While America imagines itself to be locked in a deadly cage match in the War on Terror, there is a substantial chance that we will later look back on the current era as the quaint and quiet good old days in that fight – the time before the bad guys had nukes. Similarly, after a weary decade of counter-insurgency intervention in Afghanistan, America is likely to withdraw its forces well before a stable government and civil society can take hold. Therefore, the “peace” following the American pull-out is likely to be a much more hazardous period than the “war,” with a distinct prospect of renewed civil war and a pronounced drift toward failed statehood and warlord rule. While a failed state north of the Hindu Kush would render meaningless America’s long Afghan intervention, a failed state south of the Kush in nuclearized Pakistan would be far worse of a disaster in the global War on Terror. Worryingly, the Zardari government today is struggling to fend off a coup from the same security forces that apparently harbored Osama Bin Laden for years in a safe house near the capital. In each of these nightmares, our worst fears would be realized in Pakistan.

Given all of that, stabilizing the U.S. relationship with Pakistan is likely to be one the most important challenges this country faces on the international stage in the next ten years. And yet, as critical as Pakistan is to U.S. foreign policy, it is a country that we poorly understand and therefore struggle to influence. If there is any country that understands Pakistan, it is its behemoth neighbor and estranged fraternal twin, India. While the enmity between these two nations can hardly be overstated, no nation on earth has expended more effort analyzing, cajoling, and indeed obsessing over Pakistan than India. With that in mind, I met with a senior diplomat in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs on a recent trip to New Delhi.

Such expert relationship counseling is necessary because sadly the history of the U.S.-Pakistani relationship has not been encouraging. During the Cold War, Pakistan was the United State’s staunch ally in the region against Soviet-aligned India, and Pakistan received billions of dollars in economic and military assistance. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, relations soured over Pakistan’s nuclear program. Pakistan developed nuclear weapons in 1998 despite strong U.S. opposition, and remains the only Muslim state in the nuclear club. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan was a key supporter of the Taliban. After 9/11, however, President Bush convinced former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf to join the War on Terror, and the U.S. has given large amounts of economic and military aid to Pakistan over the past ten years. In return, Pakistan has made efforts to aid in the war, for example by letting the U.S. use a base in their territory for drone strikes. Nevertheless, Pakistan is still plagued by numerous terrorist groups, and many of its provinces are completely out of the control of the central government in Islamabad and are run entirely by the Taliban.

This past year has seen relations fall to an all-time low. It began with the incident of Ray Davis, a CIA contractor who shot dead two Pakistanis on the streets of Lahore whom he thought were attempting to rob him (the U.S. then tried to keep a straight face while claiming diplomatic immunity). Next there was the clandestine May raid by Navy Seals to kill Osama bin Laden, which infuriated diplomats both in Islamabad (for Pakistan’s lack of foreknowledge, let alone permission) and in Washington (for Pakistan’s either incompetence in not finding or complicity in sheltering bin Laden). This caused criticism of the Pakistani government in Washington to boil over in public, most notably by outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, who in September accused Pakistan’s ISI spy agency of funding and directing terrorist groups. Finally, in December there was the inadvertent killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers in a NATO airstrike, which prompted Pakistani diplomats to boycott a conference at Bonn on the future of Afghanistan.

Nor is the problem due simply to miscommunication and unfounded mistrust; the U.S. and Pakistan have fundamentally opposing interests in the region. While the U.S. obviously wants to stop nuclear proliferation, some members of the Pakistani government likely would not mind if more Muslim nations became nuclear armed. In the War on Terror, George Bush committed America to fighting terrorism wherever it crops up. The Pakistanis, on the other hand, have perceived great utility in sponsoring terrorist groups in their struggle with India over Kashmir and use terrorist groups like the Haqqani network and Lashkar-e-Taiba (responsible for the 2008 Mumbai bombings) as, in the words of Admiral Mullen, a “veritable arm” of the ISI. In the theater of Afghanistan, no peace agreement or successful exit strategy can be concluded without Pakistan, mostly because Pakistan controls many proxy forces in Afghanistan which could either sustain or bring down the central government in Kabul. As long as the mountains of Pakistan are a haven for anti-Kabul terrorists, Pakistan can keep Afghanistan completely destabilized. While the U.S. wants Afghanistan to develop into a peaceful democracy, Pakistan would be happy to see a weak, corruptible Muslim theocracy, destroying everything U.S. soldiers have fought for over the past ten years. To put it bluntly, Washington wants an American puppet state, while Islamabad wants a Pakistani puppet state. These goals are not compatible.

