As the presidential election of 2012 approaches, more and more critics are deriding President Obama’s pre-election vision of hope and change, targeting what they consider to be Obama’s naivete in foreign policy. This January, however, the president announced one significant foreign policy reform that he hopes will counter such criticism. In a memorandum entitled “Reaching Out to the Cuban People,” he detailed foreign policy changes between the United States and Cuba that ease the fifty-year American embargo on Cuba. The three-part reform measure that has gone largely unnoticed attempts to create more contact with the citizens of Cuba, and the changes it implements are certainly admirable. As its failures over the past fifty years have shown, however, the embargo is a Cold War remnant of political tension that is hurting American industry, America’s reputation abroad, and most directly, the Cuban people. Analysis of the negative ramifications of the embargo reveals that President Obama should fully end the oppressive embargo and reconnect the United States with the Cuban citizenry.
The economic embargo was first enacted in 1960 as the swift answer to communist President Fidel Castro’s seizure of American property in Cuba. Since then, every American president has maintained the embargo in some form, with a conditional promise to lift it when Cuba adopts a democratic system of government.
Last year, President Obama ended restrictions on travel and cash remittances by family members of Cubans, but his newest move has forced politicians and citizens alike to reconsider the issue. Although Cuba is still not fully open to the public and businesses, the new policy aims “to enhance contact with the Cuban people and support civil society” by allowing approved licensed travelers for “purposeful travel.”
Following the changes, a variety of groups can visit the communist state: religious organizations are now able to travel for missionary purposes, academic institutions are able to sponsor study abroad programs, and cultural groups are encouraged to host conferences along with other forms of “educational exchange.” Additionally, reporters have been given more freedom to travel to Cuba for journalistic purposes. The new policy also allows remittances of $500 per quarter that can be sent by Americans to Cuban citizens (excluding senior Cuban government officials and members of the Communist Party). The final part of the memorandum affects charter flights to Cuba which had been previously restricted to Miami and a few other airports. Now, all international airports can apply for licenses allowing flights to Cuba for family members and others engaging in “purposeful travel.”
The loosening of restrictions continues a series of recent improvements in American-Cuban relations. Although Cuba is undoubtedly facing economic woes—500,000 government workers were laid off last September—citizens are slowly approaching true political freedom. In February 2008, Fidel Castro resigned from his position as president of Cuba due to health reasons, and Cuba’s National Assembly selected his relatively moderate brother, Raul, as his successor. When taking office, Raul Castro suggested that Cuba may be headed “toward a more democratic society,” and Cuba is indeed showing signs of change. In 2009 Raul Castro offered to speak with President Obama, saying, “We have sent word to the U.S. government in private and in public that we are willing to discuss everything, human rights, freedom of the press, political prisoners, everything.” Citizens in Cuba are now allowed to own cell phones, and farmers can till their own land. Most recently, Cuba has been releasing political prisoners, some of whom had been sentenced to decades of imprisonment.
The political buzz generated by the memorandum is to be expected, given that the embargo policy has been a part of American diplomacy for fifty years. Like most members of his party, Cornelius Mack (R-FL) had harsh feelings toward the president’s policy change, saying that the “dictatorship is one of the most brutal in the world. The U.S. economic embargo must remain in place until tyranny gives way to freedom and democracy.” In a statement that defied the Democratic party line, Cuban-American Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) echoed the sentiments, calling the loosening of the embargo a “gift to the Castro brothers [that] will provide the regime with the additional resources it needs to sustain its failing economy.”
Yet the changes are also receiving support from varied sources. Pepe Hernandez, head of the Cuban-American National Foundation, praised the shift for allowing impoverished Cubans to fight for economic independence from the Castro administration. Rev. Michael Kinnamon, speaking on behalf of the National Council of Churches, commended the move, saying, “We look forward to the day when the U. S. embargo of Cuba will be lifted completely.” Even some Republicans favor the change, including Senator Richard Lugar, who said last year that “the unilateral embargo on Cuba has failed to achieve its stated purpose of “bringing democracy to the Cuban people.”

Those who still favor the use of the embargo see it as a way to pressure the communist regime of Cuba. The idea was that, the embargo would inflict hunger and suffering among Cubans, weakening the regime and even spurring a revolt against the Castro regime. But Lugar is correct: the failed history of the embargo should disabuse us of this notion. Over the last five decades, American-Cuban relations have been characterized by stagnation and hostility. The country has certainly shown signs of hardship, but the Cuban people have not been able to organize and protest against the government. Instead, Fidel Castro was able to rule with an iron first, before handing the presidency to his brother. Fidel Castro continues issue regular tirades in the newspaper Granma, which serves as the mouthpiece for the Cuban Communist Party. Clearly, the outdated embargo has served to strengthen the Castro regime, rather than create extreme instability. Perhaps most tragic has been the fate of the Cuban people, who continue to suffer economically, politically, and even emotionally: the nation has one of the highest suicide rates in the world.
Although the president deserves praise for the diplomatic changes, they are not new. During the Carter and Clinton administrations, similar restrictions were lifted, but the changes were short-lived. Moreover, the embargo under the George W. Bush administration was very strictly enforced, effectively negating Clinton’s reforms. The recent changes loosen the restrictions, but the basic tenet of banned trade remains intact. American industries are still not permitted to engage in business with the communist nation. Although weakening the embargo is certainly a step in the right direction, the nation needs to take further steps to end the punitive policy.
Increasing contact with the Cuban people is certainly not equivalent to accepting communism. Rather, it exposes Cubans to the democratic principles espoused by the United States and the benefits of capitalism. At the present time, Cubans are inundated with anti-American propaganda spewed by state-run media sources. Even though funds from America may indeed benefit the Cuban economy, it is time to let diplomacy show American support for the Cuban people. By abandoning the Cuban people, the United States is leaving them at the mercy of a communist regime that continues to retain power. Forming economic, academic, and cultural connections will allow the United States to introduce American ideas to Cubans in a peaceful and effective way.
In addition to aiding the Cuban people, ending the embargo would strengthen America’s own economic interests and improve her reputation abroad. American businesses currently yearn for the untapped potential present in Cuba, and the opening of trade would help the United States assert dominance during a difficult economic time. Furthermore, the negative global consequences of the embargo would be curbed. Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez called the present embargo a “cruel and aggressive policy absolutely contrary to international law” and much of the international community agrees; in October 2010, the United Nations voted to end the U.S. embargo for the 19th consecutive year, with 187 members voting against the embargo and the only two votes supporting the embargo from the United States and Israel.
President Obama has taken a step in the right direction with his modification of the embargo against Cuba, but it is simply not enough. In the current, relatively moderate Cuban political environment, ending the fifty-year-old embargo would give the Cuban people the American economic and cultural connection they sorely need. If Obama limits his actions to the superficial changes of Carter and Clinton, both the president and his policies may be gone in 2012. Relations between the United States and Cuba cannot afford to wait another fifty years.

