Hours after the ultimatum requiring Saddam Hussein’s departure from Iraq had expired, on March 19th, 2003, President Bush ordered the commencement of the Iraq War. The justifications presented were Hussein’s intention to build weapons of mass destruction and a purported link between Iraq and Al Qaeda, the terrorist group responsible for the September 11th attacks. Both of these reasons have since been disputed and have rendered the start of the war a contentious issue to this day. By April 9t,h, 2003, Saddam Hussein’s rule had collapsed, and on May 1, Bush announced an end to major combat in Iraq.
Bush’s announcement was quickly proven premature and was subsequently followed by several mistakes and miscalculations. Members of the Bush administration issued orders to purge the government of Baathists and disband the Iraqi army, and the consequences of these decisions immediately became apparent. With the fall of Hussein’s government, American troops faced a new enemy of Baathists, paramilitary fighters, former Iraqi soldiers and foreign militants opposed to American occupation. Counterinsurgency became the newest tactical approach, causing parallels to be drawn between the war in Iraq and Vietnam War, as U.S. troops were confronted by an enemy who was willing to fight to the death and who often intermingled with civilians. In September 2004, an assault staged by U.S. and Iraqi forces targeting an insurgent stronghold resulted in 38 U.S. deaths and 800 Iraqi civilian deaths in addition to 1,200 insurgent deaths. This effort highlighted the costly nature of the war as gains against the enemy came at high civilian costs. Iraqi civilian deaths peaked in 2006, with estimates ranging from 1,000 to 3,500 per month. On April 28, 2004, evidence of prisoner abuse in Abu Ghraib was uncovered, prompting worldwide criticism of the way that the war was being conducted. Two years later, a CNN survey found that 60 percent of Americans opposed the war, the majority of which also favored the withdrawal of at least some troops from Iraq.

Partially in response to the public criticism of the war and U.S. strategy, President Bush made several significant modifications to U.S. policy in Iraq. In November 2006, he announced Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s resignation. In January 2007, the Bush administration implemented a controversial troop surge in Iraq. The increase in U.S. troops and U.S.-led offensives in Iraq, as outlined in the new strategy, led to an increased number of casualties. Indeed, the deadliest strike yet occurred in August of 2007, when coordinated suicide truck bombings resulted in hundreds of casualties, It also proved to be the most costly year for U.S. soldiers as American casualties reached over nine hundred. Nevertheless, the surge was largely credited with reducing sectarian violence in Iraq.

As the situation in Iraq began to stabilize, plans for the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces were accelerated. The withdrawal deadline set for the end of 2011 dates back to the Status of Forces agreement made in November 2008 by the Bush administration. At the time, the U.S. had intended to maintain a residual force of several thousand American soldiers for security purposes. The continued U.S. presence was opposed by varying Iraqi political factions like the Sadrists. Led by the influential Moktada al-Sadr, they advocated armed resistance if American forces remained past the withdrawal deadline. Shortly after taking office, President Obama began the process of reducing troops in Iraq and moving troops to Afghanistan. He announced plans to remove combat brigades by August 2010, a deadline which he honored with the end of combat missions on August 31, 2010. With the reduction of troops in Iraq, President Obama made it clear that an end to the Iraq war was approaching; however Defense Secretary Robert Gates continued to recommend maintaining troops past the deadline upon Iraqi request. The October 21st announcement to honor previous security agreements and complete troop withdrawal by the end of 2011 came as a surprise to many, as American officials had previously planned to keep a significant force of troops in Iraq under diplomatic immunity. Obama’s decision to honor a prior deadline reflected his desire to fulfill a campaign promise while simultaneously avoiding the prospect of an indefinite American troop commitment.

Withdrawing American troops from Iraq certainly has its consequences, as many of Obama’s Republican critics will be quick to contend. A major issue is the potential resurgence of Al Qaeda, which had suffered major defeats after the American troop surge in 2007. On August 15, 2011, a string of 42 apparently coordinated attacks left 89 dead and 315 wounded in a single day, and Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia warned of further attacks in revenge for bin Laden’s death. Analysts are particularly afraid of ties re-forming between Al Qaeda and members of the former ruling Baath Party. There is also the fear that without American troop support, the currant Iraqi government will collapse or that in the face of American withdrawal, other countries will attempt to invade Iraq. Iran is one such country that poses a threat to Iraqi security; historically it has supported aggressive attacks against American troops in Iraq.
These concerns, while valid, can overestimate the benefits of maintaining U.S. troops in Iraq. Even with the presence of American troops, violence continues to occur in Iraq. Many of the insurgents specifically oppose American intervention, creating reason to believe that attacks will decrease with the withdrawal of American troops, as will the justification for Iranian intervention to expel American troops. Furthermore, maintaining 10,000 troops beyond 2011 forces the U.S. into making an indeterminate commitment. Even with plans for diminishing the U.S. presence, 68,000 troops are expected to remain for at least another year. With troops stationed in Iraq for over eight years, many have grown disillusioned with the benefits of staying. A continued military presence without a set withdrawal deadline can only hurt morale without any tangible benefits for the troops that stay.

The parallels between Iraq and Vietnam abound, and rightly so. As in Vietnam, Americans have tired of intervention in Iraq. According to a poll conducted by Washington Post-ABC, 78 percent of Americans support Obama’s decision. The results of the Vietnam War may not have been consistent with America’s expectations, but diplomatic ties and trade relations eventually followed after American withdrawal and the fears of a domino effect proved unwarranted. There may be costs to withdrawing troops, in the form of a weakened and potentially vulnerable Iraqi government, but there are far more benefits. These include bringing troops home, ending an unpopular war, discouraging foreign attacks against American troops, and forging positive relations with the Iraqi people. America can still work to improve its relations with Iraq, but now is the time to build soft power leverage, which can only be achieved when the U.S. is no longer considered a hostile occupying force.

