The Xinjiang riots erupted after two Uighur men died in a racially charged brawl between Han Chinese and Uighurs in a Guangdong toy factory. The mass unrest following the dispute resulted in nearly 200 deaths, thousands of injuries, and 1,500 arrests. While Uighurs mounted the initial protests, Xinjiang’s Han Chinese responded with an armed counter-march a few days later. Twenty-five of those arrested have received death sentences, and although their ethnicities were not officially released, the BBC reported that their names indicate that all were Uighurs. Additionally, Human Rights Watch reported police sweeps rounding up Uighur men in Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang province. China is still dealing with the aftermath of this event; approximately 20 Uighur men who fled to Cambodia following the riots were deported back to China. No information on the men has been released, other than the fact that they are being or have been put on trial for what China considers criminal activities. Although it is less visible, the situation has not resolved itself in the months following the riots.

Ethnic tensions are not new in Xinjiang. During the 1990s, a separatist group known as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) was blamed for over 200 terrorist attacks. The goal of ETIM was to establish an Islamic state independent of China. While most Uighurs do not sympathize with the ETIM and do not in fact seek to establish an independent East Turkestan, they still resent both the Han population in Xinjiang as well as the Chinese government. Chinese development campaigns like “Open up the West” have brought massive infrastructure projects to the region, allowing more governmental control in the wake of ETIM attacks and strengthening ties to a region of great economic importance for China. But to foster these ties, the government has actively encouraged the migration of Han Chinese to Xinjiang. While Han made up just 5 percent of the Xinjiang population in the 1940s, today they account for approximately 40 percent. The massive influx of Han immigrants has increased competition for jobs and natural resources in the region. Furthermore, the Chinese government has placed tight controls on the practice of Islam. Although the Chinese government is not immediately at fault for the riots in Xinjiang, it set the stage for the violence.

Considering the apparent repression that has occurred in Xinjiang, it is worth asking why there has been so little international interest in the conflict, especially compared to the worldwide outpouring of support for Tibet. On a basic level, the Uighurs lack an effective, recognizable leader. Although Rebiya Kadeer serves as a spokesperson for the group, she lacks the popular support enjoyed by, for one, the Dalai Lama of Tibet.

Of more fundamental concern is the fact that the Uighurs have yet to shake the implicit association with terrorism. ETIM’s attacks during the 1990s complicated outside views of the Uighur community. The Beijing government has used the presence of ETIM to justify its repressive tactics in Xinjiang. In the wake of 9/11, the US and other nations were willing to support that view. The United States labeled ETIM a terrorist organization, and 22 Uighurs from Afghanistan were held in Guantanamo Bay. All have since been cleared of any terrorist affiliation. However, China’s crackdown on ETIM appears to have worked. Experts have expressed doubt that it is still an active organization, although that is not to say that there is no threat. The Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), believed to be an offshoot of ETIM, organized bombings in the months leading up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Nevertheless, these attacks are rare, and much of the unrest in Xinjiang, like July’s riots, is not associated with terrorist activity. In fact, although China continues to link violence to ETIM, many Chinese experts doubt the extent of ETIM’s operations and believe the government relies on the threat of terrorism to mask its hard-line policies in Xinjiang.

Although initially China was praised for allowing journalists fast and fairly wide-ranging access following July’s riots, this may have simultaneously served to deflect attention from the restrictions put in place. Internet and text-ing service began to be reinstated only in January, travel restrictions remain stringent, and no information has been provided about the Uighur men who vanished following police roundups. While China has used counter-terrorism to justify its heavy-handed tactics in dealing with Uighurs before, the lack of activity on the part of ETIM clearly undermines that rationale in this case. The United States, therefore, has no excuse for ignoring the human rights abuses that have occurred in Xinjiang.

China’s repressive actions fail to address the real issues facing the Uighur population in Xinjiang. The Uighurs have legitimate grievances, and the cycle of violence and repression will undoubtedly be repeated. The United States has failed to acknowledge China’s repressive actions in Xinjiang in any meaningful way. In the aftermath, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs expressed regret for the loss of life in Xinjiang. US State Department spokesman Ian Kelly gave a slightly stronger answer, calling for the Chinese government to “act to restore order and prevent further violence.” Yet even this avoids the issue of determining what caused the violence and what actions need to be taken to redress the wrongs. The US Commission on Religious Freedom was much closer to giving a response that could have had real impact, with a call for an independent investigation of the riots and targeted sanctions, but its message was not echoed by those with the power to implement those ideas.

