Because the US military is already heavily engaged in two countries, it cannot hope to fight successfully in yet another region. Nevertheless, Yemen will need assistance from the US to address its political and economic issues. The US recently raised the budget for military aid to Yemen from $67 million to $150 million. The American money will be used to finance military operations and train Yemeni soldiers, but an increase in military aid treats the symptoms rather than the disease. al-Qaeda occupies nations that are susceptible to its influence; its presence, therefore, is a symptom of the government’s ineffectiveness. The US government needs to recognize that al-Qaeda’s presence in Yemen demonstrates that the problems that allowed al-Qaeda to move into Yemen in the first place have yet to be resolved.

Yemen is already the poorest nation in the Arab world, and its oil—which accounts for 90 percent of its exports—is set to run out within the next decade. Yemen’s economic infrastructure needs restructuring from the ground up, but various financial crises have cut off foreign investments at crucial junctures, and internal strife has crippled the government’s own programs. Unfortunately, weapons sales have been one of its most consistent sources of revenue. There are approximately 60 guns for every 100 people in the nation, and streets are crowded with dealers selling everything from pistols to rockets. But even this limited, damaging economic activity is being threatened—Sana’a is in danger of becoming the first world capital to run out of water.

Yemen’s economic weakness is only one of the problems that allow for the presence of al-Qaeda. Another major factor is the weakness of the federal government, which many blame for the country’s frail economy. President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who has held the office since Yemen’s reunification in 1990, has squandered much of the nation’s wealth playing patronage politics; even now, he is trying to do so to assure his son’s succession to his position. He has also often used US aid that was expressly intended for counterterrorism to combat two insurgencies. Despite his flaunting of its authority, the US is unwilling to risk alienating one of its few supporters in the Middle East and has not confronted Saleh.

Those insurgencies are the other visible symptoms of the pervasive disease in Yemen’s government. In the north, the government has been fighting a civil war for six years against rebels known as the Houthis. Although their openly extremist views have raised concerns that their goal is to establish a fundamentalist Muslim state, the Houthis claim that their main goal is to mount a secular opposition to Saleh’s corrupt presidency. Their conflict with Saleh dates back to their failure to attain power after Yemen was unified in the 1990s. They then settled in the impoverished Sa’dah region, where the poor economic conditions have allowed them to cultivate support.
More recently, a secessionist movement has emerged in south Yemen due to various economic grievances against the north. People in the south claim that, since unification, the north has exploited their oil fields and given them nothing in return. This corruption can be traced back to Saleh, who has used money to retain control of the state.

These symptoms show precisely what is ailing Yemen: The people do not respect the government. This is largely because the Yemeni people no longer see Saleh as a legitimate leader. His influence has always been limited to a small radius around Sana’a; various tribal groups control the majority of the nation. Furthermore, Saleh has never managed to really connect with these tribes, and he has not been effective in stopping the Houthis. If Islamic fundamentalism and sectarian violence were avoided, there would still be a lack of faith in Saleh’s government. Regardless of al-Qaeda’s presence, Yemen is on the verge of state failure. Ridding it of al-Qaeda now will not prevent the return of al-Qaeda after the collapse of the state, and a civil war, which would inevitably follow the collapse of the state, would make it even more difficult to purge Yemen of the terrorist organization.

The recent operation in Marja, Afghanistan demonstrates the US military’s recognition of their primary failure in Afghanistan: By ignoring the state-building aspect of the operation, the US military negated the positive effects of training a local military and driving out terrorists. Reports coming out of Marja suggest that despite their training, the Afghani military is playing a much smaller part in the offensive than the American army. Lessons from Afghanistan are crucial for Yemen. The impulse for action has to come from within the country, and in order for that to happen, there must be a strong central government controlling the situation.

Although the US seems primarily concerned with counterterrorism in Yemen, US aid given for this purpose will be of little use, as the ineffectiveness of the Yemeni military and intelligence operatives will continue to hinder US efforts. Furthermore, any operations successful in eliminating al-Qaeda will simply leave a vacuum that will be filled by new terrorists. The solution is to fill that vacuum with a stronger Yemeni government now that can effectively unify the nation. In order to ensure that this happens, the US must direct its aid towards nation building. Because Yemen already has a government structure in place, the US must find a way to encourage the Yemeni people to recognize its legitimacy. Easing the southerners’ lack of faith may be aided by moving the capital, which may prove necessary in any case due to the water situation in Sana’a. In addition, the current distribution of seats in Yemen’s legislative body favors the region that was originally North Yemen, so redistricting would provide further amends. The US should also fund education and other social programs. To ensure cooperation, the continuation of American aid should depend on adherence to previous objectives.

The success of this plan may require that the US withdraw its unconditional support of Saleh. While the US may prefer a pro-Western leader, the cost simply may be too high. A truly authoritative government requires a high level of support within the nation that Saleh is unlikely to attain.

Ultimately, even if Al-Qaeda is eliminated now, allowing Yemen to remain a fragmented nation will leave the door open for al-Qaeda’s return. The past eight years in Afghanistan have demonstrated the futility of trying to remove al-Qaeda without also addressing the more fundamental problems of the country. The key to successfully driving al-Qaeda out of Yemen is not to continue attacking its strongholds. The means of finding a lasting solution for Yemen is to help stabilize the government, which would allow it to deal with the local faction of al-Qaeda on its own.

This is not the first time that an internal conflict in Yemen has become the epicenter of regional power tensions between major Middle Eastern states. In 1962, a coup d’état carried out by republican forces in Yemen overthrew the ruling Zaydi imamate. This coup sparked a civil war that lasted until 1970 and drew in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the major Middle East powers of the day. While the scale of the present day conflict cannot compare to the Yemen Civil War, a vicious, drawn-out clash that resulted in over 100,000 deaths, policymakers would do well to study the lessons of Yemeni history. As the United States helps Yemen in its counter-terrorist campaign against al-Qaeda, it must pay close attention to these lessons to ensure that the country’s internal conflicts do not morph into a costly and destabilizing regional power struggle.

