In 2002, the moderate Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by Istanbul mayor Recep Tayyip Erdogan swept to power. The AKP embraced economic reforms that opened up Turkey’s economy to foreign and private investment, breaking up the state’s control over major industries. Erdogan also ushered in a series of constitutional reforms to protect the rights of prisoners and journalists, ensure religious freedom, and reined in the power of the military that dominated Turkish society since the country’s founding following the First World War. Erdogan’s actions helped cement civilian control over the military and strengthened the power of Turkey’s elected government.

Turkey’s success could make it a model for the nations involved in the Arab Spring. Tunisia would likely stand the best chance of successfully implementing Turkish-style reforms given its relative economic prosperity, the emergence of a moderate Islamist party, Ennhada, which views the AKP as its mentor and possess a history of adopting moderate positions, and a strong tradition of secular thought and a powerful liberal lobby. A relatively impoverished Egypt could still follow Turkey’s path if provided with the right guidance and resources. While the emergence of the fundamentalist Salafi party al-Nour and the failure of new secular parties to organize in time to be competitive in parliamentary elections remain causes for concern, the Muslim Brotherhood’s moderate platform and willingness to form a coalition with secular parties as it becomes the largest party in parliament is promising.

Turkey stands out as an example of a secular democracy with an Islamic heritage, a model Tunisia and Egypt could follow. The AKP’s ability to appeal to voters’ desire for a government acknowledging Islamic values while ensuring a separation between religion and politics represents a possible method in which moderate Islamic political movements can provide their populations with the freedoms often attributed to Western society and the values of an Islamic one. Furthermore, the AKP’s excellent record of economic development and liberalization provides a blueprint for how the economic integration of Middle Eastern nations can lead to prosperity for their citizens. Finally, the emergence of Turkey illustrates the necessity of establishing civilian control of the military. Politicians in countries such as Egypt, where the military continues to play an overbearing role in the transition to democracy, will likely take note of the techniques used by Prime Minister Erdogan to curb the once all-mighty Turkish military. Turkey’s prominence as a democratic, prosperous Middle Eastern power serves as a beacon of hope for newly emerging democracies.

While Turkey presents a good model in some regards for newly emergent democracies to follow, any country that seeks to emulate the AKP’s success should avoid the pitfalls of the Erdogan regime. In particular, countries should beware of restricting journalistic freedom. In spite of his promises, Erdogan failed to protect the rights of Turkish journalists to question their government. Countless journalists remain detained on trumped-up charges, and some measures suggest that Turkey may incarcerate more journalists per year than more totalitarian regimes such as China. In addition, Turkey’s record on securing rights for ethnic minorities remains abysmal. In spite of Erdogan’s reforms, Kurds remain largely marginalized in Turkish society, fueling the newly resurgent PKK insurgency. Countries with large ethnic or religious minorities such as Egypt, whose Coptic Christian minority has been involved in clashes with Muslims and security forces in recent months following the fall of the Mubarak regime, should refrain from emulating the Turkish model in this regard. Furthermore, the lack of significant political movements opposed to the AKP poses additional concerns for those who view Turkey as a model for future democracies. The opposition remains in disrepute due to its prior corruption and reliance on the military for support. Until a viable opposition party manages to check the power of the AKP, Turkey cannot be classified as the true multi-party democracy it proclaims itself to be.

The emergence of democracy in Middle East raises concerns regarding the effect of the Arab Spring on U.S. power and influence in the Middle East. Many pessimists argue that the replacement of “reliable” autocrats such as Mubarak in Egypt and Ben Ali in Tunisia with potentially “unfriendly” democracies will cripple U.S. power in the region. This line of thinking has shaped U.S. policy in the region dating back to the Cold War. In 1951, the democratically-elected Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammed Mossadegh, attempted to nationalize Iranian oil wells. Fearing that Mossadegh could threaten U.S. economic interests, the U.S. backed a military coup that overthrew Mossadegh in 1953 and restored the Shah. This action fueled a deep-seated mistrust of the United States among the Iranian public, causing the power of the secular, democratic opposition to be co-opted by fundamentalists. The Mossadegh debacle illustrates that the longer a dictatorship remains in power, the harder it will be for a democratic, moderate opposition to take control. When political dissent is repressed, Islamic groups become an outlet for political expression, a key example being the popularity of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood under the Mubarak regime. The United States should embrace efforts by the citizens of Middle Eastern countries to establish democracies of their own.

While U.S. support for dictatorships yields devastating results for U.S. hegemony, the emergence of democracy in the region will greatly enhance U.S. influence in the region by promoting economic liberalization and international humanitarian involvement. The dictatorships overthrown in the Arab Spring utilized cumbersome, closed, state-run economies which they associated with a secular, socialist state. The vast majority of citizens developed a distaste for both; thus, like the AKP, most moderate Islamic parties strongly support the free market. Should these countries open up their economies to foreign investment, the United States and its allies will obtain considerable economic benefits as attested by Turkey’s significant trade with the West. Furthermore, significant economic influence in a democracy yields far greater hegemony than military aid to a dictatorship. While dictatorships can simply request assistance from another power in lieu of a loss of funds, economic realities cannot be altered overnight, as evidenced by the significant influence exerted by Chinese economic investment in the U.S. against the debatable leverage of U.S. aid to Pakistan. In addition, democracies may prove more supportive of more idealistic objectives such as human rights preservation or genocide prevention. Popular support for idealistic endeavors can force democracies to act where dictatorships may have lain dormant. For instance, public outrage prompted Erdogan to call for Gadhafi’s resignation and that of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in spite of strong economic ties. Clearly, democratic regimes will enhance long-run influence in the region of the United States far more effectively than any autocracy.

Turkey’s progress makes it a model for the emerging democracies of the Arab Spring to follow that would meet the needs of their citizens and enhance the influence of the United States. Most newly empowered nations such as Egypt and Tunisia will likely adapt aspects of the Turkish model to suite their own respective circumstances. Turkey’s ability to blend Islamic values with a secular democracy, embrace of free-market principles, and success in establishing civilian control over military forces represent positive aspects of a democracy that emerging democracies would do well to emulate. While certain aspects of the Turkish model such as restrictions journalistic freedom and minority rights remain areas of concern, Turkey nevertheless represents the premier example of a stable, functioning democracy in the Middle East. The success of the Arab Spring bodes well for the United States, whose economic influence will increase on the heels of economic liberalization. Instead of lending its support to increasingly doomed, irrelevant autocracies, the world’s oldest democracy should lend its support to the word’s newest democracies as they secure the benefits of liberty and prosperity for their citizens.

