An effective approach would be to work in conjunction with the Organization of American States (OAS). The OAS was founded as a conglomeration of the Western hemisphere’s thirty-four democracies with the goal of fostering interstate communication and advocating democracy within the region. Venezuela is a member of the OAS, and must therefore abide by the organization’s guidelines or face repercussions. The laws enacted by Chavez are in direct violation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IDC), passed by the OAS on September 11, 2001. Its intended purpose was to protect OAS member countries from unconstitutional alterations of a democracy. Articles three and four of the Charter outline the need to respect the separation of powers, the independence of the branches of government, and the freedom of press and expression. Venezuela has clearly violated these conventions. Furthermore, the IDC provides an avenue through which member countries can punish the offending nation through a series of diplomatic measures. Article Twenty states that “in the event of an unconstitutional alteration” of the democratic order, member states have the right to “undertake the necessary diplomatic initiatives…to foster the restoration of democracy.”
In discussions thus far, states have proposed launching a joint electoral task force to analyze the failings of the Venezuelan system, or even approving the expulsion of Venezuelan ambassadors from their respective countries. Although there has been some support for economic sanctions against Venezuela, enacting such barriers would be a grave mistake. Placing sanctions would only aggravate the meager living standards of Venezuelan citizens and create ill will toward the United States. Ultimately, this move would transform Chavez into a national hero and further augment his campaign for power, thus undermining any influence the Obama administration previously held. Therefore, a strong diplomatic stance condemning Chavez is the best option for the United States and its allies within the OAS.
Given this clause, it is the obligation of the United States, as a member of the OAS, to invoke article twenty and lead the diplomatic initiative to collectively censure the Chavez regime. Action on the part of the United States not only would bring Chavez’s unconstitutional measures into the spotlight and initiate the much needed discussion on the condition of Venezuela’s apocryphal democracy, but also serve as an ideal situation for the Obama administration to launch their Latin American diplomacy on firm footing, transferring the focus from its relatively unpopular drug policy to the clear overreaching of Hugo Chavez.
Too many Latin Americans view the United States as a nation that reneges on its promises to advocate democracy. Therefore, it is crucial that President Obama, acting in conjunction with the OAS, take measures to condemn Chavez for his unilateral takeover of the government in Venezuela. Doing this is vital to the long term interests of the United States in Latin America, especially in terms of increasing its foreign policy capital and reassuming the mantle of leadership in the Western Hemisphere.

To many within Brazil, Rousseff’s tenure will represent a continuation of da Silva’s time in office. Indeed, as a former advisor during Lula’s presidency, Rousseff does share his ideological spirit. Da Silva, anointed by some as the “Bill Clinton of South America” and one of the most popular regional figures of the last few decades, raised the living standards of millions of impoverished Brazilians and elevated the country’s stature  after years of stromg economic growth. Yet in order for Rousseff to truly distinguish herself, she will have to make a series of tough decisions unforeseen by those who expect her to be merely a continuation of her predecessor, particularly regarding how to address growing economic inequality and a foreign policy that allies with international pariah Iran.

In her 62 years, Rousseff has led a life that has intrigued international spectators, perhaps for its reflection of the rapid political and economic evolution of her country. Born to a middle class family in 1947, Rousseff became involved as a teenager with a Marxist paramilitary group that robbed arms stockpiles in an attempt to fight the then-ruling military dictatorship. After several years of participating in the organization, and a brief period of imprisonment, she trained as an economist and held bureaucratic positions within the government until 2003, when President da Silva appointed her as Minister of Mines and Energy, and later, as Chief of Staff.

Since then, though she has been one of da Silva’s closest and most influential advisors, many Brazilians are unfamiliar with her as a political leader. Indeed, many Brazilian citizens were unsure of her political abilities even as they voted for her. The single greatest force behind her popularity was the support of the charismatic President da Silva. Rousseff was able to take advantage of this and ride on the wave of his supporters. As Brazilian sociologist Demétrio Magnoli commented, “[Da Silva] treated this campaign as a re-election campaign.” Indeed, one voter affirmed, “If it were only about experience I would never vote for her. But she has a good team behind her. Today the country is much better off because of the Lula government.” With time, Rousseff’s backing by supporters led on by Lula’s charisma will subside. When this happens, she will have a harder time achieving political success, especially given that  many refer to her personality as aloof, brusque, and often intimidating. Additionally, her Worker’s Party owes substantial political favors to several other parties within their coalition, and those factions may cash in on their political capital to the detriment of her own agenda.