Yemen already shows signs of becoming a battleground for Middle Eastern powers. This past November, Houthi rebels crossed into Saudi territory and attacked a Saudi patrol, claiming that Saudi Arabia was assisting Yemen in its counter-Houthi offensive. This raid precipitated a wider Saudi campaign to crush the Houthi forces that has resulted in hundreds of deaths on both sides. Saudi Arabia also fears that Iran is supporting the Houthis to undermine Saudi Arabia’s regional position. This belief is bolstered by the rebels’ sympathetic portrayal in the Iranian media and their use of Katyusha rockets, weapons Iran has also provided to Hezbollah and Hamas, its other proxy groups in the region. Al-Arabiya similarly reports that Yemeni authorities have captured unmarked ships with Iranian crews carrying weapons bound for the rebels.

Iran’s support for the Houthis is particularly significant because the rebels are Zaydis, a small, heterodox sect of Shia Islam highly distinct from the Iranian Twelver Shi’ism. Iran’s support of not merely the Houthi Zaydis but also radical Sunni groups like al-Qaeda and Hamas demonstrates that the nation’s policy choices are dictated not by only religious doctrine but by an attempt to undermine and destabilize competing governments of the region.

This provides a striking parallel to the Civil War in North Yemen. Then, as now, Yemen served as a battleground for regional hegemony. Egypt, under the leadership of Abdel Nasser, sought to extend its influence over Saudi Arabia by supporting the republican forces in Yemen. These forces overthrew the Zaydi royalists, who received support from Saudi Arabia despite the clear doctrinal differences between the faith of the Zaydis and Saudi Arabia’s conservative Wahhabi brand of Sunni Islam. Ultimately, religious considerations took a backseat to the threat posed by revolutionary Egypt to the Saudi monarchy. Though the current Yemeni conflict has not yet resulted in war, Yemen continues to serve as a crucial hot spot for regional power struggles, and the United States must understand that forces greater than religion are at play.

The past conflict also provides important lessons about how impermanent and tenuous alliances in the region can be. In the past war, the Houthi rebels, now viewed as an Iranian proxy, received support from Saudi Arabia. Iran also supported the Zaydi royalists, sharing the Saudis’ fear of the growing power of revolutionary Egypt. Because alliances in this troubled area are clearly motivated by strategic convenience rather than, as some in the West believe, religion, these alliances can change radically over the course of mere decades.

The potential danger of growing Iranian influence is perhaps the greatest specific lesson for the US. At the beginning of February, the Houthi rebels and Yemeni government signed a cease-fire. While this cease-fire has admittedly been breached on occasion, the United States now has an opportunity to capitalize on the relative lapse in violence and take steps to prevent Iran from turning the conflict into a proxy war that could disintegrate into a second Yemeni civil war. One important step that the US can take in order to prevent the Yemeni conflict from becoming part of this growing trend is to devote its naval resources in the Gulf of Aden to assisting the Yemeni government in preventing Iranian weapons from reaching Houthi rebels. A concurrent effort to convince Saudi Arabia, a nation in which the US stations troops, to lessen its direct involvement in Yemen could also have important long-term consequences in lessening the scope of the conflict.

US policymakers must recognize that, as in the past, the alignments between regional powers and their proxies in Yemen are not based primarily on a religious Sunni-Shia divide but are instead grounded in strategic concerns. While current regional alignments in the Middle East may seem to be set in stone, they in fact may undergo dramatic and unexpected shifts as the strategic environment on the ground fluctuates. Therefore, when US policy makers confront Yemen and the Middle East as a whole, they must strive to remain a step ahead of the game, drawing lessons from the North Yemeni Civil War about the mutability and ever-changing nature of alliances and hostilities in the region.

After the earthquake, the international community supported Haiti with over $2.4 billion dollars and continues to supply countless aid and rescue workers. Unfortunately, Haiti’s lack of political and physical infrastructure makes this disaster one of the most complex challenges many aid organizations have ever confronted. To prevent such logistical problems in the future, Haiti must develop a long-term strategy that includes a more centralized aid administration, a strong security force, and a government willing to tackle urban decay with significant infrastructure improvements.

Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere with a GDP per capita of only $1,291. Less than half of the country’s citizens have access to clean drinking water and malnutrition is endemic. From its founding by former slaves in 1791, the country has had more than its share of misrule; a UN peacekeeping mission has been stationed in the country ever since then-President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was forced into exile in 2004. Despite its difficult history, Haiti had just begun to improve, politically and economically, before the earthquake. The government had created a national developmental strategy in 2009, and the international community forgave much of Haiti’s debt. President Obama commented that the earthquake striking in Haiti’s rare period of optimism made it particularly “cruel and incomprehensible.”

In the immediate aftermath of the quake, the international community reacted promptly and generously. The US sent navy and coast guard ships to Haiti within hours and placed up to 2,000 marines on reserve, ready to be dispatched to the country if necessary. The United Nations, which had lost more than 40 personnel in the quake, including its mission chief Hedi Annabi, offered $10 million in immediate emergency relief, as well as former President Bill Clinton as a special envoy. Total long-term aid pledges total over $2.4 billion worldwide.

Despite the influx of aid pledges, Haiti’s ruined roads, seaports and airports, and political structure prevent ample aid from reaching those who need it. Supplies were initially shipped into Haiti through the neighboring Dominican Republic; later, officials had to turn away humanitarian aid as Haitian airports lacked landing capacity. On January 31, flights transporting critically injured Haitians into the US were suspended. Finally, aid officials were unable to bring in heavy-duty machinery to clear the rubble and rescue survivors until a day after the earthquake, time being of the utmost essence in rescue operations.

Although Haitians have shown surprising resilience and goodwill towards each other, sustained delays of supplies are spurring growing violence and unrest. Gangs have assumed authority in some of Port-au-Prince’s poorest neighborhoods, rendering some roads impassable and cutting off aid to some of the people most in need. The national penitentiary was damaged enough that some inmates could escape, adding to the chaos.

Urgent measures are needed in order to ensure that basic needs are met in the country. A more centralized aid administration should take over from the over 10,000 NGOs and variegated lot of UN peacekeepers—a combination of NGO delegations and US troops who are working out of sync—in Haiti. The UN should harmonize its mission by focusing on maintaining law and order, establishing security over unstable regions, and regulating the distribution of supplies that are necessary.

In order for these goals to be realized, the internationally community should help provide a military presence as well as further economic and humanitarian aid. President Obama has already committed 7,500 additional troops to contribute to recovery efforts, and according to Vice President Joe Biden, “[The American response wasn’t just] a humanitarian mission with the life cycle of a month … This is going to be a long slog.” There are debates over how long this commitment should last. While some, such as the French minister in charge of humanitarian aid, accused the US of “occupying” Haiti, others such as the US Navy’s Rear Admiral Ted Branch claim that as long as there is a clear knowledge and consensus that the US is there to restore Haiti, there should be no problems.

