However, recent elections, increased amnesty, and a general thawing of political oppression have undeniably helped the government’s reputation. The tides appear to be turning in Myanmar, albeit slowly. And yet, one cannot help but fear that these moves towards political orthodoxy are just a charade to curry ASEAN favor. To hold the Chairmanship would legitimize Myanmar’s suspicious new government and strengthen ties with potential trading partners. At the moment, the Burmese government seems to be superficially liberalizing and using political prisoners as pawns to gain international legitimacy. Meanwhile its public remains largely oppressed. It is indeed difficult to reconcile basic conceptions of universal human rights and this politically and economically motivated exploitation. The key to optimizing these trends is to gently draw Burmese politicians and generals into enforcing policies that are both forward-looking and enduring so that the people of Myanmar can benefit from true democracy and freedom of speech. The political clout and economic might of nearby nations like India and Thailand, as well as the United States, puts them in prime positions to do so.

One may wonder as to why a martial state like Myanmar might suddenly seek international legitimacy in forums such as ASEAN. Previously, the isolated dictatorship relied almost wholly upon the support of the Communist Party of China. Ever since the Burmese government became first to recognize Mao’s fledgling regime, the nations have maintained a special relationship. Not only has China long been Myanmar’s largest trading partner, it has also provided the junta with weaponry to enforce its rule. Despite this amicable history, protests in Yangon in 2007 prompted Beijing to modestly propose that the Burmese regime impose greater peace and stability. More recently, the junta’s crackdowns on the rebellious Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) have sent thousands of Burmese refugees into China’s Yunnan province. This gradual decline of once-unshakable Chinese support, coupled with a new form of government, has forced Myanmar into looking elsewhere –places like India, Indonesia, and Thailand – for support.

Such starvation for outside support may have prompted the SPDC to allow for elections in 2010. However, the government declared Aung San Suu Kyi’s candidacy illegitimate for her criminal record, and the National League for Democracy (NLD) thus boycotted the elections; neutral outside sources have since declared these elections fraudulent. There was, however, a nominal dissolution of militant junta authority. Thein Sein – the Prime Minister under Than Shwe’s junta regime – was illegitimately voted president and maintained many vestiges of the previous administration. And yet, the junta’s decision to release Nobel Peace Prize winner Suu Kyi from 15 years of house arrest seems to indicate a shift in ideology.

More encouraging news came last month, when about 200 political prisoners were released according to government promises. This is just the beginning of the mass amnesty that is to eventually free 6,300 of Myanmar’s unjustly imprisoned citizens. Released dissidents remain cynical, however, given that around 92% of political detainees remain behind bars. In these tumultuous times in Burmese politics, even good news is confusing news. Is this truly an ideologically motivated thawing of political oppression, or simply the military apparatus’ scheme to win the ASEAN Chairmanship and international legitimacy?

It would therefore be unwise – naïve even – to begin bestowing praise on the government of Myanmar. After last year’s fraudulent elections the second-highest-ranked diplomat of Washington’s Burmese embassy, Kyaw Win, defected from his post in protest; in order to protect his family from potential political violence, he sought the American government’s asylum. He explained his motives in a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, in which he boldly claimed that “senior military officials are consolidating their grip on power…oppression is rising and war against our ethnic cousins is imminent.” Such internal experience ought not be ignored, especially in light of Myanmar’s erratic tendency to enact superficial reforms only to follow them up with violent crackdowns. Despite initial tolerance of the peaceful Saffron Revolution in 2007, protestors were soon quashed by brutal violence on behalf of the junta.

Are we to expect Suu Kyi and her supporters to disregard such novel freedoms and superficial signs of progress, despite the tireless years they have spent in its pursuit? Should the NLD not exploit the government’s current willingness to reform for ASEAN Chairmanship while they still can and push for a liberal democracy from within? Unfortunately, it seems as though the Burmese power apparatus is still hesitant to permit such internal forces to have so strong a voice. A better way might be to take advantage of Myanmar’s desperation for an improved international reputation and to allow encouragement to come from outside the country.

It is therefore imperative that surrounding nations strike a delicate balance between praise and dissatisfaction. India, for instance, had publicly supported democratic movements in Myanmar; however, when the riots of 2007 were violently quashed, India fell silent. Due to a desire to keep border tensions and resource flow secure, Delhi issued a statement saying they would let Myanmar’s people come to democracy unimpeded. Unsurprisingly, neighboring powerhouse China also neglected to enforce human rights standards. Such behavior is intolerable; developed nations must not neglect such abuses of basic human rights for the sake of commerce. Indian officials must change their tone from apathetic to indignant; the United States must aid their cause of imposing liberalization by engaging the Burmese in diplomacy, rather than in lopsided commerce. The international community must coax the Burmese into continuing these reforms, while also asserting that they ought not be for the sole purpose of temporary appeasement.

Thein Sein and the new bureaucrats have sought to gain favor from their fellow ASEAN members through the deliberate thaw of military rule and the liberation of Suu Kyi. Such actions, however, will only gain them the temporary spotlight of the globally criticized ASEAN. Through conditional engagement, we can lure Burmese politicians into acceptable behavior. The Burmese government’s desperation for international recognition and commerce, as well as its citizens’ poverty, puts it in a highly vulnerable position. Now that the most basic steps have been taken to democratize, the international community must bring these fledgling reforms to fruition. Regardless of the regime’s actual motives, if the international community crafts an optimistic albeit realistic attitude towards these changes, we can make incredible changes on behalf of the oppressed Burmese public.

For some Euro watchers, this arrangement between Europe and China is only the latest example of “the scramble for Europe”. Borrowing the phrase from the 19th century competition between European states to acquire colonies in Africa, skeptics use the term broadly to argue that the surge in Chinese acquisitions of European companies and related investments will undermine European competitiveness. In the words of a French official, “It’s a real war, with highly subsidized companies coming to open markets with unusually low prices and undercutting the competition.” Moreover, this may lead to a split EU policy on China, with “cash-strapped deal-seekers”, like Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain (PIGS), simply seeking investments, while “frustrated market-openers” like Germany and France seek a united European consensus to protect domestic firms both in Europe and abroad in China.

Especially in the eyes of countries like Germany and France, China’s investment patterns in Europe present a concern. A disproportionately large percentage of China’s global investments are in Eastern Europe (10%) and PIGS (30%) – the traditionally weaker EU economies. Combined with the fact that Chinese firms have been beating out European firms for large public-sector contracts in Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Poland, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia, this leads wealthier EU states to eye China’s intentions warily.

Undoubtedly, this arrangement has real benefits for weaker EU states, which can now obtain infrastructure at fire sale prices. However, the lack of transparency of many Chinese corporations is a cause for concern. Although EU law forbids state-run companies from bidding for public contracts, many Chinese multinationals that bid for these contracts have close ties to government, maintain a shadow party structure, and most importantly, obtain government subsidies, which give them a further leg up on their European competitors. Furthermore, Chinese firms can keep costs lower than their European competitors by importing low-cost laborers from China and paying them significantly less.

