaders at state dinners. Indeed, in terms of policy substance, the Obama-Singh event is less important than Singh’s dinner with former President Bush in 2005, when they announced a civilian nuclear agreement between the two states. Nevertheless, the state dinner helped allay fears that the Obama administration might deprioritize relations with India in favor of strengthening ties with China. Despite the administration’s globetrotting agendas, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton bypassed India on her trip to Asia in February 2009, and Obama, too, declined to visit during his Asian tour en route to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Singapore in November. Although Clinton did visit India earlier in July, the Obama administration seems to interact with India within a more bilateral framework than one in which they acknowledge its rising power and aspirations on the global stage.

New Delhi has been fretting over the U.S.’s apparent acquiescence to growing Chinese clout and in particular, the recent joint Obama-Hu statement calling for closer “cooperation [between the U.S. and China] on issues related to South Asia.” The statement seemed to open the door to China’s involvement in the longstanding sensitive rivalry between India and Pakistan. Furthermore, the ongoing economic downturn has fueled protectionist tendencies in America, especially with a Democrat-controlled Congress. Obama recently spoke of anti-outsourcing measures and criticized current tax policies which favor companies outsourcing to lower-cost countries like India. Hence some political watchers are predicting some strain in U.S.-India relations on Obama’s watch.

Officials such as U.S. Under Secretary of State William Burns and Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Robert Blake have nonetheless firmly reiterated America’s commitment to a partnership with India. Prime Minister Singh’s status as the first state guest of honor can be seen as a reaffirmation of the continued strength of U.S.-India ties and a strategic move by the White House to reassure their nervous Indian friends. The pageantry of a state dinner cannot, however, be a replacement for progress toward substantive issues. The Obama administration has been dragging its heels in the implementation of the much-heralded nuclear cooperation agreement, with the President showing little inclination to push through the final modalities and procedures.

Obama is right to engage more closely with China, but sticking too closely to a G2-style “Chimerica” script would risk overemphasizing Chinese influence at the expense of American leverage. China and America are more often than not at loggerheads with each other, from China’s resentment over its past subjugation under Western imperial powers to present-day tensions over Taiwan, Tibet, yuan undervaluation, and ideological differences over human rights and democracy. If Obama realistically wants to realize his grand visions of multilateralism and global cooperation, he needs as many allies on board as possible. An increasingly aggressive and confident China is an unlikely first candidate.

India can serve as a useful counterweight to China’s assertive and occasionally hostile presence in Asia that ensures that the much-touted ‘Asian century’ does not belong exclusively to the Chinese. While it would be overly simplistic to claim that India and the U.S.’s shared traits of being populous multiethnic democracies automatically renders easy cooperation, the fact that India is more likely to have a similar outlook as the U.S. can ease Western fears of a potentially unfriendly Asia-Pacific region based on Chinese-driven values and models. The U.S. should not try to forcefully impose American ideas on Asia, but with India as an ally the U.S. can ensure that its interests in Asia are not compromised. Most of the Southeast Asian countries, being poor and relatively small, are highly susceptible to China’s “checkbook diplomacy”—using its wealth to buy allies. For the U.S., India’s partnership may be more important than its partnership with Japan, as that country, a traditionally staunch U.S. ally, becomes increasingly distant from the U.S. after the recent shift in power to the Democratic Party of Japan under Yukio Hatoyama. India is also keen to work with the U.S. as protection against China. Supporting India’s emergence as a major power need not constitute an antagonistic containment strategy directed against any supposed “China threat.” Instead, it is a reasonable policy designed to ensure that the interests of all players are accommodated to preserve geopolitical stability and inclusiveness in a crucial region of the world.