The U.S. is concerned that upon troop withdrawal, Iraq will be vulnerable and that its neighbors will step in and exert soft power to influence Iraq’s government and people. The US can counter this by matching the efforts made by Iraq’s neighboring countries, constructing schools, contributing to infrastructure, and developing favorable trade relations. These strategies will not only improve America’s world image and its influence over Iraqi policies, but in the long run, will provide for a more sustainable method for cultivating long-term influence and positive relationships within the Middle East. The U.S. has spent more than eight years using hard power in an effort to win Iraq over; now it is time to exercise soft power to create a positive working relationship with the Iraqi government and people.

The death of Gaddafi was cause for both great celebration and scrutiny. Although Gaddafi was supposed to be captured alive and brought before the International Criminal Court, his captors allegedly ignored this and killed him, presumably in the height of anger towards the former dictator. The video of his capture shows him being dragged through the streets, the autopsy of his body shows that he died of a gunshot to head, and rumors that he was sodomized before death are rampant. The fact that the Libyan militias did not allow Gaddafi the dignity of a fair trial shows that a fierce desire for retribution was just as strong as the desire for liberty during the struggle against the dictator. This resentment towards Gaddafi’s regime, while justified, is dangerous in that it prevents Libya from focusing on its future.

With Gaddafi out of the picture, the future of Libya is uncertain, and the presence of militias is only adding to the chaos. The lack of a strong central authority has already hurt many Libyans, especially those who had loyalist ties during the revolution. A Human Rights Watch report stated that militias in Libya continue to target “loyalist” towns and pro-Gaddafi supporters in an unlawful and inhumane manner, even post-Gaddafi. The report determined detainee torture to be equal to that carried out during the height of the Gaddafi regime. For example in the loyalist town of Tawergha, Libya, the organization interviewed many residents only to find that the rebels were arbitrarily arresting, beating, and otherwise abusing former regime sympathizers, causing many to flee out of fear. Testimonies from citizens detail deaths of innocent Tawergha residents from torturous beatings by rebel captors who are seeking revenge in ways that are counterproductive to progress in Libya.

Nevertheless, the future of Libya is not completely bleak. Libya as well as the international community can perhaps put their faith in the new leader of Libya’s interim government, the National Transitional Council, Prime Minister Abdurraheem el-Keib. Holding dual citizenship in the United States and Libya, el-Keib has lived in America since 1975, receiving a PhD from North Carolina State University and holding a long term teaching position at the University of Alabama as a professor of engineering. Recently, in a hopeful sign for democracy in Libya, el-Keib was elected to his Prime Minister position by members of the National Transitional Council after the former head of the NTC, Mahmoud Jibril, remained true to his promise to step down after the capture of Sirte, the last loyalist holdout. El-Keib is a nationalist., which bodes well for Libya’s future, as he can lead the NTC to make nonpartisan decisions that are best for Libya as a whole, rather than give in to demands from various rebel groups.

Charged with overseeing the progress of Libya in its transitional period, the NTC and el-Keib must work together with the militias and rebels to bring peace and stability to Libya. Libya does not need a quick democratic panacea that has election booths up and running right away, but rather a low- key recovery and healing process that involves open communication between the desires of the rebel groups and the hopes of the new interim government. The danger of jumping on the bandwagon of democracy purely for democracy’s sake is that the Libyan people and the country will not be ready for such an abrupt change. It is likely that the various rebel and tribal groups in Libya will feel slighted or disillusioned with democracy in Libya, especially since there are competing visions of how the new Libyan government should operate. This could lead to rejection of Libya’s democracy, inter-tribal competition, and ultimately escalation to civil war. Thus, before democracy can be successfully instituted in Libya, certain groundwork steps must be taken to guarantee Libya’s stable future.

First and foremost, both the NTC and the rebel groups must work together to arrest forces loyal to Gaddafi that continue to cause uprisings while firmly insisting on maintaining fair criminal trials for those arrested. Those loyalists who accept the fall of the old regime and the new future for Libya should be incorporated into the progression of Libyan politics, not ostracized by rebels. While the NTC may extend a hand of partnership to different rebel groups to help capture those who are still Gaddafi supporters, it must insist on conducting a lawful and fair trial for those arrested.

Meanwhile, the NTC and the rebel groups must also open dialogue on the drafting of a new constitution for Libya, which is crucial in defining how the new government and society of Libya will operate. The last constitution of Libya was created in 1951 but became defunct when Gaddafi took power. A new constitution that clearly delineates human rights, just laws, and a democratic system of government will help Libyans ground themselves in a concrete sense of the future as well as dictate the law for rebel groups.

Libya can gain a lot by looking towards Tunisia – the country that instigated the “Arab Spring” movement – and its recent first democratic election since the ousting of its feared ex-leader Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali. The high participation rate in the Tunisian election, estimated to be around 90% of registered voters, coupled with the relatively peaceful Election Day, sets a great example of how to establish a fair and respected democratic system. However, Tunisia’s road to election day has been fairly bumpy, as citizens disagreed over the role of Islam in government and became disillusioned with the lack of improvement of socioeconomic problems. Libya and the NTC have the chance to learn from some of Tunisia’s struggles by working to gain the public trust early on and placate the Libyans expecting a rapid improvement of political and socioeconomic issues in Libya.

It will take time to heal a shattered Libya. The rebels must not let a desire for revenge overshadow goals for democratic progress. The success of Libya is crucial not only for the next generation of Libyans but also for providing inspiration to the citizens of other “Arab Spring” countries who are currently in the midst of a struggle for their own liberty and democratic government. Democratic progress, however, will take a great deal of effort and time. For now we can only hope that Libya does not dwell on seeking retribution but instead chooses to focus on its future.

The world market’s positive response to the Euro-zone’s solution does not mean, however, that European finances are any more secure. Whereas this proposal is a first step in the right direction, the deal does not completely solve the short run problem of Greece’s finances or prevent the spread of the debt crisis. Even with its debt cut by about a fifth, Greece will have a great deal of trouble paying back a sum larger than its GDP. The government has an extraordinarily poor tax collection system and thus no reliable source of revenue other than debt sales. Because the Euro allowed Greece to borrow more at lower interest rates, the parties in power promised their voters benefits that could only be sustained by selling this debt. But now that this gilded age has passed, Greece has to either collect taxes or cut benefits.

