Hours after the ultimatum requiring Saddam Hussein’s departure from Iraq had expired, on March 19th, 2003, President Bush ordered the commencement of the Iraq War. The justifications presented were Hussein’s intention to build weapons of mass destruction and a purported link between Iraq and Al Qaeda, the terrorist group responsible for the September 11th attacks. Both of these reasons have since been disputed and have rendered the start of the war a contentious issue to this day. By April 9t,h, 2003, Saddam Hussein’s rule had collapsed, and on May 1, Bush announced an end to major combat in Iraq.
Bush’s announcement was quickly proven premature and was subsequently followed by several mistakes and miscalculations. Members of the Bush administration issued orders to purge the government of Baathists and disband the Iraqi army, and the consequences of these decisions immediately became apparent. With the fall of Hussein’s government, American troops faced a new enemy of Baathists, paramilitary fighters, former Iraqi soldiers and foreign militants opposed to American occupation. Counterinsurgency became the newest tactical approach, causing parallels to be drawn between the war in Iraq and Vietnam War, as U.S. troops were confronted by an enemy who was willing to fight to the death and who often intermingled with civilians. In September 2004, an assault staged by U.S. and Iraqi forces targeting an insurgent stronghold resulted in 38 U.S. deaths and 800 Iraqi civilian deaths in addition to 1,200 insurgent deaths. This effort highlighted the costly nature of the war as gains against the enemy came at high civilian costs. Iraqi civilian deaths peaked in 2006, with estimates ranging from 1,000 to 3,500 per month. On April 28, 2004, evidence of prisoner abuse in Abu Ghraib was uncovered, prompting worldwide criticism of the way that the war was being conducted. Two years later, a CNN survey found that 60 percent of Americans opposed the war, the majority of which also favored the withdrawal of at least some troops from Iraq.

Partially in response to the public criticism of the war and U.S. strategy, President Bush made several significant modifications to U.S. policy in Iraq. In November 2006, he announced Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s resignation. In January 2007, the Bush administration implemented a controversial troop surge in Iraq. The increase in U.S. troops and U.S.-led offensives in Iraq, as outlined in the new strategy, led to an increased number of casualties. Indeed, the deadliest strike yet occurred in August of 2007, when coordinated suicide truck bombings resulted in hundreds of casualties, It also proved to be the most costly year for U.S. soldiers as American casualties reached over nine hundred. Nevertheless, the surge was largely credited with reducing sectarian violence in Iraq.

As the situation in Iraq began to stabilize, plans for the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces were accelerated. The withdrawal deadline set for the end of 2011 dates back to the Status of Forces agreement made in November 2008 by the Bush administration. At the time, the U.S. had intended to maintain a residual force of several thousand American soldiers for security purposes. The continued U.S. presence was opposed by varying Iraqi political factions like the Sadrists. Led by the influential Moktada al-Sadr, they advocated armed resistance if American forces remained past the withdrawal deadline. Shortly after taking office, President Obama began the process of reducing troops in Iraq and moving troops to Afghanistan. He announced plans to remove combat brigades by August 2010, a deadline which he honored with the end of combat missions on August 31, 2010. With the reduction of troops in Iraq, President Obama made it clear that an end to the Iraq war was approaching; however Defense Secretary Robert Gates continued to recommend maintaining troops past the deadline upon Iraqi request. The October 21st announcement to honor previous security agreements and complete troop withdrawal by the end of 2011 came as a surprise to many, as American officials had previously planned to keep a significant force of troops in Iraq under diplomatic immunity. Obama’s decision to honor a prior deadline reflected his desire to fulfill a campaign promise while simultaneously avoiding the prospect of an indefinite American troop commitment.

Withdrawing American troops from Iraq certainly has its consequences, as many of Obama’s Republican critics will be quick to contend. A major issue is the potential resurgence of Al Qaeda, which had suffered major defeats after the American troop surge in 2007. On August 15, 2011, a string of 42 apparently coordinated attacks left 89 dead and 315 wounded in a single day, and Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia warned of further attacks in revenge for bin Laden’s death. Analysts are particularly afraid of ties re-forming between Al Qaeda and members of the former ruling Baath Party. There is also the fear that without American troop support, the currant Iraqi government will collapse or that in the face of American withdrawal, other countries will attempt to invade Iraq. Iran is one such country that poses a threat to Iraqi security; historically it has supported aggressive attacks against American troops in Iraq.
These concerns, while valid, can overestimate the benefits of maintaining U.S. troops in Iraq. Even with the presence of American troops, violence continues to occur in Iraq. Many of the insurgents specifically oppose American intervention, creating reason to believe that attacks will decrease with the withdrawal of American troops, as will the justification for Iranian intervention to expel American troops. Furthermore, maintaining 10,000 troops beyond 2011 forces the U.S. into making an indeterminate commitment. Even with plans for diminishing the U.S. presence, 68,000 troops are expected to remain for at least another year. With troops stationed in Iraq for over eight years, many have grown disillusioned with the benefits of staying. A continued military presence without a set withdrawal deadline can only hurt morale without any tangible benefits for the troops that stay.

The parallels between Iraq and Vietnam abound, and rightly so. As in Vietnam, Americans have tired of intervention in Iraq. According to a poll conducted by Washington Post-ABC, 78 percent of Americans support Obama’s decision. The results of the Vietnam War may not have been consistent with America’s expectations, but diplomatic ties and trade relations eventually followed after American withdrawal and the fears of a domino effect proved unwarranted. There may be costs to withdrawing troops, in the form of a weakened and potentially vulnerable Iraqi government, but there are far more benefits. These include bringing troops home, ending an unpopular war, discouraging foreign attacks against American troops, and forging positive relations with the Iraqi people. America can still work to improve its relations with Iraq, but now is the time to build soft power leverage, which can only be achieved when the U.S. is no longer considered a hostile occupying force.

The U.S. is concerned that upon troop withdrawal, Iraq will be vulnerable and that its neighbors will step in and exert soft power to influence Iraq’s government and people. The US can counter this by matching the efforts made by Iraq’s neighboring countries, constructing schools, contributing to infrastructure, and developing favorable trade relations. These strategies will not only improve America’s world image and its influence over Iraqi policies, but in the long run, will provide for a more sustainable method for cultivating long-term influence and positive relationships within the Middle East. The U.S. has spent more than eight years using hard power in an effort to win Iraq over; now it is time to exercise soft power to create a positive working relationship with the Iraqi government and people.

