While America imagines itself to be locked in a deadly cage match in the War on Terror, there is a substantial chance that we will later look back on the current era as the quaint and quiet good old days in that fight – the time before the bad guys had nukes. Similarly, after a weary decade of counter-insurgency intervention in Afghanistan, America is likely to withdraw its forces well before a stable government and civil society can take hold. Therefore, the “peace” following the American pull-out is likely to be a much more hazardous period than the “war,” with a distinct prospect of renewed civil war and a pronounced drift toward failed statehood and warlord rule. While a failed state north of the Hindu Kush would render meaningless America’s long Afghan intervention, a failed state south of the Kush in nuclearized Pakistan would be far worse of a disaster in the global War on Terror. Worryingly, the Zardari government today is struggling to fend off a coup from the same security forces that apparently harbored Osama Bin Laden for years in a safe house near the capital. In each of these nightmares, our worst fears would be realized in Pakistan.

Given all of that, stabilizing the U.S. relationship with Pakistan is likely to be one the most important challenges this country faces on the international stage in the next ten years. And yet, as critical as Pakistan is to U.S. foreign policy, it is a country that we poorly understand and therefore struggle to influence. If there is any country that understands Pakistan, it is its behemoth neighbor and estranged fraternal twin, India. While the enmity between these two nations can hardly be overstated, no nation on earth has expended more effort analyzing, cajoling, and indeed obsessing over Pakistan than India. With that in mind, I met with a senior diplomat in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs on a recent trip to New Delhi.

Such expert relationship counseling is necessary because sadly the history of the U.S.-Pakistani relationship has not been encouraging. During the Cold War, Pakistan was the United State’s staunch ally in the region against Soviet-aligned India, and Pakistan received billions of dollars in economic and military assistance. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, relations soured over Pakistan’s nuclear program. Pakistan developed nuclear weapons in 1998 despite strong U.S. opposition, and remains the only Muslim state in the nuclear club. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan was a key supporter of the Taliban. After 9/11, however, President Bush convinced former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf to join the War on Terror, and the U.S. has given large amounts of economic and military aid to Pakistan over the past ten years. In return, Pakistan has made efforts to aid in the war, for example by letting the U.S. use a base in their territory for drone strikes. Nevertheless, Pakistan is still plagued by numerous terrorist groups, and many of its provinces are completely out of the control of the central government in Islamabad and are run entirely by the Taliban.

This past year has seen relations fall to an all-time low. It began with the incident of Ray Davis, a CIA contractor who shot dead two Pakistanis on the streets of Lahore whom he thought were attempting to rob him (the U.S. then tried to keep a straight face while claiming diplomatic immunity). Next there was the clandestine May raid by Navy Seals to kill Osama bin Laden, which infuriated diplomats both in Islamabad (for Pakistan’s lack of foreknowledge, let alone permission) and in Washington (for Pakistan’s either incompetence in not finding or complicity in sheltering bin Laden). This caused criticism of the Pakistani government in Washington to boil over in public, most notably by outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, who in September accused Pakistan’s ISI spy agency of funding and directing terrorist groups. Finally, in December there was the inadvertent killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers in a NATO airstrike, which prompted Pakistani diplomats to boycott a conference at Bonn on the future of Afghanistan.

Nor is the problem due simply to miscommunication and unfounded mistrust; the U.S. and Pakistan have fundamentally opposing interests in the region. While the U.S. obviously wants to stop nuclear proliferation, some members of the Pakistani government likely would not mind if more Muslim nations became nuclear armed. In the War on Terror, George Bush committed America to fighting terrorism wherever it crops up. The Pakistanis, on the other hand, have perceived great utility in sponsoring terrorist groups in their struggle with India over Kashmir and use terrorist groups like the Haqqani network and Lashkar-e-Taiba (responsible for the 2008 Mumbai bombings) as, in the words of Admiral Mullen, a “veritable arm” of the ISI. In the theater of Afghanistan, no peace agreement or successful exit strategy can be concluded without Pakistan, mostly because Pakistan controls many proxy forces in Afghanistan which could either sustain or bring down the central government in Kabul. As long as the mountains of Pakistan are a haven for anti-Kabul terrorists, Pakistan can keep Afghanistan completely destabilized. While the U.S. wants Afghanistan to develop into a peaceful democracy, Pakistan would be happy to see a weak, corruptible Muslim theocracy, destroying everything U.S. soldiers have fought for over the past ten years. To put it bluntly, Washington wants an American puppet state, while Islamabad wants a Pakistani puppet state. These goals are not compatible.

Given that as soon as the Afghan war is over, the U.S. will want to disengage from the Middle Eastern quagmire and will no longer need Pakistan as a strategic partner, many commentators in both countries have urged patience and forgiveness for Pakistan’s ever more apparent unfaithfulness and double-dealing. This argument, however, is fundamentally flawed. It fails to account for the most crucial factor in the U.S.-Pakistani relationship: aid money. Between 2002 and 2010, Pakistan received roughly $18 billion in economic and military aid from the United States. Towards the end of the decade, this amounted to almost 10 percent of the Pakistani government’s budget. The U.S. is by far Pakistan’s largest foreign donor, and Pakistani leaders know that no other country could provide more than a small fraction of the largesse that U.S. friendship guarantees.

Clearly the U.S. has a troubled relationship with Pakistan and needs to find a new way forward to prevent the partnership from falling apart. I sat down with a senior diplomat (who would prefer to remain anonymous) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the country with the most experience of all in building a relationship with Pakistan – India. Although the two countries share a troubled past, India has learned to build a stable relationship with Pakistan and relations have been improving dramatically over the past ten years. When asked how the U.S. could improve its relationship with Pakistan, my contact jumped immediately to a simple, yet prudent conclusion: “The United States must benchmark assistance to Pakistan to achieve its objectives.” Over the past ten years, the U.S. has poured aid money into Pakistan to be used more or less at Pakistan’s discretion, and in return asked for Pakistani help – or at least non-interference – in combating terrorism.

This strategy, however, has plainly failed, and this senior diplomat therefore implored the U.S. to pursue what he deemed a “transactional” relationship with Pakistan. “Pakistan can’t survive without U.S. aid,” he continued, “and the government knows this. The U.S. needs to be clear and direct [and say] for example if you pursue these terrorists in Waziristan, we’ll give you X in military aid. Otherwise it’s going to be another ten years of billions of dollars down the drain.” The U.S. needs to be clear and direct about what its objectives are and what help it needs from the Pakistani government, and then pursue those objectives relentlessly using aid money as leverage.