Domestic policy will undoubtedly be the top concern for Dilma Rousseff. Given Brazil’s simultaneously burgeoning economic potential and social inequality, there is no doubt that Rousseff faces a challenging task, as it will be difficult to follow da Silva’s impressive successes. Although he was derided by many as a leftist bent on instituting potentially damaging socialist economic reforms, da Silva exceeded the expectations of many by bringing the percentage of impoverished Brazilians down from 34% in 2002 to 23% in 2008 and lifting some 29 million of his countrymen from the working to the middle class in six years. Rousseff’s prospects will certainly benefit from the fact that Brazil suffered comparatively little and emerged relatively early from the recent financial crisis. The country currently maintains an annual growth rate of nearly 6.5% and is expected to become the world’s 5^th largest economy by 2026. Along with Russia, India, and China, Brazil is part of “BRIC”, a widely-acknowledged group of fast growing and economically powerful developing nations.

Even with its great economic potential, Brazil faces a series of challenges that Lula did not address during his tenure in office. Despite his efforts, Brazil remains one of the most socioeconomically unequal societies in the world. Much of the country’s wealth is located in the major coastal cities like São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, whereas the majority of central Brazil is still mired in poverty. Da Silva’s recent income redistribution program, La bolsa famila, is widely considered to have played a major role in lifting millions out of poverty, but new programs must be enacted in order to expand upon and monitor its progress. Furthermore, the nation’s taxation and pension systems, along with its union laws, are archaic and must be reformed to accommodate the rapidly growing new middle class.

Perhaps most importantly, Brazil’s business regulations must be reformed, if not overhauled entirely. Brazil has some of the most arcane and restrictive requirements for new businesses in the world. The country ranks quite poorly, particularly in comparison to other BRIC nations, when it comes to ease of doing business, length of startup time, ease of getting credit, and ease of employing workers, according to a 2009 World Bank report. Additionally, Brazil now faces the obstacle of continuing the booming economic growth that is expected of a developing nation while implementing the “green” environmental reforms that are especially expected from the caretaker of over half of the Amazon rainforest. While Lula came to power in an era where economic growth was valued above all other priorities, Rousseff enters her office as Brazil becomes an established economic power, with the heightened expectations that come with a more firmly entrenched global position. She must work within her party’s coalition in order to eliminate her country’s arcane business restrictions and provide the stimulus for the economic growth, something which she will most certainly need if she is to continue financing the welfare programs needed to deal with Brazil’s massive economic inequality.

While domestic policy will be paramount, it would be dangerous for Rousseff to ignore the implications of the very bold foreign policy decisions Lula made during his tenure. Rousseff, it seems, is not concerned with establishing a reputation in diplomacy. According to former Brazilian ambassador Rubens Barbosa, she “isn’t interested in international prestige; she doesn’t care if she is seen as a great world leader.” Yet in the final years of his tenure, Lula angered the international community by boldly brokering a uranium swap between Brazil, Turkey, and Iran, and by voting against a United Nations security council resolution to impose sanctions against Iran. Lula’s diplomatic leanings may make it impossible for his successor to push aside her country’s foreign affairs, as she will have to stem the fallout from Lula’s decisions to maintain relations with the western world while continuing to promote Brazilian interests abroad.

These are difficult times for the president-elect. At home, Rousseff faces economic and environmental problems that Lula swept aside during his term. Abroad, Rousseff carries with her the great responsibility of consolidating Brazil’s geopolitical position by clarifying the nation’s international outlook during her first few years in office. Faced with important domestic and international issues, Rousseff may be forced to focus on one at the expense of the other or else risk diluting the efficacy of her policies both at home and abroad. In the words of World Bank director Makhtar Diop, “Brazil is living in an exceptional moment.” To hold on to her country’s phenomenal streak, Rousseff must avoid simply maintaining the status quo of her predecessor, and also find the appropriate means to improve Brazil’s business environment and raise living standards while maintaining economic growth and expanding the nation’s influence worldwide.