Anxiously deferring to its allies and playing down its position is not the way the U.S. has traditionally begun a war. Over the weeks preceding UN air strikes on Libya, the administration has come under criticism for its relative inaction in allowing the tides of democracy to waver in Africa at such a crucial juncture. John McCain has argued that Obama waited too long to intervene, while Sarah Palin criticized Obama’s approach as “dithering.” Michael Gerson of the Washington Post characterized Obama’s response in harsh terms: “the reaction hesitant, the process chaotic, the outcome late.” Granted, it may be true that the delayed U.S. response has emboldened Gaddafi’s defiance and caused Libyan opposition to lose ground. These criticisms, however, ignore the local and international ramifications of a unilateral American war that led to such failures as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. All things considered, the U.S.’s adoption of a support role is in fact appropriate. The postponed U.S. position has allowed the international community to reach a consensus as to the legitimacy of intervention; furthermore, the U.S.’s role as supporter rather than leader will help prevent the perception of this intervention as another American crusade.

It should be recognized that the Libyan unrest is as much a European and Arab problem as it is an American problem, and thus any effort to resolve the Libyan crisis must involve meaningful input and resources from European and Arab states. Europe has high economic and military stakes in maintaining the stability of the region: 1800 kilometers of the Mediterranean coastline belong to Libya, and 85 percent of Libya’s oil exports are exported to Europe. Likewise, the Arab states are geographically, culturally, and politically tied to Libya, and Libya is itself a member of the Arab League. The U.S. should not have to carry the burden of military action that benefits all free nations in the world. It is the shared responsibility of all nations with economic and political stakes in Libya to step up and play a role in resolving the crisis.

By delaying the American response, the U.S. has gained reliable allies in its mission, as European and Arab nations realize the potential impact of Libyan unrest on their national interests if they do not act. Not only has the case for intervention acquired political support from the Arab League, but it has also secured legal approval from the U.N. with a 10-0 Security Council vote, and allowed the lead to be taken by France and Britain, sponsors of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 calling for a no-fly zone. Such a deferrential and non-dominating response has in fact been advantageous, given the potentially disastrous consequences of the alternate path of action, unilateral military action in Libya.

This alternate path is unrealistic: the U.S. cannot handle a third full-scale war. Had the U.S. taken initiative and unilaterally intervened at the start of the armed rebellion, the situation would have degenerated into another American crusade, much like in Afghanistan or Iraq. U.S. forces are already too strained in Afghanistan and Iraq to take on another all-out military intervention. Financially, the cruise missiles fired over Libya by the second evening of the attack have already cost $1 million. With 100,000 troops in Afghanistan and another 47,000 troops in Iraq, it is not militarily feasible to sustain a risky, open-ended commitment in the long term.

Historically, it has been difficult for the U.S. to successfully intervene without the support of the international community. Quick and easy victories such as the Gulf War are rare. More often, interventionist wars lacking in international support such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Vietnam quickly evolve into a stalemate that protracts for years. In Libya itself, unilateral U.S. sanctions in 1982 failed to change Gaddafi’s policies. Later, in 1986, the U.S. swiftly launched unilateral air strikes against Libya ten days after the Berlin Discotheque Bombing. The air strikes not only failed to cripple Gaddafi, who announced a spectacular “military victory”, but garnered widespread international criticism Over the last 40 years, it has become clear that the U.S. cannot overthrow Gaddafi by itself.

In addition, a decisive decision to intervene would have led to the perception that the U.S. was orchestrating the downfall of the Gaddafi government. It would have given ground to Gaddafi’s accusations in speeches at Tahrir Square as well as interviews with international news media that the protests were a “colonialist plot”. Such anti-colonialist sentiments have the potential to be very effective in influencing public opinion in many postcolonial countries. An example of this is the U.S.’s 1993 intervention in Somalia to end the starvation of thousands, which was met with increased hostility, rather than gratitude, as the U.S. became more and more embroiled in the nation-building effort.

Furthermore, any U.S.-led invasions may arouse strong anti-American sentiment that could facilitate the political rise of al-Qaeda elements in the region. Al-Qaeda may act to fill the political vacuum resulting from the Libyan chaos if its anti-American rhetoric is successful in appealing to ordinary Libyans. Al-Qaeda franchises such as AQIM (Al-Qaeda in Maghreb) and the LIFG (Libyan Islamic Fighting Group) have historically attempted to seize power in Libya. In order to avoid triggering an explosion of radical Islamic elements taking over, it is of utmost importance that any intervention in Libya not be perceived as a U.S.-led operation.

Significantly, the revolts that have swept the Middle East in recent months have been organic. In Egypt, for example, every step of the revolts, from the protests to the ultimate overthrow of the government, was directed and carried out by Egyptians without U.S. involvement – a fact of great pride among the Egyptians. A minimalist stance on the part of the US ensures the prevention of anti-American sentiments arresting political change. Waiting to secure UN and Arab League approval distributes the responsibility globally, instead of allowing intervention to be branded as an American ploy.

With the U.S. hesitance to strike Libya in mind, no one could credibly argue that the U.S. forcibly intervened. Moreover, the ultimate involvement of the US sends a signal to the leaders of regimes in other Middle Eastern and North African countries, such as Bahrain and Algeria, that the threat of international military intervention is real, and that they will be unable to use the argument of American imperialism to counter public opinion about foreign intervention.

Regardless of how Obama’s actions are interpreted, they have certainly brought about key tactical advantages. Instead of impulsively dragging the country into another war, he has led the international community to align its position on intervention in Libya by presenting an image of caution and restraint for many weeks. Previous administrations have treated the UN as a rubber stamp council in going to war, inviting it to vote on resolutions approving foreign intervention, but intervening regardless of the outcome. That approach deprives the U.S. of genuine cooperation with potential allies critical to the success of a mission. The new approach carved out by the Obama administration, however, has broken from that approach and made it clear that it will not launch any attack that is not approved by the UN. Although UN approval is not necessarily synonymous with prudent action, such an approach effectively shifts the burden of responsibility away from the US. By inviting genuine debate and input from Lebanon, France, Britain, and the Arab League, the U.S. has successfully garnered broad political and military support.

In short, Obama may be ushering in a new era of U.S. engagement in foreign military intervention, breaking from the unilateral paradigm of U.S.-initiated wars from the Bush period. By refusing to act until legal UN approval was obtained and allowing other nations to take responsibility in leading coalitions, Obama may be reshaping the rules for U.S. engagement abroad in a manner that will be beneficial to us in the future. The U.S. is adopting a pragmatic doctrine that will not only reduce economic and military expenses, but also garner international political consensus that will lessen anti-Americanism in the long-term.

Nevertheless, more than two years after this proclamation, Guantánamo Bay is still operational, and the
Obama administration recently reversed its once forceful decision to terminate military tribunals. On March 7th, President Obama signed a new executive order reauthorizing military commissions, claiming that “all branches of government have a responsibility to come together to forge a strong and durable approach to defend our nation.” This policy reversal should be welcomed and supported since it provides the most judicious and fair way to prosecute captured terrorists while also placing the safety and security of American citizens above the bickering that characterizes international human rights politics. Both pragmatically and legally, President Obama has made the correct decision in reauthorizing military commissions at Guantánamo Bay.