Although this strategy is bold and would represent a radical change in U.S.-Pakistani relations, it is likely the only possible way forward if the U.S. is to achieve its goals in the region. With the end of the war in Afghanistan in sight, failure is not an option. For the past ten years the U.S. has showered Pakistan with aid money and not gotten what it paid for. Every U.S. diplomat travelling to Pakistan should remember that the Pakistanis need our aid money just as much as we need their help in the war.

The U.S. needs to make aid to this troubled South Asian nation contingent on achieving real results, both in pursuing terrorists and internal reform. While this transactional approach risks being perceived as blunt and short-sighted, our unstable ally in Islamabad is the precarious fulcrum on which the outcome of our Afghan war is hinged. We need their unambiguous cooperation, and we need it immediately. Despite our long military adventure in Afghanistan, that war is still just as likely to become another Vietnam in which our allies and interests are devastated following our exit as it is another Kuwait in which the regime we install survives our departure. Pakistan holds the key to that outcome. Perhaps ultimately the analogy for the Afghan war will become the Gulf Wars, of which, ominously, there were not one, but two.

Still in his twenties and having only a few years of experience within the government’s highest echelons, Kim Jong Eun’s legitimacy will depend largely on his ability to emulate his predecessors. It is important to note that the new leader’s position and dominance are by no means guaranteed; Kim Jong Il’s relatives continually vie for influence, several of which are generals in the military, with experience dating back to Kim Il Sung’s reign. Although Kim Jong Eun is securing the official positions left by his father, North Korea is a society that, according to the Wall Street Journal, generally follows “a seniority-based hierarchical ideal.” This means that youth and inexperience could jeopardize Kim Jong Eun’s ability to command officials twice his age. In comparison, his father had far more experience when he took power yet still ruled for three years in his predecessor’s name. Not only that, but Kim Jong Il maintained his father’s role as the “eternal President” who accomplished “immortal achievements,” and always stressed how his policies continued Kim Il Sung’s. As such, it is hardly shocking that the new ruler has begun to appropriate this rhetoric, as seen in how the North Korean government’s website says Mr. Kim is “identical to [sic] idea, leadership and personality of Kim Jong Il.” Information published in the New York Times suggests that Kim Jong Il may have appointed Kim Jong Eun as his successor because he would continue Kim Jong Il’s policies. In defiance of traditional inheritance practices that would pass a father’s estate to the eldest son, Kim Jong Il selected his third and youngest son. While the oldest son contrasted Kim Jong Il’s personality and the second son experienced a relatively public rift with his father, Kim Jong Eun reportedly demonstrated an affinity for North Korea’s official philosophy since childhood. Kim Jong Eun’s actions will not be the only force pushing for continuity, though. The lack of change among subordinates will also prevent policy shifts.

Since Kim Jong Eun is still in the process of securing his footing, he may not yet have the power or desire necessary to brush aside the current officials. By avoiding a shake-up in the near future, he will avoid alienating needed allies and inherit an intact and experienced government. While an expert quoted in the New York Times recently predicted that it will be only a matter of months before the government passes to a younger generation, one scenario that The Economist describes seems more likely in the near future: the seasoned and experienced officials will keep Mr. Kim in check. Once he consolidates power, he will have the chance to oversee a generational shift among North Korean officials, however this will by no means give him free rein. There is a strong likelihood that current officials will pass their positions to similarly-minded relatives, which means the new leader will be hard pressed to wipe the slate clean and thereby steer his government in a new direction. Mr. Kim’s inner circle will be the clearest representation of this personnel continuity since the inner circle of relatives and generals that aided Kim Jong Il is carrying over to Kim Jong Eun’s reign. This offers Kim Jong Eun several advantages, like how would support claims of continuity with Kim Jong Il’s example. On top of that, these officials are politically savvy and have ties to various political and military factions. Since the military has significant influence economically and politically, and a small elite class dominates the government, these individuals will be essential allies as Kim Jong Eun’s reign gains traction. At the same time, he does not yet have the influence necessary to clean house without jeopardizing his control over his country’s power brokers. While those nearest Kim Jong Eun’s seat of power will pressure his actions, those in North Korea’s chief economic and military ally will do likewise.

In pursuit of its self-interest, China will also push Mr. Kim toward policies that will maintain his government’s stability. A Time article recently noted China’s concern that turmoil in North Korea would send huge numbers of refugees across its border. From the Chinese state’s perspective, it would be particularly bad if China’s government and society faced this strain in the near future since the government is presently intensifying efforts to maintain its own stability. Some articles have postulated that the recent protests in the village of Wukan may indicate more widespread social ills, and that recent efforts to censor television programs suggest concerns about the nation’s ideological fortitude. Developments among China’s political elite further increase its interest in North Korean stability. With a change of “some 70% of China’s leadership” early next year, a crisis could harm the new officials’ political capital. Another important factor is that China is in the process of stretching its military power and regional influence. According to Time, Beijing fears that a political collapse in North Korea would likely cause Korean unification under the Seoul government. For an aspiring regional power like China, it would be a painful setback if a U.S. ally gained ground at a fallen ally’s expense. Intelligence reports and news articles agree that China wants North Korea to undergo certain reforms in order to boost regional stability, so China will not be Mr. Kim’s most conservative influence. China’s overriding interest, though, is that Mr. Kim’s government does not fall. Therefore, in the event that Chinese leaders see the young leader’s policies as erratic or dangerous, they will use whatever influence they have to correct his course. This could potentially happen if, for example, Mr. Kim proposes a major internal shake-up, drastic social reform, or an inconsistent foreign policy, which could cause China to regard Mr. Kim as an incompetent leader and a liability for his regime’s stability. Thus, North Korea’s untested ruler must prove his leadership ability and his government’s functionality to audiences at home and abroad. Despite some alignment between North Korean and Chinese interests, they do not fully overlap, so they will at times push Mr. Kim in contradictory directions.