Today, the United States has an opportunity to take action and redefine its Central and South American policy through its response to the ousting of Honduran President Manuel Zelaya. By conditionally acknowledging the new Honduran election and punishing the Honduran military for its actions, the United States can defuse a dangerous situation without evoking the legacy of American imperialism.

Although Honduras has had a peaceful democracy for years, it remains haunted by the ghost of the Cold War. During the 1980’s, the United States used Honduras as a staging ground in its efforts to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Washington’s footprint remained even after the Cold War ended. Up until the Zelaya coup, the United States was still providing hefty military assistance to Honduras, the most recent package totaling $16.5 million. Despite Washington’s support, Honduras has remained one of Central America’s poorest countries. Out of an estimated 8 million Hondurans, more than a third live on less than $2 a day.

Many commentators saw President Zelaya’s election in 2005 as a revolt against the oligarchy that still controls much of the country. Zelaya represented the interests of unions and the working class and developed ties to other leftist leaders, including Hugo Chavez and Raúl Castro. He made Honduras a member of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas, a purported alternative to free trade deals which has been promoted by Venezuela and Cuba. Predictably, many Hondurans, especially members of the armed forces, felt that the President went too far in his left-leaning tendencies. Zelaya’s attempt to modify the constitution so that he could run for an additional term, a page lifted from Chavez’s book, was the final straw for the conservative establishment. Before long, Zelaya was ousted from power by the military under accusations of an unconstitutional power grab.

If anything was undemocratic, though, it was the expulsion of the Zelaya administration. In the early hours of June 28th, soldiers stormed the presidential palace, kidnapped the President, took his cell phone, and flew him out of the country. He eventually arrived in Costa Rica, where, still in his pajamas, he angrily protested the coup. After a failed attempt to fly back into Honduras, President Zelaya managed to secretly re-enter the country and is currently residing in the Brazilian embassy.

An international coalition swiftly emerged to oppose the coup, making old enemies into bedfellows. The United States and Cuba were in agreement that Mr. Zelaya was wrongfully removed from power. The UN and the Organization of American States issued warnings to the new Honduran administration. The Obama administration vocally supported a power-sharing agreement, the San Jose Accords, which would have returned President Zelaya to power before the November election. A deal was eventually made, but it fell through shortly after being finalized. Unsurprisingly, this unity of opinion was short lived. The Honduran election that took place on November 29th exposed rifts in the international coalition that insisted on Zelaya’s reinstatement. The United States recognized the results of the election of conservative candidate Porfiro Lobo, but only Colombia and a few smaller states have followed suit. Other powers with significant regional influence, namely Spain and Brazil, refuse to recognize the results and demand that Zelaya be returned to his post.

The decision to recognize the November election could compromise the United State’s legitimacy if not handled correctly. As recently as September, the Obama administration was threatening to reject any vote held without first returning Zelaya to power. Now that the U.S. has reversed course, Obama must maintain his calls for a congressional vote to reinstate Zelaya or risk looking the fool. If the administration unconditionally recognizes the vote and fails to punish the people responsible for the coup, it could look like Washington is offering tacit approval for the Honduran military’s actions. This would smack of American imperialism and remind many of past U.S. support for the ousting of leftist leaders. Therefore, President Obama should go through with recognizing the election, but only if necessary conditions are met.

First, the election must prove to have been free and fair. If strong evidence of electoral fraud emerges, the Obama administration should not hesitate to deem the elections illegitimate and withdraw its tentative backing. Second, Lobo should only be recognized as the new head of state if the intimidation of dissident groups ceases. Amnesty International has reported that factions affiliated with the government have unlawfully suppressed Zelaya supporters in preparation for the election. If the Honduran government did indeed hold a clean election and successfully ends the thuggish behavior of some government-affiliated groups, it will merit the recognition of the vote, and the United States should provide it. By making this recognition conditional, the United States can make clear that it only approves of the restoration of the democratic election process, not of the coup.

Washington must also hold the perpetrators of the coup responsible. The stream of military aid flowing into Honduras from the U.S. before the coup made the army extremely powerful, and its actions during the coup prove that it has wielded that power irresponsibly. As a punishment for the coup, the United States should cut off all military aid and restore it only once the events of the coup have been thoroughly investigated, as was promised in the power-sharing deal. Continuing to provide military aid would be a slap in the face of the Hondurans who saw their democratically-elected president whisked away by well-armed soldiers.