Although Haitians have welcomed recent UN crackdowns against the gangs, discontent is growing around primarily logistical problems, such as the inefficient supply and distribution process of aid and organizers’ failure to give medical organizations such as Doctors Without Borders priority to land in the country’s main airport. When 10 American missionaries who tried to smuggle more than 30 children out of Haiti on February 5th were charged with kidnapping, distrust of the US increased. In order to successfully restore Haiti to pre-quake levels and better, the US must accomplish the dual task of assuming organizational authority and maintaining an image of goodwill that shows that the US there to help—not to compromise—Haiti’s sovereignty.

But long-term efforts should not stop at restoring Haiti to its former infrastructure, says John Mutter, an expert on the affects of natural disasters and a professor of Environmental Sciences and Public Affairs at the Earth Institute of Columbia University. Mutter recommends an international effort to improve buildings and government infrastructure so that Haiti could be better prepared to face and recover from future natural disasters, similar to how Chile has managed to spare itself from the debilitating disaster of the recent earthquake there. Many experts suggest the government create programs to support the movement of already existing populations out of the overpopulated capital and into towns in order to counter negative effects of urbanization, such as the formation of poorly built shantytowns that experienced significant damage in the January earthquake.

Although long-term goals are materializing, Haiti’s immediate situation remains dire. Over a million people are homeless, 300,000 are injured, and 20 percent of Haiti’s jobs have been lost. In the long term, Haiti loses 80 percent of its college graduates to emigration, perpetuating the country’s lack of talent to initiate successful reforms. How the incapacitated domestic government will remobilize is unclear.

Recovery to and beyond pre-earthquake levels will likely take decades. The emergency response by the international community has been admirable, but only the coming months and years will tell how quickly Haiti can advance through reconstruction and recovery efforts.

The Xinjiang riots erupted after two Uighur men died in a racially charged brawl between Han Chinese and Uighurs in a Guangdong toy factory. The mass unrest following the dispute resulted in nearly 200 deaths, thousands of injuries, and 1,500 arrests. While Uighurs mounted the initial protests, Xinjiang’s Han Chinese responded with an armed counter-march a few days later. Twenty-five of those arrested have received death sentences, and although their ethnicities were not officially released, the BBC reported that their names indicate that all were Uighurs. Additionally, Human Rights Watch reported police sweeps rounding up Uighur men in Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang province. China is still dealing with the aftermath of this event; approximately 20 Uighur men who fled to Cambodia following the riots were deported back to China. No information on the men has been released, other than the fact that they are being or have been put on trial for what China considers criminal activities. Although it is less visible, the situation has not resolved itself in the months following the riots.

Ethnic tensions are not new in Xinjiang. During the 1990s, a separatist group known as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) was blamed for over 200 terrorist attacks. The goal of ETIM was to establish an Islamic state independent of China. While most Uighurs do not sympathize with the ETIM and do not in fact seek to establish an independent East Turkestan, they still resent both the Han population in Xinjiang as well as the Chinese government. Chinese development campaigns like “Open up the West” have brought massive infrastructure projects to the region, allowing more governmental control in the wake of ETIM attacks and strengthening ties to a region of great economic importance for China. But to foster these ties, the government has actively encouraged the migration of Han Chinese to Xinjiang. While Han made up just 5 percent of the Xinjiang population in the 1940s, today they account for approximately 40 percent. The massive influx of Han immigrants has increased competition for jobs and natural resources in the region. Furthermore, the Chinese government has placed tight controls on the practice of Islam. Although the Chinese government is not immediately at fault for the riots in Xinjiang, it set the stage for the violence.

Considering the apparent repression that has occurred in Xinjiang, it is worth asking why there has been so little international interest in the conflict, especially compared to the worldwide outpouring of support for Tibet. On a basic level, the Uighurs lack an effective, recognizable leader. Although Rebiya Kadeer serves as a spokesperson for the group, she lacks the popular support enjoyed by, for one, the Dalai Lama of Tibet.

Of more fundamental concern is the fact that the Uighurs have yet to shake the implicit association with terrorism. ETIM’s attacks during the 1990s complicated outside views of the Uighur community. The Beijing government has used the presence of ETIM to justify its repressive tactics in Xinjiang. In the wake of 9/11, the US and other nations were willing to support that view. The United States labeled ETIM a terrorist organization, and 22 Uighurs from Afghanistan were held in Guantanamo Bay. All have since been cleared of any terrorist affiliation. However, China’s crackdown on ETIM appears to have worked. Experts have expressed doubt that it is still an active organization, although that is not to say that there is no threat. The Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), believed to be an offshoot of ETIM, organized bombings in the months leading up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Nevertheless, these attacks are rare, and much of the unrest in Xinjiang, like July’s riots, is not associated with terrorist activity. In fact, although China continues to link violence to ETIM, many Chinese experts doubt the extent of ETIM’s operations and believe the government relies on the threat of terrorism to mask its hard-line policies in Xinjiang.

Although initially China was praised for allowing journalists fast and fairly wide-ranging access following July’s riots, this may have simultaneously served to deflect attention from the restrictions put in place. Internet and text-ing service began to be reinstated only in January, travel restrictions remain stringent, and no information has been provided about the Uighur men who vanished following police roundups. While China has used counter-terrorism to justify its heavy-handed tactics in dealing with Uighurs before, the lack of activity on the part of ETIM clearly undermines that rationale in this case. The United States, therefore, has no excuse for ignoring the human rights abuses that have occurred in Xinjiang.

China’s repressive actions fail to address the real issues facing the Uighur population in Xinjiang. The Uighurs have legitimate grievances, and the cycle of violence and repression will undoubtedly be repeated. The United States has failed to acknowledge China’s repressive actions in Xinjiang in any meaningful way. In the aftermath, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs expressed regret for the loss of life in Xinjiang. US State Department spokesman Ian Kelly gave a slightly stronger answer, calling for the Chinese government to “act to restore order and prevent further violence.” Yet even this avoids the issue of determining what caused the violence and what actions need to be taken to redress the wrongs. The US Commission on Religious Freedom was much closer to giving a response that could have had real impact, with a call for an independent investigation of the riots and targeted sanctions, but its message was not echoed by those with the power to implement those ideas.