Given that as soon as the Afghan war is over, the U.S. will want to disengage from the Middle Eastern quagmire and will no longer need Pakistan as a strategic partner, many commentators in both countries have urged patience and forgiveness for Pakistan’s ever more apparent unfaithfulness and double-dealing. This argument, however, is fundamentally flawed. It fails to account for the most crucial factor in the U.S.-Pakistani relationship: aid money. Between 2002 and 2010, Pakistan received roughly $18 billion in economic and military aid from the United States. Towards the end of the decade, this amounted to almost 10 percent of the Pakistani government’s budget. The U.S. is by far Pakistan’s largest foreign donor, and Pakistani leaders know that no other country could provide more than a small fraction of the largesse that U.S. friendship guarantees.

Clearly the U.S. has a troubled relationship with Pakistan and needs to find a new way forward to prevent the partnership from falling apart. I sat down with a senior diplomat (who would prefer to remain anonymous) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the country with the most experience of all in building a relationship with Pakistan – India. Although the two countries share a troubled past, India has learned to build a stable relationship with Pakistan and relations have been improving dramatically over the past ten years. When asked how the U.S. could improve its relationship with Pakistan, my contact jumped immediately to a simple, yet prudent conclusion: “The United States must benchmark assistance to Pakistan to achieve its objectives.” Over the past ten years, the U.S. has poured aid money into Pakistan to be used more or less at Pakistan’s discretion, and in return asked for Pakistani help – or at least non-interference – in combating terrorism.

This strategy, however, has plainly failed, and this senior diplomat therefore implored the U.S. to pursue what he deemed a “transactional” relationship with Pakistan. “Pakistan can’t survive without U.S. aid,” he continued, “and the government knows this. The U.S. needs to be clear and direct [and say] for example if you pursue these terrorists in Waziristan, we’ll give you X in military aid. Otherwise it’s going to be another ten years of billions of dollars down the drain.” The U.S. needs to be clear and direct about what its objectives are and what help it needs from the Pakistani government, and then pursue those objectives relentlessly using aid money as leverage.

Although this strategy is bold and would represent a radical change in U.S.-Pakistani relations, it is likely the only possible way forward if the U.S. is to achieve its goals in the region. With the end of the war in Afghanistan in sight, failure is not an option. For the past ten years the U.S. has showered Pakistan with aid money and not gotten what it paid for. Every U.S. diplomat travelling to Pakistan should remember that the Pakistanis need our aid money just as much as we need their help in the war.

The U.S. needs to make aid to this troubled South Asian nation contingent on achieving real results, both in pursuing terrorists and internal reform. While this transactional approach risks being perceived as blunt and short-sighted, our unstable ally in Islamabad is the precarious fulcrum on which the outcome of our Afghan war is hinged. We need their unambiguous cooperation, and we need it immediately. Despite our long military adventure in Afghanistan, that war is still just as likely to become another Vietnam in which our allies and interests are devastated following our exit as it is another Kuwait in which the regime we install survives our departure. Pakistan holds the key to that outcome. Perhaps ultimately the analogy for the Afghan war will become the Gulf Wars, of which, ominously, there were not one, but two.