Yet, any Greek government that pushes austerity too far would be effectively committing political suicide and dooming their country to a longer and more severe recession. A report by the European Central Bank showed Greece’s output this year will shrink by 5.5 percent, and it has been postulated that the nation will not return to growth until 2013. It will be extremely difficult for Greece to raise its revenue to the point where it can pay off even this fraction of its accrued debt, as doing so would further shrink its economy. This reality will inevitably lead to future problems regarding Greece’s finances.
Because a Greek default is a systemic risk to the Euro, economic powerhouses like Germany and France will continue to give Greece the deal of a lifetime. Greece, in turn, will continue to waffle and bargain on these agreements because it does not want to commit to austerity. At the end of the day, Europe will support Greece’s 450 billion dollar debt, because the alternative is to suffer the massive deleveraging that would result from Greece’s failure to pay. However, because it is politically unsavory to just bail Greece out, the larger countries will tiptoe around the issue and try and find other, less efficient, ways for Greece to “pay its own way.”

The second part of this deal is supposed to provide the EFSF with enough firepower to prevent larger economies like Spain and Italy from becoming insolvent. Because nations in the EU have already expanded the newly formed authority several times over, however, this new expansion is one that will not take the form of money. The EFSF will be given two new tools: the first allows the EFSF to insure the first losses of any new bonds within the Euro-zone (essentially, any non-catastrophic loss on a newly issued bond, give or take 20%, is now insured by the EFSF); and the second mandate allows the EFSF to create a series of special purpose vehicles financed by other investors and designated to specific counties to prevent the risk from spreading.

Yet, these new tools may give the EFSF less leverage than expected. Insurance does not work and is not comforting if every investor knows the institution backing the insured bond cannot reimburse the holder. Additionally, if Germany is not willing to place money in these special purpose vehicles why should Japan or the China, who have no immediate stake in the Euro-zone? The likely answer is that they will not. Thus, both the preventative measures and the stopgaps for the Euro-zone and Greek debt clearly have major flaws in their designs.

There was one option that could have lessened the cumulative sting of Greece’s new debts and secured the Italian and Spanish economies. But it was tabled because it would have negatively impacted creditor nations. Specifically Germany could have given the European Central Bank the ability to print a large number of Euros to support the EFSF. This option is completely within set of powers of the ECB, but the ECB’s ability to use those powers is limited by the nations of the Euro zone. The ECB states that its mandate is to “maintain price stability with inflation rates of below, but close to, 2% over the medium term.”

If the ECB were to scrap its mandate for a short period of time and inflate the Euro, the rest of the stopgap measure could work. Inflating the Euro coupled with the haircut would be especially painful for German banks, which hold large amounts of other European debt as well as Greek debt, but it would not force them to deleverage nor would ECB-led inflation fundamentally change the structure of the Euro zone. A moderate increase in the inflation rate would slightly lessen the real value of the debt held by the countries of the Euro-Zone and give the EFSF the firepower necessary to back up its new mandate to insure the potential first losses of new debt issued by countries of the Euro-zone.

Along with the already accepted measures, inflating the Euro is a quick and easy answer to the short-term problem of putting the Euro-zone on surer footing and making sure Greece can repay the remainder of its debt. The Germans have to realize that this may be the Euro-zone’s only way to insure that this deal does not become a meaningless one. While the German creditor banks may suffer some penalty from this policy of inflation, these losses will be miniscule compared with the financial meltdown that would occur if Italy defaults on its debt or the Greek deal has to be reworked. Both of these scenarios are not that far-fetched if the Euro-zone cannot insure that this deal is supported with something more tangible than the current proposal.

Still, the new deal is just a nicely dressed stopgap measure designed to do the bare minimum, make everyone happy, and avoid any major changes. Such a deal would be fine if the stopgaps could effectively insure Greek debt against further default and prevent the crisis from making Italian debt insoluble. Without the support of additional currency, however, the stopgap measures fail to do either. Germany is going to fight an inflation policy because such a policy would reduce its banks’ returns. Consequently, German interests have placed the rest of Europe at risk of a prolonged crisis that could be greatly helped with just a moderate amount of inflation.

In the long run, the Euro-zone will have to change its structure or face an endless cycle of smaller countries abusing their position with the larger. But for the short term, as long as the mentality of trying to “have everyone keep their cake and eat it too” prevails among the leaders Europe, no stopgap measure will ever give the Euro-zone economies the breathing space they need to introduce major reforms.

However, recent elections, increased amnesty, and a general thawing of political oppression have undeniably helped the government’s reputation. The tides appear to be turning in Myanmar, albeit slowly. And yet, one cannot help but fear that these moves towards political orthodoxy are just a charade to curry ASEAN favor. To hold the Chairmanship would legitimize Myanmar’s suspicious new government and strengthen ties with potential trading partners. At the moment, the Burmese government seems to be superficially liberalizing and using political prisoners as pawns to gain international legitimacy. Meanwhile its public remains largely oppressed. It is indeed difficult to reconcile basic conceptions of universal human rights and this politically and economically motivated exploitation. The key to optimizing these trends is to gently draw Burmese politicians and generals into enforcing policies that are both forward-looking and enduring so that the people of Myanmar can benefit from true democracy and freedom of speech. The political clout and economic might of nearby nations like India and Thailand, as well as the United States, puts them in prime positions to do so.

