The world market’s positive response to the Euro-zone’s solution does not mean, however, that European finances are any more secure. Whereas this proposal is a first step in the right direction, the deal does not completely solve the short run problem of Greece’s finances or prevent the spread of the debt crisis. Even with its debt cut by about a fifth, Greece will have a great deal of trouble paying back a sum larger than its GDP. The government has an extraordinarily poor tax collection system and thus no reliable source of revenue other than debt sales. Because the Euro allowed Greece to borrow more at lower interest rates, the parties in power promised their voters benefits that could only be sustained by selling this debt. But now that this gilded age has passed, Greece has to either collect taxes or cut benefits.

Yet, any Greek government that pushes austerity too far would be effectively committing political suicide and dooming their country to a longer and more severe recession. A report by the European Central Bank showed Greece’s output this year will shrink by 5.5 percent, and it has been postulated that the nation will not return to growth until 2013. It will be extremely difficult for Greece to raise its revenue to the point where it can pay off even this fraction of its accrued debt, as doing so would further shrink its economy. This reality will inevitably lead to future problems regarding Greece’s finances.
Because a Greek default is a systemic risk to the Euro, economic powerhouses like Germany and France will continue to give Greece the deal of a lifetime. Greece, in turn, will continue to waffle and bargain on these agreements because it does not want to commit to austerity. At the end of the day, Europe will support Greece’s 450 billion dollar debt, because the alternative is to suffer the massive deleveraging that would result from Greece’s failure to pay. However, because it is politically unsavory to just bail Greece out, the larger countries will tiptoe around the issue and try and find other, less efficient, ways for Greece to “pay its own way.”

The second part of this deal is supposed to provide the EFSF with enough firepower to prevent larger economies like Spain and Italy from becoming insolvent. Because nations in the EU have already expanded the newly formed authority several times over, however, this new expansion is one that will not take the form of money. The EFSF will be given two new tools: the first allows the EFSF to insure the first losses of any new bonds within the Euro-zone (essentially, any non-catastrophic loss on a newly issued bond, give or take 20%, is now insured by the EFSF); and the second mandate allows the EFSF to create a series of special purpose vehicles financed by other investors and designated to specific counties to prevent the risk from spreading.

Yet, these new tools may give the EFSF less leverage than expected. Insurance does not work and is not comforting if every investor knows the institution backing the insured bond cannot reimburse the holder. Additionally, if Germany is not willing to place money in these special purpose vehicles why should Japan or the China, who have no immediate stake in the Euro-zone? The likely answer is that they will not. Thus, both the preventative measures and the stopgaps for the Euro-zone and Greek debt clearly have major flaws in their designs.

There was one option that could have lessened the cumulative sting of Greece’s new debts and secured the Italian and Spanish economies. But it was tabled because it would have negatively impacted creditor nations. Specifically Germany could have given the European Central Bank the ability to print a large number of Euros to support the EFSF. This option is completely within set of powers of the ECB, but the ECB’s ability to use those powers is limited by the nations of the Euro zone. The ECB states that its mandate is to “maintain price stability with inflation rates of below, but close to, 2% over the medium term.”

If the ECB were to scrap its mandate for a short period of time and inflate the Euro, the rest of the stopgap measure could work. Inflating the Euro coupled with the haircut would be especially painful for German banks, which hold large amounts of other European debt as well as Greek debt, but it would not force them to deleverage nor would ECB-led inflation fundamentally change the structure of the Euro zone. A moderate increase in the inflation rate would slightly lessen the real value of the debt held by the countries of the Euro-Zone and give the EFSF the firepower necessary to back up its new mandate to insure the potential first losses of new debt issued by countries of the Euro-zone.

Along with the already accepted measures, inflating the Euro is a quick and easy answer to the short-term problem of putting the Euro-zone on surer footing and making sure Greece can repay the remainder of its debt. The Germans have to realize that this may be the Euro-zone’s only way to insure that this deal does not become a meaningless one. While the German creditor banks may suffer some penalty from this policy of inflation, these losses will be miniscule compared with the financial meltdown that would occur if Italy defaults on its debt or the Greek deal has to be reworked. Both of these scenarios are not that far-fetched if the Euro-zone cannot insure that this deal is supported with something more tangible than the current proposal.