Still in his twenties and having only a few years of experience within the government’s highest echelons, Kim Jong Eun’s legitimacy will depend largely on his ability to emulate his predecessors. It is important to note that the new leader’s position and dominance are by no means guaranteed; Kim Jong Il’s relatives continually vie for influence, several of which are generals in the military, with experience dating back to Kim Il Sung’s reign. Although Kim Jong Eun is securing the official positions left by his father, North Korea is a society that, according to the Wall Street Journal, generally follows “a seniority-based hierarchical ideal.” This means that youth and inexperience could jeopardize Kim Jong Eun’s ability to command officials twice his age. In comparison, his father had far more experience when he took power yet still ruled for three years in his predecessor’s name. Not only that, but Kim Jong Il maintained his father’s role as the “eternal President” who accomplished “immortal achievements,” and always stressed how his policies continued Kim Il Sung’s. As such, it is hardly shocking that the new ruler has begun to appropriate this rhetoric, as seen in how the North Korean government’s website says Mr. Kim is “identical to [sic] idea, leadership and personality of Kim Jong Il.” Information published in the New York Times suggests that Kim Jong Il may have appointed Kim Jong Eun as his successor because he would continue Kim Jong Il’s policies. In defiance of traditional inheritance practices that would pass a father’s estate to the eldest son, Kim Jong Il selected his third and youngest son. While the oldest son contrasted Kim Jong Il’s personality and the second son experienced a relatively public rift with his father, Kim Jong Eun reportedly demonstrated an affinity for North Korea’s official philosophy since childhood. Kim Jong Eun’s actions will not be the only force pushing for continuity, though. The lack of change among subordinates will also prevent policy shifts.

Since Kim Jong Eun is still in the process of securing his footing, he may not yet have the power or desire necessary to brush aside the current officials. By avoiding a shake-up in the near future, he will avoid alienating needed allies and inherit an intact and experienced government. While an expert quoted in the New York Times recently predicted that it will be only a matter of months before the government passes to a younger generation, one scenario that The Economist describes seems more likely in the near future: the seasoned and experienced officials will keep Mr. Kim in check. Once he consolidates power, he will have the chance to oversee a generational shift among North Korean officials, however this will by no means give him free rein. There is a strong likelihood that current officials will pass their positions to similarly-minded relatives, which means the new leader will be hard pressed to wipe the slate clean and thereby steer his government in a new direction. Mr. Kim’s inner circle will be the clearest representation of this personnel continuity since the inner circle of relatives and generals that aided Kim Jong Il is carrying over to Kim Jong Eun’s reign. This offers Kim Jong Eun several advantages, like how would support claims of continuity with Kim Jong Il’s example. On top of that, these officials are politically savvy and have ties to various political and military factions. Since the military has significant influence economically and politically, and a small elite class dominates the government, these individuals will be essential allies as Kim Jong Eun’s reign gains traction. At the same time, he does not yet have the influence necessary to clean house without jeopardizing his control over his country’s power brokers. While those nearest Kim Jong Eun’s seat of power will pressure his actions, those in North Korea’s chief economic and military ally will do likewise.

In pursuit of its self-interest, China will also push Mr. Kim toward policies that will maintain his government’s stability. A Time article recently noted China’s concern that turmoil in North Korea would send huge numbers of refugees across its border. From the Chinese state’s perspective, it would be particularly bad if China’s government and society faced this strain in the near future since the government is presently intensifying efforts to maintain its own stability. Some articles have postulated that the recent protests in the village of Wukan may indicate more widespread social ills, and that recent efforts to censor television programs suggest concerns about the nation’s ideological fortitude. Developments among China’s political elite further increase its interest in North Korean stability. With a change of “some 70% of China’s leadership” early next year, a crisis could harm the new officials’ political capital. Another important factor is that China is in the process of stretching its military power and regional influence. According to Time, Beijing fears that a political collapse in North Korea would likely cause Korean unification under the Seoul government. For an aspiring regional power like China, it would be a painful setback if a U.S. ally gained ground at a fallen ally’s expense. Intelligence reports and news articles agree that China wants North Korea to undergo certain reforms in order to boost regional stability, so China will not be Mr. Kim’s most conservative influence. China’s overriding interest, though, is that Mr. Kim’s government does not fall. Therefore, in the event that Chinese leaders see the young leader’s policies as erratic or dangerous, they will use whatever influence they have to correct his course. This could potentially happen if, for example, Mr. Kim proposes a major internal shake-up, drastic social reform, or an inconsistent foreign policy, which could cause China to regard Mr. Kim as an incompetent leader and a liability for his regime’s stability. Thus, North Korea’s untested ruler must prove his leadership ability and his government’s functionality to audiences at home and abroad. Despite some alignment between North Korean and Chinese interests, they do not fully overlap, so they will at times push Mr. Kim in contradictory directions.