Human rights have not been a prominent issue on the Obama administration’s agenda in dealing with China. This is not the first time China has faced internal conflict. Events in Xinjiang are remarkably similar to the ongoing situation in Tibet. The fact that a violent response to human rights abuses has become a recurring phenomenon in China indicates that the US should make this more of a priority in its interactions with China. While the United States’ relationship with China is delicate and complicated, the United States should not have ignored China’s heavy-handed tactics in Xinjiang or any other region that is or that becomes a target. The US’s failure to act undermines the human rights values that the United States claims to uphold and sets a precedent of kowtowing to the Chinese. As China becomes a more assertive world power, both for human rights and its own foreign policy, it is important that the United States remains unafraid to be loudly critical of human rights abuses in China.

At present, the Taliban leadership is in no mood to negotiate; its position is too strong. Even if, however, the Taliban leadership were somehow swayed in the coming weeks, and the government managed to produce a set of policies—amnesty, political participation, material incentives—sufficiently favorable as to induce Taliban cooperation, this would mean that an already unpopular, distrusted government would openly reward the very group that ruled tyrannically over the Afghani people before the American invasion, the group that has been at war with its own country since 2001.

This policy would doubtless run into serious backlash. Afghanis remain fundamentally bitter towards the United States; Americans were largely welcomed in 2001 as a hopeful improvement over the Taliban, but the gains for average Afghanis thus far have been small. If the American-backed Afghan government offers material incentives to the Taliban—that is, provides for the Taliban in a way that society as a whole has not been provided for—resentment towards the occupiers and the government will understandably deepen, especially amongst the ethnic Tajiks and Hazaras who have fought against the ethnically Pashtun Taliban. This is resentment, which a tenuous, disastrously corrupt government can ill afford. Indeed, by losing the support of the population, this would be to break counterinsurgency rule number one.

The even greater worry is that reconciliation would risk inviting a return to Taliban rule. The weak, unpopular Afghan government will only become exponentially more unstable when the United States and NATO inevitably reduce their presence. If reconciliation brings an intact Taliban back into the societal fabric—and, indeed, into the political process—there is a real danger that the progress made over the last eight years will be subverted by a gradual reentry of Taliban influence. Even if the Taliban agree to cut a deal and put down the guns, it cannot be expected to rethink or renounce the militant, retrograde, and repressive ideology which lies at the very heart of their movement. Any leader who renounces that ideology in favor of a bribe or the democratic process would not just risk his leadership status, he would also risk his head.

This has sinister implications for the Afghan state should the Taliban gain any real foothold in the government. If, in five years, for instance, education is once again forbidden for women above age eight, the US will have failed. Moreover, the Taliban can scarcely be expected to faithfully renounce its alliance with al-Qaeda, because that alliance has long been a fundamental power source and would, in the event of reintegration, provide fervid support for the resurgence of Taliban dominance. Should this resurgence occur and al-Qaeda begin to regain its position in Afghanistan, the US will be markedly less secure.

That said, this speculation is presently moot, because any real concessions from the Taliban leadership simply aren’t credible until the American and Afghan forces have gained more ground. The Afghan government is weak and corrupt, and the Afghan security apparatus is inept. American involvement has an expiration date, and Mr. Karzai himself has voiced skepticism about the government’s survival given the drawdown plans. Two dozen Afghan police officers recently disappeared, taking their trucks, guns, and heavy weaponry with them; it’s suspected they defected to the Taliban, following in the footsteps of hundreds of its colleagues. Certainly no progress will be made as long as Afghanis keep seeing greener pastures in the Taliban camp, because the Taliban will continue to think it can win, and it may be right.

Therefore, the coalition’s strategy in Afghanistan centers on gaining the upper hand to loosen the Taliban’s grip on the country while gaining popular support to make sure the grip stays loosened. This begins with operations like the present offensive in the Taliban stronghold of Marja. General Petraeus’ recent proposition that the current work in Marja is but the “initial salvo” in a campaign that may take 12 to 18 months underlines what will be an indispensable American asset in the coming years: patience. Americans need to recognize the potential for drawn out commitment in cases like Marja, where we simply cannot leave until a durable government is in place. We need to be prepared to exercise the utmost patience and to defer to military judgment as we approach the drawdown date in 2011. The risks of withdrawing prematurely will be monumentally greater than the risks of remaining to bolster stability.

Allied forces need to ramp up the sacrifices in another sphere as well; they need to be willing to contribute money, and a lot of it. The ability to provide for the Afghani people will be pivotal. Legitimate leadership in Afghanistan has always—dating back centuries to times when tribes ruled themselves, autonomous of any formal state—rested on the ability to accumulate and redistribute wealth to subjects. In order for Mr. Karzai’s government to gain support, allies need to be ready to finance poverty alleviation programs, rural development, and investment in irrigation canals and roads in order to help craft the image of a government that is a meaningful improvement on its predecessors. The US should also be directing money as aggressively as possible towards the bottom-up subversion of the Taliban, both by offering monetary incentives to the rank and file members—those driven by desperation, not by ideology—and by orchestrating more operations like the recent outreach to the Shinwari tribe, whereby the tribe received aid in exchange for committing to take an aggressive stand against the Taliban and all who harbored its fighters.

In a time of severe recession, providing substantial aid is naturally a gut-wrenching prospect. Yet the future of Afghanistan needs to be viewed as an investment, one into which hundreds of billions of dollars and thousands of lives have already been poured, and one whose collapse could be a considerable setback in the global war against terrorism.

The US needs to tread very carefully in neighboring Pakistan, which will ultimately be pivotal in maintaining stability after American withdrawal. Pakistan has recently shown what appears to be an increased willingness to strike aggressively at the Afghan Taliban on its own soil, capturing several senior Taliban leaders, including Mullah Baradar and Mullah Kabir. Perhaps these recent arrests underscore a new Pakistani resolve to abandon the strategy of controlling Afghanistan through support for the Taliban. Yet Islamabad is simultaneously pushing to take a leading role in reconciliation attempts, and it could be that the increased cooperation is intended to earn, in American eyes, a seat at the head of the negotiations table. The US must remain acutely cognizant of the fact that Islamabad’s overwhelming priority is to maintain influence in Afghanistan, and that if the Taliban remain strong, it may choose to favor the terrorist group regardless of its current antagonistic posture.