While the scope of damage to American diplomacy will only be revealed in time, there can be no doubt that Wikileaks’ release has undermined faith in America’s ability to protect information. When a low-ranking soldier like Pfc. Bradley Manning can access 250,000 diplomatic cables and other classified materials, burn them onto CDs, and carry them out of a secure facility, there is an inherent flaw in the government’s information controls.

Manning had unrestricted access to two massive networks of all-source secret and top secret information, which is typical for someone in his job. Efforts to avoid repeating pre-9/11 failures of communication within the intelligence community and the increasing importance of broad intelligence sources to modern warfare motivated this broad access for intelligence analysts. Manning may have been able to avoid detection by merely deleting server logs recording his activities, and a system designed to identify suspicious activity on classified servers covers only 60 percent of Department of Defense computers.

The DoD now requires that information can be transferred between classified and unclassified computer systems only in a supervised setting, but the DoD and other government agencies should also expand monitoring systems to all computers handling classified information and ensure that server logs cannot be deleted.  While closing the holes Manning exploited should be a first step in improving protection of classified information, anything less than a government-wide review seems unlikely to diagnose different weaknesses in classified computer systems.

In addition to raising concerns about the U.S. government’s ability to protect classified information, the Wikileaks case illustrates another serious problem with current government policy: over-classification. Many of the leaked cables merely confirmed information that was already in the public realm, thus raising an interesting question: why was the information classified in the first place? In effect, by erring on the side of caution and protecting material that posed no threat to American security or interests if publicly known, the government has damaged the credibility of its classification procedures.

Under the current system, information that would be embarrassing or unpleasantly complicating if released is placed in the same category as truly dangerous and damaging knowledge. The government also restricts access to a wide range of “controlled unclassified information,” which is not technically classified but is nonetheless restricted in its distribution because of concern over the potential security risk of its release. Misuse of classified or controlled unclassified labels feeds a public perception that the government is merely trying to restrict access to information without any good reason. This lack of public faith is illustrated by the hacker group Anonymous’ recent invocation of “freedom of information” as a rallying cry for its attacks against “enemies” of Wikileaks. If the government cannot become much more judicious in deciding what information to classify, this problem of public perception will only worsen.

Even if the government is more careful in choosing what information to protect, there will always be room for abuse of classification powers. As the release of the Pentagon Papers clearly illustrated, the government is not above drastically misleading the public on life-and-death issues. Leaks can serve as an essential tool for exposing questionable activities, bringing serious problems to light, sparking policy debate, or ensuring that citizens are capable of making informed judgments about the activities of their government. However, leaks are worrisome because what information is released is ultimately at the sole discretion of the leaker, whose judgment may not be sound.

To find a balance between a government stranglehold on information and a porous classification system prone to extensive information leaks, the federal government must address the woeful state of its systems for categorizing information, managing internal complaints, and protecting whistleblowers. The current weakness of these systems is vividly illustrated by the case of Robert MacLean, a former federal air marshal. In 2003, the TSA decided to remove air marshals from long-distance flights—the type of flights targeted by the 9/11 hijackers—in a cost-cutting measure. MacLean unsuccessfully raised concerns about this approach to TSA managers and a field agent of the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of the Inspector General. MacLean finally brought his case to the media, and Congressional outrage promptly led the TSA to reverse its decision. However, MacLean was fired after his release was retroactively categorized as Sensitive Security Information, a type of controlled unclassified information.

As demonstrated by MacLean’s case, the current lack of internal protections and procedures for whistleblowers makes undesirable public disclosures more likely. When higher-ranking officials seem unwilling to solve problems or actually fail to address concerns that have been raised, employees are more likely to air grievances in public. In fact, instant messaging transcripts show that Bradley Manning viewed an officer’s refusal to address abuses by Iraqi police as a major turning point in his decision to leak documents. Furthermore, when wrongdoing goes unchecked, it is likely to worsen to the point that someone will feel morally obligated to blow the whistle. Insufficient avenues and protections for whistleblowers consequently curtail internal reports of moderate wrongdoing while increasing the odds that severe abuses will be leaked to the public. If someone within the Army had listened to Bradley Manning’s concerns, 250,000 diplomatic cables might still be secure.