The U.S. has to make sure it recognizes India’s interests while balancing its own agenda. Unfortunately, relations have been soured by India’s frustrations with America’s perceived reluctance to strongly crack down on Pakistan, which harbors several extremist groups that have targeted India. India is suspicious of ramped-up American military assistance to its neighbor, fearing that Pakistan will channel those resources toward aggression in the disputed Kashmir region and along the Indo-Pakistan border, rather than toward combating Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Obama also flamed controversy early in 2009 when he suggested that resolving the Kashmir dispute would be central to addressing the problems of instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. South Asian politics have long proven to be complex and messy, and tensions have become even more strained in the wake of the 2008 Mumbai bombings by Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). Washington needs to balance its interests in working with both India and Pakistan, as well as Afghanistan, all crucial fronts in the battle against terrorism. During the state dinner, Obama wisely adopted a policy of non-involvement, issuing a neutral statement that “it is not [America’s] place” to get involved in the India-Pakistan conflict. Pakistan and India are partners that the U.S. can ill afford to lose; Washington should tread carefully.

Although the two nations have been increasingly close partners, there remains much potential for closer cooperation on counterterrorism efforts, particularly in the realms of intelligence sharing, joint training, improved institutional frameworks, and enhanced security enforcement measures and responses. India’s previous successful efforts against Sikh terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s were due in no small part to the sharing of intelligence with the U.S. and other countries, and a similar approach may be adopted with regard to global terrorism today. While terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda and the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) do have different objectives, they all cause conflict beyond Pakistan’s borders. A U.S.-India partnership in combating terrorism would underline India’s leadership both regionally and globally and would highlight international commitment to stopping terrorism and increasing stability.

Although President Obama’s ceremony and symbolic gestures are well-intentioned, building a stronger partnership with India will require further action. While China must be considered, the U.S. must engage more deeply with India on the many issues and interests that the two nations share to glean the potential economic and strategic rewards.

Although Obama’s “new era of responsibility” has found many supporters, its vagueness has also created an opening for critics who view Obama as a better speaker than policymaker. The reality of the President’s spirit of international good will lends credence to such critics. While some of his popularity is certainly attributable to his rhetoric, the bulk of it is due to the basic phenomenon that other nations expect him to pursue policies in their own self-interest.

There is no more fitting example of this disconcerting fact than the difference between President Obama’s popularity in the Middle East and President Bush’s at the end of his second term in office. The president’s tone of cooperation and reconciliation with Arab states has led to higher support in states such as Egypt, where approval for the U.S. increased from 22 to 27 percent, and in Jordan, where it rose from 19 to 25 percent, according to the Pew Research Center. Yet support for America remains unchanged in areas such as the Palestinian territories and Pakistan, which have historically maintained distant relations with the United States throughout the terms of many presidents. Such opinions are unlikely to change despite President Obama’s election and new tone towards some Arab states. In Israel, on the other hand, America’s popularity has dropped from 78 percent in 2007 to 71 percent in 2009. This is attributable to several of President Obama’s statements and policies, both during his campaign and in office, that indicate he may be less willing to support all Israeli policies unconditionally than was the Bush administration. Obama’s speech in Cairo during the summer of 2009 and his insistence on the cessation of all settlement building have instilled doubts among Israelis that he will be as accommodating as his predecessor. Nor, for that matter, should he be; the region requires a mediator who will be unafraid to demand the termination of both Israeli settlement expansion and of many Arab countries’ funding and harboring of Islamist groups that wish to disrupt the peace process within the region.

The President may soon find that in other regions, as well as the Middle East, his political capital is based primarily on what foreign nations perceive as his commitment to their own best interests, rather than those of the global community. Many see Europe as the base of the President’s international support, an idea traced to then-senator Obama’s campaign foray into Germany the summer before he was elected. At the same time, Obama’s visit to Europe revealed that he is well aware of the true factors that lie at the root of his international support. In a speech, Obama appealed to the nation’s individual needs in articulating his political vision, saying, “The poppies in Afghanistan become the heroin in Berlin.” In this way, President Obama captured the essence of a more effective manner in which to leverage his extraordinary popularity: He appealed to individual nations’ self-interest in a way that gains their respect and helps Washington’s cause as well.