In the aftermath of the exchange, in which Israel freed Palestinians,imprisoned for everything from dissent to violence in return for the release of Gilad Shalit, an Israeli Defense Force soldier captured in the July War with Lebanon’s Hizballah, Israeli opinion is divided, but only slightly: according to polls taken immediately after the release, between 74 and 80 percent of the Israeli public support the exchange. Indeed, addressing concerns as to the inequality of the exchange, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu quoted from the Talmud: “He who saves one soul, it is as though he saved an entire world.” Meanwhile, Palestinians are jubilant at the prospect of having secured the release of so many, for what they consider so little. It seems that for once, a solution has been brokered in the endlessly intractable conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people that somewhat satisfies everyone.

Yet the prisoner exchange, seemingly a one-shot, no-strings-attached PR boon for the Israeli government and Hamas alike, will have far-reaching consequences for which neither party is prepared. The exchange, brokered in secret by Egypt between the two parties, failed to engage either the Israeli or Palestinian public in a way that would have given them a sense of future potential for open cooperation. The concept of negotiation between Israel and Hamas has been thrust upon both publics quite suddenly, giving them little stake in the talks or the possibility of others in the future. Moreover, as the initial joy fades, the exchange serves to remind both parties of the tense relationship that created the need to exchange such prisoners—captured in times of conflict, imprisoned for political dissent and terrorism—in the first place. Indeed, both sides view this act as one of just compensation rather than one of reconciliation. The impact it will have for both Israeli security prospects and Palestinian aspirations is minimal at best and costly at worst.

While the deal has received much praise from the Israeli public, it is mysterious that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other senior government officials dealing with the exchange would believe such a security risk to be wise. It seems illogical that, a government and, moreover, a nation so concerned with the threat of terrorism of which they consider Hamas a key breeder, would broker a deal that releases men and women whose involvement included but was not limited to a 2001 Jerusalem pizzeria bombing, the 2002 “Passover Massacre” in Netanya, and a 2004 shooting attack on the Trans-Israel Highway. To the Israelis, these incidents no doubt represent profound threats to their security, and the release of those who committed them seems an odd risk to take considering the importance they place on that existence. Israeli opposition leader Tzipi Livni, among others, has pointed out this discrepancy.

Yet while Israeli’s security interests have been imperiled by the prisoner exchange, Palestinians aspirations for statehood have been dealt a far greater blow. The release, while celebrated by those families whose loved ones had come home, some of whom had been imprisoned since 1987′s first intifada, was quickly hailed by Hamas themselves as evidence of the need to take more Israeli soldiers hostage since, clearly, it had proven effective. “The people want a new Gilad!” protesters chanted at a Hamas rally in Gaza City, shortly after the exchange. And while the capture of Gilad Shalit does appear to have paid dividends for Hamas, it has become painfully evident to Palestinians that violent action against the state of Israel only results in increased security measures and repression. Hamas’ citing of this exchange as a success, then, has the potential to derail the non-violent Palestinian opposition to Israel that has become more widespread in recent years.

Moreover, the exchange has increased the legitimacy and popularity of Hamas at the expense of the West Bank’s Fatah, whose influence has been called into question and weakened by the deal. Israel and the international community alike generally regard Fatah as the more legitimate Palestinian government; any substantive peace deal, therefore, would necessitate their involvement. Relations between Israel and Fatah, however, are tenuous at best, and an upsurge in violence by Hamas, by taking prisoners or using similar means would most likely reflect poorly on the Palestinian cause as a whole, and therefore Fatah by association. Moreover, historically, this sort of violence has led to increasingly repressive Israeli security measures, which would set Palestinian expectations back substantially.

Furthermore, even if Hamas’ rhetoric fails to derail the Palestinian cause, the deal they brokered with Israel has taken the spotlight away from the issues that concern Palestinians the most. While Shalit’s release and the role Hamas’ played in it has caused a stir in the media, little attention has been paid to the underlying causes of the conflict, dizzying in scope and, as of late, unaddressed by either party through negotiation. Any attempts at peace talks have stalled and a UN bid, while symbolically significant, has been doomed to failure. Palestinians continue to exist in an oddly bifurcated, quasi-independent non-state, which they view as imminently threatened by Israel’s persistent creation of “facts on the ground” in the form of illegal settlements. Yet international attention regarding the conflict has been distracted from the unabated settlement construction in East Jerusalem, supported by PM Netanyahu, among others, by a high-publicity event with little implication for the larger issues at stake.

Some will argue that the joy and relief that both sides have felt in the days following the exchange will promote a mutual spirit of goodwill, inciting reconciliation and future peace. Others argue that the negotiation necessary to cut the Israel-Hamas deal served to break the ice between the two parties, laying a path for future talks. “This is a sign of a good deal,” wrote Uri Dromi, former spokesman for previous Israeli PM’s Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, “when both sides walk away equally dissatisfied.” This might have been true if a deal containing any substance had been reached.

Yet the fact that talks that did not address the underlying issues concerning Palestinian statehood and its implications—for Jerusalem— water issues, the return of refugees and Israeli security, to name a few—yet still require outside mediation does not bode well for any future relationship. Furthermore, neither the Palestinian nor Israeli public saw the talks as such: to each side, the deal represented the long-awaited return of men and women, imprisoned by an unjust party for fighting a just cause. Indeed, the Israeli government did not even attempt to portray it as such. “I have brought your son home to you,” Netanyahu announced, upon bringing Shalit to his parents’ home in northern Israel. The bravado and simplicity of his statement brushed aside any acknowledgment of the complexity of the deal he had just made, as well as its implications for his nation and another’s future.

For Hamas, the prisoner deal seemed too good to be true. For the Israeli and Palestinian public, it is. If the exchange served any purpose, it was to remind people from both societies of another type of prisoner—the one that they themselves have become, held hostage by directionless leadership willing to make long-term sacrifices for short-term popularity.