One may wonder as to why a martial state like Myanmar might suddenly seek international legitimacy in forums such as ASEAN. Previously, the isolated dictatorship relied almost wholly upon the support of the Communist Party of China. Ever since the Burmese government became first to recognize Mao’s fledgling regime, the nations have maintained a special relationship. Not only has China long been Myanmar’s largest trading partner, it has also provided the junta with weaponry to enforce its rule. Despite this amicable history, protests in Yangon in 2007 prompted Beijing to modestly propose that the Burmese regime impose greater peace and stability. More recently, the junta’s crackdowns on the rebellious Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) have sent thousands of Burmese refugees into China’s Yunnan province. This gradual decline of once-unshakable Chinese support, coupled with a new form of government, has forced Myanmar into looking elsewhere –places like India, Indonesia, and Thailand – for support.

Such starvation for outside support may have prompted the SPDC to allow for elections in 2010. However, the government declared Aung San Suu Kyi’s candidacy illegitimate for her criminal record, and the National League for Democracy (NLD) thus boycotted the elections; neutral outside sources have since declared these elections fraudulent. There was, however, a nominal dissolution of militant junta authority. Thein Sein – the Prime Minister under Than Shwe’s junta regime – was illegitimately voted president and maintained many vestiges of the previous administration. And yet, the junta’s decision to release Nobel Peace Prize winner Suu Kyi from 15 years of house arrest seems to indicate a shift in ideology.

More encouraging news came last month, when about 200 political prisoners were released according to government promises. This is just the beginning of the mass amnesty that is to eventually free 6,300 of Myanmar’s unjustly imprisoned citizens. Released dissidents remain cynical, however, given that around 92% of political detainees remain behind bars. In these tumultuous times in Burmese politics, even good news is confusing news. Is this truly an ideologically motivated thawing of political oppression, or simply the military apparatus’ scheme to win the ASEAN Chairmanship and international legitimacy?

It would therefore be unwise – naïve even – to begin bestowing praise on the government of Myanmar. After last year’s fraudulent elections the second-highest-ranked diplomat of Washington’s Burmese embassy, Kyaw Win, defected from his post in protest; in order to protect his family from potential political violence, he sought the American government’s asylum. He explained his motives in a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in which he boldly claimed that “senior military officials are consolidating their grip on power…oppression is rising and war against our ethnic cousins is imminent.” Such internal experience ought not be ignored, especially in light of Myanmar’s erratic tendency to enact superficial reforms only to follow them up with violent crackdowns. Despite initial tolerance of the peaceful Saffron Revolution in 2007, protestors were soon quashed by brutal violence on behalf of the junta.

Are we to expect Suu Kyi and her supporters to disregard such novel freedoms and superficial signs of progress, despite the tireless years they have spent in its pursuit? Should the NLD not exploit the government’s current willingness to reform for ASEAN Chairmanship while they still can and push for a liberal democracy from within? Unfortunately, it seems as though the Burmese power apparatus is still hesitant to permit such internal forces to have so strong a voice. A better way might be to take advantage of Myanmar’s desperation for an improved international reputation and to allow encouragement to come from outside the country.

It is therefore imperative that surrounding nations strike a delicate balance between praise and dissatisfaction. India, for instance, had publicly supported democratic movements in Myanmar; however, when the riots of 2007 were violently quashed, India fell silent. Due to a desire to keep border tensions and resource flow secure, Delhi issued a statement saying they would let Myanmar’s people come to democracy unimpeded. Unsurprisingly, neighboring powerhouse China also neglected to enforce human rights standards. Such behavior is intolerable; developed nations must not neglect such abuses of basic human rights for the sake of commerce. Indian officials must change their tone from apathetic to indignant; the United States must aid their cause of imposing liberalization by engaging the Burmese in diplomacy, rather than in lopsided commerce. The international community must coax the Burmese into continuing these reforms, while also asserting that they ought not be for the sole purpose of temporary appeasement.

Thein Sein and the new bureaucrats have sought to gain favor from their fellow ASEAN members through the deliberate thaw of military rule and the liberation of Suu Kyi. Such actions, however, will only gain them the temporary spotlight of the globally criticized ASEAN. Through conditional engagement, we can lure Burmese politicians into acceptable behavior. The Burmese government’s desperation for international recognition and commerce, as well as its citizens’ poverty, puts it in a highly vulnerable position. Now that the most basic steps have been taken to democratize, the international community must bring these fledgling reforms to fruition. Regardless of the regime’s actual motives, if the international community crafts an optimistic albeit realistic attitude towards these changes, we can make incredible changes on behalf of the oppressed Burmese public.

For some Euro watchers, this arrangement between Europe and China is only the latest example of “the scramble for Europe”. Borrowing the phrase from the 19th century competition between European states to acquire colonies in Africa, skeptics use the term broadly to argue that the surge in Chinese acquisitions of European companies and related investments will undermine European competitiveness. In the words of a French official, “It’s a real war, with highly subsidized companies coming to open markets with unusually low prices and undercutting the competition.” Moreover, this may lead to a split EU policy on China, with “cash-strapped deal-seekers”, like Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain (PIGS), simply seeking investments, while “frustrated market-openers” like Germany and France seek a united European consensus to protect domestic firms both in Europe and abroad in China.

Especially in the eyes of countries like Germany and France, China’s investment patterns in Europe present a concern. A disproportionately large percentage of China’s global investments are in Eastern Europe (10%) and PIGS (30%) – the traditionally weaker EU economies. Combined with the fact that Chinese firms have been beating out European firms for large public-sector contracts in Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Poland, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia, this leads wealthier EU states to eye China’s intentions warily.

Undoubtedly, this arrangement has real benefits for weaker EU states, which can now obtain infrastructure at fire sale prices. However, the lack of transparency of many Chinese corporations is a cause for concern. Although EU law forbids state-run companies from bidding for public contracts, many Chinese multinationals that bid for these contracts have close ties to government, maintain a shadow party structure, and most importantly, obtain government subsidies, which give them a further leg up on their European competitors. Furthermore, Chinese firms can keep costs lower than their European competitors by importing low-cost laborers from China and paying them significantly less.

