The Xinjiang riots erupted after two Uighur men died in a racially charged brawl between Han Chinese and Uighurs in a Guangdong toy factory. The mass unrest following the dispute resulted in nearly 200 deaths, thousands of injuries, and 1,500 arrests. While Uighurs mounted the initial protests, Xinjiang’s Han Chinese responded with an armed counter-march a few days later. Twenty-five of those arrested have received death sentences, and although their ethnicities were not officially released, the BBC reported that their names indicate that all were Uighurs. Additionally, Human Rights Watch reported police sweeps rounding up Uighur men in Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang province. China is still dealing with the aftermath of this event; approximately 20 Uighur men who fled to Cambodia following the riots were deported back to China. No information on the men has been released, other than the fact that they are being or have been put on trial for what China considers criminal activities. Although it is less visible, the situation has not resolved itself in the months following the riots.

Ethnic tensions are not new in Xinjiang. During the 1990s, a separatist group known as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) was blamed for over 200 terrorist attacks. The goal of ETIM was to establish an Islamic state independent of China. While most Uighurs do not sympathize with the ETIM and do not in fact seek to establish an independent East Turkestan, they still resent both the Han population in Xinjiang as well as the Chinese government. Chinese development campaigns like “Open up the West” have brought massive infrastructure projects to the region, allowing more governmental control in the wake of ETIM attacks and strengthening ties to a region of great economic importance for China. But to foster these ties, the government has actively encouraged the migration of Han Chinese to Xinjiang. While Han made up just 5 percent of the Xinjiang population in the 1940s, today they account for approximately 40 percent. The massive influx of Han immigrants has increased competition for jobs and natural resources in the region. Furthermore, the Chinese government has placed tight controls on the practice of Islam. Although the Chinese government is not immediately at fault for the riots in Xinjiang, it set the stage for the violence.

Considering the apparent repression that has occurred in Xinjiang, it is worth asking why there has been so little international interest in the conflict, especially compared to the worldwide outpouring of support for Tibet. On a basic level, the Uighurs lack an effective, recognizable leader. Although Rebiya Kadeer serves as a spokesperson for the group, she lacks the popular support enjoyed by, for one, the Dalai Lama of Tibet.

Of more fundamental concern is the fact that the Uighurs have yet to shake the implicit association with terrorism. ETIM’s attacks during the 1990s complicated outside views of the Uighur community. The Beijing government has used the presence of ETIM to justify its repressive tactics in Xinjiang. In the wake of 9/11, the US and other nations were willing to support that view. The United States labeled ETIM a terrorist organization, and 22 Uighurs from Afghanistan were held in Guantanamo Bay. All have since been cleared of any terrorist affiliation. However, China’s crackdown on ETIM appears to have worked. Experts have expressed doubt that it is still an active organization, although that is not to say that there is no threat. The Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), believed to be an offshoot of ETIM, organized bombings in the months leading up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Nevertheless, these attacks are rare, and much of the unrest in Xinjiang, like July’s riots, is not associated with terrorist activity. In fact, although China continues to link violence to ETIM, many Chinese experts doubt the extent of ETIM’s operations and believe the government relies on the threat of terrorism to mask its hard-line policies in Xinjiang.

Although initially China was praised for allowing journalists fast and fairly wide-ranging access following July’s riots, this may have simultaneously served to deflect attention from the restrictions put in place. Internet and text-ing service began to be reinstated only in January, travel restrictions remain stringent, and no information has been provided about the Uighur men who vanished following police roundups. While China has used counter-terrorism to justify its heavy-handed tactics in dealing with Uighurs before, the lack of activity on the part of ETIM clearly undermines that rationale in this case. The United States, therefore, has no excuse for ignoring the human rights abuses that have occurred in Xinjiang.

China’s repressive actions fail to address the real issues facing the Uighur population in Xinjiang. The Uighurs have legitimate grievances, and the cycle of violence and repression will undoubtedly be repeated. The United States has failed to acknowledge China’s repressive actions in Xinjiang in any meaningful way. In the aftermath, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs expressed regret for the loss of life in Xinjiang. US State Department spokesman Ian Kelly gave a slightly stronger answer, calling for the Chinese government to “act to restore order and prevent further violence.” Yet even this avoids the issue of determining what caused the violence and what actions need to be taken to redress the wrongs. The US Commission on Religious Freedom was much closer to giving a response that could have had real impact, with a call for an independent investigation of the riots and targeted sanctions, but its message was not echoed by those with the power to implement those ideas.

Human rights have not been a prominent issue on the Obama administration’s agenda in dealing with China. This is not the first time China has faced internal conflict. Events in Xinjiang are remarkably similar to the ongoing situation in Tibet. The fact that a violent response to human rights abuses has become a recurring phenomenon in China indicates that the US should make this more of a priority in its interactions with China. While the United States’ relationship with China is delicate and complicated, the United States should not have ignored China’s heavy-handed tactics in Xinjiang or any other region that is or that becomes a target. The US’s failure to act undermines the human rights values that the United States claims to uphold and sets a precedent of kowtowing to the Chinese. As China becomes a more assertive world power, both for human rights and its own foreign policy, it is important that the United States remains unafraid to be loudly critical of human rights abuses in China.