One of the most commonly overlooked arguments in support of military commissions is actually quite simple: the federal judiciary system is ill equipped to handle trials of terrorist operatives. Federal courts have far stricter conditions for what can be considered “admissible evidence,” an unnecessary and unusual precedent for the prosecution of terrorists. Hearsay evidence, while admissible in military tribunals, European criminal courts, and international courts, is one of the most valuable pieces of evidence that interrogators can wean from captured terrorists, yet it is not admissible in US federal courts. While such a standard may be acceptable for domestic criminal trials where evidence is far more abundant, there are generally very few eyewitnesses willing to testify at hearings for suspected terrorists because they rightfully fear strong and terrible retribution. We only need to look as far as the frightening 9/11 footage to see that al-Qaeda has no issue ruthlessly and indiscriminately murdering innocent civilians.

Certainly, their retribution would be far greater against those who have actively worked to defy them.
Beyond this justifiable fear, however, most of the witnesses from whom we have obtained evidence are terrorists, leading to countless obstacles to get these witnesses to stand trial. Terrorists are obviously unwilling to testify publicly against fellow terrorists, yet it would be reckless not to provide hard evidence simply because the witness is unwilling to take the stand. Furthermore, many of these witnesses are harbored by or hiding in foreign countries, making the procurement of their testimony all the more difficult. Even if the governments of the Middle East were willing to aid us by extraditing the terrorist witnesses to the U.S. for trial, it is doubtful that they have the political will or the institutional strength to successfully find, capture, and transport these witnesses.

In addition to these logistical reasons, military tribunals are considered legal under the Geneva Conventions, a fact voiced often by President Bush and now, albeit somewhat reluctantly, accepted by President Obama. The legal issue surrounding military tribunals stems from the Third Geneva Convention, which grants prisoners of war (POWs) the right to habeas corpus, counsel of their own choosing, and the right to appeal a court’s decision. While under the current system of military tribunals none of these rights are conferred to the most dangerous terrorists, a close reading of the treaty reveals that the United States is actually not required to do so. According to the Third Geneva Convention, POWs are defined as “members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict” that carry their arms openly and have “a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.” Terrorists, who forgo uniforms and make concerted efforts to disguise themselves as civilians, do not fulfill these requirements and are therefore not granted the legal rights conferred to POWs. The United States is still bound by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to abstain from “cruel treatment and torture,” but certainly military tribunals could not be described as “torture” in any sense of the word.

While international treaties are legally binding, seeing as they are given status as “the Supreme law of the land,” they cannot require us to violate other portions of the Constitution. Fortunately, the Supreme Court has upheld military tribunals on multiple occasions, deeming them consistent with Constitutional war powers and legal precedent. In Ex parte Quirin, the Court unanimously upheld President Roosevelt’s decision to try eight self-proclaimed Nazi spies in military tribunals, one of whom was even an American citizen. In the decision, the Court ruled, “Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals.” In 2004, the Court ruled in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that the 2002 Authorization to Use Military Force against Iraq (AUMF), which granted the President the right to use “all necessary and appropriate force” against “nations, organizations, or persons” associated with the 9/11 attacks, also authorized military tribunals while the United States was actively engaged in combat. The Court commented, “ . . . enemy combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive,” and they even went so far as to argue, “Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding.” As is evident by judicial precedent from the nation’s highest court, military tribunals are an acceptable, and oftentimes the most practical, procedure by which terrorists can be tried in a court of law. There is no legal reason, given the nature of terrorist operations and the strong precedent set in our judiciary, that terrorists should not be tried in military tribunals.

There are, however, other criticisms levied against military tribunals. Specifically, former detainees such as Majid Khan have argued that military tribunals encourage the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques,” which constitute torture. Torture, in all of its forms, is illegal under both the Constitution and our obligations to the Geneva Accords, so its use cannot be tolerated in any circumstance. In fact, studies have shown that torturous coercion is a wholly ineffective interrogation technique because the victims will probably just admit to crimes they have never committed in order to please their interrogators. Furthermore, torture at home could feasibly endanger our troops abroad by enraging an already elusive and dangerous enemy. For these reasons alone, not even considering the strong moral implications, the United States should not engage in torture if it is to be effective in its obtainment of information from terrorists.

Both Guantánamo and their military tribunals are conducted in a humane manner Detainees at Guantánamo are granted exemplary health benefits and facilities—certainly better care than they would be receiving anywhere else in the world. While some would contend that Guantánamo as a concept is illegal and morally repugnant, we unfortunately live in an age where the rules of warfare have changed. To send these detainees back to their home countries would essentially be granting their release; it has been proven that Middle Eastern prisons, especially those in Yemen, are undeniably porous. As unfortunate as it may be, the nature of our enemy requires that we maintain their imprisonment, it is crucial that we do not allow for any risk of safety of Americans on the presumption that these terrorists will remain in captivity.

The United States, as a nation of sovereign people, has its greatest responsibility to protect and defend the citizens that grant it legitimacy and power. Military tribunals are a strong component of this defense because they allow the government to try terrorist operatives efficiently without imperiling the federal court system. Legally, there is little justification for those who oppose military tribunals, since the reckless and violent manner in which terrorists wage war has stripped them of their POW status under the Third Geneva Convention. Finally, U.S. constitutional law has upheld military tribunals as an effective means to try and convict guilty terrorist operatives while the United States is engaged in activity military combat as it is today. It should be of great comfort to all Americans that President Obama has reevaluated his campaign rhetoric to adopt these tribunals as a legitimate way to try to convict terrorists, thereby increasing the United States’ capacity to contain and eliminate one of the greatest threats to its national security.

The cornerstone of any American policy toward Pakistan should be a careful balancing act between long-term and short-term interests. The former is a central reason why President Obama recently asked for a significant increase in aid to Pakistan to help provide basic government services like education. Considering Pakistan’s 50 percent literacy rate and the strong presence of religiously conservative and militaristic madrassa (schools), American support for government-run schools is a terrific idea for improving Pakistan’s prospects down the road. Standard humanitarian gifts like these, however, fail to address problems like government corruption, which might divert well-intentioned public funds into private pockets. They also fail to address the short-term problems already fermenting, such as Pakistan’s increasingly radical middle class. If this burgeoning radicalism leads to an anti-American government, then long-term American-funded investments will not yield the desired returns of stable and moderate politics. The U.S. must act decisively and soon, then, with an eye on achieving short-term goals.

At the same time, any policy should aim to genuinely benefit the Pakistani people and, more importantly, provide them the means to help themselves. In addition to the immediate benefits to Pakistanis, this course of action would improve America’s standing with the Pakistani government and populace. Such improvement would make Pakistan more likely to support American initiatives such as counterterrorism, aiding its efforts in the region.
This was the position that former Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke advocated. He argued that Pakistani organizations should spend their aid money quickly, instead of allowing it to circulate among American contractors or within the American government. In 2009, Congress allocated $1.51 billion a year, for a period of five years solely for civilian aid to Pakistan. Out of the $1.51 billion allocated in the 2010 fiscal year, a GAO report showed that only $179.5 million (less than 12 percent) was actually spent. Such a discrepancy between America’s promises and actions is unacceptable. Before Congress debates whether or not to allocate additional funding, the U.S. should use the remaining 88 percent.