In particular, the philosophy of emulation that Mr. Kim plans to employ will direct North Korea’s short-term nuclear policy. Because North Korea’s nuclear weapons program began decades ago, Kim Jong Eun has little choice but to continue supporting nuclear development or else he would undermine his own legitimacy as his father’s and grandfather’s heir. Since the West, South Korea, and even China all oppose North Korea’s efforts to develop a nuclear arsenal, any efforts to scale back the program or even enter serious negotiations to that end would jeopardize Mr. Kim’s credibility as a strong anti-Western leader among his population, especially among senior officials old enough to have lived during the country’s formation and the 1950s Korean Conflict. North Korea’s state philosophy, which stresses self-reliance and was created by Mr. Kim’s grandfather, would underscore this issue. One might argue that Mr. Kim can compromise to win incentives from the West and free up his own domestic budget. However, this appears unlikely. The new leader’s connection to his predecessors is the cornerstone of his legitimacy, and past rewards have had little influence on North Korean policymakers. In North Korea, greater loyalty, power, and service to the state correlate with a better livelihood, so the ideologues among the political and military elite do not feel the impact of food shortages like the masses who work outside the state do. These ideologues pose a greater threat to Mr. Kim since they could fragment his power or spark an ideological schism. With this in mind, it is not surprising that the North Korean government recently announced that it would not change its foreign policy and would maintain an aggressive stance toward South Korea.

The U.S. now finds itself in an uncomfortable position as it looks towards the future. In these circumstances, it would be unwise to attempt to manipulate the present situation since Mr. Kim and his top officials would rebuff any suspected American intervention. In addition, any U.S. involvement would also irritate the U.S.’s complex relationship with China. Therefore, the potential price of either overt or covert action with the intention of influencing North Korea is tremendous. This means that the U.S. should expect a continuation of the same challenges, policies, and obstinateness seen in Kim Jong Il’s final years. In light of this fact, the U.S. should offer Kim Jong Eun the same deals it offered his father and also not oppose Mr. Kim as he consolidates power. To this effect, the Obama Administration has been wise to call for a “peaceful, stable transition” but should not have officially suspended the ongoing discussions. Resuming such discussions as quickly as possible will minimize any increase in U.S.-North Korea tension caused by the transition. It would also indicate that the U.S. recognizes that Kim Jong Il’s death is not indicative of a North Korean paradigm shift. There are several reasons why countries around the world have responded to Kim Jong Il’s death with somber messages and heightened wariness rather than the excitement seen among the characters in “Wicked.” Perhaps the most significant is that reality’s Wicked Witch has a successor who has every reason to grab a broomstick and pointy hat. As such, the death of Kim Jong Il is heralding Kim Jong Eun’s rise as the leader of continued anti-U.S. policy and resistance to political change.

The region’s waterways are vital to the global economic supply chain and free-navigability is key to continued prosperity in the immediate area and beyond. Approximately a quarter of the world’s oil passes through the Malacca Straits, destined to supply China and Indonesia as well as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Over $5 trillion worth of trade is conducted in the region every year—with more than a fifth of which is American. Moreover, much of the world’s computer manufacturing is performed in the region, with factories in each nation performing complementary tasks towards a final product. The important trade routes in this area thus make it vital from both an economic and geopolitical standpoint.