In particular, the philosophy of emulation that Mr. Kim plans to employ will direct North Korea’s short-term nuclear policy. Because North Korea’s nuclear weapons program began decades ago, Kim Jong Eun has little choice but to continue supporting nuclear development or else he would undermine his own legitimacy as his father’s and grandfather’s heir. Since the West, South Korea, and even China all oppose North Korea’s efforts to develop a nuclear arsenal, any efforts to scale back the program or even enter serious negotiations to that end would jeopardize Mr. Kim’s credibility as a strong anti-Western leader among his population, especially among senior officials old enough to have lived during the country’s formation and the 1950s Korean Conflict. North Korea’s state philosophy, which stresses self-reliance and was created by Mr. Kim’s grandfather, would underscore this issue. One might argue that Mr. Kim can compromise to win incentives from the West and free up his own domestic budget. However, this appears unlikely. The new leader’s connection to his predecessors is the cornerstone of his legitimacy, and past rewards have had little influence on North Korean policymakers. In North Korea, greater loyalty, power, and service to the state correlate with a better livelihood, so the ideologues among the political and military elite do not feel the impact of food shortages like the masses who work outside the state do. These ideologues pose a greater threat to Mr. Kim since they could fragment his power or spark an ideological schism. With this in mind, it is not surprising that the North Korean government recently announced that it would not change its foreign policy and would maintain an aggressive stance toward South Korea.

The U.S. now finds itself in an uncomfortable position as it looks towards the future. In these circumstances, it would be unwise to attempt to manipulate the present situation since Mr. Kim and his top officials would rebuff any suspected American intervention. In addition, any U.S. involvement would also irritate the U.S.’s complex relationship with China. Therefore, the potential price of either overt or covert action with the intention of influencing North Korea is tremendous. This means that the U.S. should expect a continuation of the same challenges, policies, and obstinateness seen in Kim Jong Il’s final years. In light of this fact, the U.S. should offer Kim Jong Eun the same deals it offered his father and also not oppose Mr. Kim as he consolidates power. To this effect, the Obama Administration has been wise to call for a “peaceful, stable transition” but should not have officially suspended the ongoing discussions. Resuming such discussions as quickly as possible will minimize any increase in U.S.-North Korea tension caused by the transition. It would also indicate that the U.S. recognizes that Kim Jong Il’s death is not indicative of a North Korean paradigm shift. There are several reasons why countries around the world have responded to Kim Jong Il’s death with somber messages and heightened wariness rather than the excitement seen among the characters in “Wicked.” Perhaps the most significant is that reality’s Wicked Witch has a successor who has every reason to grab a broomstick and pointy hat. As such, the death of Kim Jong Il is heralding Kim Jong Eun’s rise as the leader of continued anti-U.S. policy and resistance to political change.

The region’s waterways are vital to the global economic supply chain and free-navigability is key to continued prosperity in the immediate area and beyond. Approximately a quarter of the world’s oil passes through the Malacca Straits, destined to supply China and Indonesia as well as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Over $5 trillion worth of trade is conducted in the region every year—with more than a fifth of which is American. Moreover, much of the world’s computer manufacturing is performed in the region, with factories in each nation performing complementary tasks towards a final product. The important trade routes in this area thus make it vital from both an economic and geopolitical standpoint.

One of the most important developments in the region has been the increasingly contentious dispute over sovereignty in the South China Sea. Vietnam, the Philippines, and China continue to tussle over control of the Sea and the small islands lying above potential oil and gas reserves —estimated to match Kuwait’s. China, contrary to the conventional understanding of territorial waters (which is based upon distance from the continental shelf under the Law of the Sea), has claimed the entire sea for itself based on its asserted historical sovereignty. While other nations have made such claims in the past, Beijing has shown a startling willingness to enforce them aggressively in recent years. The Chinese navy has had no compunction about sinking Vietnamese fishing vessels and has even warned oil giant Exxon Mobil last year not to explore for oil and gas resources with Vietnamese licenses and grants. Chinese forces have also been deployed to islands disputed by the Philippines, further demonstrating their aggressive commitment to using military prowess to claim control.

Most analysts agree that these moves represent just the beginning of China’s expansion of regional influence as Beijing’s economic power increases. China has backed up its aggressive territorial claims with a military strategy to project its rising power. In August, the Chinese military began sea trials for its first aircraft carrier (refitted from an older Soviet model) and has started to test its first stealth bomber. In addition, to counterbalance American defense strategy, Beijing is also developing anti-aircraft systems and satellites (which underpin communications and guidance systems) that potentially target American bases in the Philippines, South Korea, Australia, Japan, and elsewhere in the Pacific. In addition, the Chinese military has also invested in area denial weapons systems to counter American air superiority and hinder the movement of American forces. Moreover, defense experts warn that Beijing is honing cyber warfare capabilities that have already been used to successfully access U.S. defense contractors’ sites as well as commercial sites. The intellectual yields of such intrusions have already gone into China’s new stealth bomber design. Recent reports also suggest that China’s cyber attacks targeted two American weather satellites and briefly gained command of one of them, further illustrating Beijing’s increased capability to interfere with American military communication and surveillance infrastructure.

Such tactics, coupled with China’s economic clout, have begun to radically alter the dynamics within the region. Chinese aid, investment, and trade have been increasing in recent years as joint Sino-Vietnamese business ventures and Chinese support for Filipino infrastructure projects have become the norm in the region. This economic power translates into political influence, resulting in pro-China foreign policies emanating from regional governments. In fact, several nations in the region have disregarded the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) conventions by repatriating Uyghur activists and dissidents back to China, where they face nearly certain persecution, imprisonment, and even torture or execution.

Nonetheless, Southeast Asia, through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), has increasingly sought to counterbalance China by fostering ties with other states, most notably the United States—but also India, Japan, and others. In an interesting turn of events, American naval ships have increasingly berthed (and been repaired) in Vietnam, and the nation has become one of the largest recipients of American aid. The United States has also approved sales of defense equipment to Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan, and other states. Regional powers have also stepped up their commitment to the region. Japan has pledged to increase trade and upgrade its submarine fleet and Australia has geared up for a decade-long upgrade to its naval and military assets.
Diplomatic relations between the various players in the region and the United States have warmed significantly as the U.S. remains the dominant sea power and has used its naval prowess to support regional nations against Beijing’s clout. In fact, domestic attitudes in regional nations toward Beijing have begun to turn negative. For instance, in spite of growing trade and economic engagement with Beijing, last year, Vietnam halted a joint Sino-Vietnamese venture to extract bauxite, a mineral essential to China’s industries. The fact that outcry from many Vietnamese (including Buddhist monks, environmentalists, and bloggers) countered Beijing’s pressure is indicative of regional anxiety over China’s influence.. Moreover, one of America’s staunchest allies in the region, Thailand, has strengthened its relations with Washington despite a military coup and riots in recent months. On another front, U.S.-Burma relations have begun to defrost after decades of sanctions, and some progress might be made in establishing democratic institutions and freeing political prisoners. These diplomatic successes have not gone unnoticed by China as Washington and Beijing pursue different objectives.