Hours after the ultimatum requiring Saddam Hussein’s departure from Iraq had expired, on March 19th, 2003, President Bush ordered the commencement of the Iraq War. The justifications presented were Hussein’s intention to build weapons of mass destruction and a purported link between Iraq and Al Qaeda, the terrorist group responsible for the September 11th attacks. Both of these reasons have since been disputed and have rendered the start of the war a contentious issue to this day. By April 9t,h, 2003, Saddam Hussein’s rule had collapsed, and on May 1, Bush announced an end to major combat in Iraq.
Bush’s announcement was quickly proven premature and was subsequently followed by several mistakes and miscalculations. Members of the Bush administration issued orders to purge the government of Baathists and disband the Iraqi army, and the consequences of these decisions immediately became apparent. With the fall of Hussein’s government, American troops faced a new enemy of Baathists, paramilitary fighters, former Iraqi soldiers and foreign militants opposed to American occupation. Counterinsurgency became the newest tactical approach, causing parallels to be drawn between the war in Iraq and Vietnam War, as U.S. troops were confronted by an enemy who was willing to fight to the death and who often intermingled with civilians. In September 2004, an assault staged by U.S. and Iraqi forces targeting an insurgent stronghold resulted in 38 U.S. deaths and 800 Iraqi civilian deaths in addition to 1,200 insurgent deaths. This effort highlighted the costly nature of the war as gains against the enemy came at high civilian costs. Iraqi civilian deaths peaked in 2006, with estimates ranging from 1,000 to 3,500 per month. On April 28, 2004, evidence of prisoner abuse in Abu Ghraib was uncovered, prompting worldwide criticism of the way that the war was being conducted. Two years later, a CNN survey found that 60 percent of Americans opposed the war, the majority of which also favored the withdrawal of at least some troops from Iraq.

Partially in response to the public criticism of the war and U.S. strategy, President Bush made several significant modifications to U.S. policy in Iraq. In November 2006, he announced Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s resignation. In January 2007, the Bush administration implemented a controversial troop surge in Iraq. The increase in U.S. troops and U.S.-led offensives in Iraq, as outlined in the new strategy, led to an increased number of casualties. Indeed, the deadliest strike yet occurred in August of 2007, when coordinated suicide truck bombings resulted in hundreds of casualties, It also proved to be the most costly year for U.S. soldiers as American casualties reached over nine hundred. Nevertheless, the surge was largely credited with reducing sectarian violence in Iraq.

As the situation in Iraq began to stabilize, plans for the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces were accelerated. The withdrawal deadline set for the end of 2011 dates back to the Status of Forces agreement made in November 2008 by the Bush administration. At the time, the U.S. had intended to maintain a residual force of several thousand American soldiers for security purposes. The continued U.S. presence was opposed by varying Iraqi political factions like the Sadrists. Led by the influential Moktada al-Sadr, they advocated armed resistance if American forces remained past the withdrawal deadline. Shortly after taking office, President Obama began the process of reducing troops in Iraq and moving troops to Afghanistan. He announced plans to remove combat brigades by August 2010, a deadline which he honored with the end of combat missions on August 31, 2010. With the reduction of troops in Iraq, President Obama made it clear that an end to the Iraq war was approaching; however Defense Secretary Robert Gates continued to recommend maintaining troops past the deadline upon Iraqi request. The October 21st announcement to honor previous security agreements and complete troop withdrawal by the end of 2011 came as a surprise to many, as American officials had previously planned to keep a significant force of troops in Iraq under diplomatic immunity. Obama’s decision to honor a prior deadline reflected his desire to fulfill a campaign promise while simultaneously avoiding the prospect of an indefinite American troop commitment.

Withdrawing American troops from Iraq certainly has its consequences, as many of Obama’s Republican critics will be quick to contend. A major issue is the potential resurgence of Al Qaeda, which had suffered major defeats after the American troop surge in 2007. On August 15, 2011, a string of 42 apparently coordinated attacks left 89 dead and 315 wounded in a single day, and Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia warned of further attacks in revenge for bin Laden’s death. Analysts are particularly afraid of ties re-forming between Al Qaeda and members of the former ruling Baath Party. There is also the fear that without American troop support, the currant Iraqi government will collapse or that in the face of American withdrawal, other countries will attempt to invade Iraq. Iran is one such country that poses a threat to Iraqi security; historically it has supported aggressive attacks against American troops in Iraq.
These concerns, while valid, can overestimate the benefits of maintaining U.S. troops in Iraq. Even with the presence of American troops, violence continues to occur in Iraq. Many of the insurgents specifically oppose American intervention, creating reason to believe that attacks will decrease with the withdrawal of American troops, as will the justification for Iranian intervention to expel American troops. Furthermore, maintaining 10,000 troops beyond 2011 forces the U.S. into making an indeterminate commitment. Even with plans for diminishing the U.S. presence, 68,000 troops are expected to remain for at least another year. With troops stationed in Iraq for over eight years, many have grown disillusioned with the benefits of staying. A continued military presence without a set withdrawal deadline can only hurt morale without any tangible benefits for the troops that stay.

The parallels between Iraq and Vietnam abound, and rightly so. As in Vietnam, Americans have tired of intervention in Iraq. According to a poll conducted by Washington Post-ABC, 78 percent of Americans support Obama’s decision. The results of the Vietnam War may not have been consistent with America’s expectations, but diplomatic ties and trade relations eventually followed after American withdrawal and the fears of a domino effect proved unwarranted. There may be costs to withdrawing troops, in the form of a weakened and potentially vulnerable Iraqi government, but there are far more benefits. These include bringing troops home, ending an unpopular war, discouraging foreign attacks against American troops, and forging positive relations with the Iraqi people. America can still work to improve its relations with Iraq, but now is the time to build soft power leverage, which can only be achieved when the U.S. is no longer considered a hostile occupying force.

The U.S. is concerned that upon troop withdrawal, Iraq will be vulnerable and that its neighbors will step in and exert soft power to influence Iraq’s government and people. The US can counter this by matching the efforts made by Iraq’s neighboring countries, constructing schools, contributing to infrastructure, and developing favorable trade relations. These strategies will not only improve America’s world image and its influence over Iraqi policies, but in the long run, will provide for a more sustainable method for cultivating long-term influence and positive relationships within the Middle East. The U.S. has spent more than eight years using hard power in an effort to win Iraq over; now it is time to exercise soft power to create a positive working relationship with the Iraqi government and people.

The death of Gaddafi was cause for both great celebration and scrutiny. Although Gaddafi was supposed to be captured alive and brought before the International Criminal Court, his captors allegedly ignored this and killed him, presumably in the height of anger towards the former dictator. The video of his capture shows him being dragged through the streets, the autopsy of his body shows that he died of a gunshot to head, and rumors that he was sodomized before death are rampant. The fact that the Libyan militias did not allow Gaddafi the dignity of a fair trial shows that a fierce desire for retribution was just as strong as the desire for liberty during the struggle against the dictator. This resentment towards Gaddafi’s regime, while justified, is dangerous in that it prevents Libya from focusing on its future.