One of the most important developments in the region has been the increasingly contentious dispute over sovereignty in the South China Sea. Vietnam, the Philippines, and China continue to tussle over control of the Sea and the small islands lying above potential oil and gas reserves —estimated to match Kuwait’s. China, contrary to the conventional understanding of territorial waters (which is based upon distance from the continental shelf under the Law of the Sea), has claimed the entire sea for itself based on its asserted historical sovereignty. While other nations have made such claims in the past, Beijing has shown a startling willingness to enforce them aggressively in recent years. The Chinese navy has had no compunction about sinking Vietnamese fishing vessels and has even warned oil giant Exxon Mobil last year not to explore for oil and gas resources with Vietnamese licenses and grants. Chinese forces have also been deployed to islands disputed by the Philippines, further demonstrating their aggressive commitment to using military prowess to claim control.

Most analysts agree that these moves represent just the beginning of China’s expansion of regional influence as Beijing’s economic power increases. China has backed up its aggressive territorial claims with a military strategy to project its rising power. In August, the Chinese military began sea trials for its first aircraft carrier (refitted from an older Soviet model) and has started to test its first stealth bomber. In addition, to counterbalance American defense strategy, Beijing is also developing anti-aircraft systems and satellites (which underpin communications and guidance systems) that potentially target American bases in the Philippines, South Korea, Australia, Japan, and elsewhere in the Pacific. In addition, the Chinese military has also invested in area denial weapons systems to counter American air superiority and hinder the movement of American forces. Moreover, defense experts warn that Beijing is honing cyber warfare capabilities that have already been used to successfully access U.S. defense contractors’ sites as well as commercial sites. The intellectual yields of such intrusions have already gone into China’s new stealth bomber design. Recent reports also suggest that China’s cyber attacks targeted two American weather satellites and briefly gained command of one of them, further illustrating Beijing’s increased capability to interfere with American military communication and surveillance infrastructure.

Such tactics, coupled with China’s economic clout, have begun to radically alter the dynamics within the region. Chinese aid, investment, and trade have been increasing in recent years as joint Sino-Vietnamese business ventures and Chinese support for Filipino infrastructure projects have become the norm in the region. This economic power translates into political influence, resulting in pro-China foreign policies emanating from regional governments. In fact, several nations in the region have disregarded the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) conventions by repatriating Uyghur activists and dissidents back to China, where they face nearly certain persecution, imprisonment, and even torture or execution.

Nonetheless, Southeast Asia, through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), has increasingly sought to counterbalance China by fostering ties with other states, most notably the United States—but also India, Japan, and others. In an interesting turn of events, American naval ships have increasingly berthed (and been repaired) in Vietnam, and the nation has become one of the largest recipients of American aid. The United States has also approved sales of defense equipment to Thailand, Vietnam, Taiwan, and other states. Regional powers have also stepped up their commitment to the region. Japan has pledged to increase trade and upgrade its submarine fleet and Australia has geared up for a decade-long upgrade to its naval and military assets.
Diplomatic relations between the various players in the region and the United States have warmed significantly as the U.S. remains the dominant sea power and has used its naval prowess to support regional nations against Beijing’s clout. In fact, domestic attitudes in regional nations toward Beijing have begun to turn negative. For instance, in spite of growing trade and economic engagement with Beijing, last year, Vietnam halted a joint Sino-Vietnamese venture to extract bauxite, a mineral essential to China’s industries. The fact that outcry from many Vietnamese (including Buddhist monks, environmentalists, and bloggers) countered Beijing’s pressure is indicative of regional anxiety over China’s influence.. Moreover, one of America’s staunchest allies in the region, Thailand, has strengthened its relations with Washington despite a military coup and riots in recent months. On another front, U.S.-Burma relations have begun to defrost after decades of sanctions, and some progress might be made in establishing democratic institutions and freeing political prisoners. These diplomatic successes have not gone unnoticed by China as Washington and Beijing pursue different objectives.

As Southeast Asia continues to experience high rates of economic growth, the region will become increasingly important in the global economy. At the same time, the area encompasses some of the busiest maritime routes in the world as well as some of the most lucrative and promising natural resources. Both factors guarantee that China, other Southeast Asian countries, and the U.S. will jockey for regional influence. China has made a strong showing in the region and undoubtedly exerts a strong hand in the affairs of the region. Nonetheless, as many Southeast nations have expressed, there must be a “balance” to maintain peace and prosperity. China’s willingness to use its economic clout, aggression, and coercion further hint at the urgency of maintaining a balanced power structure in the region.