Human rights have not been a prominent issue on the Obama administration’s agenda in dealing with China. This is not the first time China has faced internal conflict. Events in Xinjiang are remarkably similar to the ongoing situation in Tibet. The fact that a violent response to human rights abuses has become a recurring phenomenon in China indicates that the US should make this more of a priority in its interactions with China. While the United States’ relationship with China is delicate and complicated, the United States should not have ignored China’s heavy-handed tactics in Xinjiang or any other region that is or that becomes a target. The US’s failure to act undermines the human rights values that the United States claims to uphold and sets a precedent of kowtowing to the Chinese. As China becomes a more assertive world power, both for human rights and its own foreign policy, it is important that the United States remains unafraid to be loudly critical of human rights abuses in China.

In some sense, the state dinner was nothing new; past U.S. presidents have regularly hosted Indian leaders at state dinners. Indeed, in terms of policy substance, the Obama-Singh event is less important than Singh’s dinner with former President Bush in 2005, when they announced a civilian nuclear agreement between the two states. Nevertheless, the state dinner helped allay fears that the Obama administration might deprioritize relations with India in favor of strengthening ties with China. Despite the administration’s globetrotting agendas, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton bypassed India on her trip to Asia in February 2009, and Obama, too, declined to visit during his Asian tour en route to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Singapore in November. Although Clinton did visit India earlier in July, the Obama administration seems to interact with India within a more bilateral framework than one in which they acknowledge its rising power and aspirations on the global stage.

New Delhi has been fretting over the U.S.’s apparent acquiescence to growing Chinese clout and in particular, the recent joint Obama-Hu statement calling for closer “cooperation [between the U.S. and China] on issues related to South Asia.” The statement seemed to open the door to China’s involvement in the longstanding sensitive rivalry between India and Pakistan. Furthermore, the ongoing economic downturn has fueled protectionist tendencies in America, especially with a Democrat-controlled Congress. Obama recently spoke of anti-outsourcing measures and criticized current tax policies which favor companies outsourcing to lower-cost countries like India. Hence some political watchers are predicting some strain in U.S.-India relations on Obama’s watch.

Officials such as U.S. Under Secretary of State William Burns and Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Robert Blake have nonetheless firmly reiterated America’s commitment to a partnership with India. Prime Minister Singh’s status as the first state guest of honor can be seen as a reaffirmation of the continued strength of U.S.-India ties and a strategic move by the White House to reassure their nervous Indian friends. The pageantry of a state dinner cannot, however, be a replacement for progress toward substantive issues. The Obama administration has been dragging its heels in the implementation of the much-heralded nuclear cooperation agreement, with the President showing little inclination to push through the final modalities and procedures.

Obama is right to engage more closely with China, but sticking too closely to a G2-style “Chimerica” script would risk overemphasizing Chinese influence at the expense of American leverage. China and America are more often than not at loggerheads with each other, from China’s resentment over its past subjugation under Western imperial powers to present-day tensions over Taiwan, Tibet, yuan undervaluation, and ideological differences over human rights and democracy. If Obama realistically wants to realize his grand visions of multilateralism and global cooperation, he needs as many allies on board as possible. An increasingly aggressive and confident China is an unlikely first candidate.

India can serve as a useful counterweight to China’s assertive and occasionally hostile presence in Asia that ensures that the much-touted ‘Asian century’ does not belong exclusively to the Chinese. While it would be overly simplistic to claim that India and the U.S.’s shared traits of being populous multiethnic democracies automatically renders easy cooperation, the fact that India is more likely to have a similar outlook as the U.S. can ease Western fears of a potentially unfriendly Asia-Pacific region based on Chinese-driven values and models. The U.S. should not try to forcefully impose American ideas on Asia, but with India as an ally the U.S. can ensure that its interests in Asia are not compromised. Most of the Southeast Asian countries, being poor and relatively small, are highly susceptible to China’s “checkbook diplomacy”—using its wealth to buy allies. For the U.S., India’s partnership may be more important than its partnership with Japan, as that country, a traditionally staunch U.S. ally, becomes increasingly distant from the U.S. after the recent shift in power to the Democratic Party of Japan under Yukio Hatoyama. India is also keen to work with the U.S. as protection against China. Supporting India’s emergence as a major power need not constitute an antagonistic containment strategy directed against any supposed “China threat.” Instead, it is a reasonable policy designed to ensure that the interests of all players are accommodated to preserve geopolitical stability and inclusiveness in a crucial region of the world.