The President should stop focusing on maintaining his popularity as an end in and of itself and start making substantive policy decisions even if they disappoint some members of the international community. The recent Copenhagen Climate Summit in December of 2009 represents a perfect example of the way in which President Obama’s wish to satisfy all members of the international community led to intangible progress toward policy goals. Widely regarded as what the EU termed a “great failure,” the Climate Summit ended in various participants reaching a nonbinding political agreement that advocated emissions cuts and other environmental reforms at standards far below those hoped for by environmental experts. At the end of the conference, who was to blame for what and why—with the EU unhappy with China and China unhappy with the U.S.—was more publicized than the conference’s actual accomplishments. The idea of gathering any number of nations into a room and hoping that America’s newfound popularity in the world will inspire cooperation apparently has its limits.

Some might argue that President Obama, by brushing aside international criticism, puts himself in danger of falling into the same trap as the previous administration. Yet in doing so, one assumes that President Obama and the previous administration have a similar attitude toward foreign relations. They do not. President Bush treated the idea of diplomacy as a one-dimensional spectrum, expecting support for his forays into Iraq and Afghanistan while disregarding recommendations made by the United Nations and other international organizations. Yet President Obama has demonstrated a vision of the world in which the global community has substantial importance at various levels; he is familiar with international relations and cites Cold War diplomats George Marshall and George Kennan, supporters of a multilateral foreign policy, as sources of influence. The President embodies a combination of intellectual idealism and pragmatism that distinguish him ideologically from his predecessor.

It is clear that both Europe and the Obama administration share a spirit of cooperation and dialogue. But, to quote former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, “America does not have friends; it has interests.” President Obama will inevitably have to make tough decisions that will alienate global citizens whose support he once enjoyed. In order for President Obama to gain the respect he lacks as a relatively inexperienced leader, he must be willing make such decisions publicly and forcefully, or face appearing subservient to the political desires of other countries. As President Obama enters into his second year in office, his popularity is dampened but not expired; he still enjoys a fairly clean slate regarding foreign policy as a whole and has maintained a great deal of his international popularity. He can use this advantage as an opportunity to address more contentious issues and gain the respect—not just the popularity—of the international community.

The United States should study its previous attempts to end the Iranian nuclear crisis before moving forward. Under the Bush administration, the U.S. applied unilateral financial and economic sanctions against Iran, but with limited success. In the past, countries such as Russia and China provided many of the financial services that the U.S. sanctions denied Iran, and a number of international oil companies continue to do business with Iran in spite of the sanctions. Moreover, China, who seems driven foremost by its concern for feeding its massive appetite for oil, continues to invest in Iran’s energy and refining infrastructure.

Similarly, UN sanctions on weaponry and weapons technology were largely ineffective because Russia and China refused to meaningfully cooperate. In 2008, Russia negotiated a contract to sell Iran advanced anti-aircraft missile battery system—though Russia has yet to deliver the system—insisting that it was for defensive purposes and did not violate the sanctions. While in theory it is indeed a defensive system, the delivery of such weaponry can only harden Iran’s position in the negotiations because it enhances Iran’s ability to defend its nuclear facilities. In sum, for Russia and China, security and proliferation concerns take a back seat to economic gain.

Negotiations have been largely ineffective as well. While many in the West have praised the “agreement in principle” reached at recent talks in Vienna as a step forward, Western countries should be cautious of this perceived success. Under the Vienna Agreement, Iran would ship its stock of enriched uranium to Russia. The Russians and the French would then enrich the uranium into a form that could not be easily re-processed into weapons-grade material but could be used for non-military purposes. This plan, however, is subject to the approval of Ayatollah Khameini, the Iranian Supreme Leader, who is rumored to be against the agreement. In addition, many close to him, including the speaker of the Iranian Parliament, have criticized the framework as an attempt to deceive Iran.

Nonetheless, even if the Vienna Agreement were approved, the accord would still not prevent Iran from enriching uranium. If Iran chose, it could restock its supplies of enriched uranium again within a year. The agreement also does not prevent Iran from continuing research and development of its delivery capabilities. In addition, the agreement does nothing to address the fundamental question, which is how to alter incentives such that it is not in the current regime’s best interest to develop nuclear weapons. If adopted, the proposal would simply provide a temporary stopgap. The Vienna Agreement would give Iran the chance to stall and continue developing nuclear weapons, taking the West back to square one.