With Gaddafi out of the picture, the future of Libya is uncertain, and the presence of militias is only adding to the chaos. The lack of a strong central authority has already hurt many Libyans, especially those who had loyalist ties during the revolution. A Human Rights Watch report stated that militias in Libya continue to target “loyalist” towns and pro-Gaddafi supporters in an unlawful and inhumane manner, even post-Gaddafi. The report determined detainee torture to be equal to that carried out during the height of the Gaddafi regime. For example in the loyalist town of Tawergha, Libya, the organization interviewed many residents only to find that the rebels were arbitrarily arresting, beating, and otherwise abusing former regime sympathizers, causing many to flee out of fear. Testimonies from citizens detail deaths of innocent Tawergha residents from torturous beatings by rebel captors who are seeking revenge in ways that are counterproductive to progress in Libya.

Nevertheless, the future of Libya is not completely bleak. Libya as well as the international community can perhaps put their faith in the new leader of Libya’s interim government, the National Transitional Council, Prime Minister Abdurraheem el-Keib. Holding dual citizenship in the United States and Libya, el-Keib has lived in America since 1975, receiving a PhD from North Carolina State University and holding a long term teaching position at the University of Alabama as a professor of engineering. Recently, in a hopeful sign for democracy in Libya, el-Keib was elected to his Prime Minister position by members of the National Transitional Council after the former head of the NTC, Mahmoud Jibril, remained true to his promise to step down after the capture of Sirte, the last loyalist holdout. El-Keib is a nationalist., which bodes well for Libya’s future, as he can lead the NTC to make nonpartisan decisions that are best for Libya as a whole, rather than give in to demands from various rebel groups.

Charged with overseeing the progress of Libya in its transitional period, the NTC and el-Keib must work together with the militias and rebels to bring peace and stability to Libya. Libya does not need a quick democratic panacea that has election booths up and running right away, but rather a low- key recovery and healing process that involves open communication between the desires of the rebel groups and the hopes of the new interim government. The danger of jumping on the bandwagon of democracy purely for democracy’s sake is that the Libyan people and the country will not be ready for such an abrupt change. It is likely that the various rebel and tribal groups in Libya will feel slighted or disillusioned with democracy in Libya, especially since there are competing visions of how the new Libyan government should operate. This could lead to rejection of Libya’s democracy, inter-tribal competition, and ultimately escalation to civil war. Thus, before democracy can be successfully instituted in Libya, certain groundwork steps must be taken to guarantee Libya’s stable future.

First and foremost, both the NTC and the rebel groups must work together to arrest forces loyal to Gaddafi that continue to cause uprisings while firmly insisting on maintaining fair criminal trials for those arrested. Those loyalists who accept the fall of the old regime and the new future for Libya should be incorporated into the progression of Libyan politics, not ostracized by rebels. While the NTC may extend a hand of partnership to different rebel groups to help capture those who are still Gaddafi supporters, it must insist on conducting a lawful and fair trial for those arrested.

Meanwhile, the NTC and the rebel groups must also open dialogue on the drafting of a new constitution for Libya, which is crucial in defining how the new government and society of Libya will operate. The last constitution of Libya was created in 1951 but became defunct when Gaddafi took power. A new constitution that clearly delineates human rights, just laws, and a democratic system of government will help Libyans ground themselves in a concrete sense of the future as well as dictate the law for rebel groups.

Libya can gain a lot by looking towards Tunisia – the country that instigated the “Arab Spring” movement – and its recent first democratic election since the ousting of its feared ex-leader Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. The high participation rate in the Tunisian election, estimated to be around 90% of registered voters, coupled with the relatively peaceful Election Day, sets a great example of how to establish a fair and respected democratic system. However, Tunisia’s road to election day has been fairly bumpy, as citizens disagreed over the role of Islam in government and became disillusioned with the lack of improvement of socioeconomic problems. Libya and the NTC have the chance to learn from some of Tunisia’s struggles by working to gain the public trust early on and placate the Libyans expecting a rapid improvement of political and socioeconomic issues in Libya.

It will take time to heal a shattered Libya. The rebels must not let a desire for revenge overshadow goals for democratic progress. The success of Libya is crucial not only for the next generation of Libyans but also for providing inspiration to the citizens of other “Arab Spring” countries who are currently in the midst of a struggle for their own liberty and democratic government. Democratic progress, however, will take a great deal of effort and time. For now we can only hope that Libya does not dwell on seeking retribution but instead chooses to focus on its future.

In the three short months of the “Arab Spring,” waves of young, inexperienced, and unorganized protesters have accomplished what older opposition leaders and ideologues could not in three decades. In Tunisia and Egypt, protestors held out for more than two weeks, braving arrest, oppression, and bullets to see deposed the tyrannical authors of their brutal subjugation. In Yemen and Syria, thousands of men and women are staging protests to demand wide-ranging government reform. And in a desperate struggle to gain freedom and democracy, Libyan rebels have even taken up arms against their own government.

Some hopeful democrats are wondering when this movement will spread to the rest of the Arab world. However, those awaiting the turbulent sparks of Cairo and Benghazi to ignite crowds in Riyadh, Dubai and Doha will have to wait not days, but decades. Unlike citizens of the states currently in revolt, the people in countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE have seen great increases in their standard of living, a boom fueled almost entirely by oil revenues. This has allowed the citizens of the oil-states to accept an expedient bargain—a forfeiture of liberty and democracy in return for rapid economic growth.

The common thread among revolting Arab countries is not merely tyranny, but also continued poverty. These countries either lack substantial oil deposits relative to their population, as in the case of Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan, or have refused to share the oil wealth with their people, as in Syria, Yemen and Libya. As an example, Syria ranks 32nd in crude barrels of oil produced, and yet its per capita GDP is only slightly over $5,000.

On the other hand, among the oil-rich Gulf states, only Bahrain has seen substantial unrest, and there the friction is more due to religious rivalry (a majority Shia population ruled over by a Sunni royal family) than from an outpouring of democratic ideals. The other oil-exporting Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Kuwait are every bit as repressive as those in revolt; the Saudi Secret Police are some of the most feared in the world. The governments of these states, however, have quite literally purchased their citizens’ acquiescence through stunning economic growth rates. From 1990-2010, the UAE’s per capita GDP grew by 48%, Kuwait’s by 110%, and Saudi Arabia’s by 118%. At $90,149 Qatar has by far the world’s highest GDP per capita; compare that to the US’s $45,989.