The U.S. has to make sure it recognizes India’s interests while balancing its own agenda. Unfortunately, relations have been soured by India’s frustrations with America’s perceived reluctance to strongly crack down on Pakistan, which harbors several extremist groups that have targeted India. India is suspicious of ramped-up American military assistance to its neighbor, fearing that Pakistan will channel those resources toward aggression in the disputed Kashmir region and along the Indo-Pakistan border, rather than toward combating Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Obama also flamed controversy early in 2009 when he suggested that resolving the Kashmir dispute would be central to addressing the problems of instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. South Asian politics have long proven to be complex and messy, and tensions have become even more strained in the wake of the 2008 Mumbai bombings by Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). Washington needs to balance its interests in working with both India and Pakistan, as well as Afghanistan, all crucial fronts in the battle against terrorism. During the state dinner, Obama wisely adopted a policy of non-involvement, issuing a neutral statement that “it is not [America’s] place” to get involved in the India-Pakistan conflict. Pakistan and India are partners that the U.S. can ill afford to lose; Washington should tread carefully.

Although the two nations have been increasingly close partners, there remains much potential for closer cooperation on counterterrorism efforts, particularly in the realms of intelligence sharing, joint training, improved institutional frameworks, and enhanced security enforcement measures and responses. India’s previous successful efforts against Sikh terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s were due in no small part to the sharing of intelligence with the U.S. and other countries, and a similar approach may be adopted with regard to global terrorism today. While terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda and the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) do have different objectives, they all cause conflict beyond Pakistan’s borders. A U.S.-India partnership in combating terrorism would underline India’s leadership both regionally and globally and would highlight international commitment to stopping terrorism and increasing stability.

Although President Obama’s ceremony and symbolic gestures are well-intentioned, building a stronger partnership with India will require further action. While China must be considered, the U.S. must engage more deeply with India on the many issues and interests that the two nations share to glean the potential economic and strategic rewards.

Japan is an economically strong and politically valuable ally in East Asia because it shares U.S. interests in advancing human rights and disarming North Korea. Washington should therefore improve its relationship with Tokyo by cooperating on the countries’ shared policy goals, maintaining its commitment negotiate the presence of the U.S. Marine base in Okinawa, and supporting Japan’s aspirations to join the UN Security Council.

At first glance, the DPJ victory would appear to put the U.S. at risk of losing one of its most reliable allies. Hatoyama advocates detaching Japan from the U.S. and its foreign conflicts, while remedying injured relations with neighboring countries. Realistically, the U.S. should expect less cooperation from Tokyo on a few key issues such as the Japanese Navy’s refueling mission in the Indian Ocean and maintaining a U.S. airfield on the island of Okinawa.

Nonetheless, new directions in Japan’s foreign policy could prove beneficial for both countries in the long run. Under new leadership, Japan could assume a more active role in fostering stability in East Asia by cultivating closer ties with other East Asian nations.

According to Gilbert Rozman, a professor of sociology at Princeton University and an expert on Japan, Japan’s postwar foreign policy goals have been threefold. It has focused on maintaining the alliance with the U.S., developing positive relations with its neighbors, and acquiring a more significant role in international institutions such as the United Nations. In the past, these policy goals tended to conflict, with one improving at the expense of the others.

Such was the case over the last decade. Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi prioritized strengthening ties to the U.S. by cultivating a close personal friendship with the former President George W. Bush and offering non-military assistance to the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan. Bush reciprocated this friendship in 2006 by pledging support for Japan’s (ultimately unsuccessful) bid to acquire a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.

Japan pursued its relationship with the U.S. and a stronger role in the UN at the expense of distancing itself from its East Asian neighbors. Koizumi’s provocative acts, including visiting the Yasukuni Shrine—home to the graves of many leaders who have been judged as war criminals—angered China and South Korea. Growing Chinese nationalism spawned widespread anti-Japanese protests, fanned in part by a campaign undertaken by Koizumi and his successor that appeared to whitewash the Japanese army’s atrocities during World War II. It is in light of this troubled history that Hatoyama hopes to regain the favor of its East Asian neighbors. Japan’s neighbors welcomed his announcement that he will not visit Yasukuni.