Even if a deal could be reached, a simple agreement with Iran will not be enough. The Iranian regime has a history of neither adhering to its international obligations nor cooperating with international authority. Iran, as a signatory nation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, is obligated to report to the IAEA any intention to build any nuclear facility. The regime did not report its uranium enrichment facility in Natanz until 2002, after it was fully operational. Iran likewise did not report the facility in Qom to the IAEA until Tehran realized that Western governments had discovered the facility’s existence. Furthermore, the regime has refused to allow its nuclear scientists to be questioned by the IAEA. If the U.S. and its allies are serious about preventing Iranian proliferation, they must insist on an enforceable agreement with a robust inspections regime.

The unsuccessful attempts at preventing Iran from continued development of nuclear weapons indicate that any response to Iran requires unified, international support. This summer’s election riots have presented the West with new options. The regime’s leaders appear not to want to confront external pressure and internal threats simultaneously. While Tehran has used negotiations to buy time, this new, unstable situation might make the regime amenable to meaningful settlement, especially if it faces multilateral pressure. There are a number of options available to entice and pressure the Iranians to submit to the will of the international community.

In the political sphere, the U.S., through Radio Farda—a Persian-language radio station based in Washington, D.C. and Prague—could amplify the voices of dissent with programming that provides a platform for Iranian exiles and expatriates. Internally, dissidents could be supplied with communication equipment not susceptible to jamming and other interference (such as satellite phones and sophisticated encryption equipment). The importance of communication within Iran is validated by the behavior of the theocratic regime—which moves swiftly to disrupt cellular and Internet communications at any sign of unrest.
In the economic sphere, multilateral leverage has significant potential. It is no secret that Iran’s economic situation is dire: It faces high unemployment (12 percent, according to the Iranian government), rampant inflation (28 percent, according to the Iranian government), corruption, and a lack of basic services. Iran’s economy depends heavily on petroleum exports, but without Western technological expertise, Iran’s oil production has steadily declined. According to a 2007 National Academy of Science study, Iran’s consumption of refined petroleum will outstrip its production of crude oil by 2015, effectively halting petroleum exports altogether. Furthermore, Iran lacks the capacity to refine petroleum and, as a result, imports 40 percent of its petroleum. The U.S. House of Representatives has already passed the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act, which would limit Iran’s ability to import gasoline. The Senate will likely approve the legislation in coming weeks. The U.S., through similar restrictions, should strengthen economic sanctions by convincing others to jump on board. European nations such as France, Germany, and Britain have expressed interest in such sanctions. In addition, Iran’s recent agreement to supply Turkmenistan with natural gas, which will ultimately supply all of Europe, competes with the Russian monopoly on gas, giving the Russians an incentive to support sanctions. This agreement would also give the Europeans more economic leverage over Tehran. Finally, a multilateral regimen of sanctions would force companies and financial institutions that do business in Iran to choose between continuing their transactions with Iran and doing business in the U.S. and in whichever European nations sign on to sanctions and few companies can afford to choose the former. While some have argued that enhanced sanctions might rally the Iranian people around the regime, only the opposite has happened thus far, as Iranians have blamed their regime for the country’s economic woes.

While proceeding with this new approach to Iran, however, the United States must try to ensure China and Russia’s support. While Chinese-Iranian economic interests are substantial, Chinese-U.S. economic ties are even more vital. China could be amenable to enforcing sanctions against Iran, as Beijing does not wish to deal with the economic consequences of a potential war between the U.S. and Iran that could result if the Iranian nuclear program is not stopped. In addition, the Russians, who are anxious about NATO, may be willing to enforce sanctions against Iran if the U.S. provides concessions on Russian security interests. A recent controversial overture by the U.S. to scale back missile shield deployment in Poland could be responsible for Russian officials more vocally supporting sanctions against Iran. Securing Chinese and Russian support for sanctions should be a top priority for the U.S.