President Obama already made a move in the right direction on November 4th by signing Executive Order 13566, which imposes government-wide standards for controlled unclassified information. Congress also appeared on course to move towards enhancing protections for government whistleblowers after both the House and Senate passed different versions of The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2010 in December. However, since the Senate version included protections for intelligence community whistleblowers while the House version did not, a version excluding intelligence community protections was returned to the Senate for passage, where it was killed by an anonymous Senator’s hold. Ironically, critics of the bill argued that it would lead to more Wikileaks-type disclosures.

What the Wikileaks incident revealed, more than anything, is a crisis of confidence in the government’s control of information. The release itself has raised doubts among foreign partners about the United States’ ability to guard sensitive information, and the response to Wikileaks has revealed a significant number of people who believe that the American government abuses its classification powers to keep its corruption and crimes away from criticism. To regain foreign confidence, America must improve its safeguards of classified information. To restore the faith of the American public, the government must become more judicious in assigning classified or controlled unclassified information labels while enhancing internal whistleblowing procedures and protections.

If the government merely tightens its control over information, the public will become less likely to believe that the government ever has valid reasons for protecting information. In making sure that people like Bradley Manning and Julian Assange cannot ever again become the overlords of America’s classified information, the government needs to make sure that people like Robert MacLean have a way for their voice to be heard before they feel a need to go public. Failure to act will expose the United States to future disclosures that will complicate its ability to conduct foreign policy. It will take time for foreign partners’ broken confidence in the American government’s protection of information to recover, but whether it recovers quickly or continues deteriorating depends on how the government responds to its current situation.

When news broke that the summit leaders decided to defer serious policy decisions to next year and to the IMF, however, the pundits who had themselves helped to raise expectations about the Summit then proceeded to criticize it mercilessly. The only tangible consensus was the need for greater consensus, and the Summit produced few actionable solutions as to how the G-20 countries could and should lead the world out of the Great Recession. The question must be asked: Why did this heralded meeting fail so miserably?

Unfortunately, the Summit was doomed from the onset. This is because the U.S., while decrying Chinese currency policies, was also employing currency devaluation tactics of its own. While this “quantitative easing” is not only fiscally irresponsible and detrimental to global economic recovery, it also threatens the shaky foundation of trust between G-20 nations in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.

Now, while the term “currency devaluation” has been prominent in the news, what does it exactly mean? Like all goods, currencies’ values are subject to the laws of supply and demand. Chinese currency devaluation occurs when China purposefully prints more yuan to buy U.S. dollars and other currencies, thereby increasing the yuan’s supply in the market relative to others, decreasing the yuan’s value.  This policy also entails a potent vice: as the yuan’s value decreases, the value of domestic Chinese savings also decreases. Therefore, many view currency devaluation as merely temporary. It leaves a country vulnerable to the caprices of the international market while rendering domestic consumers incapable of supporting their own economy.

In an address to the G-20 countries, President Obama said that this current yuan devaluation was an “irritant” to the international community, and he forcefully called on China to end the policy. However, China has simply not budged. In light of the Federal Reserve’s recent quantitative easing (QE-2) to buy $600 billion of U.S. treasury bonds, China thought, reasonably, that the United States was devaluing its currency to obtain a marketable advantage. Even though Chinese devaluations are far more potent in scope and effect, the hypocrisy of the American position incited political rhetoric and unproductive finger-pointing.

While many economists and financial experts agree that China’s yuan is substantially undervalued (by an estimated range  of 20 to 40 percent), the U.S. can no longer force other states into submission. Since the global financial crisis occurred under an American-dominated economic system, much of the non-Western world, most predominantly China, now questions the free-market neoliberal agenda that American economic leadership entails. Obama’s “just trust us” mentality carries less weight than it would have in the 1990s.

Furthermore, the perceived duplicity of President Obama’s argument will only exacerbate relations with the United States’ East Asian neighbor. While it is certainly true that stabilizing trade imbalances would help put the U.S. and global economies on firmer footing in the long run, the United States’ perceived hypocrisy and harsh rhetoric has rendered China unwilling to acquiesce to Washington’s demands. After such a long and public battle with the U.S. on currency valuation, China is extremely unlikely to embarrass itself by unilaterally giving in on the heels of America’s own QE2 policy.

Therefore, given China’s imprisonment within the confines of power politics, the United States must assume the mantle of leadership and prove to the international community that it is the engine of economic stability. Unfortunately, while the U.S. is still the greatest economic and military power in the world, it has not been acting that way. With soaring debt and fiscal irresponsibility pervading the U.S. political system, it is understandable that China is not eager to follow the U.S. model. This is especially true with respect to the constant use of monetary policy in lieu of meaningful fiscal reform. QE-2 is merely the latest of the Federal Reserve’s attempts to prop up the entire economy by printing ever increasing sums of money.

While President Obama has claimed that QE-2 was a necessary component of his plan to decrease interest rates, increase capital flows, and ease consumer pain in a recession, this artificial money pump is merely a temporary bandage to cover a gushing wound. While the Federal Reserve contends that QE-2 will cause inflation of about 2 percent, independent estimations have that number as high as 5 percent, a dangerously high figure that could mire the U.S. in stagflation. The German finance minister has called the policy “clueless,” while Kevin Warsh, a Fed governor, identified “significant risks that bear careful monitoring.” As inflation increases, U.S. purchasing power decreases on the international stage, thereby reducing the stimulating effect of the American consumer. While U.S. exports may also increase, the world economy still revolves around the American consumer propping up global demand. Therefore, U.S. purchasing power must be augmented in order to promote global recovery, not weakened by quantitative easing policies.