The US should thus aggressively encourage, with aid and equipment, further efforts like those which captured Baradar and Kabir. We should denounce reconciliation at the current status quo, and promise Pakistan a central position in reconciliation that may occur in the future with a drastically weakened Taliban. We should offer the Karzai government incentives to forge a close, cooperative relationship with the Pakistani government, and we should be highly explicit in warning Islamabad that any identifiable complicity in a future Taliban resurgence will be met with severe diplomatic repercussions, including the full withdrawal of American aid.

With these tactics in place, the time may come when the government can claim the upper hand in settling with the enemy. Even then, Afghanistan will remain desperately poor and widespread satisfaction with the government will be difficult to obtain. Reconciliation in this environment will first and foremost demand a purging of figures like Mullah Omar. These charismatic, ideologically-driven leaders, remarkably adept at transforming popular disillusionment into violence, must be permanently isolated from the Afghan populace. A tenable reconciliation plan might therefore include a hierarchy of reintegration, whereby the foot soldiers are fully embraced into society, the mid-level leadership are reintegrated but permanently barred from holding political office, and the top tier leadership like Omar are granted amnesty but rejected from the fabric of Afghan society, and perhaps even forbidden on Afghan soil.

These sorts of restrictions will be fundamental in preserving the order as the dust over Afghanistan settles, but they will obviously be rejected outright until the day when the Taliban can no longer see victory on the horizon. The Afghan government must reach the point where it can negotiate with a Taliban that is very much defeated and that will remain so—lest popular unrest, Pakistani (or al-Qaeda) support, or some combination thereof subvert the progress that has been so costly in blood and treasure.

There are those who argue the Copenhagen Accord did produce notable victories. Indeed, the accord does acknowledge the seriousness of the threat posed by climate change, state that cuts should be made “with a view to reduce global emissions so as to hold the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius,” and agree to raise $100 billion per year by 2020 to help developing countries adapt to climate change and reduce deforestation. It also calls for further negotiations to set targets for emissions reduction and develop the details of implementation.
A majority of environmentalists, however, view the accord as fatally insufficient: Its statements of principle are commendable, but it suffers from fundamental deficiencies that are likely to render it ineffectual. In addition, historical precedent does not bode well for the widely celebrated pledge to raise funds for climate change adaptation in developing nations. In 2005, the G8 pledged to increase annual aid funds to all developing countries to $50 billion by 2010 with half of these funds designated for Africa. What became of this commitment? In 2009, the UN reported that the G8 needed to increase total aid spending by $29.3 billion and increase African aid by $20.6 billion to reach the original 2010 target. This once lauded pledge remains an empty promise, and there is no reason to believe that the Copenhagen aid commitment will meet a different fate.

In addition, the weaknesses of the Copenhagen Accord will stifle emission-targeting legislation in the U.S. The two major objections offered by opponents of the “cap-and-trade” emissions reduction bill passed by the House of Representatives this past July centered on expanding economies, and both are certain to reappear if the bill progresses to the Senate. At the time, a press release from the office of House Minority Leader John Boehner (R-OH) stated, “Even supporters of the national energy tax concede that unilateral American action will do nothing to improve Earth’s environment unless global competitors like China and India curb their emissions, too.” While the U.S., the world’s second largest emitter of greenhouse gases, could certainly have a significant effect on worldwide greenhouse gas emissions, rapid emission increases in developing countries do pose a significant challenge to mitigating climate change. The failure of the Copenhagen Accord to set global emission targets has weakened proponents of climate change legislation in the U.S.

Additionally, “cap-and-trade” opponents argue, with some validity, that American businesses will be harmed unless other nations make similar commitments to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Rep. Boehner’s press release objects that climate change legislation “will impose tough new requirements and increased costs on American manufacturers.” The release goes on to state that these costs will affect American jobs in one of two ways: “Either domestic manufacturers will move overseas directly, or American companies in energy-intensive industries will be driven out of business by overseas rivals that undercut their prices.” It is accurate that American businesses would be harmed by bearing the costs of buying carbon credits or paying carbon taxes while their foreign competitors enjoy a cheap supply of coal-generated electricity. In this regard then, the Copenhagen Accord does nothing to assuage the concerns of senators worried about the economic consequences of climate change legislation.

Perhaps most importantly, the conference demonstrated the serious problems plaguing the current UN climate change negotiation framework, and highlighted the difficulties the U.S. will face in attempting to lead the development of climate change legislation. The developing countries who comprise the Group of 77 threatened to walk out of the conference after stating that they were being treated unfairly in the negotiations. Furthermore, the conference was on the verge of complete failure until President Obama met with leaders from China, India, Brazil, and South Africa to craft the accord that was then presented to other nations on a take-it-or-leave it basis. The sharp divisions between developed and developing countries, and the fact that nations could only come to agreement through smaller, more isolated negotiations, raises serious questions about whether all-inclusive U.N. negotiations can ever establish meaningful emissions targets.

Although the United States did, in some respects, emerge from Copenhagen as a global leader on climate change, the more important development was the global realization that the U.S. is unlikely to be the nation that will determine the future course of climate change negotiations. Instead, it seems China and India, representing the developing Group of 77, will be the determinants of climate change legislation progress. India and China signed a five-year memo of understanding in October to present a united front in climate change talks, and they were the two primary players in directing the pace of negotiations in Copenhagen.

Unfortunately, the ascendancy of China and India does not bode well for those with a firm commitment to preventing climate change. Both nations prioritize economic growth above all else, and refuse to commit to restrictive emissions targets that could impede their rapid economic expansion. China and India will probably hamper efforts to produce a strong international commitment to preventing climate change; it seems likely that future international climate treaties will be severely limited by the recalcitrance of large developing nations eager to raise the living standards of their citizens, despite the increasing costs of substantial greenhouse gas emissions on everyone else.

The Copenhagen Accord contains admirable sentiments, but in itself does nothing to prevent climate change. The future of climate change prevention rests with further negotiations, and unfortunately, it is becoming increasingly evident that those nations likely to be most influential are those least likely to support meaningful emissions limits. At the same time, Copenhagen’s failure has made it less likely that the U.S. will make a serious commitment to reducing its own greenhouse gas emissions. The prospects for a serious global agreement on climate change mitigation are dim, and national governments may not substantially cooperate until they recognize the serious economic and ecological damage climate change could cause. They must also recognize the substantial economic benefits the development and expansion of “green” industries could bring. Hopefully, this day will not come too late.