Still, the new deal is just a nicely dressed stopgap measure designed to do the bare minimum, make everyone happy, and avoid any major changes. Such a deal would be fine if the stopgaps could effectively insure Greek debt against further default and prevent the crisis from making Italian debt insoluble. Without the support of additional currency, however, the stopgap measures fail to do either. Germany is going to fight an inflation policy because such a policy would reduce its banks’ returns. Consequently, German interests have placed the rest of Europe at risk of a prolonged crisis that could be greatly helped with just a moderate amount of inflation.

In the long run, the Euro-zone will have to change its structure or face an endless cycle of smaller countries abusing their position with the larger. But for the short term, as long as the mentality of trying to “have everyone keep their cake and eat it too” prevails among the leaders Europe, no stopgap measure will ever give the Euro-zone economies the breathing space they need to introduce major reforms.

For some Euro watchers, this arrangement between Europe and China is only the latest example of “the scramble for Europe”. Borrowing the phrase from the 19th century competition between European states to acquire colonies in Africa, skeptics use the term broadly to argue that the surge in Chinese acquisitions of European companies and related investments will undermine European competitiveness. In the words of a French official, “It’s a real war, with highly subsidized companies coming to open markets with unusually low prices and undercutting the competition.” Moreover, this may lead to a split EU policy on China, with “cash-strapped deal-seekers”, like Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain (PIGS), simply seeking investments, while “frustrated market-openers” like Germany and France seek a united European consensus to protect domestic firms both in Europe and abroad in China.

Especially in the eyes of countries like Germany and France, China’s investment patterns in Europe present a concern. A disproportionately large percentage of China’s global investments are in Eastern Europe (10%) and PIGS (30%) – the traditionally weaker EU economies. Combined with the fact that Chinese firms have been beating out European firms for large public-sector contracts in Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Poland, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia, this leads wealthier EU states to eye China’s intentions warily.

Undoubtedly, this arrangement has real benefits for weaker EU states, which can now obtain infrastructure at fire sale prices. However, the lack of transparency of many Chinese corporations is a cause for concern. Although EU law forbids state-run companies from bidding for public contracts, many Chinese multinationals that bid for these contracts have close ties to government, maintain a shadow party structure, and most importantly, obtain government subsidies, which give them a further leg up on their European competitors. Furthermore, Chinese firms can keep costs lower than their European competitors by importing low-cost laborers from China and paying them significantly less.

Why is this a problem for European unity? While poorer EU members see only the benefits of discounted costs, wealthier EU members see anti-competitive practices as harmful for domestic firms. Furthermore, when European firms from wealthier nations go abroad, they are frustrated by China’s lack of reciprocity. While European firms are nominally allowed to bid for projects in China, they rarely win, as the rules are skewed almost always to favor domestic firms. Therefore, the vast majority of China’s internationally known mega-projects such as the Three Gorges Dam, Olympic stadiums, and bullet trains are administered instead by the National Development and Research Commission (NDRC). So while the “market-openers” cry foul and attempt to overhaul existing EU legislation, the “cash-strapped deal-seekers” do not see it in their interest to comply with any policy to change the status quo.

To argue that China actively seeks to weaken the EU by reaching agreements with individual member states to create a divisive “China lobby” within the union may be a stretch. China has little to gain from the dissolution of the EU. Nonetheless, Europe must put its economic house in order, encourage China to open up its market to foreign firms, and finally mitigate the unfair advantages that Chinese firms have while bidding in Europe. To achieve the first goal, the EU must evolve beyond its original intent and become a monetary and a fiscal union. Though this would most likely face serious resistance from many EU states, the debt crisis in Europe today is a direct result of a failure on the part of the EU states to coordinate fiscal policy. It is important to remember while China demands certain conditions for its purchase of euro bonds, this originated from a lack of European coordination that precipitated this disaster. By allowing each state to pursue its own interest independently, each state ended up collectively worse off than if they had coordinated their policies together. Moving towards a fiscal union will benefit the EU in the present by giving investors confidence in EU bonds, and will benefit the EU in the future by making it easier to head off the type of debt crises that we see today, reducing the need for the type of outside intervention that Europe is soliciting from China now.