Why is this a problem for European unity? While poorer EU members see only the benefits of discounted costs, wealthier EU members see anti-competitive practices as harmful for domestic firms. Furthermore, when European firms from wealthier nations go abroad, they are frustrated by China’s lack of reciprocity. While European firms are nominally allowed to bid for projects in China, they rarely win, as the rules are skewed almost always to favor domestic firms. Therefore, the vast majority of China’s internationally known mega-projects such as the Three Gorges Dam, Olympic stadiums, and bullet trains are administered instead by the National Development and Research Commission (NDRC). So while the “market-openers” cry foul and attempt to overhaul existing EU legislation, the “cash-strapped deal-seekers” do not see it in their interest to comply with any policy to change the status quo.

To argue that China actively seeks to weaken the EU by reaching agreements with individual member states to create a divisive “China lobby” within the union may be a stretch. China has little to gain from the dissolution of the EU. Nonetheless, Europe must put its economic house in order, encourage China to open up its market to foreign firms, and finally mitigate the unfair advantages that Chinese firms have while bidding in Europe. To achieve the first goal, the EU must evolve beyond its original intent and become a monetary and a fiscal union. Though this would most likely face serious resistance from many EU states, the debt crisis in Europe today is a direct result of a failure on the part of the EU states to coordinate fiscal policy. It is important to remember while China demands certain conditions for its purchase of euro bonds, this originated from a lack of European coordination that precipitated this disaster. By allowing each state to pursue its own interest independently, each state ended up collectively worse off than if they had coordinated their policies together. Moving towards a fiscal union will benefit the EU in the present by giving investors confidence in EU bonds, and will benefit the EU in the future by making it easier to head off the type of debt crises that we see today, reducing the need for the type of outside intervention that Europe is soliciting from China now.

In addition, more regulation will be required to prevent foreign firms from using subsidies to gain unfair advantages in bidding. Since there already exist a myriad of regulation in China, the European Financial Stability Fund suggests that the EU should reciprocate, especially in fields such as defense, critical technologies, media, and education.

While Chinese investments have exposed weaknesses in the EU’s structure, these are all manageable issues that, in time, can be resolved. Although the alarmist reports in the media have painted a portrait of newly ascendant China righting past wrongs by reverse-colonizing Europe, the truth is that China is neither belligerent nor friendly – it is simply in pursuit of its own self-interest, and Europe should respond accordingly by strengthening existing ties between states.

Anxiously deferring to its allies and playing down its position is not the way the U.S. has traditionally begun a war. Over the weeks preceding UN air strikes on Libya, the administration has come under criticism for its relative inaction in allowing the tides of democracy to waver in Africa at such a crucial juncture. John McCain has argued that Obama waited too long to intervene, while Sarah Palin criticized Obama’s approach as “dithering.” Michael Gerson of the Washington Post characterized Obama’s response in harsh terms: “the reaction hesitant, the process chaotic, the outcome late.” Granted, it may be true that the delayed U.S. response has emboldened Gaddafi’s defiance and caused Libyan opposition to lose ground. These criticisms, however, ignore the local and international ramifications of a unilateral American war that led to such failures as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. All things considered, the U.S.’s adoption of a support role is in fact appropriate. The postponed U.S. position has allowed the international community to reach a consensus as to the legitimacy of intervention; furthermore, the U.S.’s role as supporter rather than leader will help prevent the perception of this intervention as another American crusade.

It should be recognized that the Libyan unrest is as much a European and Arab problem as it is an American problem, and thus any effort to resolve the Libyan crisis must involve meaningful input and resources from European and Arab states. Europe has high economic and military stakes in maintaining the stability of the region: 1800 kilometers of the Mediterranean coastline belong to Libya, and 85 percent of Libya’s oil exports are exported to Europe. Likewise, the Arab states are geographically, culturally, and politically tied to Libya, and Libya is itself a member of the Arab League. The U.S. should not have to carry the burden of military action that benefits all free nations in the world. It is the shared responsibility of all nations with economic and political stakes in Libya to step up and play a role in resolving the crisis.

By delaying the American response, the U.S. has gained reliable allies in its mission, as European and Arab nations realize the potential impact of Libyan unrest on their national interests if they do not act. Not only has the case for intervention acquired political support from the Arab League, but it has also secured legal approval from the U.N. with a 10-0 Security Council vote, and allowed the lead to be taken by France and Britain, sponsors of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 calling for a no-fly zone. Such a deferrential and non-dominating response has in fact been advantageous, given the potentially disastrous consequences of the alternate path of action, unilateral military action in Libya.

This alternate path is unrealistic: the U.S. cannot handle a third full-scale war. Had the U.S. taken initiative and unilaterally intervened at the start of the armed rebellion, the situation would have degenerated into another American crusade, much like in Afghanistan or Iraq. U.S. forces are already too strained in Afghanistan and Iraq to take on another all-out military intervention. Financially, the cruise missiles fired over Libya by the second evening of the attack have already cost $1 million. With 100,000 troops in Afghanistan and another 47,000 troops in Iraq, it is not militarily feasible to sustain a risky, open-ended commitment in the long term.

Historically, it has been difficult for the U.S. to successfully intervene without the support of the international community. Quick and easy victories such as the Gulf War are rare. More often, interventionist wars lacking in international support such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Vietnam quickly evolve into a stalemate that protracts for years. In Libya itself, unilateral U.S. sanctions in 1982 failed to change Gaddafi’s policies. Later, in 1986, the U.S. swiftly launched unilateral air strikes against Libya ten days after the Berlin Discotheque Bombing. The air strikes not only failed to cripple Gaddafi, who announced a spectacular “military victory”, but garnered widespread international criticism Over the last 40 years, it has become clear that the U.S. cannot overthrow Gaddafi by itself.

In addition, a decisive decision to intervene would have led to the perception that the U.S. was orchestrating the downfall of the Gaddafi government. It would have given ground to Gaddafi’s accusations in speeches at Tahrir Square as well as interviews with international news media that the protests were a “colonialist plot”. Such anti-colonialist sentiments have the potential to be very effective in influencing public opinion in many postcolonial countries. An example of this is the U.S.’s 1993 intervention in Somalia to end the starvation of thousands, which was met with increased hostility, rather than gratitude, as the U.S. became more and more embroiled in the nation-building effort.