Washington also provides more than $180 million in miscellaneous aid to Honduras each year. Some have suggested that this aid should be withheld along with military aid, as punishment for the coup. Honduras is extremely reliant on American dollars, the argument goes, so shutting off aid could send a powerful message. Withholding the aid, however, would be ill-advised, and would only reflect the Cold War mentality that prioritized American interests over foreign lives. The people that have already suffered the most from the coup, the working poor, are those most likely to be affected by a reduction in aid. This could turn people against the United States and would punish the victims of the coup more than its perpetrators.

The United States needs to keep in mind the legacy of foreign intervention in Central America as it continues to address the aftermath of the Zelaya coup. Any significant misstep will undoubtedly reinvigorate anti-American sentiments that have been waning in recent months as a result of President Obama’s diplomatic endeavors. By handling Latin America’s first post-Cold War coup in a way that affirms that the war against communism is indeed over, the United States can take further legitimacy away from its critics and foster stable and prosperous ties across Latin America. Then, perhaps, Porfiro Díaz’s words can finally be laid to rest.

By neglecting to cultivate America’s relationship with Brazil, the Obama Administration risks unsavory comparisons with the Bush Administration, which was heavily criticized for all but ignoring South America. With memories of a (supposedly) U.S.-supported military coup d’etat that instituted a ruling military dictatorship for twenty years still fresh in the minds of many Brazilians, the U.S. must offer political gestures and concrete economic compromises that show that its relationship with Brazil is as valued as when the U.S. became the first nation to recognize Brazil’s independence in 1822. Latin American expert David Rothkopf implores the current presidency to pursue this special relationship which has been neglected until now. Despite Obama’s warm remarks about President Lula at the recent G20 London summit—Obama declared, “He’s my man”—Rothkopf urges that Obama demonstrate commitment beyond just “lip service.” He writes, “[If the Obama Administration] only pays lip service to Brazil but slow walks the most important issues while seeking disproportionate payment in turn from the Brazilians… then tension and distrust are likely to manifest themselves.”

As noted by President Lula in his March 14th meeting with President Obama, reform of the American embargo on Cuba presents a golden opportunity to send a palpable signal not just to Brazil, but also to all of Latin America. The embargo on Cuba remains an antiquated and intolerant blemish on the U.S.’s relationship with the region—a relic from a war of ideas long since won. The U.S. must initiate a new campaign of ideas for a revitalized North-South relationship built on equality and respect in order to counter the efforts of populist leaders like Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, and Rafael Correa to vilify the U.S. As Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim notes, “…It’s impossible not to talk about the Cuban embargo. It’s indicative of U.S. policy toward the region.” The repeal of the Cuban embargo would stand as a powerful symbol of goodwill and new beginnings, with all parties standing to gain, from the isolated Cuban public to the countless American multinationals chomping at the bit for a piece of the virgin Cuban market.

Moreover, enlisting the Brazilian President as a mediator in Cuban-American negotiations would be a brilliant choice for the U.S., not only because Lula is skilled at reaching compromise, but also because the move gives Brazil what it seems to want so badly these days: prestige. Brazil’s recent generous renegotiations to pay more for natural gas contracts with Bolivia and hydroelectric agreements with Paraguay, along with its successful leadership of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Haiti, indicate that Lula is maneuvering Brazil to be the torchbearer for Latin America. And as Brazil cements and expands this leadership role, it wants a say in international affairs commensurate with its growing economic power.

Though the United States has officially “recognized” Brazil’s candidacy for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, it can shoot a safe shot across the bow of the international order by announcing strong support for the bid. As Lula rightly ascertained in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly, “Today’s structure has been frozen for six decades and does not relate to the challenges of today’s world. Its distorted form of representation stands between us and the multilateral world to which we aspire.” A firm American statement of approval for Brazil’s Security Council eligibility would help strengthen a crucial alliance in Latin America. In addition, the United States stands to lose little political capital by expressing public support for Brazil. Unlike the G4 Security Council candidacies of India and Japan whose bids are opposed by important American allies such as Pakistan and China, respectively, and Germany, whose bid could be considered disadvantageous for the U.S., support for Brazil risks very little. Mexico and Argentina, the two countries most vehemently opposed to Brazil’s U.N. aspiration, are sturdy American allies who could be placated with little effort.