In addition, more regulation will be required to prevent foreign firms from using subsidies to gain unfair advantages in bidding. Since there already exist a myriad of regulation in China, the European Financial Stability Fund suggests that the EU should reciprocate, especially in fields such as defense, critical technologies, media, and education.

While Chinese investments have exposed weaknesses in the EU’s structure, these are all manageable issues that, in time, can be resolved. Although the alarmist reports in the media have painted a portrait of newly ascendant China righting past wrongs by reverse-colonizing Europe, the truth is that China is neither belligerent nor friendly – it is simply in pursuit of its own self-interest, and Europe should respond accordingly by strengthening existing ties between states.

Anxiously deferring to its allies and playing down its position is not the way the U.S. has traditionally begun a war. Over the weeks preceding UN air strikes on Libya, the administration has come under criticism for its relative inaction in allowing the tides of democracy to waver in Africa at such a crucial juncture. John McCain has argued that Obama waited too long to intervene, while Sarah Palin criticized Obama’s approach as “dithering.” Michael Gerson of the Washington Post characterized Obama’s response in harsh terms: “the reaction hesitant, the process chaotic, the outcome late.” Granted, it may be true that the delayed U.S. response has emboldened Gaddafi’s defiance and caused Libyan opposition to lose ground. These criticisms, however, ignore the local and international ramifications of a unilateral American war that led to such failures as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. All things considered, the U.S.’s adoption of a support role is in fact appropriate. The postponed U.S. position has allowed the international community to reach a consensus as to the legitimacy of intervention; furthermore, the U.S.’s role as supporter rather than leader will help prevent the perception of this intervention as another American crusade.

It should be recognized that the Libyan unrest is as much a European and Arab problem as it is an American problem, and thus any effort to resolve the Libyan crisis must involve meaningful input and resources from European and Arab states. Europe has high economic and military stakes in maintaining the stability of the region: 1800 kilometers of the Mediterranean coastline belong to Libya, and 85 percent of Libya’s oil exports are exported to Europe. Likewise, the Arab states are geographically, culturally, and politically tied to Libya, and Libya is itself a member of the Arab League. The U.S. should not have to carry the burden of military action that benefits all free nations in the world. It is the shared responsibility of all nations with economic and political stakes in Libya to step up and play a role in resolving the crisis.

By delaying the American response, the U.S. has gained reliable allies in its mission, as European and Arab nations realize the potential impact of Libyan unrest on their national interests if they do not act. Not only has the case for intervention acquired political support from the Arab League, but it has also secured legal approval from the U.N. with a 10-0 Security Council vote, and allowed the lead to be taken by France and Britain, sponsors of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 calling for a no-fly zone. Such a deferrential and non-dominating response has in fact been advantageous, given the potentially disastrous consequences of the alternate path of action, unilateral military action in Libya.

This alternate path is unrealistic: the U.S. cannot handle a third full-scale war. Had the U.S. taken initiative and unilaterally intervened at the start of the armed rebellion, the situation would have degenerated into another American crusade, much like in Afghanistan or Iraq. U.S. forces are already too strained in Afghanistan and Iraq to take on another all-out military intervention. Financially, the cruise missiles fired over Libya by the second evening of the attack have already cost $1 million. With 100,000 troops in Afghanistan and another 47,000 troops in Iraq, it is not militarily feasible to sustain a risky, open-ended commitment in the long term.