As Southeast Asia continues to experience high rates of economic growth, the region will become increasingly important in the global economy. At the same time, the area encompasses some of the busiest maritime routes in the world as well as some of the most lucrative and promising natural resources. Both factors guarantee that China, other Southeast Asian countries, and the U.S. will jockey for regional influence. China has made a strong showing in the region and undoubtedly exerts a strong hand in the affairs of the region. Nonetheless, as many Southeast nations have expressed, there must be a “balance” to maintain peace and prosperity. China’s willingness to use its economic clout, aggression, and coercion further hint at the urgency of maintaining a balanced power structure in the region.

The United States is in a unique position to counterbalance Beijing growing aggression. Washington has the opportunity to increase engagement with regional nations through military and economic cooperation. Increased American naval presence can reassure regional governments of the U.S.’s commitment to countering Chinese intimidation and pressure. Encouraging Japan and India to also establish and strengthen relationships in the region will give those nations an incentive to counter Beijing to protect their interests. Moreover, highlighting Beijing’s continued horrendous human rights violations and supporting dissidents will weaken China’s prestige and force officials to turn inwards rather than pressure neighbors.

The rising boldness of Beijing in pursuit of its interests suggests that the American presence must increase. Although domestic debates in the United States threaten to cut defense budgets, defense spending represents an investment in future stability to develop more ties to Southeast Asia. Along with military support, increased economic and political engagement with Thailand, Vietnam, Burma, the Philippines, and other nations is necessary to cement ties with regional capitals. While India and Japan have essential parts to play in maintaining peace in the region, the United States, on account of its military and economic power, is uniquely positioned to preserve its national interest and that of its allies by maintaining the freedom of the seas, open shipping lanes, and an independent Southeast Asia.

However, recent elections, increased amnesty, and a general thawing of political oppression have undeniably helped the government’s reputation. The tides appear to be turning in Myanmar, albeit slowly. And yet, one cannot help but fear that these moves towards political orthodoxy are just a charade to curry ASEAN favor. To hold the Chairmanship would legitimize Myanmar’s suspicious new government and strengthen ties with potential trading partners. At the moment, the Burmese government seems to be superficially liberalizing and using political prisoners as pawns to gain international legitimacy. Meanwhile its public remains largely oppressed. It is indeed difficult to reconcile basic conceptions of universal human rights and this politically and economically motivated exploitation. The key to optimizing these trends is to gently draw Burmese politicians and generals into enforcing policies that are both forward-looking and enduring so that the people of Myanmar can benefit from true democracy and freedom of speech. The political clout and economic might of nearby nations like India and Thailand, as well as the United States, puts them in prime positions to do so.

One may wonder as to why a martial state like Myanmar might suddenly seek international legitimacy in forums such as ASEAN. Previously, the isolated dictatorship relied almost wholly upon the support of the Communist Party of China. Ever since the Burmese government became first to recognize Mao’s fledgling regime, the nations have maintained a special relationship. Not only has China long been Myanmar’s largest trading partner, it has also provided the junta with weaponry to enforce its rule. Despite this amicable history, protests in Yangon in 2007 prompted Beijing to modestly propose that the Burmese regime impose greater peace and stability. More recently, the junta’s crackdowns on the rebellious Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) have sent thousands of Burmese refugees into China’s Yunnan province. This gradual decline of once-unshakable Chinese support, coupled with a new form of government, has forced Myanmar into looking elsewhere –places like India, Indonesia, and Thailand – for support.

Such starvation for outside support may have prompted the SPDC to allow for elections in 2010. However, the government declared Aung San Suu Kyi’s candidacy illegitimate for her criminal record, and the National League for Democracy (NLD) thus boycotted the elections; neutral outside sources have since declared these elections fraudulent. There was, however, a nominal dissolution of militant junta authority. Thein Sein – the Prime Minister under Than Shwe’s junta regime – was illegitimately voted president and maintained many vestiges of the previous administration. And yet, the junta’s decision to release Nobel Peace Prize winner Suu Kyi from 15 years of house arrest seems to indicate a shift in ideology.

More encouraging news came last month, when about 200 political prisoners were released according to government promises. This is just the beginning of the mass amnesty that is to eventually free 6,300 of Myanmar’s unjustly imprisoned citizens. Released dissidents remain cynical, however, given that around 92% of political detainees remain behind bars. In these tumultuous times in Burmese politics, even good news is confusing news. Is this truly an ideologically motivated thawing of political oppression, or simply the military apparatus’ scheme to win the ASEAN Chairmanship and international legitimacy?

It would therefore be unwise – naïve even – to begin bestowing praise on the government of Myanmar. After last year’s fraudulent elections the second-highest-ranked diplomat of Washington’s Burmese embassy, Kyaw Win, defected from his post in protest; in order to protect his family from potential political violence, he sought the American government’s asylum. He explained his motives in a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in which he boldly claimed that “senior military officials are consolidating their grip on power…oppression is rising and war against our ethnic cousins is imminent.” Such internal experience ought not be ignored, especially in light of Myanmar’s erratic tendency to enact superficial reforms only to follow them up with violent crackdowns. Despite initial tolerance of the peaceful Saffron Revolution in 2007, protestors were soon quashed by brutal violence on behalf of the junta.

Are we to expect Suu Kyi and her supporters to disregard such novel freedoms and superficial signs of progress, despite the tireless years they have spent in its pursuit? Should the NLD not exploit the government’s current willingness to reform for ASEAN Chairmanship while they still can and push for a liberal democracy from within? Unfortunately, it seems as though the Burmese power apparatus is still hesitant to permit such internal forces to have so strong a voice. A better way might be to take advantage of Myanmar’s desperation for an improved international reputation and to allow encouragement to come from outside the country.

It is therefore imperative that surrounding nations strike a delicate balance between praise and dissatisfaction. India, for instance, had publicly supported democratic movements in Myanmar; however, when the riots of 2007 were violently quashed, India fell silent. Due to a desire to keep border tensions and resource flow secure, Delhi issued a statement saying they would let Myanmar’s people come to democracy unimpeded. Unsurprisingly, neighboring powerhouse China also neglected to enforce human rights standards. Such behavior is intolerable; developed nations must not neglect such abuses of basic human rights for the sake of commerce. Indian officials must change their tone from apathetic to indignant; the United States must aid their cause of imposing liberalization by engaging the Burmese in diplomacy, rather than in lopsided commerce. The international community must coax the Burmese into continuing these reforms, while also asserting that they ought not be for the sole purpose of temporary appeasement.