In addition to these astounding growth rates, the governments of the oil-states have successfully bought off their people with extensive welfare policies. Saudi Arabia has free medical care and extremely generous unemployment benefits. The Qatari social safety net is so effective that unemployment in 2010 was only 0.5%. Kuwait has no personal taxes at all; not income, sales nor property. Businesses represent the only sector of the economy that pays taxes in the Emirate, and even then the only levy is an exceptionally low flat rate of 15%. Moreover, the awe-inspiring amounts of revenue that come into these Arab governments allow them to react to nearly any situation that threatens the elite hold on power. Most recently, to ensure continued stability in face of the nearby protests, Saudi King Abdullah was able to announce $400 billion additional spending in education, health care, unemployment benefits, and infrastructure over the next four years.

A people cannot be bought forever, however; eventually opposition movements sprout up with demands for political reform. Fortunately for the oil-states’ ruling elite, the enormous profits from oil exports provide them with the resources to squash protests and opposition before they can gain meaningful traction. According to an Amnesty International briefing, in the first 6 months of 2009 Saudi Arabia tried 330 people on very broad “terrorism” charges, virtually all of whom were convicted in closed trials, with sentences ranging from fines to the death penalty. The huge oil revenues plainly allow this scale of repression to take place; more money equates to more weapons, more sophisticated technology, more informants, and most importantly, more funding to buy off potential opposition figures.

In the 20th century, a happy coincidence emerged—the richer a country became, the more democratic it tended to be, and vice versa. The dominant model of economic development, known as the ‘Washington Consensus’, was built upon the twin pillars of economic liberalization and political freedom. Autocrats were therefore confronted with an uncomfortable dilemma—to speed the economic development of their countries, they needed to devolve power to their people.

In this century, however, the astonishing pace of development in several countries is challenging that model. The petro-states of the Persian Gulf clearly demonstrate that democracy need not accompany a high standard of living, although the source of their wealth—oil—can not be replicated in other countries that lack petroleum reserves. A greater challenge to the Washington Consensus comes from China, which is achieving unprecedented wealth creation without the benefit of black gold. The recent buzz among policy wonks has been the possibility of a ‘Beijing Consensus’—the idea that the fastest way to economic riches does not lie on the arduous path towards unruly democracy, but instead on the relatively easy track of continued dictatorship. Although the development models used in China and the Gulf states differ substantially, the essential concept remains the same: an emerging nation may accept autocracy and political repression in return for rising incomes.

Many autocrats in the beginning stages of development, particularly in Africa and Southeast Asia, are looking at the example of the Gulf states and China with relief. This in turn has profound impacts for global politics, dimming Western hopes that democracy will speedily complete its triumph around the world. If the dictators of oil-rich African countries such as the Congo, Sudan and Angola observe that they can achieve social and political stability without having to cede power to their people, we can expect to see fewer, not more, democracies in the developing world.
So while we observe the democratic ferment in parts of the Arab world with awe and hope, we must be mindful that foreign policy cannot be reduced to a simple slogan of “Democracy or bust.” It is quite clear that nowadays dictators may simply purchase stability and tolerance of autocracy with rapidly rising living standards for their people. So as the chaotic crowds gather on the rooftops of Brega and Ajdabiya aiming their rocket propelled grenades at incoming tanks, striving for a political voice, perhaps their war cry should be “Give me liberty, or give me—cash!”

The complicated state of affairs in Syria could make democratic change there even more difficult. The ruthless regime of Bashar al-Assad and religious diversity within Syria make internal stability a particularly acute challenge. Additionally, close ties with Iran, meddlesome policies in Lebanon and a tense border with Israel make Syria a lynchpin for regional stability. The situation in Syria is as precarious as it is important. While the United States should welcome democratic reform everywhere in its rhetoric, it should remain uninvolved in the Syrian movement.

The promotion of human rights is certainly a compelling reason to consider intervention. As in similar uprisings across the Arab world, average Syrians are demanding democratic reform, and their opponent is particularly destestable; few contemporary autocratic regimes are as ruthless as the Assad family. In 1982, then-president Hafez al-Assad massacred over 10,000 resistors and civilians in Hama to crush signs of rebellion from Syria’s Muslim Brotherhood. To this day, Freedom House consistently rates Syria as one of the worst regimes in the world regarding justice, equality, and freedom. Its security forces are infamous not only for their suppression of political resistance, but also for their use of torture. It is undeniable that the Assad government has little respect for human rights.

The Syrian government’s violent response to the peaceful protests, however, constrains the protestors’ ability to succeed, limiting the upside to getting involved. The protests began with a little over 100 participants in Damascus in mid-March but have grown in recent weeks—recently, protests featured hundreds of thousands of marchers in cities across Syria. The government’s response has been equally zealous; the death toll had reached over 200 as of mid-April, and hundreds more had been arrested. While these numbers are difficult to confirm—security forces have detained journalists—videos of the protests give a vivid impression of the government’s brutal reaction. Syria is not on the verge of revolution; it has a long and difficult battle ahead, which should make the U.S. especially hesitant in getting involved in what would doubtless be a protracted conflict.

This is not the only reason for the U.S. to stay away from the Syrian protests. On March 29th, thousands of Syrians, consisting of Shi’a and many upper middle class Sunni Muslims, marched in support of his presidency; unlike in Egypt, these supporters seemed to be genuinely motivated. Many Syrians see the stability afforded by a powerful and repressive autocrat as the only way to maintain peace and relative prosperity. Others still cling to the belief that Assad is the reformer he claimed to be when he came to power after his father’s death in 2000: Hillary Clinton, in a recent speech reflecting on the United States’ relationship with the Syrian dictator, indicated that the United States expected reform from Assad, rather than ruling it out as a lost cause. When the protests began, many hoped Assad’s response would be accommodation, and the President recently made a step towards rightfully claiming that mantle when he lifted the decades-long state of emergency law that gave him unfettered power. Granted, greater economic and human rights reforms beyond this one move will be necessary, and the prospect for real reform is dwindling in light of his violent crackdown on protestors.