In light of Japan’s history and its important geopolitical position, President Obama should send a clear signal that Japan’s new focus on strengthening ties with its neighbors need not dent the friendship between the U.S. and Japan.

That means reassuring Japan that the U.S. remains committed to disarming North Korea whose nuclear arsenal is a direct threat to Japan’s security. Hatoyama, along with his Chinese and South Korean counterparts, have recently urged the resumption of the Six Party Talks with North Korea, which also involve the U.S. and Russia. Obama, for his part, has levied sanctions against North Korea in response to its missile tests in April and has made continuation of the Six Party Talks a precondition for further bilateral negotiations.

When it comes to political conflicts between the U.S and Japan, Obama will have to pick his battles. With the possibility of a troop surge in Afghanistan, the Japanese refueling mission is likely to remain an essential component of American military expeditions in the Middle East. The Okinawa base, on the other hand, is not as crucial to foreign missions. The nearby U.S.-controlled island of Guam offers a convenient alternative location that both serves U.S. purposes and satisfies the Japanese government. Recognizing the possibility for compromise, the military already has plans to shift some of its forces there beginning in 2014. Reaching agreement on Okinawa may allow the U.S. to bargain for Japan’s continued commitment to assist the U.S.-led war on terror. Hatoyama’s recent pledge of $5 billion in reconstruction aid to Afghanistan suggests that he is willing to support the global security objectives of the U.S.

Obama and Hatoyama can also strengthen their relationship by working together on international issues, such as human rights and climate change. The DPJ has vowed to slash Japan’s carbon emissions to 25% below 1990 levels in the next decade, a step up from previous targets. Such a cut could spur other developed nations to adopt similar measures, particularly the U.S., where Obama’s proposed cap and trade bill faces strong opposition in Congress. Collaborating on this initiative would reinforce the notion that Japan is a friend of the United States and thus alleviate the salience of anti-American sentiments espoused by the Japanese left.

A more assertive and neutral Japan can be positive for the U.S. as well as Japan. The two states still have many historic, economic, and political connections, as well as shared policy outlooks regarding regional security threats, such as North Korea. The Obama administration should invest both the time and the political capital necessary to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance as part of its broader efforts to maintain East Asian stability and security.

President Obama’s decision not to meet with the Dalai Lama indicates a broader shift in U.S. foreign policy in East Asia. After successfully hosting the Olympics last summer and improving its relationship with Taiwan, China is gaining power and influence and is now a member of the honorary “G2”—the ever-shrinking elite group of superpowers whose only other member is the United States. The Obama administration is working with a new—and potentially more dangerous—China and has calculated that the best way to maintain strong ties with the emerging power is to downplay the issue of Tibet and human rights concerns more generally. As part of this broader policy, Obama put off his visit with the Dalai Lama at least until after he meets with Chinese President, Hu Jintao.

The China-Tibet conflict has been a critical human rights and international relations issue for decades. China claims that Tibet has been part of its territory for four centuries, while Tibetans argue that they have been effectively independent for most of their history and possess their own distinct culture and ethnicity. These contentions turned into violent conflict last year during the Beijing Olympics, when a series of anti-Chinese protests broke out in Tibet. The issue even led to worldwide confrontations between pro-Tibetan and pro-Chinese demonstrators in Paris, London, and San Francisco. The U.S. government, as the leading advocate for human rights in the international community, responded to this incident by urging China to respect “the fundamental and universally recognized rights” set out in the Geneva Conventions.

The United States has generally taken a strong stance against violations of human rights in China. Former President George W. Bush awarded the Dalai Lama with the Congressional Gold Medal in the face of repeated warnings from China, making clear the United States’ support for the ideals of autonomy and freedom. But while Bush unwaveringly supported the expansion of democracy and human rights across the globe, Obama has proven willing to subordinate these ideals to shorter-term concerns. So given China’s meteoric rise to world power, Obama sees a more practical need to win China’s support for crucial economic and environmental policies.