A final gesture that the U.S. should make to Brazil is opening up the U.S. market to Brazilian ethanol. Brazilian biofuel companies look at the American market with unequaled lust, as an astounding 54-cent tariff on Brazilian sugarcane ethanol makes exporting to the American market economically uncompetitive and unviable. Although repealing this tariff, which protects the comparably inefficient U.S. domestic corn-based ethanol industry, would be politically unpopular in the U.S., it is crucial to establishing a closer relationship with Brazil and would confer economic benefits on both countries. Given that the U.S. and Brazil account for almost 90 percent of the world’s biofuel production, developing a global ethanol market would be a mutually beneficial endeavor.

Also, such action is not without historical precedent. The Washington-based think tank Council on Hemispheric Affairs notes that officials in the Obama Administration could look to the International Trade Commission’s 1986 ruling on imported Brazilian iron ore as a historical blueprint to pleasing the elected officials in America’s Corn belt, as well as their Brazilian counterparts. Just as the 1986 accord legally isolated the American Midwest market so as to insulate the Great Lakes’ vulnerable iron industry, a similar ethanol agreement could institute an analogous protected trade area for American corn ethanol in western and central U.S., opening the East Coast to Brazilian ethanol. Since American ethanol consumption is concentrated in the West, the economic impact of such a policy change would not be dramatic, but it would be a crucial gesture of support to Brazil.

Over the years, many countries have claimed to possess a “special” relationship with the U.S. There has perhaps been no country more or longer deserving of that designation than Brazil. One of the last countries to enter the world recession and poised to be one of the first to exit it, as Jonathan Wheatley wrote in the Financial Times, “this is the Brazil that finally, after years of unfulfilled promise, is catching the world’s attention.” The three-pronged mix of political and economic gestures described above would allow the current Administration to make some much-needed overtures to its longtime rising star Latin American neighbor and possible long-lasting Latin American advocate. As for reciprocation, any Brazilian knows that once someone bestows an abraço on you, it is only good manners to return the favor.

The story started when former president Zelaya called a referendum, in March of this year, to alter the constitution and allow him to run for a second term. Article 239 of the Honduran Constitution limits presidents to one term, and this article is one of a very limited, important group that cannot be amended as per Article 374. Those who attempt an amendment are automatically and immediately prohibited from holding public office for ten years.

The Supreme Court dutifully declared the referendum unconstitutional, but Zelaya ignored the court and ordered the military to provide security for his referendum. When top military official General Romeo Vasquez refused, Zelaya fired him, prompting the resignations of the service chiefs of the army, marines, and air force. On June 25, the Supreme Court ordered Zelaya to reinstate Vasquez and the National Congress began to investigate Zelaya.

At last, the court issued an arrest warrant for President Zelaya. Again in accordance with the constitution, it ordered the military to enforce the order. By this point, the Supreme Court, the top Honduran electoral body, the human rights ombudsman, and the National Congress had all opposed Zelaya’s referendum. The National Congress removed him from office and named Roberto Micheletti as the new president, in accordance with the rules of succession. All this was, until the final stage, a perfect example of constitutional democracy stopping potential abuse of power.

The crucial misstep came when, instead of arresting Zelaya, the military deported him. The U.S. joined much of the world, including sudden friends of democracy like Venezuela and Cuba, in declaring the events a breach of democracy at the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS). Zelaya should have been arrested and tried in the sunlight, not deported in a manner reminiscent of darker periods in Latin American history, but this misstep should not be allowed to spoil the entire process.

The U.S. seems fixated on that final wrench thrown in by the military, and in doing so, has ignored both liberal – in the international relations sense – and realist logic. President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton are correct that the Honduran military did not follow the letter of the law. But as President Obama frequently remarks, the U.S. cannot let the perfect be the enemy of the good.

The constitution and the other branches of government stopped an abuse of power in a nation and a region all too familiar with such abuses. Zelaya’s removal, with the exception of the military’s decision to deport and not detain, was the proper functioning of a constitutional system of checks and balances. Unlike previous generations of strongmen, Zelaya did not seek to abolish the constitution, but he did attempt to tinker with it in violation of the will of its democratic authors. Observers must resist being taken in by the democratic façade of this new authoritarianism that Zelaya was pursuing. The Honduran constitution is strict about term limits precisely to prevent power grabs like Zelaya’s. As such, his removal from office should be cause for the United States’ support.