Religious divisions have also contributed to conflict in Syria, increasing the uncertainty that U.S. involvement would bring. Whereas the North African Arab states are largely Sunni and ruled by secular or Sunni leaders, Syria’s Alawite minority—an off-shoot of Shi’a Islam—rules a diverse state. The Syrian population is approximately 75% Sunni, 12% Shiite, 10% Christian, and 3% Druze. Many working-class Sunnis are protesting in part because they do not see Bashar al-Assad’s Alawite government as truly Islamic. But many Syrians and analysts fear that a bloodbath of the Shi’a minority would follow if the current uprising were to succeed in deposing Assad. As a result, there is no clear “good guy” for the U.S. to support in this situation.

Looking internationally, Assad’s unfriendly foreign policy towards U.S. interests also fails to justify intervention. It is true that the President’s Shi’a affiliations helped him forge close ties with Iran and, in Lebanon, with Hezbollah. These groups have proven to be especially antagonistic to the West and to Israel. Assad’s continued resistance to working with Israel and the West at a time when many Arab countries became more cooperative seems to have placed him on the leading edge of Anti-Americanism in the region.

Despite this, though, Syria’s neighbors have reasons to support his rule. For Lebanon, stability in Syria is crucial for stability in its own fractious state, and many worry that a civil war in Syria could spill over the border. Counter-intuitively, Israel also has reasons to hope Assad stays in power. His opposition to Israel has led to aggressive rhetoric rather than action; despite not signing a peace agreement—unlike Jordan, Egypt, and the PLO—Assad has enforced a strong border with Israel and seems unwilling to risk a confrontation between the Syrian and Israeli armies. Less helpful to Israel is Assad’s support for Hamas, the violent Palestinian resistance party whose political bureau is based in Damascus. Nevertheless, Assad has not been willing to throw the Syrian military’s weight against Israel. It is also unclear whether a Sunni takeover in Syria would be more sympathetic to its Jewish neighbor. Thus even Israel is unsure whether to be enthusiastic about the uprisings in Syria.

Washington would do well to monitor closely the situation in Syria, as its dominion in the Arab world is certainly more critical for U.S. interests than Libya’s. But, because so much is at stake, the United States is right to remain distant. In the 1990s, the U.S. faced a similar situation in Iraq. The U.S. made a mistake when it encouraged a Shi’a rebellion against Saddam Hussein, only to refuse to provide the support necessary for regime change, leaving the Shi’a to suffer a massacre at Hussein’s hands. With commitments of indeterminate duration and expense in Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Libya, the United States is wise to stay uninvolved with Syria. Despite compelling reasons to encourage the protesters in Syria, the situation is also complicated and unpredictable. The nuances of the situation present strong reasons to proceed with caution.

These events that took place in Itamar, an Israeli settlement in the West Bank, earlier this March. In response, the Israeli government called for international condemnation and joint Israeli-Palestinian investigation of the crime. But, in the same breath, the Israeli government announced the approval of construction of 300-500 new settlement housing units.

Prime Minister Netanyahu met with relatives of the murdered family a few days after the event and told them the Israel would respond to the attacks with new construction initiatives: “They murder and we build.” In choosing settlement construction as a direct response [to the murders in Itamar, the Israeli government is making settlements a tool of war and conflict, and a response to terrorism. The implication is that the Israeli government is prepared, and even eager, to respond to this criminal act of quintuple homicide with an illegal act of their its own: construction of settlements in the West Bank, which the UN still considers to be occupied territory. Interior Minister Eli Yishai urged construction of at least a thousand settlement homes for each murder victim, while Chief Rabbi Yona Metzger agreed that settlement construction should accelerate because doing so would be an appropriate response to the murders. This rhetoric in support of settlement building is shared by a significant number of Israelis, including the current right-wing government. While the urge to avenge the victims in Itamar is understandable, murder is a crime that should be prosecuted by a police investigation and judicial system, not a construction team.

The tragedy of the Itamar murders is now two-fold, both for the family and friends of the murdered settlers and for the state of Israel itself: in addition to the tragedy and loss of life, the approval of new settlement construction makes the renewal of peace negotiations less and less likely. Also unfortunate is the fact that Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu had begun to take a stand against members of his own conservative Likud party, who were pressing him to undertake more settlement building in the past few months. His resistance had signaled a potential shift toward a more moderate policy, which included halting new settlement construction and the evacuation of settlements on land owned by Palestinians.

The existence and continued construction of Israeli settlements in the West Bank areas seized by Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War is a constant point of contention between the Israeli and Palestinian governments, and has often played a central role in peace talks. A more moderate settlement policy on the part of the Israeli government would have been crucial to facilitating cooperation between the Israelis and Palestinians and a move toward a two-state solution. The last round of peace talks hit a wall when the 10-month-long freeze of settlement construction in the West Bank expired and the Israeli government refused to extend it. Palestinian President Abbas has made another settlement freeze a condition for renewing peace talks, but so far the strong Israeli political support for settlements has prevented the cessation of construction. No other issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be addressed until this condition is met; only then can the negotiations continue. The murders in Itamar have terminated Netanyahu’s resistance to the pressures of his party, and with it the chance of continued peace negotiations in the near future. Just as, according to Chief Rabbi Metzger, the murders in Itamar have served to unite Israelis against Palestinians, so too will the approval of increased settlement construction inevitably unite Palestinians against Israelis. Furthermore, the Israeli government’s approval of the building of new settlements has signaled to militants and terrorists that they have the power to influence the decisions of the Israeli government. By approving the punitive measure of settlement building, the Israeli government has allowed a small militant group to speak for and represent the entire Palestinian population, undermining the legitimacy of President Abbas and his potential efficacy as a negotiator.

U.S. government officials must continue to pressure their Israeli counterparts to revoke the approval of settlement building and to reinstate the settlement freeze, which had allowed the commencement of peace negotiations last year. The U.S. government has expressed concern over continued Israeli construction of settlements in the West Bank, arguing that the settlements are not legitimate according to international law and will create a further obstacle to the hopes of coming to a two-state solution. The US government, as Israel’s closest ally, must make it clear that not only is settlement building an inappropriate response to the murders in Itamar, but also that Israel is actually doing itself a disservice by elevating the murders to the status of political activism. In February of this year, fourteen out of fifteen members of the UN Security Council voted to support a resolution condemning the construction of settlements and demanding all construction be halted. The US was the only member to refuse to support the resolution, citing a preference for allowing negotiations between Israel and Palestine to deal with such subjects. With the recent events in Itamar and the Israeli government’s response, however, it is unlikely that these negotiations will occur anytime soon.