Furthermore, QE-2 has put considerable pressure on other countries to devalue their currencies. To avoid massive foreign capital outflows, other countries may devaluate their currencies relative to the dollar. The United States could then justify further reciprocal devaluation, and the ensuing beggar-thy-neighbor behavior would leave the global financial system riddled with inflation and uncertainty. Even if this scenario did not occur, the mere fear of it happening would be sufficient to hamper any economic growth, for economic expectations themselves affect economic outcomes.

Therefore, as a preliminary step to reach any consensus with China, the U.S. must commit to fiscal austerity measures that prove it is serious about lasting economic stability, not temporary and unsustainable spurts of negligible growth. While this round of quantitative easing may have little net effect, it seems possible that the Federal Reserve could implement QE-3 in the near future. This possibility is the cornerstone of China’s current trepidations and resulting noncompliance. By stopping the inflationary spending and wrangling its deficits under control,  the U.S. will have an adequate bargaining position to begin negotiations with China. The U.S. will be able to tout its reforms and require similar ones as reciprocation, thereby increasing trust and stability in the international economic system.

President Obama was absolutely correct when he wrote to the G-20 leaders, “When all nations do their part—emerging no less than advanced, surplus no less than deficit—we all benefit from higher growth.” However, “all nations” must do their part, including the United States, for any one nation to move forward. Therefore, as the world’s greatest power, the United States cannot ask for international reform and then cower behind a failed system. Instead, it must lead the charge and then require reciprocation. The world economy cannot recover without the U.S., but the U.S. cannot recover without the world economy.

This faith is misplaced. COP 16 was able to achieve several of its aims because it focused on less contentious, lower profile objectives; few foreign heads of state even bothered to attend the conference. The complex, multilateral UNFCCC forum has proven effective for oft ignored constituencies like small island states and underdeveloped regions to air concerns. – however, the layered bureaucracy of negotiations has perversely stymied progress on the commission’s preeminent focus: emissions reductions. Rather than working solely through the thicket of the UNFCCC, the US should pursue bilateral negotiations with the key parties – specifically, top emitters China, India, and the EU – and then return to the COP, with agreements in hand, to register further scrutiny and establish truly multilateral solutions.

The parties that might suffer from future climate change are as diverse as they are numerous; offending polluters, however, are easily identified. Seven sovereignties, the US, EU, China, India, Canada, Russia, and Japan, produced nearly three quarters of global CO₂ emissions in 2007, according the UNFCCC; sixty percent came from America, Europe, China, and India alone. Evident, too, is the future emissions landscape: non-Annex B Kyoto (developing) states surpassed developed ones in annual CO₂ output in 2005 and their emissions share continues to grow. Rapidly industrializing China and India have seen their emission outputs grow an astounding 250 percent since 1990. Developing South Africa and Brazil, lightweight polluters today, will contribute the same emissions impact as Canada and Japan by 2040. Clearly, any new scheme to prescribe anthropocentric emissions must include concessions from developing and developed states alike.

The trouble with past and present climate negotiations has been a collective action problem over the use of a common-pool resource or CPR. With binding regulation absent,  nation-states faced with a CPR (the atmosphere), which they can exploit for profit, opt to continue unencumbered CO₂ emissions growth, rather than cooperate. Each country refuses to hamstring itself unilaterally, instead waiting for assurances that others will limit emissions first.

As collective action is central to fundamental climate problems, so has it been instrumental in early negotiations breakdowns. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol sought to address greenhouse buildups through emissions quotas for developed states only; these nations, receiving no guarantee that developing countries would abet such an effort by limiting their own growth, each refused to ratify the treaty or failed to meet their emissions guarantees. COP 15 faced a similar problem: with so large a cohort comprising each negotiating faction at the forum, agitator states were quick to fault opposition by raising failed obligations or regulatory asymmetries, and only trivial legislation advanced.  Meanwhile, defector states continued to enjoy unencumbered economic growth. The swiftest means to end this climate gridlock is through bilateralism. If the US cannot trust the collective to negotiate in decorous good faith, it must work with specific influential states, from across the pollution spectrum, to expedite an accord. By focusing on China, India and the EU in particular the US may streamline negotiations. Since these few actors contribute so greatly to the greenhouse crisis, they can circumvent the collective action shortfall by acknowledging their respective responsibilities and accordingly accepting regulation. The US should negotiate to this end bilaterally and through direct diplomatic channels, rather than via international institutional forums, to cut bureaucratic delay.

America’s first focus for co-opting must be China.  Responsible for 22.3% of global carbon output, China’s rapid economic expansion has have made it both the most egregious emitter in the world. The 9.5 percent annual emissions growth of China’s huge industrial sector cannot be married with any initiative to limit anthropocentric carbon.  It is not, however, unreasonable to assume that China would be receptive to a climate treaty, especially one that would restrict the developing with the developed (namely, America itself). China has shown itself capable of bold environmental rhetoric and aggressive action: days before COP 15, Beijing committed to reducing “carbon intensity” (carbon output per unit GDP) 40 to 45 percent by 2020, and China’s 34.6 billion dollar green investment sector, the largest in the G20, grew over 50 percent from 2008 to 2009.

Similarly, India, which itself has pursued an ambitious pre-Copenhagen carbon intensity pledge, would agree to a bilateral pact with western powers for both sides to crop emissions were it confident that China would not continue aggressive ‘dirty’ expansion at its expense. Smaller developed polluters like Japan, Russia, and Canada, and developing ones like South Africa and Brazil each refuse to hinder their own economies with carbon regulation until the others act.  To wit, America itself rejected the Kyoto protocol and partially obstructed COP 15, refusing to commit to act without assurances from the developing world.