Why is this a problem for European unity? While poorer EU members see only the benefits of discounted costs, wealthier EU members see anti-competitive practices as harmful for domestic firms. Furthermore, when European firms from wealthier nations go abroad, they are frustrated by China’s lack of reciprocity. While European firms are nominally allowed to bid for projects in China, they rarely win, as the rules are skewed almost always to favor domestic firms. Therefore, the vast majority of China’s internationally known mega-projects such as the Three Gorges Dam, Olympic stadiums, and bullet trains are administered instead by the National Development and Research Commission (NDRC). So while the “market-openers” cry foul and attempt to overhaul existing EU legislation, the “cash-strapped deal-seekers” do not see it in their interest to comply with any policy to change the status quo.

To argue that China actively seeks to weaken the EU by reaching agreements with individual member states to create a divisive “China lobby” within the union may be a stretch. China has little to gain from the dissolution of the EU. Nonetheless, Europe must put its economic house in order, encourage China to open up its market to foreign firms, and finally mitigate the unfair advantages that Chinese firms have while bidding in Europe. To achieve the first goal, the EU must evolve beyond its original intent and become a monetary and a fiscal union. Though this would most likely face serious resistance from many EU states, the debt crisis in Europe today is a direct result of a failure on the part of the EU states to coordinate fiscal policy. It is important to remember while China demands certain conditions for its purchase of euro bonds, this originated from a lack of European coordination that precipitated this disaster. By allowing each state to pursue its own interest independently, each state ended up collectively worse off than if they had coordinated their policies together. Moving towards a fiscal union will benefit the EU in the present by giving investors confidence in EU bonds, and will benefit the EU in the future by making it easier to head off the type of debt crises that we see today, reducing the need for the type of outside intervention that Europe is soliciting from China now.

In addition, more regulation will be required to prevent foreign firms from using subsidies to gain unfair advantages in bidding. Since there already exist a myriad of regulation in China, the European Financial Stability Fund suggests that the EU should reciprocate, especially in fields such as defense, critical technologies, media, and education.

While Chinese investments have exposed weaknesses in the EU’s structure, these are all manageable issues that, in time, can be resolved. Although the alarmist reports in the media have painted a portrait of newly ascendant China righting past wrongs by reverse-colonizing Europe, the truth is that China is neither belligerent nor friendly – it is simply in pursuit of its own self-interest, and Europe should respond accordingly by strengthening existing ties between states.

To understand why this move is so politically significant, it is necessary to first have a basic understanding of the Tibetan government-in-exile. Starting from the top, while many in the West view the Dalai Lama primarily as the spiritual leader of the Tibetan people, he is also the chief executive of the government, armed with an array of political powers. Though there are some checks on his power – for example, his decision to retire required approval by the Tibetan parliament – his combination of political and spiritual influence makes the Dalai Lama a remarkably potent figure.

The Dalai Lama seeks to devolve all his political power to the Kalon Tripa, who as a direct subordinate to the Dalai Lama is democratically elected and functions as a prime minister. The Kalon Tripa is the second-most powerful political figure in the Tibetan government-in-exile, but it gives cause to ponder just how powerful the Kalon Tripa can be, given that the Dalai Lama has the power to remove him from office without Parliamentary approval. Now, however, the Dalai Lama seeks to devolve all his political power to the Kalon Tripa, the elections for whom were held earlier this month. Though the winner has not yet been announced, it is clear that he will be more powerful than any of his predecessors.

This vast expansion of the Kalon Tripa’s power is a wise political move in terms of the Tibetan government’s foreign relations. First consider how this move will affect Tibetan-Chinese relations: China believes that it should play an active role in the appointment of the next Dalai Lama. There is some historical precedent for this belief as the Chinese maintain that the sixth Dalai Lama was appointed by the Qing dynasty Emperor Kangxi. Tsering Yangdzom, an ethnic Tibetan at the China Tibetology Research Center, has cited the appointment of the sixth Dalai Lama in support of China’s paradoxica conviction that it should elect the Dalai Lama’s successor– China has long opposed the very institution of the Dalai Lama

The Dalai Lama fears that, should the Tibetan government continue to place executive power in the hand of Dalai Lamas, China will attempt to elect a puppet ruler who would lead Tibetans in the direction of the interests of China. Thus, the Tibetan government-in-exile has rejected China’s appeal to precedent in appointing Dalai Lamas, arguing that Emperor Kangxi had only sent representatives to the inauguration of the sixth Dalai Lama and was not involved in his appointment at all. Regardless of which historical account is true, a critical eye should be cast towards China’s claim that it has the right to perpetuate the Tibetan Buddhist succession model it has so vocally denounced in the past. Clearly, China’s objections are politically motivated – the power to appoint the next Dalai Lama would eliminate the possibility of another “threatening” Tibetan ruler like Tenzin Gyatso, the current Dalai Lama. Thus, the Dalai Lama’s retirement is an intelligent, politically motivated move, as it undermines the potential for the Chinese to gain leverage over Tibet.

The Dalai Lama’s retirement will also garner greater sympathy for the Tibetan cause from democracies, as the new executive, the Kalon Tripa, will be democratically elected. Compare this to the process of selecting a Dalai Lama: he is chosen by a small group of monks who believe him to be the reincarnation of the previous Dalai Lama. Thus, Tenzin Gyatso’s political retirement will ensure a move towards democratic government. The desire for increased democratization is also evident in how elections for the Kalon Tripa were conducted: last month, polling was conducted by 56 regional election commissions around the world. All Tibetan adults are eligible to vote, an impressive feat considering that the Tibetan people and their government are in exile and dispersed globally. Thus, the election process further highlights the extent to which the Tibetan government is committed to the principles of an open society, which will help win it greater support from democracies worldwide.

Finally, the devolvement of the Dalai Lama’s political power will allow countries to support more openly the Dalai Lama’s advocacy for Tibetan autonomy. Though no government has officially recognized the legitimacy of the Central Tibetan Administration, the Dalai Lama dislocsed that the Tibetan government-in-exile receives an annual sum of $1.7 million in aid from the United States, specifically from the Central Intelligence Agency. Though other governments may or may not have contributed monetarily to the Dalai Lama’s advocacy for Tibetan autonomy, many have expressed sympathy for his cause. The most obvious evidence for this is his having received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989. At the same time, China has pressured governments around the world not to accept the Dalai Lama as the legitimate ruler of the Tibetans. For fear of souring relations with China, the international community has given into this pressure and has denied the legitimacy of the Dalai Lama’s rule while still trying to support his cause.
Now, however, countries will be able to more readily rally behind him, as supporting him as a spiritual and moral leader rather than as a head of state will no longer be a matter of international relations, but rather a matter of supporting a man who continues to fight for human rights and for the autonomy of his people. In stepping down, then, the Dalai Lama can increase his prestige and moral standing and better fight for the Tibetan cause.