Of course, the U.S. has never taken the military option off the table, and Israel has strongly hinted that it would consider using military force against Iran as well. Air strikes on Iran’s nuclear targets present a difficult tactical challenge, however. Iran’s nuclear facilities are distributed across the country, with some installations hidden underground, heavily fortified. Moreover, Iran has military assets throughout the Middle East with which it could retaliate against such a strike. In Iraq, Iran would almost certainly intensify support for the insurgency, endangering American troops and the already unstable democracy. In Gaza, Hamas could, at Iran’s instigation, unleash missile strikes into densely populated areas of Israel. Indeed, Iran itself has ballistic capability and could retaliate with its own missile strikes. Additionally, Iran could, in retaliation, finally make good on its threat to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40 percent of the world’s sea-transported oil and 90 percent of the Gulf’s oil output flows. Even if the U.S. were able to open the straits quickly, insurers would refuse to cover oil tankers passing through a conflict zone, effectively closing it to international commerce. Thus, superior firepower simply may not provide an effective solution to this problem, and could provoke a harsh response from the international community against the U.S. or Israel. As such, it is imperative that multilateral economic and political sanctions be applied instead of a military option.

To persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear program, the United States must employ multilateral cooperation and sanctions to convince Iran’s leaders that it is highly disadvantageous to continue nuclear development. A combination of economic, political, and social pressures could finally push Iran to accept an agreement. Iran has always used negotiations to stall because the price for delaying a negotiated settlement was significant but not crippling. The U.S. should make the price for stalling unacceptably high for Iran, in economic and political terms.

Importing countries in the developing world and the U.S. should enhance the food security of the developing world by creating an open and predictable market. Such efforts should advance on two fronts. First, the developed world should recognize its distortionary role in world food markets and eliminate biofuel and agricultural subsidies. Second, the U.S. should work through international institutions and with exporting countries to mitigate the price increases in ways that do not hamper trade.

The dysfunctional food market has caused extreme food shortages and political conflict. When food prices spike, the poor and those who feed them cannot afford as much food. The UN’s World Food Program and the U.S. Agency for International Development have announced cutbacks in food aid in response to rising prices, while undernourishment has increased globally by roughly 20 percent since 2006. Rising food prices have also caused political instability in the developing world. In 2009 riots against food and fuel prices left nearly 40 dead in Cameroon, and food-related instability led to the Haiti’s prime minister and Madagascar’s president.
The food market faces two obstacles: long-term structural distortions stemming from Western policy, and short-term instability caused by exporting nations. A properly functioning global food market could allow direct investment in the most productive land and let net-importing countries focus on their comparative advantages. While the rise in food prices is partly due to growth in demand from developing nations, the recent drastic price increases owe much to misguided policies.

The West’s agricultural policies play a large part in the troubles of the global food market. The primary culprits are agricultural subsidies and biofuel subsidies. While subsidies are supposed to increase output and decrease global food prices, they divert private investment toward Western agriculture and away from underdeveloped countries, where the potential gains in productivity are greater. This counterproductive diversion of resources distorts investment patterns and reduces spare production capacity when prices are high. Biofuel subsidies encourage farmers to shift production away from food and toward ethanol, decreasing the supply of food and driving up prices. The U.S., by far the world’s largest producer and exporter of corn, may soon use half of its crop for ethanol.

These subsidies are also wasteful for Western countries. Subsidies are a blatantly inefficient case of special interest favoritism; the government will spend over $21 billion next year on “farm income stabilization.” Biofuel subsidies and regulations have become a boondoggle—estimated to cost the U.S. between $5 billion and $9 billion—that fails to reduce CO2 emissions.
The heart of the problem is the enormous political importance of food prices in developing countries. In countries where food makes up a large part of household expenditures, price increases can be devastating for voters and treacherous for governments. While facing political pressure to reduce food prices, several major food producers, including Argentina, Thailand, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam, restricted exports to ensure adequate domestic supplies. These restrictions further increased the price of food traded on the international market, causing additional pain to importing nations.