Historically, it has been difficult for the U.S. to successfully intervene without the support of the international community. Quick and easy victories such as the Gulf War are rare. More often, interventionist wars lacking in international support such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Vietnam quickly evolve into a stalemate that protracts for years. In Libya itself, unilateral U.S. sanctions in 1982 failed to change Gaddafi’s policies. Later, in 1986, the U.S. swiftly launched unilateral air strikes against Libya ten days after the Berlin Discotheque Bombing. The air strikes not only failed to cripple Gaddafi, who announced a spectacular “military victory”, but garnered widespread international criticism Over the last 40 years, it has become clear that the U.S. cannot overthrow Gaddafi by itself.

In addition, a decisive decision to intervene would have led to the perception that the U.S. was orchestrating the downfall of the Gaddafi government. It would have given ground to Gaddafi’s accusations in speeches at Tahrir Square as well as interviews with international news media that the protests were a “colonialist plot”. Such anti-colonialist sentiments have the potential to be very effective in influencing public opinion in many postcolonial countries. An example of this is the U.S.’s 1993 intervention in Somalia to end the starvation of thousands, which was met with increased hostility, rather than gratitude, as the U.S. became more and more embroiled in the nation-building effort.

Furthermore, any U.S.-led invasions may arouse strong anti-American sentiment that could facilitate the political rise of al-Qaeda elements in the region. Al-Qaeda may act to fill the political vacuum resulting from the Libyan chaos if its anti-American rhetoric is successful in appealing to ordinary Libyans. Al-Qaeda franchises such as AQIM (Al-Qaeda in Maghreb) and the LIFG (Libyan Islamic Fighting Group) have historically attempted to seize power in Libya. In order to avoid triggering an explosion of radical Islamic elements taking over, it is of utmost importance that any intervention in Libya not be perceived as a U.S.-led operation.

Significantly, the revolts that have swept the Middle East in recent months have been organic. In Egypt, for example, every step of the revolts, from the protests to the ultimate overthrow of the government, was directed and carried out by Egyptians without U.S. involvement – a fact of great pride among the Egyptians. A minimalist stance on the part of the US ensures the prevention of anti-American sentiments arresting political change. Waiting to secure UN and Arab League approval distributes the responsibility globally, instead of allowing intervention to be branded as an American ploy.

With the U.S. hesitance to strike Libya in mind, no one could credibly argue that the U.S. forcibly intervened. Moreover, the ultimate involvement of the US sends a signal to the leaders of regimes in other Middle Eastern and North African countries, such as Bahrain and Algeria, that the threat of international military intervention is real, and that they will be unable to use the argument of American imperialism to counter public opinion about foreign intervention.

Regardless of how Obama’s actions are interpreted, they have certainly brought about key tactical advantages. Instead of impulsively dragging the country into another war, he has led the international community to align its position on intervention in Libya by presenting an image of caution and restraint for many weeks. Previous administrations have treated the UN as a rubber stamp council in going to war, inviting it to vote on resolutions approving foreign intervention, but intervening regardless of the outcome. That approach deprives the U.S. of genuine cooperation with potential allies critical to the success of a mission. The new approach carved out by the Obama administration, however, has broken from that approach and made it clear that it will not launch any attack that is not approved by the UN. Although UN approval is not necessarily synonymous with prudent action, such an approach effectively shifts the burden of responsibility away from the US. By inviting genuine debate and input from Lebanon, France, Britain, and the Arab League, the U.S. has successfully garnered broad political and military support.

In short, Obama may be ushering in a new era of U.S. engagement in foreign military intervention, breaking from the unilateral paradigm of U.S.-initiated wars from the Bush period. By refusing to act until legal UN approval was obtained and allowing other nations to take responsibility in leading coalitions, Obama may be reshaping the rules for U.S. engagement abroad in a manner that will be beneficial to us in the future. The U.S. is adopting a pragmatic doctrine that will not only reduce economic and military expenses, but also garner international political consensus that will lessen anti-Americanism in the long-term.