The cornerstone of any American policy toward Pakistan should be a careful balancing act between long-term and short-term interests. The former is a central reason why President Obama recently asked for a significant increase in aid to Pakistan to help provide basic government services like education. Considering Pakistan’s 50 percent literacy rate and the strong presence of religiously conservative and militaristic madrassa (schools), American support for government-run schools is a terrific idea for improving Pakistan’s prospects down the road. Standard humanitarian gifts like these, however, fail to address problems like government corruption, which might divert well-intentioned public funds into private pockets. They also fail to address the short-term problems already fermenting, such as Pakistan’s increasingly radical middle class. If this burgeoning radicalism leads to an anti-American government, then long-term American-funded investments will not yield the desired returns of stable and moderate politics. The U.S. must act decisively and soon, then, with an eye on achieving short-term goals.

At the same time, any policy should aim to genuinely benefit the Pakistani people and, more importantly, provide them the means to help themselves. In addition to the immediate benefits to Pakistanis, this course of action would improve America’s standing with the Pakistani government and populace. Such improvement would make Pakistan more likely to support American initiatives such as counterterrorism, aiding its efforts in the region.
This was the position that former Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke advocated. He argued that Pakistani organizations should spend their aid money quickly, instead of allowing it to circulate among American contractors or within the American government. In 2009, Congress allocated $1.51 billion a year, for a period of five years solely for civilian aid to Pakistan. Out of the $1.51 billion allocated in the 2010 fiscal year, a GAO report showed that only $179.5 million (less than 12 percent) was actually spent. Such a discrepancy between America’s promises and actions is unacceptable. Before Congress debates whether or not to allocate additional funding, the U.S. should use the remaining 88 percent.

However, it is important that the U.S. provide Pakistan with this financial backing while not dictating policy; the U.S. cannot afford to be perceived as trying to manipulate Pakistan’s internal affairs. A few years ago, heavy-handed American policies triggered anti-American resentment, led extremist clerics to rally anti-government support, and fueled tensions between Washington and Islamabad. The clearest solution to this potential problem is to allow Pakistanis themselves to decide how to enact policies, with Americans offering only general directions or recommendations. This would require the U.S. to provide aid and funding with fewer strings attached.

The best way for America to help Pakistan is to use a carrot-and-stick model with civilian and military support. The American government should give a higher-than-normal amount of aid this year and outline a handful of modest policy goals for the Pakistani government, such as building a certain number of new highways or reducing corruption by a certain percent (to be determined by international standards and an organization affiliated with neither nation’s government). If the Pakistanis succeed in meeting these goals, the U.S. should continue providing a large amount of aid along with a set of more ambitious goals. If Pakistan fails to meet these goals, the U.S. should reduce its support to levels lower than the current ones and wait until the goals are met. During this waiting period, the support should not drop so low that there is danger of a government collapse. Current levels of aid like the GAO-estimated $179.5 million could provide an approximation of this lower limit; Pakistan’s current situation is precarious, yet it is unlikely that the government will fall in the next few months.

These goals should begin by aiming for as little controversy as possible. In this way, such goals would support government effectiveness rather than the fight against the Taliban: the latter would likely draw accusations of American heavy-handedness and imperialism. Only after a few rounds of goals should the Taliban even enter the list of top priorities. The benefit of this model is that it allows the Pakistanis, the people who best know their country, to decide how to achieve the goals and build an independent and effective government.
A key early step would be to work with Pakistanis to build a well-funded anti-corruption agency modeled on similar agencies in other countries. Developing this organization does not have to be combative, with Americans pressuring a resistant Pakistani government. For example, the U.S. could stress that favorable reviews from the agency could open the door to more aid to Pakistan in the future. Some corruption is inevitable in the interim, especially if the amount of American money reaching Pakistan increases, but the U.S. should have realistic rather than idealistic goals for lost funds; well-intentioned efforts to monitor aid spending is what is preventing America from fulfilling its promised contributions, and an under-funded Pakistani government cannot build the administrative infrastructure necessary to root out corruption. A more flexible carrot-and-stick approach, mixed with realistic goals, should break the existing vicious cycle.

By encouraging the Pakistani government as a whole to improve, the goals can also become a trial by fire for Pakistan’s policymakers and help identify whom the U.S. and the Pakistani people can trust as effective leaders. The Pakistani government’s incentivized yet organic improvement would turn the tide against radicalism by providing a viable alternative. At the same time, the stick part of the model would encourage Pakistan not to actively work against American interests (as it now does by supporting certain terrorist groups).

Perhaps the most daunting feature of Pakistan’s problems is their interconnectedness. The U.S. must help solve multiple problems at once in order to solve any, yet this also means that improving one aspect of the nation requires improvements in several others. Consequently, the Pakistani government has struggled and radical fundamentalism has grown more popular. Left unchecked, this fundamentalism will endanger American interests in Pakistan and threaten regional stability. It is therefore critical that America and Pakistan work together to prevent Pakistanis from plunging into instability. If the U.S. defers its duty to other countries or to international organizations, it will renege on its commitment to the Pakistani government and run the risk that less or even no additional support reaches Pakistan. Because of America’s alliance with Pakistan, access to resources, power on the international stage, and ability to act more efficiently than some large international group, it therefore falls to the U.S. to help Pakistan keep its democracy and its hopes of modernization alive.

In order to build a stronger Pakistan, the resource in shortest supply is time. Pakistan’s historic instability, governmental weaknesses, and increasing radicalization threaten to depose the current leaders. If that happens, the replacement would likely tolerate, if not support, the Taliban and its repressive ideology in a country with nuclear weapons and more than five times Afghanistan’s population. Therefore, America cannot afford to ignore Pakistan amidst the flaring regional unrest or wait until other nations stabilize. It should move Pakistan off the back burner as soon as possible, or the decade-old alliance could explode in America’s face.

Furthermore, the Kremlin’s recent behavior in Japan has been the key factor in escalating the conflict far beyond simple diplomatic tensions. Russia, equally infamous for its rabid youth movements, such as Nashi, is certainly not without anti-Japanese sentiment to rival Tokyo’s Northern Territories Day rallies. The Molodaya Gvardia (Young Guard) arm of the United Russia party has commissioned the spy-turned-TV-personality Anna Chapman to hoist the Russian flag on Kunashir, an island visible from the Japanese island of Hokkaido. In a backwards-diplomatic approach, the Young Guard has filmed an inflammatory documentary featuring the glamorous Chapman as a spokesperson for the Russians’ great prosperity and consequent legitimacy in the Kuril Islands. Their intent is to convince the Japanese government of their rightful rule there.