Thein Sein and the new bureaucrats have sought to gain favor from their fellow ASEAN members through the deliberate thaw of military rule and the liberation of Suu Kyi. Such actions, however, will only gain them the temporary spotlight of the globally criticized ASEAN. Through conditional engagement, we can lure Burmese politicians into acceptable behavior. The Burmese government’s desperation for international recognition and commerce, as well as its citizens’ poverty, puts it in a highly vulnerable position. Now that the most basic steps have been taken to democratize, the international community must bring these fledgling reforms to fruition. Regardless of the regime’s actual motives, if the international community crafts an optimistic albeit realistic attitude towards these changes, we can make incredible changes on behalf of the oppressed Burmese public.

For some Euro watchers, this arrangement between Europe and China is only the latest example of “the scramble for Europe”. Borrowing the phrase from the 19th century competition between European states to acquire colonies in Africa, skeptics use the term broadly to argue that the surge in Chinese acquisitions of European companies and related investments will undermine European competitiveness. In the words of a French official, “It’s a real war, with highly subsidized companies coming to open markets with unusually low prices and undercutting the competition.” Moreover, this may lead to a split EU policy on China, with “cash-strapped deal-seekers”, like Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain (PIGS), simply seeking investments, while “frustrated market-openers” like Germany and France seek a united European consensus to protect domestic firms both in Europe and abroad in China.

Especially in the eyes of countries like Germany and France, China’s investment patterns in Europe present a concern. A disproportionately large percentage of China’s global investments are in Eastern Europe (10%) and PIGS (30%) – the traditionally weaker EU economies. Combined with the fact that Chinese firms have been beating out European firms for large public-sector contracts in Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Poland, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia, this leads wealthier EU states to eye China’s intentions warily.

Undoubtedly, this arrangement has real benefits for weaker EU states, which can now obtain infrastructure at fire sale prices. However, the lack of transparency of many Chinese corporations is a cause for concern. Although EU law forbids state-run companies from bidding for public contracts, many Chinese multinationals that bid for these contracts have close ties to government, maintain a shadow party structure, and most importantly, obtain government subsidies, which give them a further leg up on their European competitors. Furthermore, Chinese firms can keep costs lower than their European competitors by importing low-cost laborers from China and paying them significantly less.

Why is this a problem for European unity? While poorer EU members see only the benefits of discounted costs, wealthier EU members see anti-competitive practices as harmful for domestic firms. Furthermore, when European firms from wealthier nations go abroad, they are frustrated by China’s lack of reciprocity. While European firms are nominally allowed to bid for projects in China, they rarely win, as the rules are skewed almost always to favor domestic firms. Therefore, the vast majority of China’s internationally known mega-projects such as the Three Gorges Dam, Olympic stadiums, and bullet trains are administered instead by the National Development and Research Commission (NDRC). So while the “market-openers” cry foul and attempt to overhaul existing EU legislation, the “cash-strapped deal-seekers” do not see it in their interest to comply with any policy to change the status quo.

To argue that China actively seeks to weaken the EU by reaching agreements with individual member states to create a divisive “China lobby” within the union may be a stretch. China has little to gain from the dissolution of the EU. Nonetheless, Europe must put its economic house in order, encourage China to open up its market to foreign firms, and finally mitigate the unfair advantages that Chinese firms have while bidding in Europe. To achieve the first goal, the EU must evolve beyond its original intent and become a monetary and a fiscal union. Though this would most likely face serious resistance from many EU states, the debt crisis in Europe today is a direct result of a failure on the part of the EU states to coordinate fiscal policy. It is important to remember while China demands certain conditions for its purchase of euro bonds, this originated from a lack of European coordination that precipitated this disaster. By allowing each state to pursue its own interest independently, each state ended up collectively worse off than if they had coordinated their policies together. Moving towards a fiscal union will benefit the EU in the present by giving investors confidence in EU bonds, and will benefit the EU in the future by making it easier to head off the type of debt crises that we see today, reducing the need for the type of outside intervention that Europe is soliciting from China now.

In addition, more regulation will be required to prevent foreign firms from using subsidies to gain unfair advantages in bidding. Since there already exist a myriad of regulation in China, the European Financial Stability Fund suggests that the EU should reciprocate, especially in fields such as defense, critical technologies, media, and education.

While Chinese investments have exposed weaknesses in the EU’s structure, these are all manageable issues that, in time, can be resolved. Although the alarmist reports in the media have painted a portrait of newly ascendant China righting past wrongs by reverse-colonizing Europe, the truth is that China is neither belligerent nor friendly – it is simply in pursuit of its own self-interest, and Europe should respond accordingly by strengthening existing ties between states.

To understand why this move is so politically significant, it is necessary to first have a basic understanding of the Tibetan government-in-exile. Starting from the top, while many in the West view the Dalai Lama primarily as the spiritual leader of the Tibetan people, he is also the chief executive of the government, armed with an array of political powers. Though there are some checks on his power – for example, his decision to retire required approval by the Tibetan parliament – his combination of political and spiritual influence makes the Dalai Lama a remarkably potent figure.

The Dalai Lama seeks to devolve all his political power to the Kalon Tripa, who as a direct subordinate to the Dalai Lama is democratically elected and functions as a prime minister. The Kalon Tripa is the second-most powerful political figure in the Tibetan government-in-exile, but it gives cause to ponder just how powerful the Kalon Tripa can be, given that the Dalai Lama has the power to remove him from office without Parliamentary approval. Now, however, the Dalai Lama seeks to devolve all his political power to the Kalon Tripa, the elections for whom were held earlier this month. Though the winner has not yet been announced, it is clear that he will be more powerful than any of his predecessors.