The trade restrictions have important disadvantages. First, they reduce income to farmers while their products’ prices are high, thus stifling investment and production when greater supply is most needed. Second and more damaging is that importing nations begin to fear that the market will no longer suffice to meet their needs. They rush toward panicked and inefficient responses, particularly those that increase production on their own land. Saudi Arabia, an extreme example, spent billions to achieve self-sufficiency in wheat production by turning desert into farmland; the drain on the country’s aquifers and its pocketbook forced Saudi Arabia to abandon the experiments.

Both of these trends steer investment toward unproductive land in importing countries and away from fertile land in exporting countries. Saudi Arabia, with enormous oil reserves and virtually no water, could export oil and import food rather than try to grow wheat in the desert. Its newest strategy for food security, along with countries such as China, the United Arab Emirates, and South Korea, has been to buy huge tracts of land in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe to assure long-term food security in fertile lands. While this may be an efficient investment in certain cases, the opacity and size of the deals has led to complaints of neocolonialism and corruption. Furthermore, this trend demonstrates the strategic disadvantages of global food insecurity for the United States.

The developed world must take the first steps to bolster the global food market, by eliminating agricultural and biofuel subsidies to enhance the food security of developing countries. More importantly, the United States must prevent nervous exporters from diverting food supplies inward. The first step is to alter the terms of the World Trade Organization compact to explicitly declare export bans (or extremely high export taxes) to be contrary to the principles of free trade and subject to penalty. While many exporting countries would oppose such a move, they might make this concession if the U.S. eliminates its agricultural subsidies—a long-sought goal that would make their own exports more competitive in return. Removing the subsidies could advance trade talks, since these subsidies were largely responsible for the breakdown in 2008 of the World Trade Organization’s Doha Development Round of negotiations to lower trade barriers.

It will be difficult to design international rules sufficiently compelling to overcome the political pressures attendant with rising food prices. Equally important will be policy advice to developing exporter nations to mitigate the effects of price increases as an alternative to market manipulation. As food prices rise, exporting nations gain income overall. The downside for such countries lies in the transfer of income from consumers to farmers. Governments, during times of high-prices, should assess farmers a lump-sum tax and distribute the revenue to the poor. Carefully calibrated redistributive measures could keep countries satisfied. A push for global regulation and policy changes would give less developed countries and their citizens the stability they need for security and economic growth and development.

The Kimberley Process certification scheme tracks diamonds from the mine to the store by issuing certificates indicating the stones are conflict-free. The process relies on self-regulation by the member nations’ governments. Though an admirable ideal, the Kimberley Process has already shown that it is unreliable in practice. The conflict diamond trade declined in Sierra Leone and Angola following the ends of both countries’ civil wars, but the Kimberley Process acknowledges continued smuggling in both countries, which Human Rights Watch calls “rampant.” The Democratic Republic of Congo has been plagued by conflict diamond problems exacerbated by rising instability, despite the D.R.C.’s Kimberley Process membership.
These ongoing problems show that while the Kimberley Process has been a good first step, a stronger independent body composed of both exporters and importing firms is needed to regulate both sides of the diamond trade. If enforcement is reliable enough, the profits from the legal trade should be the only incentive needed to ensure participation.

In 2007, a Kimberley Process team was sent to Zimbabwe to review allegations of smuggling, illegal mining, and human rights abuses by the military supervising the mining. The team publicly reported that Zimbabwe was in compliance with the Kimberley Process’s minimum standards. However, a confidential report from the Kimberley team, as well as accounts from Human Rights Watch and other humanitarian organizations, paint a different picture. Miners interviewed by the team said the military attempted to cover up corruption and committed violent acts against workers, including children. The Kimberley Process team’s confidential report also expressed concern over serious discrepancies in Zimbabwe’s statistical data on diamond production. Because many firms will not buy conflict diamonds directly from their country of origin, the diamonds are often smuggled into, and sold by, secondary countries. Conflict diamonds from other countries such as the Congo could easily be mixed in with Zimbabwean diamonds and certified as legal. Although Zimbabwe’s share of the global diamond market is small, the threat to the legitimacy of the Kimberley Process, and therefore to the entire diamond trade, is real.