Much more worrying, however, is the Russians’ decision to deploy advanced military artillery on the Kuril Islands. During a controversial visit to the islands, President Medvedev claimed that in order to “ensure the security” of “our strategic region,” armed precautions were necessary against aggressive nationalism in Japan. Although the exact extent of this expansion remains unknown, its very prospect is an enormous threat to the Japanese who have, until now, not gone beyond civil public action concerning the Kurils. Now, Japan too has plans to increase defense forces in Hokkaido to rival Russia’s. Such arms escalation and increased use of force have become disappointingly common. When a Japanese fishing vessel recently passed nearby the Kurils, it was detained by a Russian patrol; in August, another wary Russian coast guard unit opened fire on a Japanese vessel and killed an innocent crewmember. Then, earlier this year, Japanese authorities had to scramble 22 jets in order to prevent a suspicious Russian Tupolev 95 bomber from further harassing neutral airspace.

These developments come amidst mounting tensions elsewhere in East Asia. Chinese aircraft have taken after the Russians and begun to harass Japanese and Filipino vessels traveling too close to disputed territories. Taiwan too recently conducted artillery exercises near the oil-rich Spratly and Parcel archipelagos, islands also claimed by Vietnam and Malaysia; Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Phuong Nga said in response that this action “seriously violated” their sovereignty. Regional media have also reflected this shift in tactical ideology. In an alarming Hong Kong editorial, the Ming Pao wrote, “Medvedev’s move has fully shown the importance of actual control over regions with disputed sovereignty. It shows that China must change course on sovereignty disputes. It cannot rely solely on oral declarations of sovereignty and must take specific action.” The disputed Dokdo, Senkaku, and Dongsha islands, each claimed by various East Asian states, represent potential flashpoints for conflict in the near future. The Chinese and Russian governments’ decision to use military harassment to scare their rivals out of disputed territories is an evident refusal of internationally prominent states to abide by conventional diplomatic practices. Coupled with Pyongyang’s decision to shell the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong this winter, heightened conflict in the East China Sea seems imminent.

And yet, the recent series of tragedies in Japan may have a silver lining in potentially helping to alleviate mounting tensions in the region by redirecting energies to the philanthropic rapprochement expected of Russia, China, Korea and Taiwan. Given the tragic plights that the Japanese now suffer – a 9.0 magnitude earthquake followed by a tsunami, and the spread of nuclear radiation, as well as imminent social strife – one hopes that the Kremlin would pause to reconsider any belligerent escalation against Japan. Indeed, Arkady Klimov of the Duma’s International Affairs Committee stated, “grievous events sometimes show us what is important and what is not.” Such self-cognizance may be the key to eased Russo-Japanese relations. Indeed, the Kremlin has already pledged to lay an underwater electricity cable and ship large amounts of gas “very quickly” in order to aid humanitarian efforts in Tohoku, Japan.

Ultimately, the vocal youth movements concerning the Kuril territories in Tokyo are peculiar phenomena, as their fierce investment in such an isolated issue seems to be a manifestation of an unexplained trend towards a familiar fanatical nationalism. While such nationalistic sentiments are not easily quashed or ceased, regional diplomatic action is necessary to prevent long-latent tensions from worsening. The international community must therefore pressure the governments in Russia and Japan alike to act more responsibly. The Japanese Prime Minister must quit his brazen nationalistic stance and approach the Kremlin more diplomatically. The responsibility of utmost importance, however, lies with the Russians, who must withdraw their forces from the Kuril Islands and return these Northern Territories to Japanese sovereignty. Only then will these two powers be able to sign the treaty to formally terminate their animosity.

To do so would empower Russian legitimacy as a rational diplomatic role model for similar developing nations. This could consequently force China and other states involved in territorial disputes to realize that diplomacy rather than military force is the most constructive approach. Thus, in order to be recognized as a responsible world power and member of the United Nations Security Council, Russia needs to demonstrate civil diplomatic behavior through cautious and rational actions. Their cession would also improve the Russians’ reputation in East Asia, which is home to four of the world’s largest economies, would consequently ameliorate their dismal trade position in South Korea and Japan. Although Japan too must terminate its authorized antagonism in the Kurils, Russia ought to make the first move; their reconciliation would soothe Japanese anxiety and hopefully ease tensions with the Chinese as well. Thus, the Kremlin’s compliance with regular diplomatic protocol will ultimately set the example for other actors to determine the fate of the region.

Many African leaders have welcomed and hailed Chinese investment as a savior that, as Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe proclaimed during Yang’s visit, “demolishes colonialism.” African nations are happy to find an alternative to Western nations that have exercised unrivalled influence in the region since the fall of the Soviet Union. Despite the economic fruits of Chinese influence in Africa, however, Chinese leaders must consider the deeper problems with current investment practices. Local policies and attitudes that neglect worker welfare, crowd out employment, and collude with dictatorial regimes are fostering grassroots resentment that may undermine China’s ability to continue business with Africa in the long term.

On the surface, China seems to be playing its cards well. The China-Africa relationship is in many respects worlds away from colonialism. In contrast to European colonialists of the 19th and 20th centuries, China does not forcibly acquire resources from African nations, enslave local people, or artificially break apart populations by drawing territorial lines. China treats its African partners as diplomatic equals, with officials from Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi to Premier Wen Jiabao repeatedly stressing its “win-win” rhetoric of a partnership with “mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit”.

In the face of lingering concerns, China has also been able to successfully deflect criticism, especially from the West, that China’s relations with Africa are characteristic of a neocolonialist relationship. Neocolonialism may refer to a form of contemporary economic imperialism, where powerful nations behave like colonial powers of imperialism in a post-colonial world. Critics point to China’s economic support of African regimes that violate human rights as evidence that China is leveraging its economic relationships to gain political hold on the continent. The Chinese government has repeatedly rejected this view, asserting that human rights are relative to cultures and countries.

While America has hardly been blameless on the issue of human rights, China’s disregard for it is not so easily resolved. Self-interested Chinese policies and attitudes that show scarce concern for worker welfare have already generated resentment in local African communities. Many infrastructure deals signed by Chinese firms mandate that the majority of labor for the project must be Chinese, precluding Africans from fully benefitting from the inflow of Chinese investment. This deprives locals of jobs and fosters discontent, as workers cannot reap the expected benefits of the influx of new projects.