But many in the U.S. rightly oppose this controversial policy shift. Indeed, Obama’s choice to avoid a meeting with the Dalai Lama was harshly criticized at home, especially on the right. Commentators have argued that the Dalai Lama’s visit symbolizes the U.S. influence in the realm of human rights. They claim that by shunning the spiritual leader Obama has demonstrated a lack of concerns for human rights issues, particularly in powerful states like China.

More generally, critics claim that the United States has become too economically dependent on China, and therefore too susceptible to China’s demands. In the current economic climate, this criticism may be the most salient. The economic downturn has created a delicate situation in which the U.S. struggles with national recession while China funds large fiscal deficits by buying U.S. treasury bills. As long as the U.S. remains beholden to China to finance its large national debt, China will have strong leverage over the U.S. on other crucial issues like human rights.

Unsurprisingly, the postponement of Obama’s visit has done nothing to ease tensions between the Chinese government and the Tibetan leader. Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said recently that the White House should not allow the Dalai Lama to engage in separatist activities in the U.S. and called the Dalai Lama a “wolf in monk’s robe.” In response, the Dalai Lama accused China of “acting like a child” and claimed his visits are anything but political. He added that he only sought genuine autonomy for Tibetans in China.

Compromises are an inevitable aspect of policymaking. In choosing to put off his meeting with Dalai Lama, Obama had to decide which foreign policy agenda was more important: pursuing human rights or cultivating a stronger relationship with Beijing. From a realist outlook, a nation acts rationally in pursuit of relative power; if China is steadfast in its policies toward human rights, pandering to them will not change their stance. Furthermore, if the U.S. yields to China’s demands it could give an unwarranted impression in the long-term as kowtowing to both U.S. voters and China itself.

President Obama is known for his diplomacy and commitment to peace. He should have used this skill for diplomacy to convince Chinese officials that the Dalai Lama’s visit was irrelevant to U.S.-China relations or perhaps even beneficial in resolving China’s conflict with Tibet. The Dalai Lama has historically maintained his role as a religious figure and not assumed a political position during his visits to the White House. The Dalai Lama has visited Washington ten times over the past eighteen years with no adverse affects on U.S.-China relations. President Obama should have pointed this out in defending the visit rather than acceding to Chinese interests on the issue.

China now has a powerful voice in international affairs that U.S. should not ignore. And though prudence is a desirable approach in politics sticking to the one’s belief and ideals is equally important. In the wake of his postponed visit with the Dalai Lama, Obama must maintain a balance between these two competing goals. He must not be afraid to stand on principle, even when it has short-term costs in international politics.

Reinsurance is just what it sounds like—insurance companies such as Lloyd’s of London, Munich Re, and Swiss Re buy the risk held by other insurance companies. There are several aspects of reinsurance that allow North Korea to commit fraud so easily. First, unlike with the usual kind of insurance, with reinsurance the investigation of the original claim is not carried out by the company that ultimately pays. KNIC, for instance, insures a North Korean helicopter. When it crashes, KNIC investigates the claim, puts together the paperwork showing that the claim is legitimate, and then simply passes on the paperwork to its reinsurer, say Lloyd’s of London, and waits. Lloyd’s itself cannot do any investigation unless North Korea allows it to do so, which it often does not. Further, if a claim is made on something that is reinsured, it is in KNIC’s best interest not to deny the claim, because they do not in fact have to pay it and can siphon money off the top when it is paid. A third key point is that KNIC is a state-owned insurance company, and reinsurers such as Lloyd’s generally agree to be bound by North Korean law in administering KNIC’s claims. This is a clear conflict of interest. The same people who are making the laws under which North Korean reinsurance is administered are the people buying and using that reinsurance.

According to Kim Kwang Jin, who left North Korea in 2003 after working as a manager at KNIC for six years, North Korea has made between $50 and $60 million a year from reinsurance fraud – 5% of the regime’s annual revenue. The money is used, says Kim, ‘to scout out potential disasters in North Korea, to buy more reinsurance on the global market, and to pay premiums.’ The money left over after this, about $20 million dollars, is delivered yearly near Kim Jong Il’s birthday as a “present.”