The United States is in a unique position to counterbalance Beijing growing aggression. Washington has the opportunity to increase engagement with regional nations through military and economic cooperation. Increased American naval presence can reassure regional governments of the U.S.’s commitment to countering Chinese intimidation and pressure. Encouraging Japan and India to also establish and strengthen relationships in the region will give those nations an incentive to counter Beijing to protect their interests. Moreover, highlighting Beijing’s continued horrendous human rights violations and supporting dissidents will weaken China’s prestige and force officials to turn inwards rather than pressure neighbors.

The rising boldness of Beijing in pursuit of its interests suggests that the American presence must increase. Although domestic debates in the United States threaten to cut defense budgets, defense spending represents an investment in future stability to develop more ties to Southeast Asia. Along with military support, increased economic and political engagement with Thailand, Vietnam, Burma, the Philippines, and other nations is necessary to cement ties with regional capitals. While India and Japan have essential parts to play in maintaining peace in the region, the United States, on account of its military and economic power, is uniquely positioned to preserve its national interest and that of its allies by maintaining the freedom of the seas, open shipping lanes, and an independent Southeast Asia.

In 2002, the moderate Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by Istanbul mayor Recep Tayyip Erdogan swept to power. The AKP embraced economic reforms that opened up Turkey’s economy to foreign and private investment, breaking up the state’s control over major industries. Erdogan also ushered in a series of constitutional reforms to protect the rights of prisoners and journalists, ensure religious freedom, and reined in the power of the military that dominated Turkish society since the country’s founding following the First World War. Erdogan’s actions helped cement civilian control over the military and strengthened the power of Turkey’s elected government.

Turkey’s success could make it a model for the nations involved in the Arab Spring. Tunisia would likely stand the best chance of successfully implementing Turkish-style reforms given its relative economic prosperity, the emergence of a moderate Islamist party, Ennhada, which views the AKP as its mentor and possess a history of adopting moderate positions, and a strong tradition of secular thought and a powerful liberal lobby. A relatively impoverished Egypt could still follow Turkey’s path if provided with the right guidance and resources. While the emergence of the fundamentalist Salafi party al-Nour and the failure of new secular parties to organize in time to be competitive in parliamentary elections remain causes for concern, the Muslim Brotherhood’s moderate platform and willingness to form a coalition with secular parties as it becomes the largest party in parliament is promising.

Turkey stands out as an example of a secular democracy with an Islamic heritage, a model Tunisia and Egypt could follow. The AKP’s ability to appeal to voters’ desire for a government acknowledging Islamic values while ensuring a separation between religion and politics represents a possible method in which moderate Islamic political movements can provide their populations with the freedoms often attributed to Western society and the values of an Islamic one. Furthermore, the AKP’s excellent record of economic development and liberalization provides a blueprint for how the economic integration of Middle Eastern nations can lead to prosperity for their citizens. Finally, the emergence of Turkey illustrates the necessity of establishing civilian control of the military. Politicians in countries such as Egypt, where the military continues to play an overbearing role in the transition to democracy, will likely take note of the techniques used by Prime Minister Erdogan to curb the once all-mighty Turkish military. Turkey’s prominence as a democratic, prosperous Middle Eastern power serves as a beacon of hope for newly emerging democracies.