Furthermore, any U.S.-led invasions may arouse strong anti-American sentiment that could facilitate the political rise of al-Qaeda elements in the region. Al-Qaeda may act to fill the political vacuum resulting from the Libyan chaos if its anti-American rhetoric is successful in appealing to ordinary Libyans. Al-Qaeda franchises such as AQIM (Al-Qaeda in Maghreb) and the LIFG (Libyan Islamic Fighting Group) have historically attempted to seize power in Libya. In order to avoid triggering an explosion of radical Islamic elements taking over, it is of utmost importance that any intervention in Libya not be perceived as a U.S.-led operation.

Significantly, the revolts that have swept the Middle East in recent months have been organic. In Egypt, for example, every step of the revolts, from the protests to the ultimate overthrow of the government, was directed and carried out by Egyptians without U.S. involvement – a fact of great pride among the Egyptians. A minimalist stance on the part of the US ensures the prevention of anti-American sentiments arresting political change. Waiting to secure UN and Arab League approval distributes the responsibility globally, instead of allowing intervention to be branded as an American ploy.

With the U.S. hesitance to strike Libya in mind, no one could credibly argue that the U.S. forcibly intervened. Moreover, the ultimate involvement of the US sends a signal to the leaders of regimes in other Middle Eastern and North African countries, such as Bahrain and Algeria, that the threat of international military intervention is real, and that they will be unable to use the argument of American imperialism to counter public opinion about foreign intervention.

Regardless of how Obama’s actions are interpreted, they have certainly brought about key tactical advantages. Instead of impulsively dragging the country into another war, he has led the international community to align its position on intervention in Libya by presenting an image of caution and restraint for many weeks. Previous administrations have treated the UN as a rubber stamp council in going to war, inviting it to vote on resolutions approving foreign intervention, but intervening regardless of the outcome. That approach deprives the U.S. of genuine cooperation with potential allies critical to the success of a mission. The new approach carved out by the Obama administration, however, has broken from that approach and made it clear that it will not launch any attack that is not approved by the UN. Although UN approval is not necessarily synonymous with prudent action, such an approach effectively shifts the burden of responsibility away from the US. By inviting genuine debate and input from Lebanon, France, Britain, and the Arab League, the U.S. has successfully garnered broad political and military support.

In short, Obama may be ushering in a new era of U.S. engagement in foreign military intervention, breaking from the unilateral paradigm of U.S.-initiated wars from the Bush period. By refusing to act until legal UN approval was obtained and allowing other nations to take responsibility in leading coalitions, Obama may be reshaping the rules for U.S. engagement abroad in a manner that will be beneficial to us in the future. The U.S. is adopting a pragmatic doctrine that will not only reduce economic and military expenses, but also garner international political consensus that will lessen anti-Americanism in the long-term.

In fact, one could almost say there was no revolution at all: although Mubarak is gone, the military regime he led is still in place, complete with nearly all his former officials and generals. Indeed, it was these very leaders who elected to maintain the vestiges of their own wealth and influence rather than defend Mubarak’s rule. Whatever changes or reforms made thus far have lacked substance and been issued by decree, with seemingly no input from any youth opposition groups. In fact, the two groups that seem have had the most influence in directing any changes over the past few months have been the two most established political parties in Egypt: the National Democratic Party (NDP)—Mubarak’s former party—and the Muslim Brotherhood, the world’s oldest Islamist political party and best-organized opposition group in Egypt. Meanwhile, the activists who largely organized and inspired the Tahrir Square protests that overthrew Mubarak have found themselves sidelined, struggling to avoid becoming marginalized in the pivotal upcoming months.

The most dramatic step towards transition thus far has been the referendum on a series of constitutional amendments, but this has caused as many difficulties as it has solved. Early in March, the military unveiled a set of amendments to be approved or rejected as a whole by a popular vote. The move was complicated by the fact that the procedure was in violation of the current Egyptian constitution, with amendments dictated rather than negotiated. Nevertheless, it was the first tangible step that the military took to form a new government and political system. The amendments themselves seek to undo some of the worst abuses of the old system; for example, they require that the President be limited to only two 4-year terms in office and that a state of emergency lasting over 6 months must be approved by a public referendum. But they stop well short of limiting presidential powers, instead requiring the next parliament (with elections scheduled for this September) to write an entirely new constitution within 60 days of being seated.

The unsteady alliance that existed between the youth protest leaders and the Muslim Brotherhood at Mubarak’s downfall did not extend to these amendments. The Muslim Brotherhood, along with the NDP, supported the amendments vigorously, arguing that it was imperative to have a set date for the transition lest the military change course. The youth leaders, however, opposed the amendments, arguing they didn’t go far enough to address demands for reform. Moreover, youth activists worried that scheduling elections for September would benefit well-established parties like the Muslim Brotherhood and marginalize the slew of activist-run groups, which would have very little time to organize before elections.

The amendment package passed resoundingly, with over 77 percent of Egyptians voting in favor of the measures. Much of this support can be attributed to citizen anxiety over the pace of change slowing down. But the support also had a religious component; in its pamphlets urging a ‘yes’ vote, the Muslim Brotherhood argued that the primacy of Islam in Egypt could be threatened if the constitution was immediately thrown out. Those that voted ‘no’ were disproportionately Coptic Christian and Jewish, while those that voted ‘yes’ were disproportionately Muslim. Interestingly, the ‘yes’ votes were also disproportionately from the countryside; a far greater majority voted ‘yes’ in rural than in urban areas, further signifying that the driving force of the revolution is shifting away from the young, secular, and urban protesters that originated it. Frustration over this outcome has led urban protesters back to Tahrir Square, and while they may regain some of their influence, April’s violence has shown that the protest may just as easily backfire.