The Yemeni offshoot of al-Qaeda has steadily grown more potent in recent years, merging with its Saudi progenitor to form al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. This organization’s targets are both local and global. In October 2000, al-Qaeda attacked the Navy destroyer U.S.S. Cole in the port of Aden with predominantly Yemeni explosives, attackers, and accomplices. Yemen was also linked to the 1998 East African embassy bombings, the strike on the French oil tanker Limburg, the September 11th attacks, and the assassination attempt against Prince Mohammed bin Nayef in Saudi Arabia last August. That assassination attempt used the same tactics and explosives (pentaerythritol tetranitrate sewn into the bomber’s underwear) as the attempted Christmas attack.
Yemen’s location, geography, and fractured polity make it a paradise for al-Qaeda. At the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen is close to Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan; its porous borders and extensive coastline are far from secure, while its rugged mountains provide apt hiding places for terrorists. With oil reserves running dry, Yemen’s arms market is among its few economic strengths—it trails only the U.S. in gun ownership per capita. Meanwhile, a strong, conservative religious population is a solid support base for al Qaeda’s propaganda, and tribal groups with relations to al-Qaeda control much of the borderlands. There is a separatist movement in the south and an insurgency in the north, and the unified Yemen is less than two decades old. Yemen is a near-ideal base of operations for Al-Qaeda, combining Afghanistan and Pakistan’s formidable terrain with Somalia’s near-anarchy.

In 2005, the terrorists responsible for the Cole bombing were in prison. Today, however, many of them are free, including confessed bombers Jamal al-Badawi, Fahd al-Quso, and Naser Abdel-Karim al-Wahishi. All three escaped from maximum-security prisons in Yemen. Badawi turned himself in after a year, but was released for good behavior; Quso is a re-established terrorist operative, conducting interviews for al Qaeda; and Wahishi is the head of al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula. In 2008, FBI special agent Ali Soufan warned Senate staff members “unless the American government sent a united message to the Yemenis to act against Al Qaeda, the terrorists responsible for the Cole would remain free and there would be future attacks against the United States connected to Yemen.” Soufan observes, “Today, the terrorists behind the Cole are still free, and an attack connected to Yemen has been attempted.”

Current U.S. policy towards Yemen is based on counterterrorism support, limited special operations, and drone strikes. In 2009, US expenditures for counterterrorism support were $70 million; according to a senior military official, President Obama plans to increase that amount to $190 million. The U.S. coordinates much of its effort with Western-friendly Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. But President Saleh has often used American aid against local insurgencies rather than against al-Qaeda. The local insurgencies more directly threaten Saleh’s sovereign authority, and he wants to maintain at least minimal support from the conservative Islamist population. Unconditional aid is therefore ineffective—Yemeni authorities can divert resources from counter-terrorism to counterinsurgency.

The U.S. should make an all-or-nothing deal on foreign aid to Yemen: America should offer more financial support under the condition that Yemeni courts imprison those responsible for the Cole bombing. Some might argue that incarceration would be ineffective because new recruits would replace those imprisoned. But anything short of life imprisonment means effective impunity for terrorists; prosecution would send a message to al-Qaeda that the U.S. and Arab governments will not tolerate acts of terror. If these conditions are met, the U.S. should stay its present course of providing counter-terrorist aid. Admittedly, this solution may not be immediately effective, but any sustainable, forward-looking strategy against an asymmetrical threat will require patience.
Senator Joe Lieberman (I-CT) has suggested that Yemen will be “tomorrow’s war” if the U.S. does not act preemptively. Preemptive military engagement, however, is simply not feasible, with the U.S. military already overstretched in Afghanistan and Iraq. America is still fighting two wars, and escalating one of them; we cannot realistically expect victory in a third, especially after taking into account the counterinsurgency efforts that U.S. troops would inherit from the Yemeni government. Even if preemptive military intervention were feasible, it would likely provoke a popular backlash, destabilizing the Western-friendly regime. Al-Qaeda feeds on Western interventions; the risk of backlash is especially high in Yemen’s tribal north with widespread poverty, illiteracy, and resentment of the central government. Intelligence, logistical support, and foreign aid should be the extent of American involvement in an effort that only Yemen can achieve. As Marc Lynch, a counter-terrorism expert at George Washington University, has suggested, the U.S. should not fall into the trap of overcommitment in a rush to “just do something.”

In short, the U.S. should largely stay the course in Yemen, but must put more diplomatic pressure on the Yemeni government to ensure our plans are carried through. Although the Yemeni government is weak, it has achieved success in counterterrorist operations in the past few weeks. We have recently seen an unprecedentedly successful offensive against jihadist commanders in the south and center of the nation; five raids in the Abyan and Shabwa provinces have killed more than 60 fighters. Of course, an avowedly pro-Western government faces grave dangers in the Middle East, but a puppeteer is better than a hegemon. The United States should provide further assistance to Yemen before resorting to direct military engagement.

Currently, the U.S. has no formal diplomatic ties with Cuba and has maintained an embargo that makes it illegal for U.S. companies to do business in the country. Although Fidel Castro’s abdication of power in 2006 precipitated shifts in the Cuban power structure that offered the possibility of a gradual thaw in relations, lingering Cold War antagonisms have precluded these possibilities from maturing into real change.

The Obama administration’s Cuba policy has thus far been a mix of inspiring first steps and disappointing stubbornness. In the weeks surrounding the Summit of the Americas, rapprochement looked like a real possibility. President Obama told leaders at the Summit that “the United States seeks a new beginning with Cuba. I know there is a longer journey that must be traveled in overcoming decades of mistrust, but there are critical steps we can take toward a new day.” Since then, however, U.S.-Cuban relations have frozen. After finally removing restrictions on Cuban-Americans’ ability to visit family on the island and send remittances, as well as permitting telecommunication companies to provide cell phone service in Cuba, the White House has disappointingly outlined a “tit-for-tat” approach to further rapprochement. Referring to Cuban leaders, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs told reporters that in order to see more benefits from the U.S., “They’re certainly free to release political prisoners. They’re certainly free to stop skimming money off the top of remittance payments as they come back to the Cuban island. They’re free to institute a greater freedom of the press.” From the Cuban perspective, such reforms would dwarf the concessions the U.S. has offered; issuing token economic reforms and demanding massive political change is not the way to win the trust of leaders in Cuba, or anywhere else in Latin America for that matter.