The limited employment opportunities for African workers have also become synonymous with bad working conditions, low pay, or abusive practices. Managers exploiting the cheap labor available in African nations have reportedly dishonored pay contracts and prohibited unions and protests, both of which are actions that reveal a disregard for the rights of workers. In recent years, numerous examples of poor worker treatment have surfaced. Last year, Chinese coal mine managers in Sinazongwe, Zambia shot and wounded 11 of their local employees during a protest about pay and working conditions, putting Zambian politicians under intense public pressure to shut down the mine and arrest the managers. In 2007, the Nigerian government leased to China Nuclear International Uranium Corporation a tract of land belonging to ethnic Tuaregs, displacing the local Tuaregs without compensation. With pre-agreed stipulations on the division of labor, few jobs were available for the Tuaregs, and those available were described as hazardous and poorly paid.

In addition to concerns over the protection of workers’ rights, China has partnered with corrupt governments eager to place foreign economic investment over the well-being of their people. On some occasions, Chinese corporations in Africa that have violated local labor laws have repeatedly ignored communication from regionally elected leaders because of existing relationships with the central government. For example, in 2005, an explosion due to unsafe working conditions in a Chinese copper mine in Chambishi, Zambia killed 46 workers. Zambian president Rupiah Banda and the Ministry of Commerce, Trade, and Industry stood behind the Chinese corporation, leading trade unions, workers, politicians, and ordinary Zambians to protest that President Banda was “taking sides” with the Chinese. In the long run, such a policy of disregard may trigger a political backlash. In the event that dictatorial governments are overthrown by their people, as has been seen in cases such as Egypt and Syria, China would be seen as an accomplice that helped to sustain and perpetuate the ruthless regimes. Ultimately, this complicity could prove counterproductive for Chinese interests in Africa.

Dissatisfaction with China’s close ties to corrupt African authorities also extends to other countries in an international context. Because China grants aid packages with “no strings attached”, oppressive dictatorial regimes have been able to subvert and survive Western efforts to initiate political reform. While Western nations have attempted to pass a UN arms embargo on the Sudanese government to stop the genocide in Darfur, China has sold $24 million worth of arms and $57 million worth of vehicles and equipment to Sudan. In Zimbabwe, Western sanctions to bring about reform were likewise undermined by China’s support to President Robert Mugabe’s regime in the form of $200 million worth of military vehicles and equipment.

Moral argument aside, the long-term political consequences of current Chinese investment practices in Africa will also be adverse. Already, signs of malcontent indicate that China needs to change its ways if it is to sustain its investment interests in Africa. In 2006, an opposition presidential candidate in Zambia ran his campaign on the idea of “Zambia for Zambians,” a platform in favor of expelling Chinese influence from the country. The disconnect between the official Chinese government rhetoric of “win-win” agreements and local realities will only entrench and perpetuate distrust of the Chinese. It will not take long for the common public to see through the veiled Chinese rhetoric of win-win situations that belies its real quest for natural resources and political control. China’s support of these rogue governments will inevitably harm its reputation on the global stage, reduce its credibility in international affairs, and degrade relations with its neighbors.

While China’s relationship with the countries of Africa may strictly not qualify as that of a neocolonialist nature, there are critical problems in the way it deals with local populations that alienates them and generates resentment. In order to maintain its international credibility and support with local populations, China should discontinue supporting dictatorial regimes that overtly repress its people, especially in terms of the sale of military weapons and equipment. At the local level, China should encourage or mandate Chinese firms working in Africa to hire more local labor, improve working conditions, and respect local laws. It is ultimately in China’s own interest to review its involvement in Africa in order to sustain its economic growth and maintain its international credibility. If China fails to recognize these mistakes, it will ultimately find itself in the same position as America, grappling with its own brand of anti-Americanism.

When news broke that the summit leaders decided to defer serious policy decisions to next year and to the IMF, however, the pundits who had themselves helped to raise expectations about the Summit then proceeded to criticize it mercilessly. The only tangible consensus was the need for greater consensus, and the Summit produced few actionable solutions as to how the G-20 countries could and should lead the world out of the Great Recession. The question must be asked: Why did this heralded meeting fail so miserably?

Unfortunately, the Summit was doomed from the onset. This is because the U.S., while decrying Chinese currency policies, was also employing currency devaluation tactics of its own. While this “quantitative easing” is not only fiscally irresponsible and detrimental to global economic recovery, it also threatens the shaky foundation of trust between G-20 nations in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.

Now, while the term “currency devaluation” has been prominent in the news, what does it exactly mean? Like all goods, currencies’ values are subject to the laws of supply and demand. Chinese currency devaluation occurs when China purposefully prints more yuan to buy U.S. dollars and other currencies, thereby increasing the yuan’s supply in the market relative to others, decreasing the yuan’s value.  This policy also entails a potent vice: as the yuan’s value decreases, the value of domestic Chinese savings also decreases. Therefore, many view currency devaluation as merely temporary. It leaves a country vulnerable to the caprices of the international market while rendering domestic consumers incapable of supporting their own economy.

In an address to the G-20 countries, President Obama said that this current yuan devaluation was an “irritant” to the international community, and he forcefully called on China to end the policy. However, China has simply not budged. In light of the Federal Reserve’s recent quantitative easing (QE-2) to buy $600 billion of U.S. treasury bonds, China thought, reasonably, that the United States was devaluing its currency to obtain a marketable advantage. Even though Chinese devaluations are far more potent in scope and effect, the hypocrisy of the American position incited political rhetoric and unproductive finger-pointing.

While many economists and financial experts agree that China’s yuan is substantially undervalued (by an estimated range  of 20 to 40 percent), the U.S. can no longer force other states into submission. Since the global financial crisis occurred under an American-dominated economic system, much of the non-Western world, most predominantly China, now questions the free-market neoliberal agenda that American economic leadership entails. Obama’s “just trust us” mentality carries less weight than it would have in the 1990s.

Furthermore, the perceived duplicity of President Obama’s argument will only exacerbate relations with the United States’ East Asian neighbor. While it is certainly true that stabilizing trade imbalances would help put the U.S. and global economies on firmer footing in the long run, the United States’ perceived hypocrisy and harsh rhetoric has rendered China unwilling to acquiesce to Washington’s demands. After such a long and public battle with the U.S. on currency valuation, China is extremely unlikely to embarrass itself by unilaterally giving in on the heels of America’s own QE2 policy.

Therefore, given China’s imprisonment within the confines of power politics, the United States must assume the mantle of leadership and prove to the international community that it is the engine of economic stability. Unfortunately, while the U.S. is still the greatest economic and military power in the world, it has not been acting that way. With soaring debt and fiscal irresponsibility pervading the U.S. political system, it is understandable that China is not eager to follow the U.S. model. This is especially true with respect to the constant use of monetary policy in lieu of meaningful fiscal reform. QE-2 is merely the latest of the Federal Reserve’s attempts to prop up the entire economy by printing ever increasing sums of money.