To understand why this move is so politically significant, it is necessary to first have a basic understanding of the Tibetan government-in-exile. Starting from the top, while many in the West view the Dalai Lama primarily as the spiritual leader of the Tibetan people, he is also the chief executive of the government, armed with an array of political powers. Though there are some checks on his power – for example, his decision to retire required approval by the Tibetan parliament – his combination of political and spiritual influence makes the Dalai Lama a remarkably potent figure.

The Dalai Lama seeks to devolve all his political power to the Kalon Tripa, who as a direct subordinate to the Dalai Lama is democratically elected and functions as a prime minister. The Kalon Tripa is the second-most powerful political figure in the Tibetan government-in-exile, but it gives cause to ponder just how powerful the Kalon Tripa can be, given that the Dalai Lama has the power to remove him from office without Parliamentary approval. Now, however, the Dalai Lama seeks to devolve all his political power to the Kalon Tripa, the elections for whom were held earlier this month. Though the winner has not yet been announced, it is clear that he will be more powerful than any of his predecessors.

This vast expansion of the Kalon Tripa’s power is a wise political move in terms of the Tibetan government’s foreign relations. First consider how this move will affect Tibetan-Chinese relations: China believes that it should play an active role in the appointment of the next Dalai Lama. There is some historical precedent for this belief as the Chinese maintain that the sixth Dalai Lama was appointed by the Qing dynasty Emperor Kangxi. Tsering Yangdzom, an ethnic Tibetan at the China Tibetology Research Center, has cited the appointment of the sixth Dalai Lama in support of China’s paradoxica conviction that it should elect the Dalai Lama’s successor– China has long opposed the very institution of the Dalai Lama

The Dalai Lama fears that, should the Tibetan government continue to place executive power in the hand of Dalai Lamas, China will attempt to elect a puppet ruler who would lead Tibetans in the direction of the interests of China. Thus, the Tibetan government-in-exile has rejected China’s appeal to precedent in appointing Dalai Lamas, arguing that Emperor Kangxi had only sent representatives to the inauguration of the sixth Dalai Lama and was not involved in his appointment at all. Regardless of which historical account is true, a critical eye should be cast towards China’s claim that it has the right to perpetuate the Tibetan Buddhist succession model it has so vocally denounced in the past. Clearly, China’s objections are politically motivated – the power to appoint the next Dalai Lama would eliminate the possibility of another “threatening” Tibetan ruler like Tenzin Gyatso, the current Dalai Lama. Thus, the Dalai Lama’s retirement is an intelligent, politically motivated move, as it undermines the potential for the Chinese to gain leverage over Tibet.

The Dalai Lama’s retirement will also garner greater sympathy for the Tibetan cause from democracies, as the new executive, the Kalon Tripa, will be democratically elected. Compare this to the process of selecting a Dalai Lama: he is chosen by a small group of monks who believe him to be the reincarnation of the previous Dalai Lama. Thus, Tenzin Gyatso’s political retirement will ensure a move towards democratic government. The desire for increased democratization is also evident in how elections for the Kalon Tripa were conducted: last month, polling was conducted by 56 regional election commissions around the world. All Tibetan adults are eligible to vote, an impressive feat considering that the Tibetan people and their government are in exile and dispersed globally. Thus, the election process further highlights the extent to which the Tibetan government is committed to the principles of an open society, which will help win it greater support from democracies worldwide.

Finally, the devolvement of the Dalai Lama’s political power will allow countries to support more openly the Dalai Lama’s advocacy for Tibetan autonomy. Though no government has officially recognized the legitimacy of the Central Tibetan Administration, the Dalai Lama dislocsed that the Tibetan government-in-exile receives an annual sum of $1.7 million in aid from the United States, specifically from the Central Intelligence Agency. Though other governments may or may not have contributed monetarily to the Dalai Lama’s advocacy for Tibetan autonomy, many have expressed sympathy for his cause. The most obvious evidence for this is his having received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989. At the same time, China has pressured governments around the world not to accept the Dalai Lama as the legitimate ruler of the Tibetans. For fear of souring relations with China, the international community has given into this pressure and has denied the legitimacy of the Dalai Lama’s rule while still trying to support his cause.
Now, however, countries will be able to more readily rally behind him, as supporting him as a spiritual and moral leader rather than as a head of state will no longer be a matter of international relations, but rather a matter of supporting a man who continues to fight for human rights and for the autonomy of his people. In stepping down, then, the Dalai Lama can increase his prestige and moral standing and better fight for the Tibetan cause.