Obtaining Kimberley Process certificates is the only way to legally trade in diamonds, so there should be a powerful incentive to comply with the process’s requirements. However, there are many opportunities for both importing and exporting nations to evade the rules. Governments looking for extra revenues through increased diamond sales would not find it difficult to pass off smuggled diamonds as legitimate — the governments control the certification process. While companies importing diamonds are legally obligated to purchase only certified, conflict-free stones, Global Witness reports that many firms are known to work around the process.

When corruption and smuggling are suspected, the Kimberley Process requires a consensus of the 75 represented countries to act, making it less likely that abuses will be addressed. Despite a Kimberley Process report stating Zimbabwe did not seem to be complying with the minimum standards for membership, Zimbabwe was allowed to remain a member, provided it adhered to a work plan created by the country itself. Instead of encouraging compliance, this sends the message that abuses will be tolerated.

Under the current system, it is also very difficult to target firms that import diamonds without certificates. The system calls for action by the country, but one cannot reasonably blame a government for one firm’s corruption. The World Diamond Council, the industry’s representative, also cannot be held at fault. The Kimberley Process has few tools to deal with corruption among diamond importers beyond asking governments to implement stricter industry regulations.

This flaw also means that the Kimberley Process currently has almost no way to stop the flow of conflict diamonds from rebel groups. Limiting the rebels’ opportunities to sell the diamonds deters them from creating conflict diamonds. One way to achieve this would be to require diamond-importing firms, as well as the nations that host them, to join the Kimberley Process and trade legal, certified diamonds.

The Kimberley Process would be more powerful and more reliable if it were not self-regulated but run instead by an independent regulatory group needing only a majority to act. Under this system, nations and importing firms would be far more likely to incur effective penalties, such as suspension from the Kimberley Process, if they failed to prevent the proliferation of conflict diamonds. An independent regulatory agency would also encourage more accurate record-keeping, making it more difficult to introduce smuggled diamonds into the legal market and harder for importers to knowingly purchase tainted diamonds. Because the Kimberley Process is the sole way to legally trade diamonds, a reintroduction process for suspended countries would be essential. This tool would ensure that these countries would not simply sell their diamonds to less exacting importers and enter the illegal diamond trade.

Although difficult, obtaining diamond producers’ participation in an organization capable of penalizing them is essential. If diamond traders concluded that the only profitable path was compliance, the legal diamond industry would free itself from the taint of conflict diamonds. An end to these concerns would increase consumers’ demand and increase profits for both importers and exporters. These benefits would reinforce commitment to keeping conflict diamonds out of the legal trade.

The inevitable question is where the responsibility for this independent regulator will fall. The United States is certainly in a position to exercise leadership by showing its commitment to stricter regulations. Yet the credibility of the Kimberley Process would be jeopardized if one nation, particularly one with such a significant share of the imports, took charge. The US cannot monitor the entire diamond trade; this is not one nation’s responsibility. The World Trade Organization is a logical candidate for this role. Its status as the accepted authority on global trade and experience monitoring trade issues would benefit a Kimberley Process group. Both governments and industry members could still be involved through an already-existing organization.

Although the conflict diamond trade may never be entirely eradicated, we should not dismiss the potential for improvement. As a more powerful regulatory agency, the Kimberley Process could harness its strengths to change the incentive structure for trading in diamonds, creating a lasting decline in conflict diamonds, greater revenues for diamond-exporting nations, and an end to the human rights abuses tied to the “blood diamonds.”

In announcing the cancellation of the Eastern European missile defense installations, the Obama administration emphasized that it was not abandoning European missile defense entirely, but was instead pursuing an alternative strategy to more effectively address current threats. Long-range missile interceptors are unreliable and frequently ineffective, and neither Iran nor North Korea appears to be close to developing the long-range missiles the cancelled system would have been designed to intercept. Iran instead possesses short- and medium-range missiles that could pose a threat to Israel and parts of Europe, while North Korea’s current technology poses no threat to Europe. To protect Europe and Israel from any potential strikes by short- and medium-range Iranian missiles, the Obama administration’s new plan will use ship-based missile interceptors and an installation of small ground-to-air missiles in Poland.