While President Obama has claimed that QE-2 was a necessary component of his plan to decrease interest rates, increase capital flows, and ease consumer pain in a recession, this artificial money pump is merely a temporary bandage to cover a gushing wound. While the Federal Reserve contends that QE-2 will cause inflation of about 2 percent, independent estimations have that number as high as 5 percent, a dangerously high figure that could mire the U.S. in stagflation. The German finance minister has called the policy “clueless,” while Kevin Warsh, a Fed governor, identified “significant risks that bear careful monitoring.” As inflation increases, U.S. purchasing power decreases on the international stage, thereby reducing the stimulating effect of the American consumer. While U.S. exports may also increase, the world economy still revolves around the American consumer propping up global demand. Therefore, U.S. purchasing power must be augmented in order to promote global recovery, not weakened by quantitative easing policies.

Furthermore, QE-2 has put considerable pressure on other countries to devalue their currencies. To avoid massive foreign capital outflows, other countries may devaluate their currencies relative to the dollar. The United States could then justify further reciprocal devaluation, and the ensuing beggar-thy-neighbor behavior would leave the global financial system riddled with inflation and uncertainty. Even if this scenario did not occur, the mere fear of it happening would be sufficient to hamper any economic growth, for economic expectations themselves affect economic outcomes.

Therefore, as a preliminary step to reach any consensus with China, the U.S. must commit to fiscal austerity measures that prove it is serious about lasting economic stability, not temporary and unsustainable spurts of negligible growth. While this round of quantitative easing may have little net effect, it seems possible that the Federal Reserve could implement QE-3 in the near future. This possibility is the cornerstone of China’s current trepidations and resulting noncompliance. By stopping the inflationary spending and wrangling its deficits under control,  the U.S. will have an adequate bargaining position to begin negotiations with China. The U.S. will be able to tout its reforms and require similar ones as reciprocation, thereby increasing trust and stability in the international economic system.

President Obama was absolutely correct when he wrote to the G-20 leaders, “When all nations do their part—emerging no less than advanced, surplus no less than deficit—we all benefit from higher growth.” However, “all nations” must do their part, including the United States, for any one nation to move forward. Therefore, as the world’s greatest power, the United States cannot ask for international reform and then cower behind a failed system. Instead, it must lead the charge and then require reciprocation. The world economy cannot recover without the U.S., but the U.S. cannot recover without the world economy.

While the Copenhagen conference produced clear answers as to how much member nations are expected to donate in climate aid, it did not make explicit precisely which nations would be benefitting from the aid. As the wealthier nations begin to determine where aid will be distributed, it is clear that it is in the United States’ interest to direct climate change mitigation aid towards India.

In the past, environmental aid has been directed toward major emerging nations – namely, China, India and Brazil – in large part because these nations have enough political and economic clout to demand the attention of donors in the developed world.  These nations also possess the infrastructure necessary to navigate the complex application process required to access aid. The global aid group Oxfam found that over the past ten years, one-third of the international money aimed at climate programs went to these three nations, while the world’s poorest 49 countries received just one-eighth. Moreover, even among these three emerging economies aid is not distributed equally:  the majority of the money from the United Nations’ Clean Development Mechanism, for example, goes to projects in China.

To effectively reduce future greenhouse gas emissions, mitigation aid from developed countries like the United States must continue to flow to major developing nations like China, India, and Brazil, rather than to the world’s poorest countries. The emerging economic giants have seen the greatest rise in emissions over the past 20 years. Since they are large, industrializing nations, their future emissions will have a greater effect on global warming than the undersized emissions from poorer countries.

But why does the United States favor China over India and Brazil in terms of environmental aid?  The United States should direct more of its aid towards environmental projects in India. If invested in India, this aid will not only produce global environmental benefits but also further the United States’ strategic interests. Although investing in renewable energy in China will have roughly the same global, climactic effect as investing in Indian energy projects, investment in India is strategically better for the U.S. Over the past ten years, China has become an economic powerhouse, a fact that has greatly increased its political clout. China’s economic superiority and continued growth gives it more leisure to pursue its foreign policy initiatives.  This has led to an asymmetry.

It is in the interest of the United States that India, a democratic ally, keep pace with China, a Communist dictatorship pursuing an aggressive foreign policy. As a populous Asian nation with a well-educated upper middle class, India serves as a counterweight to China’s increasing dominance in the region. Unlike China, India has vibrant and open political debate and is rarely criticized for its human rights record. Investment in India will strengthen the allegiance between the U.S. and this important regional ally.

India is also strategically located. Sharing a border with Pakistan, India is a gateway to the Middle East, and has cooperated with the U.S. in the past on counterterrorism efforts.  During his November visit to India, President Obama went as far as to endorse India’s bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, hoping to elevate the nation of over a billion people to “its rightful place in the world.” But Obama also reaffirmed the importance of Indian cooperation in counterterrorism efforts, and the two nations agreed to launch new joint projects in Africa and Afghanistan.

While U.S.-Indian relations are already friendly, further U.S. investment in the nation will serve to bolster existing ties. Strategic investment in Indian green technology will not only mitigate global CO2 emissions, but such investment will also enrich Indian development efforts.  India is desperately poor: an astonishing 400 million Indians do not have regular access to electricity. According to the CIA World Factbook, 25 percent of Indians live below their poverty line while the same is true of only 3 percent of Chinese. China no longer needs aid, while India still does.  The donation of such aid would not only stimulate the Indian economy and counter Chinese economic dominance, but also set India on a path toward lower carbon emissions.

Despite high initial investment costs, renewable energy can be profitable. Carbon-emitting technologies are not sustainable, since fossil fuel resources will eventually run out. Renewable sources of energy are starting to play an increasingly important role in global energy markets. Future demand for renewable power must grow as our collective non-renewable sources become further depleted. Even oil-rich nations like the United Arab Emirates have come to this realization and have started to invest in green technology: the nation’s capital, Abu Dhabi, is revamping its infrastructure to become a “zero carbon” city.  In 2009, researchers at Trent University published a paper in the International Journal of Applied Econometrics and Quantitative Studies showing that higher economic development is associated with more environmental aid.  If we want to stimulate the Indian economy, investments in green projects in India are the way to go.

At present, China dominates the production of components necessary for the construction of renewable energy facilities. According to Bloomberg New Energy Finance, Chinese manufacturers, who have the ability to price their products as much as 20 percent cheaper than their European counterparts, have taken over more than 43 percent of the global solar panel market in the last six years.  Stimulating India’s economy through green investments would temper China’s ascendancy in this area and decrease the United States’ reliance on one nation — China — for its renewable energy needs.

If the United States manages to direct climate aid towards India, it will strengthen ties with a rising world power that will help bolster the economic interests of all involved.