Next to weapon sales, reinsurance fraud is the regime’s second largest source of hard currency revenue. Since North Korea relies so heavily on this source of funding, measures taken to diminish this supply would be highly effective in encouraging the regime to toe the line. Such measures would not only threaten North Korea’s capacity to build weapons, but would also remove the possibility for North Korea to respond, as it has historically, with more bellicosity. The beauty of tightening insurance fraud laws is that North Korea cannot say anything in response—for to do so would be to admit to the fraud. At worst, North Korea might respond with some criticism of new insurance laws as unduly restrictive, or as opposed to a free-market economy. Given their 3000% inflation, their concern will be easy to ignore.

Critics might argue that North Korea will simply switch to other types of financial fraud. But this is a negligible objection. First, nothing prevents North Korea from doing these unspecified other types of fraud in the first place (in fact, North Korea already counterfeits US currency on a noticeable scale). Therefore, presumably if these other frauds were lucrative, North Korea would already be doing them, or doing them to a greater extent than it is. Even supposing North Korea could simply increase its other kinds of fraud and make the same money it now makes, this switch would take several years and a re-tooling of the regime’s expertise in fraud. These several years could buy the US and like-minded countries valuable time in bringing North Korea’s nuclear program to heel.

A further advantage of stemming the flow of reinsurance fraud revenue is that doing so is unlikely to hurt the average North Korean. Cutting off food aid might do so, but since the regime is using the money from fraud to buy itself big guns and fast cars anyway, the North Korean people have little to lose. Lastly, new approaches are needed because UN resolutions have simply not been effective in the past. Although SCR 1718 (2006), which froze assets relating to weapons programs, is often cited as a successful measure, it was not ultimately sufficient to stall North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, as a nuclear device was tested soon after. Overall, UN resolutions are cast in the form of rebukes after North Korea tests a weapon and seem to be more “crying over spilled milk” than impeding North Korea’s aggressive aims.

A measure which forced US banks to cut off all transactions with Banco Delta Asia, a bank which does substantial business with North Korea, illustrates how effective an approach aimed at cutting off North Korea’s supply of foreign currency can be. Kim Kwang Jin called the case “frightening” to the regime, and it was soon after this that North Korea returned to multilateral talks. But tightening reinsurance fraud laws is even better. Whereas North Korea could plausibly argue that US actions in the BDA case were highly prejudicial to its interests, and that the US was demonstrating its typical bullying behavior as the “bad guy,” such arguments do not hold much water for reinsurance. Here, the US can easily claim it is just interested in making sure the reinsurance industry runs as efficiently as possible, and that these new laws are not directed at any one country. This would leave North Korea with little negotiating leverage.

How might this strategy be implemented? First, reinsurance corporations need to learn to better detect fraud and avoid it. So far, insurance companies have been remarkably poor at detecting North Korean reinsurance fraud because the North Koreans split their reinsurance up into many small packages to diminish suspicion. For instance, in a 2005 judgment in London, Lloyd’s lost $58 million on a case that was likely fraudulent. North Korea also operates under front companies to conceal the country where the risk originates and moves from country to country, much like a con man moving from town to town before the populace of each town catches on. Governments can play a role in disseminating the information. An international information clearinghouse on reinsurance fraud might be established, so that reinsurers could immediately find out which companies have had large and questionable claims on a regular basis in the past and avoid them. This clearinghouse might also have an arm to investigate currently operating companies and pin down how they are interconnected. This would remedy the fact that the North Koreans often operate using shell companies that appear to be based in other countries.

Second, governments should consider requiring reinsurance companies to administer claims only under the laws of the country where the reinsurance company is based. This would prevent claims being decided under North Korean law, which is a sure-loss situation for any reinsurance company. Another piece of legislation might demand that any reinsurance claim be considered void unless it could be investigated by the reinsurer, which would prevent North Korea from fudging paperwork and then barring investigation by those paying. Finally, reinsurance companies that do choose to work with North Korea should be legally compelled to pay North Korean claims in North Korea won rather than in a hard currency.

In closing, the international community should use tightened reinsurance laws as part of its broad strategy to pressure the North Korean regime. Its current tactics of UN condemnations and broad based sanctions are too clumsy and reactive to handle the dynamic and difficult challenge of containing North Korea’s nuclear program. Reinsurance reform is a more sensible and subtle economic alternative.

China’s prosperity should be welcomed. It benefits the Chinese people through better living standards, social mobility, economic freedom and improved government safety nets. China’s growth will also increase demand for foreign products and spur trade.