Thus America should proceed piecewise, starting from the top. By securing bilateral pacts from India and China – roping in the largest and fastest growing polluters at the outset – the US could all but guarantee that an agreement would hold up in a multilateral forum. Such treaties should stress mutual interest, featuring investment in each nation’s already sizable sustainable technology sectors to ameliorate inevitable businesses losses from carbon restriction. Negotiating with developing states, America must demand the concession of binding emissions ceilings, and not carbon intensity commitments to ensure that carbon reductions will be substantive and meaningful.  In recompense, the developed world should offer to expand green financing for sustainable development in industrializing states, as has begun with the “Green Fund” from COP 16. America would need to domestically soften its harsh stance towards hard emissions caps, a reasonable development to expect in a scheme encompassing developing and developed polluters. With China and India in the fold, it is reasonable to assume that the EU would fall in line with an agreement: the economic union has already committed to reduce carbon emissions unilaterally by 20 percent from 1990s levels by 2020, even offering to increase reductions to 30 percent with similar commitments from the international community.

Only once the key players are all in agreement ought an accord advance to the UNFCC. A truly multinational conference like the UN COP is appropriate and necessary for smaller interest groupings  to voice their objections to a potential accord – however, these parties must not be allowed to paralyze negotiations altogether, as at prior climate conferences. Climate change, being natural rather than humanistic in nature, is an intrinsically temporal phenomenon: human attitudes and positions may soften and coalesce over time, but the warming timetable is less forgiving. Progress is imperative. Finding a viable agreement must take priority over achieving a perfect one.

The US should look to the UNFCCC to formally legalize the next major global climate agreement, but it should not wait for the COP to decide the terms of the arrangement. Rather, it should pursue a series of bilateral treaties with influential high-volume polluters, and then bring those accords forward for international inspection. In this fashion, America can catalyze the creation of a tenable, balanced climate pact to credibly curtail anthropocentric greenhouse emissions.

To be clear, this article will not engage in the domestic policy debate from which California has recently emerged.  It will not weigh in on the morality of legalizing marijuana, its impacts on Americans’ health, or on its potential tax revenues. Smokers and libertarians can square off against moralists and health advocates in some other forum.  This article will instead explore the impacts that the federal legalization of marijuana would have on U.S.-Mexican relations, and will argue that legalization would yield gross benefits for both nations.

Any analysis of the drug trade must start with a candid admission: U.S. attempts to defeat domestic consumption have been – and forever will be – a dismal failure.  Despite four decades of tough law enforcement and draconian criminal penalties, lifetime consumption rates of illegal drugs among adults continue to hover around 45 percent, and are even rising for some drugs, according to the Office of National Drug Control Policy.  Youth education policies have also failed: the percentage of high school seniors who say they use cannabis is now close to 50 percent, according to the same study.  Some states, like Massachusetts, are ignoring the federal ban entirely by decriminalizing possession, while others are using medical marijuana as a way to skirt the federal ban (a few states such as California and Maine do both).  The prohibition of alcohol in the 1920s failed, and the prohibition of cannabis has and will fail for the same reason: domestic demand is simply too great and too resilient.  Accordingly, it is unfair and hypocritical for the U.S. to let Mexico bear the brunt of enforcing its ban on marijuana, simply because the U.S. is unable to enforce it.

In recognition of the failure to curb domestic consumption, the second President Bush declared a renewed “War on Drugs” in an effort to target the importation of drugs into the U.S.  In other words, Bush sought to shift the focus from decreasing demand to cutting off supply.  Although enforcement agencies have had measured successes in the seizure of imports, domestic consumption remains strong.  Moreover, viewed from south of the border, the drug busts have only increased the ingenuity and deadliness of the Mexican cartels.  The border is too vast and American demand too immense  for policy watchers to have any great faith that the federal government will be able to the stem the torrent of contraband gushing northward by out-witting or out-gunning the drug gangs.

The American policy of exporting drug policy enforcement to Mexico has had disastrous consequences.  Although the Mexican government is still in charge of its capital, Mexico City, it is clearly not in charge of all of the border regions.  Corruption runs rampant at all levels of government; according to The Economist, half of all police officers in the northern states regularly receive bribes.  The narco-gangs therefore operate with legal impunity, as evidenced by the ubiquitous SUVs filled with armed mobsters that roam the streets of Juarez and Tijuana.  Civil society has started to break down as the narcotics gangs become the de facto governments in some areas; in September, a front page editorial appeared in a popular Mexican newspaper, El Diario de Juarez, asking for direct guidelines from the cartels on what it could publish without the abduction and murder of its journalists.  The homicide rates have become staggering; 28,000 people have lost their lives since Felipe Calderón assumed the presidency in 2006, a murder rate more than three times higher than that in the U.S.  The northern border regions of Mexico have come to resemble Somalia or pre-invasion Afghanistan more than their southern counterparts.  The Mexican government reacts angrily to statements of this kind, especially the use of the phrase “failed state.” The anger is probably justified.  For the moment, Mexico does not warrant the designation “failed state,” for although the northern border regions may resemble lawless Somalia, the rest of the country clearly does not.  A more appropriate comparison would be to Pakistan, where the central government is in control of Islamabad, but clearly has no clout in regions such as Waziristan and the Northwest Frontier Provence.  The risk is that Mexico will end up in the same position, with a government that controls the capital but not the borders.  To remind the reader, these borders are our borders.