If the diplomatic ramifications of abandoning the Bush-era missile defense plans are ignored, the administration’s new strategy is logically sound. New installations in Europe are not necessary for improving and testing the currently unreliable technology for intercepting long-range missiles. In addition, constructing, maintaining, and manning the missile defense sites in Europe would impose a financial burden on the United States for the sake of providing unreliable protection against a threat that does not currently exist. Building missile defense sites now would ensure that the United States would be ready if and when North Korea and Iran develop long-range missiles, but intelligence reports should give the United States enough advance warning to prepare for such an occurrence. The canceled long-range interceptor sites also failed to address the danger of the technology that Iran currently possesses, so the addition of new capabilities to the missile defense system is commendable.

In spite of these pragmatic arguments for an adjustment in European missile defense strategy, the United States’ new strategy is short-sighted and ignores the broader diplomatic implications of canceling the planned installations. Poland and the Czech Republic, NATO allies of the U.S., hoped that American military installations in their nations would deter Russian aggression in the region. Their desire to secure a material American commitment beyond a treaty obligation is reasonable, particularly in light of the Russian military occupation of territory in Georgia little more than a year ago. Although a Russian attack on a NATO member seems very unlikely in the foreseeable future, Poland and the Czech Republic are rightly concerned with checking the expansion of Russian influence in the region.

Conversely, one might argue that cancelling the missile defense sites reduces the need for Russia to pursue an aggressive foreign policy, thereby giving Poland and the Czech Republic less reason to fear Russian encroachment in Eastern Europe. This analysis assumes that Russia is seeking a fixed amount of influence with which it will be satisfied attaining—a thesis with little supporting evidence. Russia’s recent foreign policy has been characterized by an aggressive pursuit of power; actions such as gas shutoffs to Ukraine and the armed incursion into Georgia give no indication that Russian leaders will be content with some particular amount of regional influence.

More broadly, the Obama administration’s new missile defense strategy raises questions about the credibility of American commitments in Europe and around the globe. It signals to other nations the United States’ willingness to change policy in pursuit of its own interests, and indicates that American commitments may weaken with changes in administration. While the Obama plan to include smaller interceptors in Poland may assuage Polish concerns to some degree, it remains to be seen if the shift in missile defense policy will make other nations more skeptical of American commitments and less likely to enter into defense agreements.

One could argue that revising missile defense policy presented an opportunity for the United States to improve diplomatic relations with Russia and increase the odds of Russian cooperation on other issues, such as sanctions against Iran or supply lines into Afghanistan. But the Obama administration has repeatedly insisted that its missile defense decision was completely unrelated to U.S.-Russian relations, and there is no evidence that the United States has received any concessions from Russia in return. Clearly, an open agreement between America and Russia on abandoning missile defense in exchange for Russian concessions would have carried high diplomatic penalties for both states. Alternatively, it would have been naïve of the administration to change its missile defense strategy and simply hope for a future Russian concession in return. Russian President Dmitri Medvedev did say, “if our partners hear some of our concerns, we will, of course, be more attentive to theirs.” This supposed attention to American concerns is unlikely to produce actual policy results, however, given Russia’s aggressive foreign policy stance. Simply put, there is no evidence that realigning missile defense policy has motivated Russia to change its positions on issues important to the United States.

From a purely military standpoint, the decision to immediately implement missile defenses against short and medium-range missiles is a good strategic outcome. Unfortunately, the decision to simultaneously abandon slower-developing plans for long-range missile defenses was a diplomatic misstep. Abandoning the originally planned sites in Poland and the Czech Republic has not only harmed relations with these NATO allies, but may also make other nations skeptical of American commitments and hesitant to reach agreements with the United States. Moreover, the realignment may reduce the number of complaints from the Kremlin, but is unlikely to help secure any real diplomatic concessions from Russia. Ultimately, the Obama administration’s decision to discontinue the Bush administration’s missile defense program damaged American diplomatic credibility without producing any benefits for the United States.