This vast expansion of the Kalon Tripa’s power is a wise political move in terms of the Tibetan government’s foreign relations. First consider how this move will affect Tibetan-Chinese relations: China believes that it should play an active role in the appointment of the next Dalai Lama. There is some historical precedent for this belief as the Chinese maintain that the sixth Dalai Lama was appointed by the Qing dynasty Emperor Kangxi. Tsering Yangdzom, an ethnic Tibetan at the China Tibetology Research Center, has cited the appointment of the sixth Dalai Lama in support of China’s paradoxica conviction that it should elect the Dalai Lama’s successor– China has long opposed the very institution of the Dalai Lama

The Dalai Lama fears that, should the Tibetan government continue to place executive power in the hand of Dalai Lamas, China will attempt to elect a puppet ruler who would lead Tibetans in the direction of the interests of China. Thus, the Tibetan government-in-exile has rejected China’s appeal to precedent in appointing Dalai Lamas, arguing that Emperor Kangxi had only sent representatives to the inauguration of the sixth Dalai Lama and was not involved in his appointment at all. Regardless of which historical account is true, a critical eye should be cast towards China’s claim that it has the right to perpetuate the Tibetan Buddhist succession model it has so vocally denounced in the past. Clearly, China’s objections are politically motivated – the power to appoint the next Dalai Lama would eliminate the possibility of another “threatening” Tibetan ruler like Tenzin Gyatso, the current Dalai Lama. Thus, the Dalai Lama’s retirement is an intelligent, politically motivated move, as it undermines the potential for the Chinese to gain leverage over Tibet.

The Dalai Lama’s retirement will also garner greater sympathy for the Tibetan cause from democracies, as the new executive, the Kalon Tripa, will be democratically elected. Compare this to the process of selecting a Dalai Lama: he is chosen by a small group of monks who believe him to be the reincarnation of the previous Dalai Lama. Thus, Tenzin Gyatso’s political retirement will ensure a move towards democratic government. The desire for increased democratization is also evident in how elections for the Kalon Tripa were conducted: last month, polling was conducted by 56 regional election commissions around the world. All Tibetan adults are eligible to vote, an impressive feat considering that the Tibetan people and their government are in exile and dispersed globally. Thus, the election process further highlights the extent to which the Tibetan government is committed to the principles of an open society, which will help win it greater support from democracies worldwide.

Finally, the devolvement of the Dalai Lama’s political power will allow countries to support more openly the Dalai Lama’s advocacy for Tibetan autonomy. Though no government has officially recognized the legitimacy of the Central Tibetan Administration, the Dalai Lama dislocsed that the Tibetan government-in-exile receives an annual sum of $1.7 million in aid from the United States, specifically from the Central Intelligence Agency. Though other governments may or may not have contributed monetarily to the Dalai Lama’s advocacy for Tibetan autonomy, many have expressed sympathy for his cause. The most obvious evidence for this is his having received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989. At the same time, China has pressured governments around the world not to accept the Dalai Lama as the legitimate ruler of the Tibetans. For fear of souring relations with China, the international community has given into this pressure and has denied the legitimacy of the Dalai Lama’s rule while still trying to support his cause.
Now, however, countries will be able to more readily rally behind him, as supporting him as a spiritual and moral leader rather than as a head of state will no longer be a matter of international relations, but rather a matter of supporting a man who continues to fight for human rights and for the autonomy of his people. In stepping down, then, the Dalai Lama can increase his prestige and moral standing and better fight for the Tibetan cause.

The cornerstone of any American policy toward Pakistan should be a careful balancing act between long-term and short-term interests. The former is a central reason why President Obama recently asked for a significant increase in aid to Pakistan to help provide basic government services like education. Considering Pakistan’s 50 percent literacy rate and the strong presence of religiously conservative and militaristic madrassa (schools), American support for government-run schools is a terrific idea for improving Pakistan’s prospects down the road. Standard humanitarian gifts like these, however, fail to address problems like government corruption, which might divert well-intentioned public funds into private pockets. They also fail to address the short-term problems already fermenting, such as Pakistan’s increasingly radical middle class. If this burgeoning radicalism leads to an anti-American government, then long-term American-funded investments will not yield the desired returns of stable and moderate politics. The U.S. must act decisively and soon, then, with an eye on achieving short-term goals.

At the same time, any policy should aim to genuinely benefit the Pakistani people and, more importantly, provide them the means to help themselves. In addition to the immediate benefits to Pakistanis, this course of action would improve America’s standing with the Pakistani government and populace. Such improvement would make Pakistan more likely to support American initiatives such as counterterrorism, aiding its efforts in the region.
This was the position that former Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke advocated. He argued that Pakistani organizations should spend their aid money quickly, instead of allowing it to circulate among American contractors or within the American government. In 2009, Congress allocated $1.51 billion a year, for a period of five years solely for civilian aid to Pakistan. Out of the $1.51 billion allocated in the 2010 fiscal year, a GAO report showed that only $179.5 million (less than 12 percent) was actually spent. Such a discrepancy between America’s promises and actions is unacceptable. Before Congress debates whether or not to allocate additional funding, the U.S. should use the remaining 88 percent.

However, it is important that the U.S. provide Pakistan with this financial backing while not dictating policy; the U.S. cannot afford to be perceived as trying to manipulate Pakistan’s internal affairs. A few years ago, heavy-handed American policies triggered anti-American resentment, led extremist clerics to rally anti-government support, and fueled tensions between Washington and Islamabad. The clearest solution to this potential problem is to allow Pakistanis themselves to decide how to enact policies, with Americans offering only general directions or recommendations. This would require the U.S. to provide aid and funding with fewer strings attached.

The best way for America to help Pakistan is to use a carrot-and-stick model with civilian and military support. The American government should give a higher-than-normal amount of aid this year and outline a handful of modest policy goals for the Pakistani government, such as building a certain number of new highways or reducing corruption by a certain percent (to be determined by international standards and an organization affiliated with neither nation’s government). If the Pakistanis succeed in meeting these goals, the U.S. should continue providing a large amount of aid along with a set of more ambitious goals. If Pakistan fails to meet these goals, the U.S. should reduce its support to levels lower than the current ones and wait until the goals are met. During this waiting period, the support should not drop so low that there is danger of a government collapse. Current levels of aid like the GAO-estimated $179.5 million could provide an approximation of this lower limit; Pakistan’s current situation is precarious, yet it is unlikely that the government will fall in the next few months.

These goals should begin by aiming for as little controversy as possible. In this way, such goals would support government effectiveness rather than the fight against the Taliban: the latter would likely draw accusations of American heavy-handedness and imperialism. Only after a few rounds of goals should the Taliban even enter the list of top priorities. The benefit of this model is that it allows the Pakistanis, the people who best know their country, to decide how to achieve the goals and build an independent and effective government.
A key early step would be to work with Pakistanis to build a well-funded anti-corruption agency modeled on similar agencies in other countries. Developing this organization does not have to be combative, with Americans pressuring a resistant Pakistani government. For example, the U.S. could stress that favorable reviews from the agency could open the door to more aid to Pakistan in the future. Some corruption is inevitable in the interim, especially if the amount of American money reaching Pakistan increases, but the U.S. should have realistic rather than idealistic goals for lost funds; well-intentioned efforts to monitor aid spending is what is preventing America from fulfilling its promised contributions, and an under-funded Pakistani government cannot build the administrative infrastructure necessary to root out corruption. A more flexible carrot-and-stick approach, mixed with realistic goals, should break the existing vicious cycle.