However, it is important that the U.S. provide Pakistan with this financial backing while not dictating policy; the U.S. cannot afford to be perceived as trying to manipulate Pakistan’s internal affairs. A few years ago, heavy-handed American policies triggered anti-American resentment, led extremist clerics to rally anti-government support, and fueled tensions between Washington and Islamabad. The clearest solution to this potential problem is to allow Pakistanis themselves to decide how to enact policies, with Americans offering only general directions or recommendations. This would require the U.S. to provide aid and funding with fewer strings attached.

The best way for America to help Pakistan is to use a carrot-and-stick model with civilian and military support. The American government should give a higher-than-normal amount of aid this year and outline a handful of modest policy goals for the Pakistani government, such as building a certain number of new highways or reducing corruption by a certain percent (to be determined by international standards and an organization affiliated with neither nation’s government). If the Pakistanis succeed in meeting these goals, the U.S. should continue providing a large amount of aid along with a set of more ambitious goals. If Pakistan fails to meet these goals, the U.S. should reduce its support to levels lower than the current ones and wait until the goals are met. During this waiting period, the support should not drop so low that there is danger of a government collapse. Current levels of aid like the GAO-estimated $179.5 million could provide an approximation of this lower limit; Pakistan’s current situation is precarious, yet it is unlikely that the government will fall in the next few months.

These goals should begin by aiming for as little controversy as possible. In this way, such goals would support government effectiveness rather than the fight against the Taliban: the latter would likely draw accusations of American heavy-handedness and imperialism. Only after a few rounds of goals should the Taliban even enter the list of top priorities. The benefit of this model is that it allows the Pakistanis, the people who best know their country, to decide how to achieve the goals and build an independent and effective government.
A key early step would be to work with Pakistanis to build a well-funded anti-corruption agency modeled on similar agencies in other countries. Developing this organization does not have to be combative, with Americans pressuring a resistant Pakistani government. For example, the U.S. could stress that favorable reviews from the agency could open the door to more aid to Pakistan in the future. Some corruption is inevitable in the interim, especially if the amount of American money reaching Pakistan increases, but the U.S. should have realistic rather than idealistic goals for lost funds; well-intentioned efforts to monitor aid spending is what is preventing America from fulfilling its promised contributions, and an under-funded Pakistani government cannot build the administrative infrastructure necessary to root out corruption. A more flexible carrot-and-stick approach, mixed with realistic goals, should break the existing vicious cycle.

By encouraging the Pakistani government as a whole to improve, the goals can also become a trial by fire for Pakistan’s policymakers and help identify whom the U.S. and the Pakistani people can trust as effective leaders. The Pakistani government’s incentivized yet organic improvement would turn the tide against radicalism by providing a viable alternative. At the same time, the stick part of the model would encourage Pakistan not to actively work against American interests (as it now does by supporting certain terrorist groups).

Perhaps the most daunting feature of Pakistan’s problems is their interconnectedness. The U.S. must help solve multiple problems at once in order to solve any, yet this also means that improving one aspect of the nation requires improvements in several others. Consequently, the Pakistani government has struggled and radical fundamentalism has grown more popular. Left unchecked, this fundamentalism will endanger American interests in Pakistan and threaten regional stability. It is therefore critical that America and Pakistan work together to prevent Pakistanis from plunging into instability. If the U.S. defers its duty to other countries or to international organizations, it will renege on its commitment to the Pakistani government and run the risk that less or even no additional support reaches Pakistan. Because of America’s alliance with Pakistan, access to resources, power on the international stage, and ability to act more efficiently than some large international group, it therefore falls to the U.S. to help Pakistan keep its democracy and its hopes of modernization alive.

In order to build a stronger Pakistan, the resource in shortest supply is time. Pakistan’s historic instability, governmental weaknesses, and increasing radicalization threaten to depose the current leaders. If that happens, the replacement would likely tolerate, if not support, the Taliban and its repressive ideology in a country with nuclear weapons and more than five times Afghanistan’s population. Therefore, America cannot afford to ignore Pakistan amidst the flaring regional unrest or wait until other nations stabilize. It should move Pakistan off the back burner as soon as possible, or the decade-old alliance could explode in America’s face.

The military’s efforts to purchase sophisticated weaponry have never been free of flaws, with weapons programs frequently encountering some combination of cost overruns and production delays. For example, the F-111 program in the 1960s was originally intended to produce a joint fighter for the Navy and Air Force, but the Navy withdrew from the project because the aircraft failed to meet its specifications. Similarly, cost overruns on Black Hawk helicopters and Patriot missiles prompted passage of the 1982 Nunn-McCurdy Act, which requires the Secretary of Defense to notify Congress when acquisition programs exceed certain cost growth thresholds. However, even with such historical context, the list of recent acquisition failures is extensive and shocking.

Three separate major aircraft acquisition programs have been mired in chaos. Expensive technical difficulties reduced the purchase order of F-22 Raptors from an originally planned 750 to only 187. The cost of F-35 Joint Strike Fighter has risen over 80 percent, making it the United States’ most expensive weapons program, and Defense Secretary Robert Gates has threatened to cancel the troubled project. Finally, the Air Force’s efforts to replace its decades-old aerial refueling tankers have been troubled by corruption and contractor protests.

The Pentagon’s acquisition meltdown has not been limited to aircraft. In 2009, Secretary Gates canceled the Army’s Future Combat Systems program, which had failed to produce any of the eight major planned vehicles despite years of research and development at a cost of almost $200 billion. The V-22 Osprey entered service in the mid-2000s at more than twice its originally estimated cost while the amphibious Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle was canceled in January due to massive cost overruns. The Navy has canceled its next-generation CG(X) cruiser and limited its acquisition of DDG-1000 (Zumwalt) class destroyers to three ships at a total cost of about $3 billion per ship. The smaller Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) has more than doubled in cost, and the lead ship of one of the two LCS classes developed a six-inch crack in its hull during sea trials. The Coast Guard’s “Deepwater” fleet overhaul has also encountered numerous technical difficulties and cost overruns, including major cracks in refitted ships that then had to be removed from service.

All of these acquisition failures serve to weaken America’s military. Cost overruns force the military to either purchase fewer vehicles and weapons or cut funds from other parts of their budgets. Production delays present the services with a difficult dilemma: the choice between temporarily weakening the force by retiring old equipment as scheduled or paying additional costs to maintain aging and increasingly unreliable weaponry. Canceling acquisitions late in their development also leaves the services with no clear replacement for aging equipment, requiring them to either purchase older technologies or invest large sums in service life extension programs while organizing a new acquisition program from square one. For example, even before the Future Combat Systems program was canceled, the Army anticipated spending $2 billion annually on maintenance and upgrades for aging equipment.