Nevertheless, more than two years after this proclamation, Guantánamo Bay is still operational, and the
Obama administration recently reversed its once forceful decision to terminate military tribunals. On March 7th, President Obama signed a new executive order reauthorizing military commissions, claiming that “all branches of government have a responsibility to come together to forge a strong and durable approach to defend our nation.” This policy reversal should be welcomed and supported since it provides the most judicious and fair way to prosecute captured terrorists while also placing the safety and security of American citizens above the bickering that characterizes international human rights politics. Both pragmatically and legally, President Obama has made the correct decision in reauthorizing military commissions at Guantánamo Bay.

One of the most commonly overlooked arguments in support of military commissions is actually quite simple: the federal judiciary system is ill equipped to handle trials of terrorist operatives. Federal courts have far stricter conditions for what can be considered “admissible evidence,” an unnecessary and unusual precedent for the prosecution of terrorists. Hearsay evidence, while admissible in military tribunals, European criminal courts, and international courts, is one of the most valuable pieces of evidence that interrogators can wean from captured terrorists, yet it is not admissible in US federal courts. While such a standard may be acceptable for domestic criminal trials where evidence is far more abundant, there are generally very few eyewitnesses willing to testify at hearings for suspected terrorists because they rightfully fear strong and terrible retribution. We only need to look as far as the frightening 9/11 footage to see that al-Qaeda has no issue ruthlessly and indiscriminately murdering innocent civilians.

Certainly, their retribution would be far greater against those who have actively worked to defy them.
Beyond this justifiable fear, however, most of the witnesses from whom we have obtained evidence are terrorists, leading to countless obstacles to get these witnesses to stand trial. Terrorists are obviously unwilling to testify publicly against fellow terrorists, yet it would be reckless not to provide hard evidence simply because the witness is unwilling to take the stand. Furthermore, many of these witnesses are harbored by or hiding in foreign countries, making the procurement of their testimony all the more difficult. Even if the governments of the Middle East were willing to aid us by extraditing the terrorist witnesses to the U.S. for trial, it is doubtful that they have the political will or the institutional strength to successfully find, capture, and transport these witnesses.

In addition to these logistical reasons, military tribunals are considered legal under the Geneva Conventions, a fact voiced often by President Bush and now, albeit somewhat reluctantly, accepted by President Obama. The legal issue surrounding military tribunals stems from the Third Geneva Convention, which grants prisoners of war (POWs) the right to habeas corpus, counsel of their own choosing, and the right to appeal a court’s decision. While under the current system of military tribunals none of these rights are conferred to the most dangerous terrorists, a close reading of the treaty reveals that the United States is actually not required to do so. According to the Third Geneva Convention, POWs are defined as “members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict” that carry their arms openly and have “a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance.” Terrorists, who forgo uniforms and make concerted efforts to disguise themselves as civilians, do not fulfill these requirements and are therefore not granted the legal rights conferred to POWs. The United States is still bound by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to abstain from “cruel treatment and torture,” but certainly military tribunals could not be described as “torture” in any sense of the word.