By encouraging the Pakistani government as a whole to improve, the goals can also become a trial by fire for Pakistan’s policymakers and help identify whom the U.S. and the Pakistani people can trust as effective leaders. The Pakistani government’s incentivized yet organic improvement would turn the tide against radicalism by providing a viable alternative. At the same time, the stick part of the model would encourage Pakistan not to actively work against American interests (as it now does by supporting certain terrorist groups).

Perhaps the most daunting feature of Pakistan’s problems is their interconnectedness. The U.S. must help solve multiple problems at once in order to solve any, yet this also means that improving one aspect of the nation requires improvements in several others. Consequently, the Pakistani government has struggled and radical fundamentalism has grown more popular. Left unchecked, this fundamentalism will endanger American interests in Pakistan and threaten regional stability. It is therefore critical that America and Pakistan work together to prevent Pakistanis from plunging into instability. If the U.S. defers its duty to other countries or to international organizations, it will renege on its commitment to the Pakistani government and run the risk that less or even no additional support reaches Pakistan. Because of America’s alliance with Pakistan, access to resources, power on the international stage, and ability to act more efficiently than some large international group, it therefore falls to the U.S. to help Pakistan keep its democracy and its hopes of modernization alive.

In order to build a stronger Pakistan, the resource in shortest supply is time. Pakistan’s historic instability, governmental weaknesses, and increasing radicalization threaten to depose the current leaders. If that happens, the replacement would likely tolerate, if not support, the Taliban and its repressive ideology in a country with nuclear weapons and more than five times Afghanistan’s population. Therefore, America cannot afford to ignore Pakistan amidst the flaring regional unrest or wait until other nations stabilize. It should move Pakistan off the back burner as soon as possible, or the decade-old alliance could explode in America’s face.

Furthermore, the Kremlin’s recent behavior in Japan has been the key factor in escalating the conflict far beyond simple diplomatic tensions. Russia, equally infamous for its rabid youth movements, such as Nashi, is certainly not without anti-Japanese sentiment to rival Tokyo’s Northern Territories Day rallies. The Molodaya Gvardia (Young Guard) arm of the United Russia party has commissioned the spy-turned-TV-personality Anna Chapman to hoist the Russian flag on Kunashir, an island visible from the Japanese island of Hokkaido. In a backwards-diplomatic approach, the Young Guard has filmed an inflammatory documentary featuring the glamorous Chapman as a spokesperson for the Russians’ great prosperity and consequent legitimacy in the Kuril Islands. Their intent is to convince the Japanese government of their rightful rule there.

Much more worrying, however, is the Russians’ decision to deploy advanced military artillery on the Kuril Islands. During a controversial visit to the islands, President Medvedev claimed that in order to “ensure the security” of “our strategic region,” armed precautions were necessary against aggressive nationalism in Japan. Although the exact extent of this expansion remains unknown, its very prospect is an enormous threat to the Japanese who have, until now, not gone beyond civil public action concerning the Kurils. Now, Japan too has plans to increase defense forces in Hokkaido to rival Russia’s. Such arms escalation and increased use of force have become disappointingly common. When a Japanese fishing vessel recently passed nearby the Kurils, it was detained by a Russian patrol; in August, another wary Russian coast guard unit opened fire on a Japanese vessel and killed an innocent crewmember. Then, earlier this year, Japanese authorities had to scramble 22 jets in order to prevent a suspicious Russian Tupolev 95 bomber from further harassing neutral airspace.

These developments come amidst mounting tensions elsewhere in East Asia. Chinese aircraft have taken after the Russians and begun to harass Japanese and Filipino vessels traveling too close to disputed territories. Taiwan too recently conducted artillery exercises near the oil-rich Spratly and Parcel archipelagos, islands also claimed by Vietnam and Malaysia; Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Phuong Nga said in response that this action “seriously violated” their sovereignty. Regional media have also reflected this shift in tactical ideology. In an alarming Hong Kong editorial, the Ming Pao wrote, “Medvedev’s move has fully shown the importance of actual control over regions with disputed sovereignty. It shows that China must change course on sovereignty disputes. It cannot rely solely on oral declarations of sovereignty and must take specific action.” The disputed Dokdo, Senkaku, and Dongsha islands, each claimed by various East Asian states, represent potential flashpoints for conflict in the near future. The Chinese and Russian governments’ decision to use military harassment to scare their rivals out of disputed territories is an evident refusal of internationally prominent states to abide by conventional diplomatic practices. Coupled with Pyongyang’s decision to shell the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong this winter, heightened conflict in the East China Sea seems imminent.

And yet, the recent series of tragedies in Japan may have a silver lining in potentially helping to alleviate mounting tensions in the region by redirecting energies to the philanthropic rapprochement expected of Russia, China, Korea and Taiwan. Given the tragic plights that the Japanese now suffer – a 9.0 magnitude earthquake followed by a tsunami, and the spread of nuclear radiation, as well as imminent social strife – one hopes that the Kremlin would pause to reconsider any belligerent escalation against Japan. Indeed, Arkady Klimov of the Duma’s International Affairs Committee stated, “grievous events sometimes show us what is important and what is not.” Such self-cognizance may be the key to eased Russo-Japanese relations. Indeed, the Kremlin has already pledged to lay an underwater electricity cable and ship large amounts of gas “very quickly” in order to aid humanitarian efforts in Tohoku, Japan.

Ultimately, the vocal youth movements concerning the Kuril territories in Tokyo are peculiar phenomena, as their fierce investment in such an isolated issue seems to be a manifestation of an unexplained trend towards a familiar fanatical nationalism. While such nationalistic sentiments are not easily quashed or ceased, regional diplomatic action is necessary to prevent long-latent tensions from worsening. The international community must therefore pressure the governments in Russia and Japan alike to act more responsibly. The Japanese Prime Minister must quit his brazen nationalistic stance and approach the Kremlin more diplomatically. The responsibility of utmost importance, however, lies with the Russians, who must withdraw their forces from the Kuril Islands and return these Northern Territories to Japanese sovereignty. Only then will these two powers be able to sign the treaty to formally terminate their animosity.