As a result of these failures, the United States is left with a military that is not only smaller but also less reliable and more difficult to maintain. In the mid-1980’s, the Air Force spent $7 billion (inflation-adjusted) to purchase over 200 fighter/attack aircraft each year, but it spent about $5 billion annually between 2003 and 2009 to purchase only about 20 F-22s per year. In addition, one report found that about 70 percent of Army systems failed reliability requirements in operational testing between 1997 and 2006. Compounded over time, the unplanned shrinking of the military and the unreliability of new equipment will undermine its ability to complete its missions.

The responsibility for this grim situation lies with both the contractors themselves and the military’s approach to acquisitions. Only a handful of large companies, such as Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman, are capable of undertaking massive military programs. But the quality of their work has repeatedly proven questionable.

Troublingly, instead of focusing on engineering, these companies consistently seek to exploit the government by playing to Congress. According to opensecrets.org, these four companies together spent nearly $60 million on lobbying in 2010. Contractors also often strategically distribute their manufacturing facilities and subcontracts to secure Congressional support. For example, Lockheed Martin inefficiently distributed subcontracts for various F-22 components to 44 states. While such behavior is unsurprising for profit-seeking corporations and unlikely to change, the current acquisition crisis would no doubt improve if major contractors paid more attention to their vital role in national security and less attention to maximizing their income from tax dollars.

The government nonetheless bears a significant share of responsibility for the current state of military acquisitions. Improved oversight of contractors would help ensure that projects proceed smoothly. The Pentagon’s implementation of Total System Performance Responsibility in the mid-1990s diminished oversight of several major acquisition programs. For example, the program manager of an Army missile program had no contractual authority to require preliminary tests, which the contractor skipped, and the missile ultimately failed in full development testing.

The government should also impose strict schedule cutoffs and/or cost ceilings at various steps in the development, testing, and production of military hardware that would either automatically cancel the project or require contractors to bear 100 percent of additional costs. Such an approach would strengthen contractors’ incentives to deliver on their promises and would cancel troublesome programs early, before substantial costs are borne and the services are left with no replacement for equipment due for retirement. The Nunn-McCurdy Act is designed to serve a similar purpose. It only requires, however, that the Secretary of Defense justify over-budget programs to Congress, which rarely cancels any project. Specification adjustments for equipment under development must also be minimized, as demands for added capabilities often cause significant cost increases and delays.

On a deeper level, the military needs to reassess its approach to acquisition programs. Many of the troubled recent acquisition programs have sought to combine various capabilities into one system. The Pentagon’s acquisition projects end up sounding like something out of the imaginings of a schoolboy or a science fiction writer rather than evolutionary advancements of military technology. For example, the F-22 was designed to be not only an unmatched air superiority fighter but also to possess stealth, ground strike, and reconnaissance capabilities; the Osprey was designed as a helicopter-fixed wing plane hybrid with adjustable rotors.

Rather than selecting specifications for its acquisitions based on clearly defined strategic goals and planned missions, the Pentagon seems to embrace a philosophy of putting as many high-tech capabilities into each piece of equipment as possible. The Pentagon has not yet realized that these systems, prone to long delays and major technical difficulties, are too expensive to sustain forces at current levels. In an era where small-scale, low-tech conflict is more likely than great power war, it must realistically assess the need for sophisticated, high-cost weapons programs. At the same time, the military must keep in mind that the strategic environment can change drastically in the years or even decades it takes to develop such sophisticated weapons systems.

The Department of Defense must ultimately make a choice between maintaining an extremely high-tech but smaller military or a larger but less technologically sophisticated force, as it has proven incapable of acquiring the weaponry for a military that is both large and futuristic. While the superior technology of newer systems may compensate to some extent for lesser numbers, the military seems headed towards a smaller, unreliable force filled with equipment that fails to live up to grandiose expectations. A more sober evaluation of the military’s needs and a realistic skepticism of cost estimates and promised capabilities will become increasingly important as federal deficits tighten the defense budget.

If the current failures in the development and acquisition process persist, the United States will find itself pouring massive sums of money into its military without possessing the capability to deploying large numbers of ships, planes, and tanks. Winning the wars of the future begins with the battle to build tomorrow’s military—a battle the United States is currently losing.

International economic trade talks currently or soon to be underway afford valuable opportunities for the U.S. to pursue a trade liberalization policy that will help to create new markets for its products. One such opportunity will be the Doha round of World Trade Organization (WTO) talks, led by members of the European Union, the U.S., and Japan as well as rapidly developing countries like China, India, and Brazil. Though the most recent round collapsed in 2008 over agricultural trade issues between the U.S., India, and China, negotiations over environmental goods and services may help to facilitate future talks. WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy has already expressed the hope that environmental goods and services will serve as the basis for future negotiation; when discussions resume, the U.S. should take the lead in utilizing green goods and services as a catalyst for cooperation.

The U.S. should also seek to strengthen and establish new free trade agreements (FTAs) with international economic partners. In the long run, competitive market conditions are the only way to promote economic innovation and growth. Strengthened FTAs would increase U.S. access to foreign markets, as well as generate competition by eliminating tariffs and quotas on U.S. manufacturing exports. Opportunities for the U.S. to create new FTAs with other nations abound, as agreements with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea are each very close to completion. A trade agreement with South Korea holds particular potential, and President Obama has announced that he and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak are working towards a deal worth tens of billions of dollars in U.S. exports. The U.S. should forge ahead with negotiations and also seek to expand pending FTAs to include the export of clean energy goods and services.

In alignment with the goal of free trade, the U.S. should take firm action to ensure a level global playing field for its renewable industries. In September 2010, the United Steelworkers industrial labor union filed a detailed trade complaint with the U.S. government, alleging that China unfairly subsidized the export of its own clean-energy products, fostered the forced transfer of technology, discriminated against foreign firms, and demonstrated preferences in contract bidding processes. China has been vocal in its protest of the U.S. trade complaint, countering that the U.S. has pursued similar practices domestically. While parallels may appear to exist between Chinese and U.S. practices of subsidization, the WTO has established a framework of rules that are tougher on the direct subsidization of exports than on the subsidization of research and development or technology deployment. The White House, which acknowledges that the U.S. has subsidized research in clean tech, notes that it has not subsidized the export of these technologies, unlike China.

Moving forward, the Obama administration needs to proceed with firm yet strategic diplomacy that will preserve its already strained relationship with China. It is no secret that China possesses the upper hand in many aspects of international trade; advantages such as its large currency reserves, especially of U.S. debt, give China strategic leverage in tempering U.S. foreign policy. Given existing long-term tensions over China’s currency deflation, the straightforward response for the U.S. would be to file a complaint with the WTO or to engage in direct talks with Chinese officials. While tempting, direct confrontation is not the ideal policy, not least because it is likely to be ineffective. A more tactful policy approach would help to forward broader U.S. goals of global trade liberalization.