The Kimberley Process certification scheme tracks diamonds from the mine to the store by issuing certificates indicating the stones are conflict-free. The process relies on self-regulation by the member nations’ governments. Though an admirable ideal, the Kimberley Process has already shown that it is unreliable in practice. The conflict diamond trade declined in Sierra Leone and Angola following the ends of both countries’ civil wars, but the Kimberley Process acknowledges continued smuggling in both countries, which Human Rights Watch calls “rampant.” The Democratic Republic of Congo has been plagued by conflict diamond problems exacerbated by rising instability, despite the D.R.C.’s Kimberley Process membership.
These ongoing problems show that while the Kimberley Process has been a good first step, a stronger independent body composed of both exporters and importing firms is needed to regulate both sides of the diamond trade. If enforcement is reliable enough, the profits from the legal trade should be the only incentive needed to ensure participation.

In 2007, a Kimberley Process team was sent to Zimbabwe to review allegations of smuggling, illegal mining, and human rights abuses by the military supervising the mining. The team publicly reported that Zimbabwe was in compliance with the Kimberley Process’s minimum standards. However, a confidential report from the Kimberley team, as well as accounts from Human Rights Watch and other humanitarian organizations, paint a different picture. Miners interviewed by the team said the military attempted to cover up corruption and committed violent acts against workers, including children. The Kimberley Process team’s confidential report also expressed concern over serious discrepancies in Zimbabwe’s statistical data on diamond production. Because many firms will not buy conflict diamonds directly from their country of origin, the diamonds are often smuggled into, and sold by, secondary countries. Conflict diamonds from other countries such as the Congo could easily be mixed in with Zimbabwean diamonds and certified as legal. Although Zimbabwe’s share of the global diamond market is small, the threat to the legitimacy of the Kimberley Process, and therefore to the entire diamond trade, is real.

Obtaining Kimberley Process certificates is the only way to legally trade in diamonds, so there should be a powerful incentive to comply with the process’s requirements. However, there are many opportunities for both importing and exporting nations to evade the rules. Governments looking for extra revenues through increased diamond sales would not find it difficult to pass off smuggled diamonds as legitimate — the governments control the certification process. While companies importing diamonds are legally obligated to purchase only certified, conflict-free stones, Global Witness reports that many firms are known to work around the process.

When corruption and smuggling are suspected, the Kimberley Process requires a consensus of the 75 represented countries to act, making it less likely that abuses will be addressed. Despite a Kimberley Process report stating Zimbabwe did not seem to be complying with the minimum standards for membership, Zimbabwe was allowed to remain a member, provided it adhered to a work plan created by the country itself. Instead of encouraging compliance, this sends the message that abuses will be tolerated.

Under the current system, it is also very difficult to target firms that import diamonds without certificates. The system calls for action by the country, but one cannot reasonably blame a government for one firm’s corruption. The World Diamond Council, the industry’s representative, also cannot be held at fault. The Kimberley Process has few tools to deal with corruption among diamond importers beyond asking governments to implement stricter industry regulations.

This flaw also means that the Kimberley Process currently has almost no way to stop the flow of conflict diamonds from rebel groups. Limiting the rebels’ opportunities to sell the diamonds deters them from creating conflict diamonds. One way to achieve this would be to require diamond-importing firms, as well as the nations that host them, to join the Kimberley Process and trade legal, certified diamonds.

The Kimberley Process would be more powerful and more reliable if it were not self-regulated but run instead by an independent regulatory group needing only a majority to act. Under this system, nations and importing firms would be far more likely to incur effective penalties, such as suspension from the Kimberley Process, if they failed to prevent the proliferation of conflict diamonds. An independent regulatory agency would also encourage more accurate record-keeping, making it more difficult to introduce smuggled diamonds into the legal market and harder for importers to knowingly purchase tainted diamonds. Because the Kimberley Process is the sole way to legally trade diamonds, a reintroduction process for suspended countries would be essential. This tool would ensure that these countries would not simply sell their diamonds to less exacting importers and enter the illegal diamond trade.

Although difficult, obtaining diamond producers’ participation in an organization capable of penalizing them is essential. If diamond traders concluded that the only profitable path was compliance, the legal diamond industry would free itself from the taint of conflict diamonds. An end to these concerns would increase consumers’ demand and increase profits for both importers and exporters. These benefits would reinforce commitment to keeping conflict diamonds out of the legal trade.

The inevitable question is where the responsibility for this independent regulator will fall. The United States is certainly in a position to exercise leadership by showing its commitment to stricter regulations. Yet the credibility of the Kimberley Process would be jeopardized if one nation, particularly one with such a significant share of the imports, took charge. The US cannot monitor the entire diamond trade; this is not one nation’s responsibility. The World Trade Organization is a logical candidate for this role. Its status as the accepted authority on global trade and experience monitoring trade issues would benefit a Kimberley Process group. Both governments and industry members could still be involved through an already-existing organization.

Although the conflict diamond trade may never be entirely eradicated, we should not dismiss the potential for improvement. As a more powerful regulatory agency, the Kimberley Process could harness its strengths to change the incentive structure for trading in diamonds, creating a lasting decline in conflict diamonds, greater revenues for diamond-exporting nations, and an end to the human rights abuses tied to the “blood diamonds.”