The decision to use settlement building as a punitive measure is reckless and will inevitably lead to far more lives lost than the five in Itamar. In a time of such instability, anger, and uncertainty, the Israeli government should focus on stabilization rather than escalation – there have already been violent clashes between Israeli settlers and their Palestinian neighbors in the wake of the murders, which need to be immediately controlled and defused. Further, the Israeli government needs to move forward in its plans to remove Israeli settlements from private Palestinian land and halt further settlement construction if there are to be any peace negotiations in the near future.

It will take months, maybe years, for Egypt to get back on its feet. But already the protesters have done more than simply topple the Mubarak regime; they have also dealt a serious blow to the motivations behind the United States’ meddlesome foreign policy. The lack of Islamist leadership in the protests shows that the United States has held false beliefs about the support for the Muslim Brotherhood because of Mubarak, a misunderstanding of Egyptian popular sentiment, and its own fear. This misconception about Egyptian citizens’ beliefs led to US support for yet another oppressive dictator; a mistake that has seriously weakened its position in the region.

Founded in 1928 and banned 20 years later, the Muslim Brotherhood has long endorsed a harsh brand of Islam across the Muslim world while also providing basic services to the Egyptian people in areas where Mubarak’s government failed to do so. Until the protests in January, American officials seemed to think the Muslim Brotherhood commanded the support of the great majority of Egyptians. President Mubarak fueled this fear, as it helped him maintain leverage in negotiations with the United States. When President Bush’s rhetoric promoting democracy in the Middle East was running high in 2005, Mubarak allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to take 88 of Parliament’s 444 elected seats. The concession served as a warning to President Bush: advocating democracy in the Middle East will lead to the rise of Islamism. With the political and economic exhaustion that followed Iraq, Afghanistan, and the election results in Palestine, US advocacy for democracy in the Middle East seemed to be flagging; and in Egypt’s 2010 parliamentary elections, Mubarak’s National Democratic Party did not let the Brotherhood claim a single seat, which only served to reinforce the American sentiment that leaving Mubarak alone would prevent the rise of Islamism.

But within Egypt, it was not at all obvious that the Muslim Brotherhood commanded as much support as the United States thought it did. For example, Kefaya, an alternative opposition group founded in 2004, headed several major protests that posed a legitimate threat to the Mubarak government. Kefaya leaders repeatedly pleaded with Western powers to recognize that a moderate Egyptian government was an option, but to no avail. Even Western officials sympathetic to Kefaya’s arguments felt that its eventual fracaturing over ideological differences was evidence that there was no moderate civil society possible in Egypt.

The protest movement firmly discounts this theory. Contrary to almost all expectations, the Muslim Brotherhood did not lead the recent protests; only weeks in did they finally attempt to piggyback on the youth-fuelled movement to press their own goals. A variety of theories have attempted to explain this fact; some cynics argue that the protestors are feigning secularism in order to galvanize western support. But this does not explain the throngs in Tahrir Square – over two million people on a given day – whom, all evidence suggests, are not following a hidden political strategy and are not directed by behind-the-scenes extremist leadership. While religious, protesters have adamantly chanted slogans of religious unity rather than division, even shouting down those who proclaim the time is ripe for Islamism. Furthermore, the major figures involved in the protest, such as Google executive Wael Ghonim and Nobel-laureate Mohamed El-Baradei, are explicitly secular in their demands. It is foolish, naïve, and ultimately dangerous to assume that the Egyptian people will naturally support extremist Islamists for political office simply because they are devout Muslims themselves.

Still, even those who recognize that the Brotherhood is unlikely to win office are wary that one of its main tenets—a firm opposition to Israel—will take hold in a new Egypt. The United States began its charitable contributions to Egypt’s military after the Camp David accords in 1979, in which President Carter brokered an Egyptian alliance with Israel that endured both regional and domestic resentment. Before the Camp David accords, Egypt had engaged in two wars with Israel, settling on the current 125-mile border. Egypt also shares a five-mile border with Gaza, which has been the site of recent controversy over arms smuggling into the Israeli-blockaded region. Mubarak cooperated with US demands for stricter security in compliance with Israel’s blockade, and went along with the plan to burry an American-funded metal wall along the critical border.
This sort of help, along with the steady maintenance of his nation’s peace treaty with Israel, made Mubarak very valuable for American interests.

It is certainly true that the great majority of Egyptians – even those who don’t support the Muslim Brotherhood – are disgruntled, to say the least, with their government’s friendliness toward its northern neighbor and with the reputation the alliance has given Egypt throughout the Middle East. Israel’s popularity in the country is far lower than even the United States, which propped up a hated autocrat for 30 years. Still, notably, the protestors did not focus their criticism on Mubarak’s alliance with Israel. Attacking Israel seems to be a thing of the past, even for more conservative groups. Rather, they directed it at the lack of job opportunities, censorship, and Mubarak’s brutality.

It is difficult to quantify the degree and scale of human rights violations in Egypt. The fear maintained by police violence has silenced many would-be witnesses. Granted, the scale of violations does not compare to other regimes the United States has funded in the past few centuries. Mubarak was no Pinochet; in 2008, Amnesty International estimated that 20 people had died in Egypt as a consequence of torture. But numbers in cases of torture and unjust arrests are arguably not the relevant criterion, and comparison is not the relevant point; the brutality inflicted by the Egyptian police stomped out political opposition, religious expression, free speech, and fair trials.

America’s fear of Islamism has blinded it to all of these harms, greatly damaging its reputation in the region. Certainly, US aid cannot be blamed for Mubarak’s grip on power; it constituted only a small fraction of Egypt’s budget. US aid, however, was a symbol, both to the Egyptian people and to other Arab countries, that Western powers were more concerned over peace with Israel than they were with the human rights of eighty million Egyptians. US policy in Egypt made Bush’s “freedom agenda” look like a political gimmick, especially as the Bush administration used Egypt as a site for “rendition” of terrorist suspects. Preventing the rise of the Brotherhood made obsolete America’s purported strategy of winning hearts and minds in the region.