In this instance, working to create a more liberal global economy may be the wisest approach. The U.S. should seek stronger economic integration with China’s regional trading partners and neighbors to induce China to play by the free-trade rulebook. President Obama has already made strides in this area, embarking on a November trip to India, Indonesia, South Korea, and Japan, with the goal of spurring trade talks. On this trip, President Obama announced the end of bans on the export of certain technologies to India. Measures such as these, as well as increased U.S. economic integration in economic organizations and forums such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, will not only further open foreign markets in the region but also serve to build rapport between the U.S. and Asian nations. In building economic coherence between the U.S. and China’s regional trade partners, the U.S. will gain allies in trade who may also play a vocal role in advocating for China to adopt free trade practices.

A second, more indirect approach to stiffen U.S. policy towards China would be to strengthen the military regional alliances the U.S. shares with Japan and South Korea. When the U.S. pursued a stronger alliance with Japan in the 1990s, the additional pressure this alliance placed on China pushed the nation to build up its economic trade relations with East Asian neighbors so as to ward off U.S. encroachment. This policy approach has in part produced the recent dramatic economic success of China. In the current situation, the strengthening of U.S. military presence in East Asia may encourage Chinese officials to seek to defuse tensions with trading partners in East Asia and abroad by pursuing fairer trade practices.

As the U.S. contemplates its future in renewable energy, it will need to rely on its economic partners to help build an open market for its exports. To address current trade disputes with China, the U.S. must strengthen its economic relationships, and perhaps even military alliances, with China’s regional trade partners in order to place pressure on China both locally and from afar. In the interest of the future health of U.S. clean tech industries, policymakers must take bold, strategic action to ensure greater global trade liberalization.

AQAP is an elusive terrorist organization that poses a significant threat to America and its interests. While never under the direct control of bin Laden or the al-Qaeda parent organization, the current AQAP traces its roots to two regional Al Qaeda affiliated groups that launched such attacks as that against the U.S.S. Cole, suicide bombings at a Western housing compound, and the 2008 assault on the American embassy in Yemen. These groups merged in 2009 with the intention of establishing a new Islamic caliphate in the Arabian Peninsula by overthrowing the Saudi and Yemeni governments and forcing Western nations from the region. Intelligence agencies also claim that the group was responsible for the failed “underwear bomber” suicide plot on a Detroit-bound plane last Christmas.

The organization’s leaders recruit experienced fighters from Saudi, Yemeni, Somali, Afghan, Iraqi, and Pakistani cells.  Although experts and intelligence agencies know the names of several of the group’s most prominent members, including an American national, they have not published information on how large the group is or how far its influence is known to extend. Estimates range from dozens to hundreds, demonstrating that the group’s full potential is still unknown. The Yemeni government, however, is poorly equipped and cannot easily restrain AQAP. The nation’s economy is the poorest in the Middle East per capita and dependent on its dwindling oil supplies. Since Yemen’s 1990 unification, President Ali Abdullah Saleh has struggled to exert influence beyond the major cities. As part of this effort, Saleh has not only fought AQAP but also countered separatists and rebels that have spread the government’s meager resources thin and obscured AQAP’s actions amid widespread violence. Much of Yemen’s territory, especially in the mountains and desert, is virtually autonomous tribal areas that oppose heavy government involvement. While most of these tribes reject AQAP, experts like Gregory Johnsen of Princeton University hold that some tolerate AQAP and allow it to build bases in their territory. This sympathy is greater in areas with other anti-government movements. Additionally, the Saudi-Yemeni border is extremely porous, allowing AQAP members to attack targets in both nations. As Saudi forces have prevented terrorist groups from forming in its territory, AQAP’s situation parallels the Taliban’s use of uncontrolled Pakistani tribal regions as bases from which to attack Afghan targets. The parts of the country Saleh’s government does control are often corrupt and ineffective, especially as Saleh appoints family members to political positions and seems focused on consolidating his family’s power.

American success in Yemen has been limited. The War on Terror’s early years saw initial gains against AQAP as the United States helped train and support Yemeni forces and launched Yemeni-approved missile strikes. Utilizing what President Obama’s top counterterrorism expert referred to as a “scalpel” rather than a “hammer,” the United States has increased its involvement in Yemen since 2009 through covert action, cruise missiles, and drone attacks that fall under the CIA’s, rather than the military’s, command. Both American and Yemeni officials say these operations occur with the Yemeni government’s approval. Despite successfully hitting several AQAP targets, the campaign’s impact is questionable partially due to Yemenis’ suspicion about Saleh’s motives and concern over American intervention. There have also been reports of civilian casualties, earning condemnation from human rights groups and sparking tribal conflicts. Considering the bomb plot uncovered October 29, it appears that this effort has so far failed to decisively undermine AQAP’s strength, and the CIA must reevaluate its approach.

The U.S. should strengthen the Yemeni government’s influence. A top priority should be unifying the tribal regions against AQAP. To do this, America should set up discussions between Saleh and his nation’s tribal leaders so that they can reach policy compromises and convince the tribal leaders that AQAP is a mutual enemy. To cement tribal loyalties in the current push against AQAP, America and Yemen should follow the tribal motto “My state is anyone who fills my pocket with money”: the U.S. should give Saleh the financial backing he would need to buy tribal loyalty. This might be expensive, but current estimates expect U.S. military aid to approach the enormous sum of $1.2 billion in the next five years anyway. Buying tribes’ loyalty would not be a long-term solution, nor would it ensure that tribes remain loyal, but expanding support for the Yemeni government would limit where AQAP could operate and allow American and Yemeni forces to concentrate their energies on smaller areas.

Focusing American resources on intelligence gathering is also a critical step. The U.S. should bolster its intelligence network in Yemen and work to strengthen cooperation with Yemeni intelligence resources. This would render covert operations more effective, reducing civilian and unintended casualties. Cooperating with Yemeni authorities would also assure that Saleh and his government play an integral role in long-term stability. While increasing the number of intelligence-gathering resources, though, the U.S. should not follow what some State Department officials propose and give the Yemeni army a cache of expensive weaponry. Given the number of weapons proposed, the Yemeni government’s corruption could allow insurgents to acquire some of these weapons. There is also the possibility of government misuse, as the Yemeni government could use resources intended for fighting AQAP to fight other insurgent groups or suppress political dissent.

Yemen presents a new front in the War on Terror and a new opportunity to improve on what lessons the U.S. has already learned. In a political climate where troop deployment in Afghanistan and Iraq has led to public outcry and where the current administration campaigned on an anti-war platform, the operations in Yemen can signify a new strategy in which intelligence-gathering and cooperation with an existing society replace the alternate focus on military efforts, troop number, and nation building. Fully embracing this new approach by winning tribal support and improving intelligence networks will change how the U.S. fights the war and will replace the hammer with the scalpel. By focusing on practical measures, policymakers can use Yemen as a turning point in the War on Terror.