Despite its strengths, China still lags far behind the U.S.—especially in economic freedom and its capacity for innovation. Its GDP per capita is relatively low and its government inhibits innovation. While China should be recognized for its progress and strong economy, it is ridiculous to discount the U.S.’ economic potential or prematurely pontificate about American decline. The U.S.’ diverse population and capacity for innovation will keep it economically competitive and geopolitically strong for years to come.

Proponents of America’s decline make it appear as if China outperforms the U.S. both economically and educationally. In China, however, more than 20 million college students have few job prospects and half of its engineering graduates only have associate degrees. Naturally, given China’s massive population, it will eventually overtake the U.S. in its population of scientists. The U.S. though, educates more engineers per capita than does China and in its 2008-2009 report, the World Economic Forum ranked the U.S. as the most competitive economy. Minxin Pei, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says that despite China’s rapid growth, it will take nearly 50 years for the average income in China to equal the average income in America.

A recent article in the New York Times suggests that job opportunities for American graduates in China are plentiful and that so are the Americans seeking these positions as evidence of American economic decline. It recounts stories of Americans and their successful jobs in China; yet, it cites no research and provides no concrete figures. Some Americans may easily find work in China like the Americans in the article. Shaun Rein, founder and managing director of the China Market Research Group thinks not. Jobs for recent college grads are scarce in China. And Rien says that Chinese companies would rather hire Chinese employees who understand both American and Chinese cultures than American applicants. Rein says that Americans have to convince employers that they are more valuable than the Chinese applicants—hundreds of thousands of whom have the same western education as the Americans.

Jobs are scarce in China. Unemployment in cities is officially 4.3 percent, but unemployment among last year’s Chinese graduates is about 12 percent. And the number of Chinese college students is growing. The bottom line is that Americans will struggle to find jobs in China just as they will in the U.S.

Both countries suffer slow growth and high unemployment rates in this tough economy. The difference between the U.S. and China is that American culture and its government fosters innovation. The U.S. is home to a majority of the world’s most innovative companies and people. In 2003 IBM, an American company garnered five times as many patents as China and India gained combined. In 2008 the U.S. still greatly outpaced China in the number of patents generated.

Former Woodrow Wilson School dean and current Director of Policy Planning for the U.S. State Department, Anne Marie Slaughter talks about America’s creativity in “America’s Edge,” published in Foreign Affairs this year. She says that the U.S.’ capacity for networking will “renew its power and restore its global purpose.” Slaughter says that China’s economic and political policies will prevent it from becoming an international leader in economics.

American companies and even American universities are experts at networking and marketing themselves and their products. Slaughter explains how American multinationals use networking to create well-selling products in markets around the world. A recent article in The Economist points to America’s history to show how important marketing has been for American innovation: “Edison did not invent the light bulb and Ford did not think up the motor car, but both came up with the business-model innovations required to profit from those marvels.”

American universities also market themselves to draw foreign students who contribute greatly to innovation in America. Fareed Zakaria, author of “The Rise of the Rest,” says that nearly half of all science researchers in the U.S. are either foreign students or immigrants. Foreign nationals made up 62% of all PhDs in the 2006 in the U.S., but they only comprised 7% of all B.S. degrees. Although the stay rate—percentage of foreign students who stay in the U.S. upon graduation—decreased slightly over the past few years, it remains high. A little over two-thirds of foreign PhD students stayed in the U.S. for at least 2 years after graduation. The stay rate will depend on America’s economy and immigration policies and whether foreign students and researchers have job prospects there in the future. As of 2009, the U.S. State Department is reworking its policies to reduce the time it takes to process Visas to two weeks.

For now though, as a 2008 RAND corporation report says, “America accounts for 40 percent of the total world’s spending on scientific research and development, employs 70 percent of the world’s Nobel Prize winners and is home to three-quarters of the world’s top 40 universities.” Diversity helps America discover new markets. Like Henry Chesbrough of the Berkeley Haas School of Business says, Americans are so successful at marketing because of their “ability to listen to, and learn from, customers in new markets.”