Despite tensions, improved relations with Cuba are consistent with U.S. interests. Economically, Cuba represents an untapped and desirable trading partner. In an early December lecture at Princeton University, Cuba scholar Julia Sweig hypothesized that, were it not for the American embargo, Cuba could follow Vietnam’s developmental model, and gradually expand its economy through the growth of export markets. This would be of direct benefit to the U.S. economy.

Even more important than encouraging domestic change on the island, rapprochement with Cuba stands to improve U.S. diplomatic relations with all of Latin America. At last year’s Summit of the Americas, leaders from around the region, including relative moderate Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina, berated the U.S. for an “anachronistic” approach to Cuba. America’s insistence on antagonizing the Cuban government undercuts more important regional goals, specifically efforts to demonstrate that U.S. hemispheric hegemony need no longer be consistent with demanding, heavy-handed political relationships. Given the national significance of trade with Latin America, and the need for regional cooperation on issues like the drug trade, undocumented migrations, and human trafficking, the distrust motivated by the U.S. stance towards Cuba is a serious detriment to hemispheric policy. The lessening of hostilities towards Cuba could do much to assist the pursuit of other regional goals.

In this context, the emphasis the TSA recently placed on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism was misguided. The 2008 Country Reports on Terrorism admit that “Cuba no longer actively supports armed struggle in Latin America and other parts of the world.” Current justification for Cuba’s inclusion seems based on its harboring of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna in Spain, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and the National Liberation Army of Colombia, although the Country Reports acknowledge that some individuals visited Cuba in connection with peace negotiations with the governments of Spain and Colombia. The Cuban government has also admitted U.S. fugitives from groups like the Boricua Popular (or Macheteros) and the Black Liberation Army, but the Reports concede that in accordance with the government’s public declarations, Cuba has not granted protection to any new fugitives since 2006.

Given that ongoing Cuban activity does not appear to threaten the U.S., its position on the list of state sponsors of terror is clearly anachronistic. Removing Cuba from the list would not cost the U.S. anything, nor would it represent significant backtracking on the U.S. commitment to political and economic freedoms. It would, however, be a powerful signal to Cubans and other Latin American observers that the U.S. does in fact want to move past the Cold War framework of U.S.-Latin American relations. The removal, while individually insufficient to ease U.S.-Cuban antagonism, would be an important first step in that direction. Until President Obama updates the list accordingly, it is unlikely that Latin American governments will take seriously his overtures for a new era of inter-American relations.

In some sense, the state dinner was nothing new; past U.S. presidents have regularly hosted Indian leaders at state dinners. Indeed, in terms of policy substance, the Obama-Singh event is less important than Singh’s dinner with former President Bush in 2005, when they announced a civilian nuclear agreement between the two states. Nevertheless, the state dinner helped allay fears that the Obama administration might deprioritize relations with India in favor of strengthening ties with China. Despite the administration’s globetrotting agendas, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton bypassed India on her trip to Asia in February 2009, and Obama, too, declined to visit during his Asian tour en route to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Singapore in November. Although Clinton did visit India earlier in July, the Obama administration seems to interact with India within a more bilateral framework than one in which they acknowledge its rising power and aspirations on the global stage.

New Delhi has been fretting over the U.S.’s apparent acquiescence to growing Chinese clout and in particular, the recent joint Obama-Hu statement calling for closer “cooperation [between the U.S. and China] on issues related to South Asia.” The statement seemed to open the door to China’s involvement in the longstanding sensitive rivalry between India and Pakistan. Furthermore, the ongoing economic downturn has fueled protectionist tendencies in America, especially with a Democrat-controlled Congress. Obama recently spoke of anti-outsourcing measures and criticized current tax policies which favor companies outsourcing to lower-cost countries like India. Hence some political watchers are predicting some strain in U.S.-India relations on Obama’s watch.

Officials such as U.S. Under Secretary of State William Burns and Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Robert Blake have nonetheless firmly reiterated America’s commitment to a partnership with India. Prime Minister Singh’s status as the first state guest of honor can be seen as a reaffirmation of the continued strength of U.S.-India ties and a strategic move by the White House to reassure their nervous Indian friends. The pageantry of a state dinner cannot, however, be a replacement for progress toward substantive issues. The Obama administration has been dragging its heels in the implementation of the much-heralded nuclear cooperation agreement, with the President showing little inclination to push through the final modalities and procedures.

Obama is right to engage more closely with China, but sticking too closely to a G2-style “Chimerica” script would risk overemphasizing Chinese influence at the expense of American leverage. China and America are more often than not at loggerheads with each other, from China’s resentment over its past subjugation under Western imperial powers to present-day tensions over Taiwan, Tibet, yuan undervaluation, and ideological differences over human rights and democracy. If Obama realistically wants to realize his grand visions of multilateralism and global cooperation, he needs as many allies on board as possible. An increasingly aggressive and confident China is an unlikely first candidate.

India can serve as a useful counterweight to China’s assertive and occasionally hostile presence in Asia that ensures that the much-touted ‘Asian century’ does not belong exclusively to the Chinese. While it would be overly simplistic to claim that India and the U.S.’s shared traits of being populous multiethnic democracies automatically renders easy cooperation, the fact that India is more likely to have a similar outlook as the U.S. can ease Western fears of a potentially unfriendly Asia-Pacific region based on Chinese-driven values and models. The U.S. should not try to forcefully impose American ideas on Asia, but with India as an ally the U.S. can ensure that its interests in Asia are not compromised. Most of the Southeast Asian countries, being poor and relatively small, are highly susceptible to China’s “checkbook diplomacy”—using its wealth to buy allies. For the U.S., India’s partnership may be more important than its partnership with Japan, as that country, a traditionally staunch U.S. ally, becomes increasingly distant from the U.S. after the recent shift in power to the Democratic Party of Japan under Yukio Hatoyama. India is also keen to work with the U.S. as protection against China. Supporting India’s emergence as a major power need not constitute an antagonistic containment strategy directed against any supposed “China threat.” Instead, it is a reasonable policy designed to ensure that the interests of all players are accommodated to preserve geopolitical stability and inclusiveness in a crucial region of the world.