While international treaties are legally binding, seeing as they are given status as “the Supreme law of the land,” they cannot require us to violate other portions of the Constitution. Fortunately, the Supreme Court has upheld military tribunals on multiple occasions, deeming them consistent with Constitutional war powers and legal precedent. In Ex parte Quirin, the Court unanimously upheld President Roosevelt’s decision to try eight self-proclaimed Nazi spies in military tribunals, one of whom was even an American citizen. In the decision, the Court ruled, “Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals.” In 2004, the Court ruled in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that the 2002 Authorization to Use Military Force against Iraq (AUMF), which granted the President the right to use “all necessary and appropriate force” against “nations, organizations, or persons” associated with the 9/11 attacks, also authorized military tribunals while the United States was actively engaged in combat. The Court commented, “ . . . enemy combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive,” and they even went so far as to argue, “Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding.” As is evident by judicial precedent from the nation’s highest court, military tribunals are an acceptable, and oftentimes the most practical, procedure by which terrorists can be tried in a court of law. There is no legal reason, given the nature of terrorist operations and the strong precedent set in our judiciary, that terrorists should not be tried in military tribunals.

There are, however, other criticisms levied against military tribunals. Specifically, former detainees such as Majid Khan have argued that military tribunals encourage the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques,” which constitute torture. Torture, in all of its forms, is illegal under both the Constitution and our obligations to the Geneva Accords, so its use cannot be tolerated in any circumstance. In fact, studies have shown that torturous coercion is a wholly ineffective interrogation technique because the victims will probably just admit to crimes they have never committed in order to please their interrogators. Furthermore, torture at home could feasibly endanger our troops abroad by enraging an already elusive and dangerous enemy. For these reasons alone, not even considering the strong moral implications, the United States should not engage in torture if it is to be effective in its obtainment of information from terrorists.

Both Guantánamo and their military tribunals are conducted in a humane manner Detainees at Guantánamo are granted exemplary health benefits and facilities—certainly better care than they would be receiving anywhere else in the world. While some would contend that Guantánamo as a concept is illegal and morally repugnant, we unfortunately live in an age where the rules of warfare have changed. To send these detainees back to their home countries would essentially be granting their release; it has been proven that Middle Eastern prisons, especially those in Yemen, are undeniably porous. As unfortunate as it may be, the nature of our enemy requires that we maintain their imprisonment, it is crucial that we do not allow for any risk of safety of Americans on the presumption that these terrorists will remain in captivity.

The United States, as a nation of sovereign people, has its greatest responsibility to protect and defend the citizens that grant it legitimacy and power. Military tribunals are a strong component of this defense because they allow the government to try terrorist operatives efficiently without imperiling the federal court system. Legally, there is little justification for those who oppose military tribunals, since the reckless and violent manner in which terrorists wage war has stripped them of their POW status under the Third Geneva Convention. Finally, U.S. constitutional law has upheld military tribunals as an effective means to try and convict guilty terrorist operatives while the United States is engaged in activity military combat as it is today. It should be of great comfort to all Americans that President Obama has reevaluated his campaign rhetoric to adopt these tribunals as a legitimate way to try to convict terrorists, thereby increasing the United States’ capacity to contain and eliminate one of the greatest threats to its national security.

Furthermore, the Kremlin’s recent behavior in Japan has been the key factor in escalating the conflict far beyond simple diplomatic tensions. Russia, equally infamous for its rabid youth movements, such as Nashi, is certainly not without anti-Japanese sentiment to rival Tokyo’s Northern Territories Day rallies. The Molodaya Gvardia (Young Guard) arm of the United Russia party has commissioned the spy-turned-TV-personality Anna Chapman to hoist the Russian flag on Kunashir, an island visible from the Japanese island of Hokkaido. In a backwards-diplomatic approach, the Young Guard has filmed an inflammatory documentary featuring the glamorous Chapman as a spokesperson for the Russians’ great prosperity and consequent legitimacy in the Kuril Islands. Their intent is to convince the Japanese government of their rightful rule there.