Q: The Weather Underground was opposed to United States military involvement in Vietnam on the grounds that it constituted an imperialistic advance into Southeast Asia. The current conflict in Iraq has been criticized for similar offenses, and lately the Obama administration has come under fire, both for failing to fulfill a campaign promise to end the war and then for mishandling the withdrawal. Do you feel that these concerns, both about the administration and the similarities to Vietnam’s precedent, are justified, and if not, what do you feel were the forces behind the United States’ invasion of Iraq? Should we be as concerned about what this war indicates about the American mentality as you were about Vietnam?

A: Absolutely, we have to be concerned about our country’s militarism. There are many other ways to solve problems in the world, including the development of international law. The Europeans have been dealing with terrorism for years as a criminal matter, handled by police agencies. They don’t declare “war on terror” and invade countries, they go after the criminals. But our country’s foreign policy is based on the use of force. War is not only the means, it’s the goal. For decades, Noam Chomsky used to say that the goal of the United States is global domination. In the last decade he’s changed the formulation, now he says that the goal is global domination through the use of violence.

I could go on at length about this question because it’s probably my main motivation for the organizing work I do, having come of age during Vietnam and seen the absolute immorality and waste of our wars. I’ll just make two points, and then move on.

First, our economy is oriented toward the production of weapons and war-making capability. Oil, a major component of the economy, is a military necessity, incidentally. The largest part of the discretionary federal budget, 48 percent, goes to “defense,” including intelligence and nuclear weapons and paying for past wars. (Source: War Resisters League, http://www.warresisters.org/files/FY2011piechart.pdf). So the military and the defense industry are supremely powerful. Huge weapons systems costing billions are split up to subcontractors in every single congressional district. In our debates over the cost of domestic human and social needs, such as health and education, the obvious solution would be to take money from the bloated and corrupt defense industry, yet the media never raises this point for discussion and politicians don’t dare. (Dennis Kucinich, one who does break the silence, is completely isolated, a pariah in Congress). One purpose of our periodic wars is to prove to the American people the need for this completely wasteful and unnecessary sacrifice, the “defense” budget. The goal of war is war. No wonder the American people are confused.

Second, there is a potential alternative to this war system which we’re seemingly trapped in: international law. Europe has processed the last two centuries of their miserable history to the point that they’re breaking down borders and establishing the legal framework to avoid war. The U.S. has gone in the opposite direction since 1945, seeking out wars. Most American people have never heard of the possibility of international law. A great source for this discussion is Jonathan Schell, “The Unconquerable World.” He believes, and I concur, that international law is the great challenge of the 21st century, your century. It can be used not only to avoid war and the waste entailed, but also to solve our environmental crises, such as global warming.

The simple fact that there’s so little debate and discussion in this country, especially in the media, concerning militarism and its alternatives, does indicate a problem with our “mentality,” as you suggest. We’re in complete denial, a totally irrational situation.

Concerning the current administration’s continuation of the wars, even before the election, President Obama and his advisers made a political decision not to challenge the power of the military and the corporations behind them, no matter what the desire of the American people for peace. (That desire does not have any organized political way to express itself). I like to believe that President Obama wants peace, unlike any of his predecessors, judging by his brilliant memoir, “Dreams from My Father,” but he’s trapped within this war system that controls the government and the media at every level. Unfortunately, he’s not only retained major officials from Bush’s neo-con interventionist administration, such as Secretary of Defense Gates, but he’s excluded all non-militarists from his advisers. Things would have been different had our anti-war movement been larger and more politically significant, but it’s not. Politics matters ultimately. It’s up to us to build such a movement. It’s a good learning experience, though: many of us were naive in believing that a president can change policy. Only a political mass movement can force such a thing. In short, power has not shifted, since there’s no organized peace party.

Q: Do you feel like the group was successful in any of its objectives or just a colossal failure?

A: Both Weatherman in SDS and the subsequent Weather Underground Organization failed in our strategy for building a movement. Guerilla warfare is just a plain stupid strategy. It will always fail in this country. It mostly failed abroad. What happened, in retrospect, was that we confused our own self-expression for strategy. Also, most important, we wanted revolution, so we figured everyone else did, too. Wrong!

On the other hand, we did help to raise the issues of imperialism and militarism and showed an example of young people so committed to the cause of peace and justice that we were willing to risk our lives. That point seems to be coming back since 2003, when the Weather Underground documentary appeared. I’m hoping that contemplating the story may be of some use to helping to ignite a new mass movement. And also figuring out what to do and not to do.

Q: Why did you decide to pursue a violent disobedience despite the remarkable success of the non-violent protests that had taken place in the 60’s, such as the civil rights movement?

A: My friends and I were entranced by the heroism of Che Guevara and the Vietnamese and the Black Panthers and various people around the world who had taken up the gun to fight for freedom. We wanted to be like them. It was a losing strategy, in retrospect, but when you’re twenty years old you often choose wrong strategies, especially attractive heroic ones. As for nonviolent strategy, you’re right, it is one of the great contributions of the twentieth century to world history, and yet we underrated its achievements. “Black Power,” for example, as espoused by Malcolm X and others, seemed more radical in its tactics as well as its analysis than nonviolent integration. To us, nonviolence was “wimpy,” while “picking up the gun” had a virile, macho cachet. Twenty-year-old boys need to prove themselves. So did a few young women.

Vanguardism was also a way to avoid the long hard work of mass political organizing. I used to say in my public speeches, “organizing is another word for going slow.” What I forgot is that there’s no other way, you’ve got to “do the work.”

Q: Do you think that the Weather Underground movement was harmed by its affiliation with socialism and communism, potentially tainting its anti-war message?

A: By the time the Weather Underground emerged, we had already rejected “merely” the anti-war position in favor of the “revolutionary” position: we didn’t want to stop one war, we wanted to stop the system that gave us successive wars. In doing so, we harmed the more realistic, practical, and appropriate anti-war movement, by splitting it into two camps, one for nonviolence and ending the war, one for violent revolution. We did the work of the FBI for them.

We thought the alternative to militaristic capitalism was communism, a case of believing the fallacy that the enemy of our enemy is our friend. Of course our ultra-radical position diminished any chances we had of building a mass political base among normal people. It was merely self-expression, not strategic politics.