While Turkey presents a good model in some regards for newly emergent democracies to follow, any country that seeks to emulate the AKP’s success should avoid the pitfalls of the Erdogan regime. In particular, countries should beware of restricting journalistic freedom. In spite of his promises, Erdogan failed to protect the rights of Turkish journalists to question their government. Countless journalists remain detained on trumped-up charges, and some measures suggest that Turkey may incarcerate more journalists per year than more totalitarian regimes such as China. In addition, Turkey’s record on securing rights for ethnic minorities remains abysmal. In spite of Erdogan’s reforms, Kurds remain largely marginalized in Turkish society, fueling the newly resurgent PKK insurgency. Countries with large ethnic or religious minorities such as Egypt, whose Coptic Christian minority has been involved in clashes with Muslims and security forces in recent months following the fall of the Mubarak regime, should refrain from emulating the Turkish model in this regard. Furthermore, the lack of significant political movements opposed to the AKP poses additional concerns for those who view Turkey as a model for future democracies. The opposition remains in disrepute due to its prior corruption and reliance on the military for support. Until a viable opposition party manages to check the power of the AKP, Turkey cannot be classified as the true multi-party democracy it proclaims itself to be.

The emergence of democracy in Middle East raises concerns regarding the effect of the Arab Spring on U.S. power and influence in the Middle East. Many pessimists argue that the replacement of “reliable” autocrats such as Mubarak in Egypt and Ben Ali in Tunisia with potentially “unfriendly” democracies will cripple U.S. power in the region. This line of thinking has shaped U.S. policy in the region dating back to the Cold War. In 1951, the democratically-elected Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammed Mossadegh, attempted to nationalize Iranian oil wells. Fearing that Mossadegh could threaten U.S. economic interests, the U.S. backed a military coup that overthrew Mossadegh in 1953 and restored the Shah. This action fueled a deep-seated mistrust of the United States among the Iranian public, causing the power of the secular, democratic opposition to be co-opted by fundamentalists. The Mossadegh debacle illustrates that the longer a dictatorship remains in power, the harder it will be for a democratic, moderate opposition to take control. When political dissent is repressed, Islamic groups become an outlet for political expression, a key example being the popularity of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood under the Mubarak regime. The United States should embrace efforts by the citizens of Middle Eastern countries to establish democracies of their own.

While U.S. support for dictatorships yields devastating results for U.S. hegemony, the emergence of democracy in the region will greatly enhance U.S. influence in the region by promoting economic liberalization and international humanitarian involvement. The dictatorships overthrown in the Arab Spring utilized cumbersome, closed, state-run economies which they associated with a secular, socialist state. The vast majority of citizens developed a distaste for both; thus, like the AKP, most moderate Islamic parties strongly support the free market. Should these countries open up their economies to foreign investment, the United States and its allies will obtain considerable economic benefits as attested by Turkey’s significant trade with the West. Furthermore, significant economic influence in a democracy yields far greater hegemony than military aid to a dictatorship. While dictatorships can simply request assistance from another power in lieu of a loss of funds, economic realities cannot be altered overnight, as evidenced by the significant influence exerted by Chinese economic investment in the U.S. against the debatable leverage of U.S. aid to Pakistan. In addition, democracies may prove more supportive of more idealistic objectives such as human rights preservation or genocide prevention. Popular support for idealistic endeavors can force democracies to act where dictatorships may have lain dormant. For instance, public outrage prompted Erdogan to call for Gadhafi’s resignation and that of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in spite of strong economic ties. Clearly, democratic regimes will enhance long-run influence in the region of the United States far more effectively than any autocracy.

Turkey’s progress makes it a model for the emerging democracies of the Arab Spring to follow that would meet the needs of their citizens and enhance the influence of the United States. Most newly empowered nations such as Egypt and Tunisia will likely adapt aspects of the Turkish model to suite their own respective circumstances. Turkey’s ability to blend Islamic values with a secular democracy, embrace of free-market principles, and success in establishing civilian control over military forces represent positive aspects of a democracy that emerging democracies would do well to emulate. While certain aspects of the Turkish model such as restrictions journalistic freedom and minority rights remain areas of concern, Turkey nevertheless represents the premier example of a stable, functioning democracy in the Middle East. The success of the Arab Spring bodes well for the United States, whose economic influence will increase on the heels of economic liberalization. Instead of lending its support to increasingly doomed, irrelevant autocracies, the world’s oldest democracy should lend its support to the word’s newest democracies as they secure the benefits of liberty and prosperity for their citizens.