Much more worrying, however, is the Russians’ decision to deploy advanced military artillery on the Kuril Islands. During a controversial visit to the islands, President Medvedev claimed that in order to “ensure the security” of “our strategic region,” armed precautions were necessary against aggressive nationalism in Japan. Although the exact extent of this expansion remains unknown, its very prospect is an enormous threat to the Japanese who have, until now, not gone beyond civil public action concerning the Kurils. Now, Japan too has plans to increase defense forces in Hokkaido to rival Russia’s. Such arms escalation and increased use of force have become disappointingly common. When a Japanese fishing vessel recently passed nearby the Kurils, it was detained by a Russian patrol; in August, another wary Russian coast guard unit opened fire on a Japanese vessel and killed an innocent crewmember. Then, earlier this year, Japanese authorities had to scramble 22 jets in order to prevent a suspicious Russian Tupolev 95 bomber from further harassing neutral airspace.

These developments come amidst mounting tensions elsewhere in East Asia. Chinese aircraft have taken after the Russians and begun to harass Japanese and Filipino vessels traveling too close to disputed territories. Taiwan too recently conducted artillery exercises near the oil-rich Spratly and Parcel archipelagos, islands also claimed by Vietnam and Malaysia; Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Phuong Nga said in response that this action “seriously violated” their sovereignty. Regional media have also reflected this shift in tactical ideology. In an alarming Hong Kong editorial, the Ming Pao wrote, “Medvedev’s move has fully shown the importance of actual control over regions with disputed sovereignty. It shows that China must change course on sovereignty disputes. It cannot rely solely on oral declarations of sovereignty and must take specific action.” The disputed Dokdo, Senkaku, and Dongsha islands, each claimed by various East Asian states, represent potential flashpoints for conflict in the near future. The Chinese and Russian governments’ decision to use military harassment to scare their rivals out of disputed territories is an evident refusal of internationally prominent states to abide by conventional diplomatic practices. Coupled with Pyongyang’s decision to shell the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong this winter, heightened conflict in the East China Sea seems imminent.

And yet, the recent series of tragedies in Japan may have a silver lining in potentially helping to alleviate mounting tensions in the region by redirecting energies to the philanthropic rapprochement expected of Russia, China, Korea and Taiwan. Given the tragic plights that the Japanese now suffer – a 9.0 magnitude earthquake followed by a tsunami, and the spread of nuclear radiation, as well as imminent social strife – one hopes that the Kremlin would pause to reconsider any belligerent escalation against Japan. Indeed, Arkady Klimov of the Duma’s International Affairs Committee stated, “grievous events sometimes show us what is important and what is not.” Such self-cognizance may be the key to eased Russo-Japanese relations. Indeed, the Kremlin has already pledged to lay an underwater electricity cable and ship large amounts of gas “very quickly” in order to aid humanitarian efforts in Tohoku, Japan.

Ultimately, the vocal youth movements concerning the Kuril territories in Tokyo are peculiar phenomena, as their fierce investment in such an isolated issue seems to be a manifestation of an unexplained trend towards a familiar fanatical nationalism. While such nationalistic sentiments are not easily quashed or ceased, regional diplomatic action is necessary to prevent long-latent tensions from worsening. The international community must therefore pressure the governments in Russia and Japan alike to act more responsibly. The Japanese Prime Minister must quit his brazen nationalistic stance and approach the Kremlin more diplomatically. The responsibility of utmost importance, however, lies with the Russians, who must withdraw their forces from the Kuril Islands and return these Northern Territories to Japanese sovereignty. Only then will these two powers be able to sign the treaty to formally terminate their animosity.

To do so would empower Russian legitimacy as a rational diplomatic role model for similar developing nations. This could consequently force China and other states involved in territorial disputes to realize that diplomacy rather than military force is the most constructive approach. Thus, in order to be recognized as a responsible world power and member of the United Nations Security Council, Russia needs to demonstrate civil diplomatic behavior through cautious and rational actions. Their cession would also improve the Russians’ reputation in East Asia, which is home to four of the world’s largest economies, would consequently ameliorate their dismal trade position in South Korea and Japan. Although Japan too must terminate its authorized antagonism in the Kurils, Russia ought to make the first move; their reconciliation would soothe Japanese anxiety and hopefully ease tensions with the Chinese as well. Thus, the Kremlin’s compliance with regular diplomatic protocol will ultimately set the example for other actors to determine the fate of the region.