The U.S. has to make sure it recognizes India’s interests while balancing its own agenda. Unfortunately, relations have been soured by India’s frustrations with America’s perceived reluctance to strongly crack down on Pakistan, which harbors several extremist groups that have targeted India. India is suspicious of ramped-up American military assistance to its neighbor, fearing that Pakistan will channel those resources toward aggression in the disputed Kashmir region and along the Indo-Pakistan border, rather than toward combating Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Obama also flamed controversy early in 2009 when he suggested that resolving the Kashmir dispute would be central to addressing the problems of instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. South Asian politics have long proven to be complex and messy, and tensions have become even more strained in the wake of the 2008 Mumbai bombings by Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). Washington needs to balance its interests in working with both India and Pakistan, as well as Afghanistan, all crucial fronts in the battle against terrorism. During the state dinner, Obama wisely adopted a policy of non-involvement, issuing a neutral statement that “it is not [America’s] place” to get involved in the India-Pakistan conflict. Pakistan and India are partners that the U.S. can ill afford to lose; Washington should tread carefully.

Although the two nations have been increasingly close partners, there remains much potential for closer cooperation on counterterrorism efforts, particularly in the realms of intelligence sharing, joint training, improved institutional frameworks, and enhanced security enforcement measures and responses. India’s previous successful efforts against Sikh terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s were due in no small part to the sharing of intelligence with the U.S. and other countries, and a similar approach may be adopted with regard to global terrorism today. While terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda and the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) do have different objectives, they all cause conflict beyond Pakistan’s borders. A U.S.-India partnership in combating terrorism would underline India’s leadership both regionally and globally and would highlight international commitment to stopping terrorism and increasing stability.

Although President Obama’s ceremony and symbolic gestures are well-intentioned, building a stronger partnership with India will require further action. While China must be considered, the U.S. must engage more deeply with India on the many issues and interests that the two nations share to glean the potential economic and strategic rewards.

Although Obama’s “new era of responsibility” has found many supporters, its vagueness has also created an opening for critics who view Obama as a better speaker than policymaker. The reality of the President’s spirit of international good will lends credence to such critics. While some of his popularity is certainly attributable to his rhetoric, the bulk of it is due to the basic phenomenon that other nations expect him to pursue policies in their own self-interest.

There is no more fitting example of this disconcerting fact than the difference between President Obama’s popularity in the Middle East and President Bush’s at the end of his second term in office. The president’s tone of cooperation and reconciliation with Arab states has led to higher support in states such as Egypt, where approval for the U.S. increased from 22 to 27 percent, and in Jordan, where it rose from 19 to 25 percent, according to the Pew Research Center. Yet support for America remains unchanged in areas such as the Palestinian territories and Pakistan, which have historically maintained distant relations with the United States throughout the terms of many presidents. Such opinions are unlikely to change despite President Obama’s election and new tone towards some Arab states. In Israel, on the other hand, America’s popularity has dropped from 78 percent in 2007 to 71 percent in 2009. This is attributable to several of President Obama’s statements and policies, both during his campaign and in office, that indicate he may be less willing to support all Israeli policies unconditionally than was the Bush administration. Obama’s speech in Cairo during the summer of 2009 and his insistence on the cessation of all settlement building have instilled doubts among Israelis that he will be as accommodating as his predecessor. Nor, for that matter, should he be; the region requires a mediator who will be unafraid to demand the termination of both Israeli settlement expansion and of many Arab countries’ funding and harboring of Islamist groups that wish to disrupt the peace process within the region.

The President may soon find that in other regions, as well as the Middle East, his political capital is based primarily on what foreign nations perceive as his commitment to their own best interests, rather than those of the global community. Many see Europe as the base of the President’s international support, an idea traced to then-senator Obama’s campaign foray into Germany the summer before he was elected. At the same time, Obama’s visit to Europe revealed that he is well aware of the true factors that lie at the root of his international support. In a speech, Obama appealed to the nation’s individual needs in articulating his political vision, saying, “The poppies in Afghanistan become the heroin in Berlin.” In this way, President Obama captured the essence of a more effective manner in which to leverage his extraordinary popularity: He appealed to individual nations’ self-interest in a way that gains their respect and helps Washington’s cause as well.

The President should stop focusing on maintaining his popularity as an end in and of itself and start making substantive policy decisions even if they disappoint some members of the international community. The recent Copenhagen Climate Summit in December of 2009 represents a perfect example of the way in which President Obama’s wish to satisfy all members of the international community led to intangible progress toward policy goals. Widely regarded as what the EU termed a “great failure,” the Climate Summit ended in various participants reaching a nonbinding political agreement that advocated emissions cuts and other environmental reforms at standards far below those hoped for by environmental experts. At the end of the conference, who was to blame for what and why—with the EU unhappy with China and China unhappy with the U.S.—was more publicized than the conference’s actual accomplishments. The idea of gathering any number of nations into a room and hoping that America’s newfound popularity in the world will inspire cooperation apparently has its limits.

Some might argue that President Obama, by brushing aside international criticism, puts himself in danger of falling into the same trap as the previous administration. Yet in doing so, one assumes that President Obama and the previous administration have a similar attitude toward foreign relations. They do not. President Bush treated the idea of diplomacy as a one-dimensional spectrum, expecting support for his forays into Iraq and Afghanistan while disregarding recommendations made by the United Nations and other international organizations. Yet President Obama has demonstrated a vision of the world in which the global community has substantial importance at various levels; he is familiar with international relations and cites Cold War diplomats George Marshall and George Kennan, supporters of a multilateral foreign policy, as sources of influence. The President embodies a combination of intellectual idealism and pragmatism that distinguish him ideologically from his predecessor.

It is clear that both Europe and the Obama administration share a spirit of cooperation and dialogue. But, to quote former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, “America does not have friends; it has interests.” President Obama will inevitably have to make tough decisions that will alienate global citizens whose support he once enjoyed. In order for President Obama to gain the respect he lacks as a relatively inexperienced leader, he must be willing make such decisions publicly and forcefully, or face appearing subservient to the political desires of other countries. As President Obama enters into his second year in office, his popularity is dampened but not expired; he still enjoys a fairly clean slate regarding foreign policy as a whole and has maintained a great deal of his international popularity. He can use this advantage as an opportunity to address more contentious issues and gain the respect—not just the popularity—of the international community.