Even democratically elected leaders can become threats to democracy by abusing their power. Hugo Chavez, the democratically elected president of Venezuela, has sought to dress up authoritarian rule in the guise of democracy by amending his own country’s constitution to expand the executive’s power and extend term limits. Zelaya received both the idea and the tools for his assault on democracy from Chavez; Venezuela provided the very ballots to be used in his referendum. In so doing, Zelaya joined Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Cuba as an ally of Chavez and his model of authoritarianism.

The U.S. goal of promoting democracy, whether for strategic or altruistic purposes, demands that Washington discourage Latin American politicians from this path. Imperfect but constitutionally minded processes like the coup in Honduras can defend democracy against attacks like Zelaya’s power grab.

It must be reaffirmed that the U.S. has disgracefully supported anti-democratic Latin American coups in years past, but the real threat to democracy today is from Latin American strongmen, not the United States. Obama deserves credit for taking pains to avoid behaving in a way that reinforces the specter of the imperialist yanqui. Unfortunately, President Obama seems to have worried too much about how he would look and not enough about how he should act. When governments like Honduras’ seek to stem abuses of power and when the U.S. can responsibly support them, Washington should firmly stand with its ideological allies. This does not mean the U.S. should offer full-throated approval of the flawed actions, but it does mean that we should provide assistance to a government that chose democracy in a region where self-proclaimed enemies of the United States stifle representative government.

Questions of alliances should also concern realists looking at the situation. President Obama linked arms with Chavez, who has slowly but explicitly sought to marshal allies and resources against US policies in Latin America. Chavez has amassed arms and nationalized natural resources like oil, directly challenging the U.S. and its allies. He allied Venezuela with the regime in Iran (the same one seeking a nuclear weapon) in a quest to counterbalance U.S. strength, and sought economic arrangements in Latin America to counter U.S. economic interests. President Obama should have no illusions about Chavez’s dreams. After all, he told the United States to “go to hell” in 2007.

If cold-blooded realism actually held sway in Washington, as some claim it does, then the State Department would not be seeking to reinstate an enemy who has allied himself with Chavez – and, according to new reports, with the Colombian narco-terrorist group FARC – while Chavez seeks to counter U.S. power with allies, arms, and oil. The situation in Honduras offers an uncommon opportunity where liberal principles and realism agree and point to one policy – that very policy which America has eschewed.

In spite of these arguments, the Obama administration reacted to the “coup” by cutting aid to Honduras, revoking the visas of some of its officials, and joining hands with rogue regimes in repeatedly condemning Honduras for standing up to its president. It is not too late for the United States to reverse that course and follow good practice and great ideals to sound policy by increasing aid. Of course, given the self-assured position already taken by President Obama, such a reversal will not be easy.

First, in the short-term, the U.S. should make its goal pragmatic cooperation with the interim government. Obama and Clinton have unwisely boxed themselves in by supporting the OAS and UN condemnation. For self-identified realists, they left themselves with little strategic — or even tactical — flexibility. What little leeway they still have should be used to switch to cooperation. This is not a self-serving, hypocritical change in tone, but an honest appraisal of a delicate situation that requires more than knee-jerk condemnation.

Obama should also resume normal aid to Honduras, stop ignoring Honduran diplomats, and accelerate cooperation with the interim government. President Obama has offered engagement to true enemies of the United States, so a democracy like Honduras should be no problem. In fact, Obama should seek additional aid for Honduras. The interim government is the one recognized by the legislature, in line with the actions of the judicial branch. Zelaya is a man who has been removed from office, as the constitution requires. Neither a true realist, nor a true friend of democracies in the region, could ignore those facts.

In the longer term, Obama needs to steer the international community to diplomatic recognition of the Micheletti government. The U.S. and other governments cannot continue to ignore what is an imperfect but democratic state, which deserves a functioning government and redemption from its unfair pariah status on the world stage.

From both realist and liberal perspectives, it seems unwise to support a foe in the face of a growing threat to U.S. interests in the region and condemn a democracy in a very difficult situation – a democracy which managed to act with considerable poise and which provided an example to other democrats in the region. It is no wonder, then, if the people of Honduras question why President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Ali Khameini in Iran managed to get the benefit of the doubt from Obama this summer during their rigged elections, but the Micheletti government gets no patience.