Even with a schedule in place, Egypt’s democratic transition is at a crucial moment. Protesters are again turning out in droves, and this time the military is uprooting them. Sporadic violence is occurring, often religiously motivated, as with the reported murders of Coptic Christians in late February. The opposition plays a dangerous game as it tries to maintain enough pressure on the army to ensure reform, but not so much as to cause the army to rethink its position and modify the transition schedule. At this critical moment, the United States, with its various policy levers in Egypt, can and should play an important role in making sure the transition stays on track.

For the United States, as well as the people of Egypt, a democratic government is the best possible outcome that can result from post-Mubarak Egypt. Although an authoritarian Egyptian government had aided U.S. interests for decades, it was an inherently inefficient and stagnant regime that stymied the development and vitality of its own nation. Such an arrangement is not sustainable in the long run—at least not without a high cost to the Egyptian people and nation and to U.S. moral authority—and the United States should never have viewed it as such. The United States has sufficient policy levers, most obviously the billions of dollars in aid it grants to the Egyptian government and military each year, to ensure that regardless of the governing coalition U.S. interests may still be upheld.

That being said, the United States should refrain from overtly attempting to impose a democratic political structure in Egypt. The lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan have aptly demonstrated the perils and shortcomings of that approach. There exist, however, a number of actions the United States could take to gently but firmly aid the transition to a form of government accountable to its own people. The U.S. may do this by offering logistical and campaigning assistance and advice to political parties involved in the upcoming elections. If it does this, it should offer assistance to all political parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood, to avoid the appearance a partisan actor. It could also offer legal assistance to the new parliament as it drafts a new constitution. While dictating terms, as it did with Iraq, is inadvisable, there have already been domestic calls for external constitutional assistance. With regards to the military, the United States has financial leverage and deep personal connections it may employ to insist that the military continues with the transition process. It can build on the negotiation networks it built during the first stages of the revolution and present itself as a reliable advisor and ally for the Egyptian army. Indeed, even an arrangement where the military maintains a role of sorts—or at least vestiges of wealth and prestige—in an otherwise popularly elected government, as in Turkey, would be a great improvement from the Mubarak days.

Many are worried about the prospects for U.S. interests in post-Mubarak Egypt. The United States cannot impose democracy on other nations, nor should it openly attempt to stir up democratic uprisings. For many decades, the desire to secure short-term U.S. interests has propped up unsavory regimes and arrangements that are as untenable to lasting prosperity and stability as Mubarak’s Egypt ultimately was. To be fair, Mubarak was one of America’s staunchest allies in the Middle East. However, now that Mubarak has been removed from power, the best course of action for the United States moving forward is to simply aid Egypt in its transitional period.

Some hopeful democrats are wondering when this movement will spread to the rest of the Arab world. However, those awaiting the turbulent sparks of Cairo and Benghazi to ignite crowds in Riyadh, Dubai and Doha will have to wait not days, but decades. Unlike citizens of the states currently in revolt, the people in countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE have seen great increases in their standard of living, a boom fueled almost entirely by oil revenues. This has allowed the citizens of the oil-states to accept an expedient bargain—a forfeiture of liberty and democracy in return for rapid economic growth.

The common thread among revolting Arab countries is not merely tyranny, but also continued poverty. These countries either lack substantial oil deposits relative to their population, as in the case of Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan, or have refused to share the oil wealth with their people, as in Syria, Yemen and Libya. As an example, Syria ranks 32nd in crude barrels of oil produced, and yet its per capita GDP is only slightly over $5,000.

On the other hand, among the oil-rich Gulf states, only Bahrain has seen substantial unrest, and there the friction is more due to religious rivalry (a majority Shia population ruled over by a Sunni royal family) than from an outpouring of democratic ideals. The other oil-exporting Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Kuwait are every bit as repressive as those in revolt; the Saudi Secret Police are some of the most feared in the world. The governments of these states, however, have quite literally purchased their citizens’ acquiescence through stunning economic growth rates. From 1990-2010, the UAE’s per capita GDP grew by 48%, Kuwait’s by 110%, and Saudi Arabia’s by 118%. At $90,149 Qatar has by far the world’s highest GDP per capita; compare that to the US’s $45,989.

In addition to these astounding growth rates, the governments of the oil-states have successfully bought off their people with extensive welfare policies. Saudi Arabia has free medical care and extremely generous unemployment benefits. The Qatari social safety net is so effective that unemployment in 2010 was only 0.5%. Kuwait has no personal taxes at all; not income, sales nor property. Businesses represent the only sector of the economy that pays taxes in the Emirate, and even then the only levy is an exceptionally low flat rate of 15%. Moreover, the awe-inspiring amounts of revenue that come into these Arab governments allow them to react to nearly any situation that threatens the elite hold on power. Most recently, to ensure continued stability in face of the nearby protests, Saudi King Abdullah was able to announce $400 billion additional spending in education, health care, unemployment benefits, and infrastructure over the next four years.

A people cannot be bought forever, however; eventually opposition movements sprout up with demands for political reform. Fortunately for the oil-states’ ruling elite, the enormous profits from oil exports provide them with the resources to squash protests and opposition before they can gain meaningful traction. According to an Amnesty International briefing, in the first 6 months of 2009 Saudi Arabia tried 330 people on very broad “terrorism” charges, virtually all of whom were convicted in closed trials, with sentences ranging from fines to the death penalty. The huge oil revenues plainly allow this scale of repression to take place; more money equates to more weapons, more sophisticated technology, more informants, and most importantly, more funding to buy off potential opposition figures.

In the 20th century, a happy coincidence emerged—the richer a country became, the more democratic it tended to be, and vice versa. The dominant model of economic development, known as the ‘Washington Consensus’, was built upon the twin pillars of economic liberalization and political freedom. Autocrats were therefore confronted with an uncomfortable dilemma—to speed the economic development of their countries, they needed to devolve power to their people.