To do so would empower Russian legitimacy as a rational diplomatic role model for similar developing nations. This could consequently force China and other states involved in territorial disputes to realize that diplomacy rather than military force is the most constructive approach. Thus, in order to be recognized as a responsible world power and member of the United Nations Security Council, Russia needs to demonstrate civil diplomatic behavior through cautious and rational actions. Their cession would also improve the Russians’ reputation in East Asia, which is home to four of the world’s largest economies, would consequently ameliorate their dismal trade position in South Korea and Japan. Although Japan too must terminate its authorized antagonism in the Kurils, Russia ought to make the first move; their reconciliation would soothe Japanese anxiety and hopefully ease tensions with the Chinese as well. Thus, the Kremlin’s compliance with regular diplomatic protocol will ultimately set the example for other actors to determine the fate of the region.

Many African leaders have welcomed and hailed Chinese investment as a savior that, as Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe proclaimed during Yang’s visit, “demolishes colonialism.” African nations are happy to find an alternative to Western nations that have exercised unrivalled influence in the region since the fall of the Soviet Union. Despite the economic fruits of Chinese influence in Africa, however, Chinese leaders must consider the deeper problems with current investment practices. Local policies and attitudes that neglect worker welfare, crowd out employment, and collude with dictatorial regimes are fostering grassroots resentment that may undermine China’s ability to continue business with Africa in the long term.

On the surface, China seems to be playing its cards well. The China-Africa relationship is in many respects worlds away from colonialism. In contrast to European colonialists of the 19th and 20th centuries, China does not forcibly acquire resources from African nations, enslave local people, or artificially break apart populations by drawing territorial lines. China treats its African partners as diplomatic equals, with officials from Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi to Premier Wen Jiabao repeatedly stressing its “win-win” rhetoric of a partnership with “mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit”.

In the face of lingering concerns, China has also been able to successfully deflect criticism, especially from the West, that China’s relations with Africa are characteristic of a neocolonialist relationship. Neocolonialism may refer to a form of contemporary economic imperialism, where powerful nations behave like colonial powers of imperialism in a post-colonial world. Critics point to China’s economic support of African regimes that violate human rights as evidence that China is leveraging its economic relationships to gain political hold on the continent. The Chinese government has repeatedly rejected this view, asserting that human rights are relative to cultures and countries.

While America has hardly been blameless on the issue of human rights, China’s disregard for it is not so easily resolved. Self-interested Chinese policies and attitudes that show scarce concern for worker welfare have already generated resentment in local African communities. Many infrastructure deals signed by Chinese firms mandate that the majority of labor for the project must be Chinese, precluding Africans from fully benefitting from the inflow of Chinese investment. This deprives locals of jobs and fosters discontent, as workers cannot reap the expected benefits of the influx of new projects.

The limited employment opportunities for African workers have also become synonymous with bad working conditions, low pay, or abusive practices. Managers exploiting the cheap labor available in African nations have reportedly dishonored pay contracts and prohibited unions and protests, both of which are actions that reveal a disregard for the rights of workers. In recent years, numerous examples of poor worker treatment have surfaced. Last year, Chinese coal mine managers in Sinazongwe, Zambia shot and wounded 11 of their local employees during a protest about pay and working conditions, putting Zambian politicians under intense public pressure to shut down the mine and arrest the managers. In 2007, the Nigerian government leased to China Nuclear International Uranium Corporation a tract of land belonging to ethnic Tuaregs, displacing the local Tuaregs without compensation. With pre-agreed stipulations on the division of labor, few jobs were available for the Tuaregs, and those available were described as hazardous and poorly paid.

In addition to concerns over the protection of workers’ rights, China has partnered with corrupt governments eager to place foreign economic investment over the well-being of their people. On some occasions, Chinese corporations in Africa that have violated local labor laws have repeatedly ignored communication from regionally elected leaders because of existing relationships with the central government. For example, in 2005, an explosion due to unsafe working conditions in a Chinese copper mine in Chambishi, Zambia killed 46 workers. Zambian president Rupiah Banda and the Ministry of Commerce, Trade, and Industry stood behind the Chinese corporation, leading trade unions, workers, politicians, and ordinary Zambians to protest that President Banda was “taking sides” with the Chinese. In the long run, such a policy of disregard may trigger a political backlash. In the event that dictatorial governments are overthrown by their people, as has been seen in cases such as Egypt and Syria, China would be seen as an accomplice that helped to sustain and perpetuate the ruthless regimes. Ultimately, this complicity could prove counterproductive for Chinese interests in Africa.

Dissatisfaction with China’s close ties to corrupt African authorities also extends to other countries in an international context. Because China grants aid packages with “no strings attached”, oppressive dictatorial regimes have been able to subvert and survive Western efforts to initiate political reform. While Western nations have attempted to pass a UN arms embargo on the Sudanese government to stop the genocide in Darfur, China has sold $24 million worth of arms and $57 million worth of vehicles and equipment to Sudan. In Zimbabwe, Western sanctions to bring about reform were likewise undermined by China’s support to President Robert Mugabe’s regime in the form of $200 million worth of military vehicles and equipment.

Moral argument aside, the long-term political consequences of current Chinese investment practices in Africa will also be adverse. Already, signs of malcontent indicate that China needs to change its ways if it is to sustain its investment interests in Africa. In 2006, an opposition presidential candidate in Zambia ran his campaign on the idea of “Zambia for Zambians,” a platform in favor of expelling Chinese influence from the country. The disconnect between the official Chinese government rhetoric of “win-win” agreements and local realities will only entrench and perpetuate distrust of the Chinese. It will not take long for the common public to see through the veiled Chinese rhetoric of win-win situations that belies its real quest for natural resources and political control. China’s support of these rogue governments will inevitably harm its reputation on the global stage, reduce its credibility in international affairs, and degrade relations with its neighbors.

While China’s relationship with the countries of Africa may strictly not qualify as that of a neocolonialist nature, there are critical problems in the way it deals with local populations that alienates them and generates resentment. In order to maintain its international credibility and support with local populations, China should discontinue supporting dictatorial regimes that overtly repress its people, especially in terms of the sale of military weapons and equipment. At the local level, China should encourage or mandate Chinese firms working in Africa to hire more local labor, improve working conditions, and respect local laws. It is ultimately in China’s own interest to review its involvement in Africa in order to sustain its economic growth and maintain its international credibility. If China fails to recognize these mistakes, it will ultimately find itself in the same position as America, grappling with its own brand of anti-Americanism.