This outcome would be terrible for the United States for four reasons.  First of all, the lack of security could eventually destroy foreign investment in Mexico and hamper if not reverse growth in the economy overall.  Large, modern businesses, including American business, cannot operate and certainly will not invest if commercial law evaporates.  Since Mexico is America’s third-largest trading partner, slow or negative growth in Mexico will directly impact U.S. economic prospects.  Second, the most assured long-term solution to America’s immigration problems involves growing the Mexican economy and thereby reducing the economic pressure for migrants to head northward.  A declining Mexican economy will face the U.S. with unprecedented levels of illegal immigrants seeking to escape both economic hardships and violence, which would put even further strain on the American labor market.  Third, the violence engulfing northern Mexico will undoubtedly spread into the U.S. (the main narcotics gangs are known to be operating in 195 American cities), creating new nightmares for the federal enforcement agencies.  Finally, the existence of Mexican democracy itself would come in to question, which would create significant problems for U.S.-Mexican relations.  American foreign policy interests tend to coincide with those of other democracies, and if democracy in Mexico falters (whether due to the gangs or far-right militarists), the United States may face awkward diplomatic rows with Mexico, much as it does now with states like Venezuela.

Given the grave consequences of Mexico becoming akin to Pakistan, the U.S. must use every means at its disposal to avoid this situation.  The current American policies of limiting domestic demand and the importation of narcotics, however, are clearly ineffective.  This article posits, therefore, that the best solution is to legalize marijuana nation-wide.  As the least harmful and most widely used of illegal narcotics, cannabis is the best candidate for legalization. If legalization were to occur, domestic production would become legitimate, which would force Mexican gangs out of the American marijuana market for two reasons: first, due to economies of scale and reduced transportation costs, domestically produced marijuana would be far cheaper than its Mexican counterpart, according to a recent report by the NGO RAND.  Secondly, American producers would be able to focus their efforts on producing higher-grade marijuana (of the type that is currently used for medical purposes), which is both more potent and longer lasting.  Faced with competition from American firms supplying cheaper and higher-grade cannabis, Mexican cartels would effectively be priced out of the U.S. market.

Given the secrecy with which the cartels operate, the proportion of their revenues that come from the exportation of marijuana is not precisely known; credible estimates range from 25% to 40%.  However, even a reduction in profits of 25% is likely to have a sizeable effect on both sides of the border.  In Mexico, a decline in revenue would correspond to a decline in the power of the gangs, in at least three areas: first, since the gangs do not seem to exhibit product specialization (the only distinguishing factor is geography), U.S. legalization would force all gangs to downsize their operations and lay off workers.  The gangs would also be obliged to offer less enticing economic incentives to young Mexicans considering joining their operations, which would reduce their influence in Mexican society.  Second, reduced profits from the loss of U.S. market share would hinder the ability of the cartels to bribe police officials, politicians,  and journalists, which would allow for better law enforcement and increase public awareness of the gangs’ atrocities.  Third, decreased revenues would simply mean decreased working capital, both for the maintenance and expansion of the gangs’ activities, and for the purchase of weapons.  Each of the above factors would likely contribute to lower levels of violence in the long term, reports RAND, as a decline in the cartels’ power would allow the government to regain control of the situation, although it has been suggested that violence might increase in the short term while the drug markets stabilize.

North of the border, the legalization of marijuana would have many positive spillover effects from Mexico, in addition to the direct elimination of the crime problem.  As a byproduct of the declining ability of the cartels to export to the United States, the existing domestic supply routes that have been established (which smuggle marijuana within the U.S. once it has crossed the border) would wither and die.  This would eliminate a further source of revenue for the cartels and decrease the possibility of “spillover violence” in the U.S.  Additionally, better security in the long term will ensure a more robust Mexican economy with higher GDP growth, which will entice more Mexican workers to seek jobs in their own country rather than in the U.S., thus alleviating strain on the American labor market and border patrol.  It is therefore clear that the federal legalization of marijuana would yield sizeable benefits in both the United States and Mexico.

Unfortunately, the recent debate in California over Proposition 19 focused only on the domestic aspects of the legalization of marijuana, and as this article shows, one of the most important impacts it would have is on U.S.-Mexican relations.  It is plainly in America’s best interests to help Mexico combat the narcotics gangs, as well as our responsibility to the extent that U.S. demand is the reason for their existence.  As it stands, the rule of law in Mexico is not strong enough to withstand the economic hurricane of U.S. drug demand, and if we do not radically alter our strategies, the rule of law in our southern neighbor may be blown away.

Y is known to be developing nuclear technology, a prospect that clearly threatens X.  Fearing that Y will develop weaponry capabilities, X develops a piece of malware – surreptitious software designed to interfere with another computer’s normal functions – to infect computers in Y’s nuclear plants and delay its production of nuclear technology.  Computers in Y and other nations around the world are temporarily crippled by the sophisticated contagion of X’s malware.

Years ago, such a crisis would have seemed to be an excerpt from a preposterous piece of science fiction kitsch, grounded in fanciful perceptions of computer capabilities.  Last month, however, the inevitable occurred – a piece of malware, Stuxnet, demonstrated that such futuristic fantasies have already become reality.

It is not hard to guess that X is Israel and that its suspected aggressor, Y, is Iran, set within a turbulent Middle East.  Although roughly 62,000 computers in Iran were recently attacked by “the most complex piece of malware in the history of computing,” it cannot be confirmed that the engineer of the malware was Israel. According to Graham Cluley, a computer security expert at the British firm Sophos, it is “very hard to prove 100 percent who created a piece of malware, unless you are able to gather evidence from the computer they created it on.”

Still, Ralph Langner, a computer scientist at Langner Communications, points out that “because the development requires much more resources than any … hacker group could afford,” Stuxnet must have been constructed by a wealthy and resourceful government with “insider information” concerning the computers targeted.  The list of governments with the motive and the capability is not very long.

Identity of the perpetrator aside, this incident raises an important possibility – that such malware should in fact be used to sabotage malevolent nations’ facilities when international sanctions and other methods of warning fail to suffice.  A more professionally designed malware program, under careful management, could serve as an excellent last resort to prevent violent actions from aggressor states, as well as threatened states who might take preemptive military actions.