In this century, however, the astonishing pace of development in several countries is challenging that model. The petro-states of the Persian Gulf clearly demonstrate that democracy need not accompany a high standard of living, although the source of their wealth—oil—can not be replicated in other countries that lack petroleum reserves. A greater challenge to the Washington Consensus comes from China, which is achieving unprecedented wealth creation without the benefit of black gold. The recent buzz among policy wonks has been the possibility of a ‘Beijing Consensus’—the idea that the fastest way to economic riches does not lie on the arduous path towards unruly democracy, but instead on the relatively easy track of continued dictatorship. Although the development models used in China and the Gulf states differ substantially, the essential concept remains the same: an emerging nation may accept autocracy and political repression in return for rising incomes.

Many autocrats in the beginning stages of development, particularly in Africa and Southeast Asia, are looking at the example of the Gulf states and China with relief. This in turn has profound impacts for global politics, dimming Western hopes that democracy will speedily complete its triumph around the world. If the dictators of oil-rich African countries such as the Congo, Sudan and Angola observe that they can achieve social and political stability without having to cede power to their people, we can expect to see fewer, not more, democracies in the developing world.
So while we observe the democratic ferment in parts of the Arab world with awe and hope, we must be mindful that foreign policy cannot be reduced to a simple slogan of “Democracy or bust.” It is quite clear that nowadays dictators may simply purchase stability and tolerance of autocracy with rapidly rising living standards for their people. So as the chaotic crowds gather on the rooftops of Brega and Ajdabiya aiming their rocket propelled grenades at incoming tanks, striving for a political voice, perhaps their war cry should be “Give me liberty, or give me—cash!”

To understand why this move is so politically significant, it is necessary to first have a basic understanding of the Tibetan government-in-exile. Starting from the top, while many in the West view the Dalai Lama primarily as the spiritual leader of the Tibetan people, he is also the chief executive of the government, armed with an array of political powers. Though there are some checks on his power – for example, his decision to retire required approval by the Tibetan parliament – his combination of political and spiritual influence makes the Dalai Lama a remarkably potent figure.

The Dalai Lama seeks to devolve all his political power to the Kalon Tripa, who as a direct subordinate to the Dalai Lama is democratically elected and functions as a prime minister. The Kalon Tripa is the second-most powerful political figure in the Tibetan government-in-exile, but it gives cause to ponder just how powerful the Kalon Tripa can be, given that the Dalai Lama has the power to remove him from office without Parliamentary approval. Now, however, the Dalai Lama seeks to devolve all his political power to the Kalon Tripa, the elections for whom were held earlier this month. Though the winner has not yet been announced, it is clear that he will be more powerful than any of his predecessors.

This vast expansion of the Kalon Tripa’s power is a wise political move in terms of the Tibetan government’s foreign relations. First consider how this move will affect Tibetan-Chinese relations: China believes that it should play an active role in the appointment of the next Dalai Lama. There is some historical precedent for this belief as the Chinese maintain that the sixth Dalai Lama was appointed by the Qing dynasty Emperor Kangxi. Tsering Yangdzom, an ethnic Tibetan at the China Tibetology Research Center, has cited the appointment of the sixth Dalai Lama in support of China’s paradoxica conviction that it should elect the Dalai Lama’s successor– China has long opposed the very institution of the Dalai Lama

The Dalai Lama fears that, should the Tibetan government continue to place executive power in the hand of Dalai Lamas, China will attempt to elect a puppet ruler who would lead Tibetans in the direction of the interests of China. Thus, the Tibetan government-in-exile has rejected China’s appeal to precedent in appointing Dalai Lamas, arguing that Emperor Kangxi had only sent representatives to the inauguration of the sixth Dalai Lama and was not involved in his appointment at all. Regardless of which historical account is true, a critical eye should be cast towards China’s claim that it has the right to perpetuate the Tibetan Buddhist succession model it has so vocally denounced in the past. Clearly, China’s objections are politically motivated – the power to appoint the next Dalai Lama would eliminate the possibility of another “threatening” Tibetan ruler like Tenzin Gyatso, the current Dalai Lama. Thus, the Dalai Lama’s retirement is an intelligent, politically motivated move, as it undermines the potential for the Chinese to gain leverage over Tibet.

The Dalai Lama’s retirement will also garner greater sympathy for the Tibetan cause from democracies, as the new executive, the Kalon Tripa, will be democratically elected. Compare this to the process of selecting a Dalai Lama: he is chosen by a small group of monks who believe him to be the reincarnation of the previous Dalai Lama. Thus, Tenzin Gyatso’s political retirement will ensure a move towards democratic government. The desire for increased democratization is also evident in how elections for the Kalon Tripa were conducted: last month, polling was conducted by 56 regional election commissions around the world. All Tibetan adults are eligible to vote, an impressive feat considering that the Tibetan people and their government are in exile and dispersed globally. Thus, the election process further highlights the extent to which the Tibetan government is committed to the principles of an open society, which will help win it greater support from democracies worldwide.

Finally, the devolvement of the Dalai Lama’s political power will allow countries to support more openly the Dalai Lama’s advocacy for Tibetan autonomy. Though no government has officially recognized the legitimacy of the Central Tibetan Administration, the Dalai Lama dislocsed that the Tibetan government-in-exile receives an annual sum of $1.7 million in aid from the United States, specifically from the Central Intelligence Agency. Though other governments may or may not have contributed monetarily to the Dalai Lama’s advocacy for Tibetan autonomy, many have expressed sympathy for his cause. The most obvious evidence for this is his having received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989. At the same time, China has pressured governments around the world not to accept the Dalai Lama as the legitimate ruler of the Tibetans. For fear of souring relations with China, the international community has given into this pressure and has denied the legitimacy of the Dalai Lama’s rule while still trying to support his cause.
Now, however, countries will be able to more readily rally behind him, as supporting him as a spiritual and moral leader rather than as a head of state will no longer be a matter of international relations, but rather a matter of supporting a man who continues to fight for human rights and for the autonomy of his people. In stepping down, then, the Dalai Lama can increase his prestige and moral standing and better fight for the Tibetan cause.