Any new approach, though, must focus on China’s relationship with its reclusive neighbor. While officially allied with North Korea, China was embarrassed by the North’s seemingly random torpedoing of the Cheonan and is reassessing its relationship with Pyongyang. At this moment of diplomatic flux, the United States may have an opportunity to push Chinese policy towards North Korea in a more responsible direction. China’s immense leverage over Pyongyang in the form of food, energy, and other aid could be transformed into an asset in halting Korea’s belligerence and proliferation.

So far, China has been unwilling to take a tougher line on North Korea, arguing instead that diplomacy is effective enough. But even before the Cheonan incident, the Chinese argument was fraying. For years, engagement with North Korea has failed to produce lasting progress on the issue most important to regional and global security – proliferation of nuclear and ballistic technology. North Korea has restarted its uranium and plutonium enrichment facilities, expelled International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, and detonated two nuclear devices. Even more worrying, Pyongyang’s willingness to trade its weapons research has already transferred military technology to other dangerous states, such as Iran and Syria. North Korean cooperation with Iran on the Shahab-3 ballistic missile may give Tehran the capability to launch nuclear attacks throughout the Middle East and beyond – thus destabilizing a region of immense global strategic importance. Although the US and China both have an interest in a stable and peaceful Middle East, diplomacy has so far failed to secure the interests of either state.

What can the US and its allies do to ratchet up the pressure? At this point, not much, at least in economic terms. Unfortunately, America and its allies have exhausted nearly all of their non-military options to alter Pyongyang’s behavior. Japan already halted all trade with North Korea several years ago. South Korea has also curtailed many business ventures in the North, including the once profitable Kaesong Industrial Complex, which provides hard currency to the regime. To prevent weapons trading and hamper the regime’s efforts to raise revenue, the Treasury Department continues to crack down on North Korean financial transactions, and several armaments shipments have also been returned to port. While such actions have undoubtedly hurt the regime, Pyongyang has not been dissuaded from pursuing its present course.

China, however, retains strong leverage over its autarkic neighbor because its assistance plays such a critical role in the regime’s survival. Uninterrupted Chinese investment has allowed Pyongyang to ignore American demands for disarmament. While the US, Japan, and South Korea have recently halted food aid to the North, China continues to support its rogue neighbor. More importantly, unlike other nations, China does not monitor its aid, allowing Pyongyang to provide food to the nation’s “elites” (the military and apparatchiks) at the expense of ordinary North Koreans. In addition, China effectively provides North Korea credit to purchase Chinese goods, allowing the North to divert resources to its weapons programs rather than economic development. In addition, Chinese diplomats have routinely watered down Security Council resolutions and have resisted stronger sanctions against the North. China, indeed, provides the North Korean regime a vital lifeline that keeps the nation relatively stable and allows it to continue to defy the greater international community.

Beijing, though, has been reluctant even to curtail its aid to Pyongyang as it fears instability on the Korean Peninsula and desires an ally on its border. If the North Korean government were to collapse, South Korea would move to unify the peninsula under Seoul. To Beijing, a reunified Korea would bring the American nuclear umbrella—and American troops—to the Yalu River. This situation is unacceptable to Beijing, already uncomfortable with the American presence in South Korea. In addition, China feels it has to contend with a growing refugee problem from the North. Inevitably, the influx would become even worse if Pyongyang fell, potentially straining resources in northern China. These considerations provide Beijing an incentive to maintain the status quo and continue enabling the regime.

Continued support for the North, however, does not serve China’s long-term interests. While the North is currently friendly to Beijing, if Pyongyang fully develops its nuclear capabilities, not even China will have the leverage to influence the regime significantly; a nuclear North would pursue its own interests, not Beijing’s. Moreover, even if the North does not turn on China, continued belligerence from Pyongyang will lead to increased militarization on the Korean Peninsula and in the region. China has never been content with the American deployment in the South, but enabling North Korean aggression will only increase that presence. China, indeed, stands to lose if both South Korea and Japan draw closer together and bolster their military forces in response to Pyongyang’s threat. Already, Japan has acquired ballistic missile technology from the US and is expanding its submarine fleet. Moreover, there have been domestic political discussions in Japan on whether to revise its pacifist constitution. This increased militarization, then, hampers China’s efforts to assert itself as a regional and world power and needlessly increases the risk of armed conflict.

The United States, thus, must reassure a wavering Beijing that a defeated North Korea does not harm China’s interests. The US, to allay Chinese fears, should assure Beijing that it would not bring the American troop presence farther north in the reunified state and promise to remove currently deployed nuclear weapons from the South if China joins in isolating the regime and Pyongyang collapses. The US and South Korea should additionally pledge that the South would address any refugee problem with international assistance following a potential collapse of the regime. South Korea also must outline a specific plan for reunification. Although President Lee Myung-bak has proposed a “reunification tax,” the United States and the international community must assist South Korea with the immense costs of reintegrating North Korea. To this end, the US should also press other nations, such as Japan, to resume trading once the regime falls in order to facilitate development in the impoverished region. By signaling the South and the US’s preparedness to efficiently and quickly embrace the North, the US can ease Beijing’s fears.

If such actions fail, however, the US must carefully but resolutely pressure China into joining the American effort. Banning (mostly Chinese) companies that do business with North Korea from operating in the US and other willing nations may provide an effective economic deterrent. Most affected firms cannot afford to forgo doing business in the US and other markets. The US could also be more aggressive in pursuing North Korean banking transactions originating from China. On the military front, the US command could increase its naval presence in the area and deploy additional anti-ballistic capabilities. This combination of “carrots and sticks” should encourage China to move from its current position on Pyongyang to concrete actions against the regime.

Bringing Beijing firmly into the fold would be especially auspicious at this time, as internal developments within the North indicate that the regime is contending with several problems. Recent riots against Pyongyang’s “currency reform,” which threatened to wipe out the wealth of many North Korean farmers, forced the regime to modify the program. These protests underscore a failing propaganda machine and an increasingly restive population. As more North Koreans learn about the outside world and their nation through smuggled radios, cellular phones, or South Korean television broadcasts, sanctions from Beijing could bring the regime to an end.

In less than fifty years, North Korea has transformed itself from a relatively prosperous state to one of the world’s poorest. Pyongyang has consistently refused to comply with international law even as the US and other regional powers have attempted to isolate the regime. As China begins to question its alignment with the North, the US must convince Beijing to join in international sanctions and further isolate the regime. By pressing to cut off Pyongyang’s last source of support, the US and its allies have an opportunity to end one of the world’s most belligerent regimes and ensure a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

At the time of the coup, the military held that it was necessary to rid Thailand of Thaksin due to his gross abuses of power. What originally started as a movement to remove an individual politician, however, has since given way to a larger, more pressing national conflict between the Thai masses, known as the “red shirts”, and the Bangkok elite, or “yellow shirts”. Holding another round of elections for a new government (which has changed hands three times since the 2006 coup), will merely serve to perpetuate the conflict and discontentment on either side, as both refuse to accept the legitimacy of the other’s victory, let alone reconcile or negotiate. The urgency and acuteness of this political gridlock demands a new solution. Although it may be a controversial move, the monarchy must step in to bring all stakeholders to the negotiating table to hammer out a compromise.