The Chinese government is trying to increase its capacity for innovation through state-created communities that consist of University campuses and research centers of International and Asian firms. These state-planned centers of innovation will not recreate the dynamic environment that encourages innovation in the U.S. because innovation comes from what Slaughter describes as “positive conflict”—the ability to challenge the status quo. China wants to produce more innovative citizens yet it controls the simplest aspects of their lives.

During the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China exposed how strictly its censors media. Foreign journalists were appalled by how much the government censored the internet. Chinese journalists also face tough restrictions—China leads the world in number of Journalists imprisoned. The Chinese government controls foreign trade just as strictly. On August 12th, 2009 the WTO ruled that China has been violating trade rules by restricting imports of media—movies, music etc. The state film distribution organization, China Film Corp., can decide for example that this summer the Chinese people will watch Harry Potter and not Star Trek. Unless China allows its people more freedom, both personal and economic, its private sector will remain stifled and small.

China has a strong and growing economy that is helping many people escape poverty and improve their lives. The U.S. and the world though, should not lose confidence in America. Eric Schmidt, CEO of Google’s reminds us that, “innovation is how America works…creative destruction, this constant process of layoffs and new jobs and new companies and so forth is key to America’s competitiveness.” That mentality will make America the world’s most competitive economy for decades to come.

Pakistan has not given the Waziristan conflict the resources or the resolve it requires. A Defense Department official described the situation in these terms: “The government is too worried about its own political survival to take on the militants.” Still, if the U.S. is to salvage its anti-terror partnership with Pakistan, it must emphasize that strategies designed to appease the Taliban are unacceptable. Furthermore, the U.S. must understand that the crisis in Pakistan is not entirely a military endeavor. Current President Asif Ali Zardari heads a fragile, insecure government, the country’s disenfranchised and uneducated youth remain vulnerable to radical strains of Islam, and sympathy for Islamist groups lingers within Pakistan’s intelligence and security institutions. America must use its funds, resources and international clout to promote, first and foremost, a more robust secular educational system, one designed to inculcate democratic virtues and national pride among young Pakistanis.

That education is the only surefire cure for extremism has become a cliché, but in Pakistan it is highly applicable. Pakistan’s public education system has suffered enormous neglect over the past thirty years, and Islamic schools, madrassas, have filled the void. In 2002, approximately 10,000 Pakistani madrassas educated a total of 1.7 million students. Though only a small minority of these schools promote violent, anti-Western ideologies, almost all encourage prioritizing allegiance to the pan-Islamic ummah (community of believers) over national duty. The development of a competent secular educational system, dedicated to teaching not only reading and writing but also the value of democratic participation would help to cultivate a more vibrant and accessible political environment, getting into the non-military roots of the problem.

In 2007, a representative sample of 1,044 Pakistanis found that Osama bin Laden had an approval rating of 46%. Approval ratings of the Taliban and al-Qaeda were similarly high. Perhaps even more jarring, only 4% of respondents believed that the United States had good intentions in its War on Terror. Winning the hearts, minds and loyalties of the Pakistani people is as central to U.S. interests as anything happening in Waziristan; the U.S. must understand that donations to the Pakistani military, however generous, are unlikely to alter public opinion, especially given the historic tendency of the military to carve itself a role in civilian politics.

Thus, while the Pakistani military certainly does deserve continued American support, so too do the Pakistani people and their government. A strong, effective educational system, and more particularly the economic opportunities and civic virtues it would cultivate, would go a long way to fostering the growth of moderation, tolerance, and democracy in Pakistan. America can best improve its regional reputation by demonstrating tangible support for the social, and especially educational, needs of the Pakistani people. Future aid should be directed more towards public programs than military enhancement. Additionally, financial assistance should be targeted not merely at projects of local development, but also towards the Pakistani government’s own attempts at systemic reform.

In June 2009, as Pakistani troops were retaking Swat, Osama bin Laden released an audio recording to Al Jazeera, the Arabic-language television network. He claimed that the Waziristan war was “an American, Jewish and Indian plot”, whose ultimate aim was to weaken Pakistan in the face of Indian aggression and American imperialism. Appealing to historic Pakistani insecurities, bin Laden attempted to deflect attention from the thousands of Pakistanis killed and the millions displaced by the current conflict. Against such an enemy, America must recognize that education is its strongest defense; only with a holistic appreciation of the conflict will Pakistanis be able to recognize that their deadliest foe is extremism itself.