The Muslim Brotherhood did not lead the eighteen days of protests in Egypt; by all accounts, the resistance was led by average Egyptians. Young and old, families and singles, Muslims, Christians, and secularists were all to be seen in the circle of Tahrir Square, inspired by the successful “Jasmine Revolution” in Tunisia days before. If Egypt’s grassroots, non-Islamist movement can organize itself, it will reveal an embarrassing fact to the United States: The Muslim Brotherhood has not been the only alternative to a dictatorship. The United States bought Mubarak’s bluff, and now the protestors are calling it. It is only fitting that in the aftermath of the protests, Egyptians spent hours cleaning up trash from the streets of Cairo; the time has come for Egypt to reclaim ownership of their country.

The traditional obstacles towards a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace remain potent. As leaders on both sides lack the will or political capital to institute any significant reforms, the clear result is many failed talks and indefinitely suspended summits. An ardent nationalist, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu believes any significant land forfeited by Israel is a step towards the complete destruction of his homeland—a destruction which he believes is the ultimate goal of the Palestinian people. For support, Netanyahu points to the immediate election of Hamas in 2005 upon Israel’s cession of the Gaza Strip. Hamas repudiates Israel’s right to exist and has strong terrorist affiliations. This election caused Israel to further doubt the willingness of the Palestinian people to offer legitimate concessions. It also cast doubt on the viability of their moderate President Mahmoud Abbas and his centrist Fatah party, who, compared to Hamas, hold much less power.

Abbas’ perceived lack of power has prompted Israel to view negotiations with him as a mere formality and as a means of appeasing the international community, rather than a step towards progress. For these reasons, Israelis and Palestinians seemed unlikely to even reach the negotiating table to begin to tackle the fundamental divides and issues which have plagued them for generations. However, the democratic revolts in Egypt have completely transformed this status quo, enabling and encouraging both sides to overcome these obstacles and legitimately engage one another in a substantive peace process.

While the recent political turmoil and upheaval in Egypt—which resulted in the departure of President Mubarak on February 11—seems to have hindered the efforts of moderates on both sides, it has actually created a level of political uncertainty and fear that represents the only plausible facilitator of peace between these factions. It is unclear whether the Egyptian military will honor the democratic wishes of the protest movement, and it is also unknown who will fill the power vacuum created by Mubarak’s departure (an issue that may not be truly resolved for years). Israeli leaders will recognize that Egypt, which was once one of their most dangerous and adamant military and political opponents, could regress to its former active effort to ensure the annihilation of the Jewish State. While Mubarak was neither a benevolent leader to his own people nor a strong ally of Israel’s, Netanyahu could safely assume that if Israel continued to honor the terms of their 1967 peace treaty, Egypt would do the same. Although the Egyptian military has publicly expressed its support for the continuation of this treaty, there is no guarantee that the military will either remain in power or continue to honor its pledge.

Recognizing the possibility that Israel could once again be facing a fierce enemy from the south will inspire a much greater sense of vulnerability in Netanyahu’s administration. Israel’s safety in the Middle East is already precarious, facing unceasing assault from terrorist organizations and the possibility that their largest sponsor, Iran, is in pursuit of nuclear weapons. Israel’s concern that Egypt will develop into yet another hostile, volatile and powerful enemy may cause even Netanyahu to recognize the prudence of arranging boundaries with the Palestinians. He may shift from his current delicate position of relative strength to avoid being forced to handle a militant Palestinian uprising sponsored by Egypt, Iran, and a myriad of other groups. While he may not now feel compelled to genuinely consider the serious efforts that Abbas has put forward towards reaching a peaceful settlement, there is a very realistic chance he might feel his position of leverage in the peace process weaken in coming months. For the Muslim Brotherhood, a once terrorist-affiliated group in a position of considerable power in Egypt, to dominate Egyptian foreign policy is not necessary to cause such a change in Netanyahu—rather, the possibility of doing so suffices.

If the uncertainty caused by the Egyptian revolt is likely to create a change in Israel’s perspective on sincere concessions in the peace process, it will also impact the Palestinian perspective. Abbas’ government, like many across the Middle East, recognizes the strength and the contagious nature of such democratic reforms, and is also fully aware that if Mubarak’s iron-clad 30-year reign can be brought to an abrupt end, none are immune from a similar fate. This fear of a revolt across the Middle East, and the resulting shift in political dynamic, occurs at an ideal time for a moderate government. Abbas’ government was in danger of collapse prior to the events in Egypt. It recently suffered an extreme humiliation by the publication of the “Palestine papers,” a series of private memos and documents that suggested Abbas was willing to make far more severe concessions on territory, settlement, and Palestinian refugee status than ever previously indicated publicly. The offer of concessions, combined with Israel’s refusal to consider them, was a substantial humiliation for the government of Abbas. It was very plausible that prior to the Egyptian revolt, the moderate government of Abbas in the West Bank would be replaced by an extreme Hamas takeover by public demand.

However, Abbas’ decision to call for democratic elections this coming September has changed everything. Also significant is Hamas’ unwillingness to participate in them; it is possible that Hamas recognizes it has little to gain compared to the pre-Egypt advantage it enjoyed. Hamas, by stating its unwavering refusal to participate in these upcoming elections, has portrayed itself as hostile to democracy, a decision that prior to the Egyptian revolts would have had few major consequences. However, if the Egyptian democratic wave does in fact spread to its neighbors in Gaza and the West Bank, the Palestinian people will crave a democratic process of their own and will be enraged by Hamas’ obstruction of such a progression in Palestinian politics. This could reverse public sentiment in favor of the moderate, somewhat more democratic government of Abbas. Such a result would strengthen Abbas’ hold in the Palestinian government and simultaneously weaken Hamas’ public support in Gaza, thus convincing the Israeli government that any arrangements reached with Abbas will translate into legitimate policy. This, combined with Israel’s new incentive to negotiate, may lead to a serious and potentially fruitful discussion between these two factions.

The Israelis and Palestinians have a very long road ahead of them before achieving any significant peace. Even if the circumstances outlined above come to fruition in the manner described, they will only bring both parties to the table with sincere intention of negotiation; they will not suffice to solve the plethora of difficult issues surrounding the conflict. These include issues as complex and irresolvable as the borders of a Palestinian state; whether Israel should even recognize its right to exist; the Palestinian claim to territory currently occupied by millions of Israeli citizens and Israel’s expansion of these settlements; the status of millions of Palestinian refugees; and the continuous acts of hatred and violence committed against Israeli citizens by Palestinian fundamentalists. And yet, in spite of these massive mountains that still need to be climbed, this is more than anyone could have hoped for a mere five weeks ago, and it demonstrates the potential of the volatility of Middle Eastern politics to promote peace in the region, rather than detract from it.