One reason why the present standoff has taken such a different, agitated path is Thaksin’s role as a symbol of the popular vote and the masses (not to mention his ability to mobilize their anger). When in power, Thaksin instituted many populist-spending reforms that benefited the rural poor. This group constituted Thaksin’s main support base and now forms the core of the “red shirt” movement. While now a fugitive, Thaksin regularly grabs the political limelight, riling up his supporters through (video) calls for a “people’s revolution.”

In addition, the powerful Bangkok elite—comprising the military, business and aristocratic elite as well as the urban middle-classes—has consistently been hostile to the red shirts’ popular appeal. Their use of hard-handed tactics has only heightened tensions. For example, the yellow shirts staged a massive sit-in at Bangkok International Airport, paralyzing the country for days. This demonstration, along with convenient court rulings, helped to topple the Puea Thai party (a Thaksin proxy) after it was elected into power. It was in fact the yellow shirts who first set a precedent for large-scale protests, leading the red shirts to adopt similarly disruptive tactics, as evidenced by the large-scale protests that continue to erupt in Thailand today.

Hence, many describe Thailand as being polarized between the red-shirted rural poor in the northern provinces and the yellow-shirted entrenched urban elite, some who disdain the idea of a one-person-one-vote democracy as a poor method of political governance. The yellow shirts claim the tacit support of the military and the Thai royalty. They also appear to have the backing of the country’s political and judicial institutions. Past court rulings have not only indicted Thaksin and seized his assets, but also removed the popularly-elected Puea Thai party from power on grounds of fraud.

While still true to an extent, this analysis tends to oversimplify the current picture, especially as the protest movements have gained in momentum and scale over the past years. A significant population in Bangkok—most notably the urban lower-income groups such as taxi drivers and street vendors—identify with the red shirts, supporting the protests even at the expense of their disrupted livelihoods (many work in the tourist and commercial sectors). The protests do not even spare the army—a major player—of rifts. While support for Abhisit’s government has traditionally prevailed in the higher echelons of the military, many rank-and-file soldiers belong to lower classes, and share the discontent of the masses. There have been several reports of soldiers melting into the crowds of red shirt protesters, or failing to muster more than half-hearted attempts to rein in the protests as ordered by the government. Such divided loyalty was a key reason that recent efforts to capture red shirt leaders ended in an embarrassing failure for the government, with protesters escaping in blatant view. In fact, even some military top brass are privately urging compromise.

In late March, televised peace talks between Abhisit and red shirt leaders raised some hopes for a peaceful resolution, but both sides refused to budge over a timetable for elections. Abhisit proposed dissolving parliament in December 2010 (a year before he has to), but the red shirts are demanding new elections immediately. In addition, the Thai Supreme Court’s recent decision that the Abhisit government had been involved in accepting illicit campaign donations has given the red shirts a timely boost.

The current political environment is a lose-lose situation for Abhisit. While a further crackdown on protests would likely be ineffective and only serve to rile the masses further, ceding outright to their demands looks weak politically. Concession would also send the wrong message to the protesters that disruption and violence is the best way to achieve their goals. Clearly, the Prime Minister will have to step down sooner rather than later.

Merely working out an election timetable, however, is not sufficient. Such a piecemeal answer will merely continue the same cycle of violent political dramas and standoffs between the red and yellow shirts. The crux of the issue is that both sides must be willing to accept the election results, even if they are in favor of the other party. In order for the political system to function, no party should seek to subvert the results, whether in the form of open protests or by pulling strings behind the scenes.

In this respect, the yellow shirted royalists must acknowledge the mandate and staying power of the red shirt movement. It is no longer just a motley rabble of Thaksin proxies and supporters. The red shirt protests have escalated beyond Thaksin, and they now represent a movement to give more voice to Thailand’s masses symbolizing a hope for future change in Thailand’s institutions. Abhisit and his powerful backers need to recognize that popular attitudes see the current government as an illegitimate front for the elite. Trying to maintain their grip on power without heeding the wishes of the people, as expressed through electoral votes, will impede any forward peaceful resolution in addressing the waves of discontent.

On their part, the red shirts must also have more realistic expectations. Declaring the streets of Bangkok to be their “final battleground” in an all-out war is scarcely a productive approach to achieving systematic empowerment for the people. Rather than making uncompromising demands, the red shirts must come to the negotiating table with an open mind. A victory would entail finding common ground that addresses the concerns of all parties rather than a radical upheaval.

Reconciliation, admittedly, is easier said than done, especially with the systemic mutual mistrust present between the people, elites, and the army. This is why the much-revered Thai King Bhumibol Adulyadej should step in. The King should use his influence to get the various parties together and broker a compromise. Although the Thai monarchy has historically stayed out of politics, Thailand’s current crisis is unprecedented and begets action rather than silence. To maintain its position above the murky realm of politics, the monarchy certainly should not be a partisan actor and must avoid taking sides. Nevertheless, the King should capitalize on the respect and influence he commands in the nation as leverage to force the different groups to the negotiating table. He should aim to work out an electoral timetable, a fair system that would take into account the interests of both the masses and the elite, and a mutual agreement to accept the results of a vote by the people.

The King should take action soon, especially in light of his ailing health. The uncertainty surrounding his political succession and the unpopularity of the Crown Prince as a successor would put the monarchy in a more difficult position in the future if it attempts to rally the people, army and opposing political leaders together. Furthermore, a silent monarchy will ultimately decrease its legitimacy (already seen to be tacitly backing the elite, who even call themselves the “royalists”) and increase the fragility of both the monarchy and the country’s political system. The existing electoral system has all but broken down. It needs a higher, respected authority to mend the fissures. For all the internal turmoil, the Thai people still accord great love and respect for the throne, believing the King to have their best interests at heart, and will thus be far more likely to listen to him than any perceived partisan actor.

Thailand’s harsh lèse majesté laws, which criminalize criticism and defamation of the monarchy, have greatly restricted debate about the King’s national role, and even about his possible death. But it is precisely because of the monarchy’s centrality that Thailand must reform and engage it in securing the foundations of a fair and democratic political system that represents the interests of the people. The King should look at avoiding the regular patronage of loyalists in the army and bureaucracy as well as reducing palace meddling in political appointments. Ultimately, this reform can build a stable, legitimate system that Thais trust without dependence on the King’s leadership and direction. It provides a hopeful, conducive environment for the various quarters in Thailand to thrash out their differences and come to a compromise.

With a dose of royalty sense, Thais would hopefully be able to look beyond the color of their shirts and towards their country’s best long-term interests.