How advanced could this malicious software be, and how do its capabilities inform the perpetrators’ motivation behind its production?  Sean McGurk, the head of the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, demonstrates that the Stuxnet virus can be contained in a single “blue rubber-clad swivel-style USB thumb drive.” This virus could, he explains, infiltrate any software that uses Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, or SCADA.

Most automated plants, including oil refineries, food production facilities, and nuclear reactors, use such software and are thus susceptible to the virus.  Once planted in these computers, Stuxnet can modify the programs’ functions while remaining hidden, rendering any changes invisible.

Given that over 60 percent of the computers infected by Stuxnet were located in Iran, it is plausible that the virus’ engineers had targeted the nuclear facilities at Bushehr and Natanz, which, according to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, its president, are being used strictly for civilian energy purposes.  Siemens AG, the German control systems conglomerate that built the Bushehr facility for the Shah of Iran in the 1970s, has confirmed the Iranian government’s claim that no significant harm was inflicted upon the facilities.  Although no permanent damage was done, Alan Bentley of Lumension said that the Bushehr plant “was not working properly for months.” Stuxnet’s perpetrator had therefore been successful in disabling the epicenter of Iranian nuclear innovation.

According to computer security experts, the Stuxnet virus is under control and no longer poses a threat.  The question that remains in its wake, however, is whether such cyberwarfare ought to become an accepted tool in the arsenal of warring states.

Indeed, other potential aggressors, from national governments to multinational corporations, could potentially use Stuxnet as a platform to build and launch their own malware.  Such tactics could ultimately become commonplace methods of espionage and sabotage from state and non-state actors alike.

Given its insidious ease and speed in “infecting” computers on a global scale, cyber sabotage is often decried as dangerous and cowardly.  But the Stuxnet incident also opens a provocative angle: if the malware is used to reduce the aggressive capabilities of a government that is internationally recognized as structurally backwards, defiant, and malevolent in its policy, then non-militaristic means of sabotage such as Stuxnet should perhaps be applauded for their ability to temporarily cripple their military potential.

With the advent of government-funded malware, aggressive or defiant nations could be neutralized without violence when diplomacy has failed.  North Korea, a nation that has flagrantly defied international sanctions and diplomatic agreements, could be paralyzed with advanced malware.  This would bypass the violence and almost certain loss of life associated with military force.

Naturally, such an approach remains contentious, and this must be addressed at both the national and international levels.  Leaders must weigh carefully the implications of such a frighteningly effective method of preventive action.  Governments should work together on joint regulations, which could be modeled after nuclear disarmament treaties.

Domestically, America should improve its cyber security to ensure that it is not susceptible to sabotage from abroad or within.  Bugs must be ironed out of any malware to prevent civilian computers from being accidentally attacked.

Despite these difficulties, we should consider the potential peaceful efficiency afforded by cyber sabotage.  Imagine a world in which defiant and malicious military actions can be stopped before they have begun.  Warfare fought by lifeless computers with viruses may ultimately prove to be better for us all than war fought by young men and women with guns.

At the same time, the nuances of the story have dramatically changed since President George W. Bush first designated the naval base as a detention facility for terrorism suspects. Since then, the United States has ordered the release or transfer of over 500 prisoners, with fewer than 250 inmates remaining in custody. And the Bush Administration decided all but a handful of these cases. Whereas the federal government once lauded the facility as a formidable icon for progress in the War on Terror, Guantanamo Bay now represents a political liability and ethical offense for the growing contingent of government officials that have demanded its closure. This movement gained traction when President Barack Obama, freshly inaugurated, issued an executive order to close the facility by January 2010. Yet there remains much wrangling over where to relocate detainees and how to fulfill this mandate. Furthermore, many Congressional Republicans continue to oppose plans to close the prison camps in an effort strongly reminiscent of Bush-era drumbeating.

But there exists only one viable direction for deliberations over the Guantanamo issue. Lawmakers must put their full support behind the President’s decision to end this eight-year nightmare. If the United States is to have any hopes of demonstrating to the world that it has charted a new course, then closing this detention facility in a timely manner must remain a foreign policy priority. Guantanamo’s turbulent beginnings and sinister past offer only half of the incentive for taking action. While there is enough cause to close down the facility purely based on previous wrongdoings, officials should also seize this opportunity to use the closure as a symbol of America’s new ideological direction. And despite what many opponents would suggest, this task is not so complicated.

At the heart of the historical controversy over Guantanamo is the original intent of the Bush Administration to establish a military prison unconstrained by domestic or international law—an objective that served as the catalyst for ensuing abuses. As classified terrorists, inmates were denied Geneva rights and basic Constitutional protections. The Supreme Court and legal scholars alike have since debunked the legitimacy of that proposition.

Aside from the nuances of their legal status (which are beyond the purview of this paper), the more compelling argument for closing Guantanamo is that very few of the detainees should have ever been incarcerated. David Remes, a Harvard-educated lawyer who left an elite position at Covington & Burling to represent detainees, often speaks about the sobering experience of representing Gitmo detainees. In a special lecture at Princeton in April 2009, Mr. Remes emphasized the fact that the US military captured only 5% of the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay. Many of the remaining 95% were delivered by bounty hunters, who often subsequently received a few thousand dollars for each suspect.