By all indications, America’s Afghanistan strategy is in a period of upheaval. The Obama administration’s long-deliberated 30,000-soldier surge in Afghanistan began in earnest in May. Yet public sentiment about the war has soured even further since the surge, with clamor rising once more for a complete troop withdrawal from the region. With unpromising reports from the spring offensive in Marja, the administration’s timeline for a troop drawdown beginning in June 2011 has also met criticism. Explanations for the mounting discontent are ubiquitous: ballooning casualty figures – 60 deaths recorded in June, exceeded only by the 65 in July – growing frustration in the ranks with civilian policymakers and restrictive rules of engagement (as evinced in the Rolling Stone article that catalyzed McChrystal’s resignation), and the escalating cost of an almost nine-year war effort in the midst of a global economic recession. This last issue might prove the most contentious of all. The Department of Defense budget stands a tick over $700 billion – the highest single area of federal spending outside of Social Security – with almost $200 billion designated specifically for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. With calls to slash the federal deficit, the Pentagon has come under new pressure to shrink its expenditures, prompting Defense Secretary Robert Gates to announce a $100-billion budget slash. In an increasingly hostile climate, many are demanding an exit from Afghanistan because the US simply cannot afford the war.

Against this backdrop, strategy has shifted from counterinsurgency to counterterrorism tactics. At the advice of the Kabul jirga (a peace assembly of tribal elders) in June, the Karzai government, Pakistani officials, and NATO have initiated a plan to engage low- and mid-level Taliban insurgents in talks, with the aim of negotiating a political settlement to resolve the Afghan conflict. The allied military has sought to hasten this effort in two ways: by utilizing a $300 million coalition fund to purchase the loyalty of low ranking insurgents and by targeting elite Taliban commanders for killing.
The preferred strategic outcome under the new counterterrorism mantra is the achievement of peace and stability in the AfPak region without a protracted and institutionalized nation-building effort, typical of a counterinsurgency. Contrary to the time- and manpower-intensive “clear, hold, build” tactics that have characterized recent US Afghanistan operations, which emphasize marshaling local support by developing infrastructure and providing humanitarian services and security, a counterterrorism strategy is much simpler: weaken the targeted terrorist network to the greatest extent possible, expressly by killing prominent terrorist operatives. The counterinsurgency strategy has been espoused by civilian and military officials as a means of securing territories on the national scale and quickly reintegrating them into regional and international politics, specifically in Iraq and recently in Afghanistan. Yet it has proven tedious and costly, both in financial and human terms. In addition, while opponents of recent U.S. counterinsurgency operations in the Middle East have been outspoken and often persuasive, the paucity of public discourse on counterterrorism stems more from a lack of media exposure than from any strategic superiority of the other strategy.

Proponents of the counterterrorism strategy have begun to advocate the narrower victory criteria it espouses. “We are in Afghanistan for one express purpose: Al-Qaeda,” proclaimed Vice President Joe Biden on “Today” on July 29th, “We are not there to nation-build. We are not out there deciding we are going to turn this into a Jeffersonian Democracy.” When Rhode Island senator Jack Reed was asked whether the June 2011 withdrawal date for American troops in Afghanistan, which remained firm despite a stagnating ground campaign, indicated that the military was shifting from counterinsurgency to counterterrorism, he replied, “I believe that is the approach.”

The counterterrorism strategy is already yielding results. Reports indicate that at least 130 high-ranking insurgents have been killed since March. Intelligence cites increasing examples of junior Taliban subordinates refusing promotion for fear of being targeted. American and Afghan officials view the coalition’s bargaining position as so improved that they are strongly considering engaging the Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan this fall to negotiate a peace settlement should the militants agree to renounce Al-Qaeda.

Yet, for all the utility of the movement towards counterterrorism strategies in Afghanistan, the motivation behind the strategy change is suspect. While carrying out targeted killings against terrorist militants may appear to be a choice avenue in the effort to hasten a conclusion to the Afghan War, the strategy sets a poor precedent for future military endeavors. While this problem might seem merely semantic, there are strong indications that the strategy being employed in Afghanistan is meant as a provisional blueprint for the military, intended for reuse in volatile terrorist havens worldwide. With its heavy reliance on extralegal strike teams and covert spying, a sustained global counterterrorism effort raises huge moral, legal, and financial questions. Yet, the Pentagon has already extended these strategies to Yemen and Somalia and is expanding intelligence-gathering in the Middle East with an eye towards growing the US military presence there even further.

Furthermore, a key issue has emerged in counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan: the collateral damage by US and NATO troops to Afghan civilians. One of more profound revelations from the WikiLeaks report this past July was the flood of details about the shadowy Task Force 373, a troop of Army Delta Force Officers and Navy Seals responsible for assassinating high-ranking Taliban agents. A series of leaked classified documents revealed three separate incidents in June and October 2007 in which they killed seven Afghan policemen in a firefight, seven civilian children with HIMAR rockets, and then six more civilians in an air raid, pursuing Taliban targets each time. The reports provided examples of at least four “high value targets” killed by the task force, and likely included several other coded references to the unit, both successful and not. But they have also raised troubling questions. For one, the continued use of an extralegal killing team responsible for numerous civilian deaths is a huge ethical liability for the American military. These soldiers themselves are forced into the difficult position of making life-and-death decisions on tenuous ground-level intelligence, even as their own safety is also often endangered. Secondly, blowback from botched missions like the ones described by WikiLeaks brings into question the efficacy of the strategy on the whole: if accidental civilian deaths engender anti-American sentiment and fuel terrorist and insurgent ideologies, can this strategy really be beneficial? As in the case of automated Predator drone aircraft attacks (the frequency of which stands to increase under counterterrorism tactics), counterterrorist killing squad activities often unfavorably affect civilian resolve – and so may actually empower terrorist networks in the long run, though weakening them in the near term.

Yet for all that counts against it, the global US counterterrorism effort is substantively growing, not shrinking. In 2009, the New York Times reported that the US has tacitly begun counterterrorist exercises against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. While the Pentagon claims to be spending $70 million to bolster Yemeni police forces, at least four airstrikes have been launched in the region since December, and in all likelihood the American Special Forces teams in the region are doing far more than training Yemenis. In August, UN soldiers returned to Somalia after almost two decades of absence, joining African Union peacekeepers in what will almost certainly escalate into sustained conflict against Al-Shabaab, a prominent local terrorist organization. While both regions doubtless contain key terrorist network elements – Anwar Al-Awlaki, the Al-Qaeda recruiter with ties to Nidal Malik Hasan (the Fort Hood Assassin) and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (the would-be Christmas Day bomber), is known to be hiding in Yemen,– the moral, strategic, and economic consequences of more counterterrorist operations in two new countries warrant, at the very least, an open public dialogue. As the U.S. ratchets up intelligence gathering in Saudi Arabia, Kenya, Tajikistan, and Sudan, the American people deserve an engaged discourse with policymakers and the opportunity to voice dissent and skepticism, not confront counterproductive secrecy.

In a telling illustration, a May airstrike in the Marib province of Yemen killed a cell of suspected Al-Qaeda operatives but also the province’s respected deputy governor. The botched attack prompted a counterstrike by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula against an oil target, but also a wave of anti-Western protests, organized by the Al-Qaeda group, in which previously pro-American Yemenis also took part. A renewed global effort against terrorism is too important, complex and costly to be waged in secret. We need political openness and a serious, comprehensive evaluation of whether this strategy is most prudent for the nation on the whole.