Oftentimes, the basis of the accusation rested on the alleged sighting of the suspect in unsavory company. In slightly more substantive cases, soldiers were arrested on the battlefield for actually fighting alongside the Taliban. But even this justification for detention is not entirely logical. As Mr. Remes acknowledged, Afghanistan has been embroiled in a civil war for over a decade between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban. In short, the lines of this conflict had solidified before American involvement. For simply declaring allegiance to one side over another in a preexisting conflict, a soldier could be detained and sent to Guantanamo as a terrorist and enemy of the United States. Nevertheless, the Bush administration convinced the public that these men were at the helm of a global conspiracy, as Vice President Dick Cheney declared them “the worst of a very bad lot” and insisted that they “are devoted to killing millions of Americans.” A far cry from fulfilling the dangerous mastermind conception, the average Guantanamo prisoner is an underweight Yemenite who was delivered into US hands, by an enemy or rival, for a cash reward. Typically, the detainee speaks no English and had never encountered an American prior to his arrival at the military base.

The testimonies and anecdotes of prisoner abuse have been constant. By what authority did the United States arrest, brutalize, and psychologically torment these men without substantive evidence of their wrongdoing? The most straightforward answer is that the federal government took this course of action because President Bush needed to create the semblance of accomplishment in the War on Terror and impoverished Middle Eastern countries were powerless to stand in the way of this goal. But the rest of the world has since denounced this injustice, and Guantanamo has become a universal symbol of American tyranny.

Nevertheless, with a new administration comes the opportunity to revamp the national image. For his part, President Obama has wholeheartedly embraced this obligation. In a 50-minute address at the National Archives in May, Mr. Obama spoke about Guantanamo with a renewed energy. Beyond a simple pledge to close the detention facility, the speech represented a profound ideological departure from US doctrine over the past several years. The President spoke plainly about the corrosive effect of the Guantanamo legacy, and also of the dangers of stagnation: “I can tell you that the wrong answer is to pretend like this problem will go away if we maintain an unsustainable status quo. As president, I refuse to allow this problem to fester. Our security interests won’t permit it. Our courts won’t allow it. And neither should our conscience.” For the first time in a long time, an American president acknowledged that morality has a place in foreign policy and that our national security is not predicated on a disregard for civil liberties. Of course, President Bush made Wilsonian overtures of peace and democracy, but these gestures were frequently delivered at the end of a bayonet. And although former President Clinton’s efforts in Bosnia and Somalia were guided by feelings of altruism, President Obama is the first commander-in-chief since Jimmy Carter to prioritize humility and restraint in his worldview. Such a philosophy is part of what New York Magazine refers to as Mr. Obama’s greater attempt to “change our conception of both ourselves and our country, as well as the way outsiders perceive us.” Swift rectification of the Guantanamo issue would offer the reprieve that President Obama seeks for this country’s moral standing.

Republicans and Democrats alike belabor the administrative difficulties of transferring and releasing detainees, but there are several viable options for lawmakers to choose from, should they ever become serious about supporting the President’s agenda. One concern with repatriating inmates to countries like Yemen—known to be somewhat lax on terrorism—is that they would become an attractive pool of recruits for organizations like al Qaeda. But US allies like Saudi Arabia have agreed to adopt part of the prison’s Yemenite population. The Obama Administration has also made arrangements to transfer detainees to a host of European countries including France, Portugal, and Italy. At the same time, the United States must also be willing to accept a sizeable share of Guantanamo’s inhabitants. As the principal architect of this quagmire, the US has an obligation to rehabilitate and provide for these inmates until further provisions can be established. For the handful of detainees that are truly dangerous, facilities similar to the Supermax prison in Florence, Colorado remain realistic options. While many politicians vehemently protest the possibility of absorbing suspects connected to the ominous War on Terror, The Denver Post reports that Governor Bill Ritter “supports the idea” of bringing them to his state, declaring that “Supermax was built to handle exactly this type of inmate.”

However, this position stands in stark contrast to the arguments of a contingent of the Republican Party, which has hyperbolized the risks of housing detainees on American soil. The Washington Post has covered the efforts of Congressional Republicans to dissuade residents of Standish, Michigan (a site that has made President Obama’s most recent shortlist) from advancing plans to transfer inmates to a local facility:

At the time, [tavern owner] Munson said he saw the idea as an economic lifeline for the town and the prison, which provides more than 300 jobs. Then he met U.S. Rep. Peter Hoekstra (R-Mich.) at a cocktail party and quickly changed his mind. ‘He told me things that really scared the heck out of me,’ Munson said. ‘He told me about soft targets and safe zones, that if they came to this country they would have rights, visitors and friends would come who could be jihadists.’
Politicians that espouse the beliefs of Rep. Hoekstra, who serves as the ranking Republican on the House Intelligence Committee, assert a moot argument. Yes, some of the detainees at Guantanamo are dangerous. Yes, these particular men should not be released into society. Yes, they would pose a threat to ordinary Americans if permitted to roam freely. But, as Governor Ritter noted, federal penitentiaries are equipped to deal with such people. One would be hard pressed to explain why our prisons would be wholly unfit for Guantanamo inmates, considering that these very facilities have secured the public against drug traffickers, mafia bosses, and deadly terrorists like Timothy McVeigh.

The closure of Guantanamo Bay stands out as one of President Obama’s most worthwhile foreign policy initiatives, yet only six Democrats voted in favor of the May 2009 bill to appropriate funds for this cause. The President’s difficulty in garnering congressional support is reflective of a broader problem in the political landscape: as with healthcare, Democrats have failed to unify under a common ideology. The Wall Street Journal is one publication that has exposed this embarrassing deficiency, detailing how Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and other well-positioned liberals have equivocated on the issue. Until Mr. Obama’s party is able to overcome internal squabbling, many significant problems will be left unresolved. And the change that Americans so eagerly sought in the aftermath of the Bush Administration will become an unfulfilled promise.