Few would have expected the partnership to accomplish so much in just two years. Despite the externally imposed leadership structure, between former political rivals no less, Kibaki and Odinga collaborated to finally bring about long-awaited constitutional reform. On August 4th, 2010, nearly 70% of Kenyans went to the polls and participated in free, fair and peaceful voting on the constitutional referendum that was the product of Kibaki and Odinga’s great compromise. The results of the referendum were announced on time; the camp that had opposed the proposed constitution conceded their loss without protest; and Kenya’s government is now working on enacting the reforms the constitution outlines.

But what Kenya’s constitution-watchers have largely ignored thus far is that this is not the first time they have been promised reform. When elected in 2002, Kibaki was seen as a reformer, promising to end corruption; corruption continued, however, and Kibaki was implicated in the disputed 2007 elections that led to violent protest throughout the country. As such, one new and overlooked aspect of the referendum process that does not depend on Kenyan politicians following through gains additional significance. This critical element is Ushahidi, an innovative locally-based election monitoring program. By offering the promise of ensuring equally fair and peaceful elections in the future, Ushahidi may be as important of a legacy to the Constitutional process as any political reform.

This should not be seen as an undervaluing of the promises made in the referendum. The new constitution aims to balance power within government by creating a more effective judiciary, including a new Supreme Court and a better system for identifying and removing corrupt judges, and expanding the legislative branch’s powers. The reforms endorsed in the referendum also include a broader devolution of power to local institutions. In addition to these institutional changes, the new Constitution also calls for the passage of over 49 worthy new laws aimed at limiting presidential power, corruption, patronage, land-grabbing, and ethnic tribalism.

These goals present a tall order under the best of circumstances, even more so given the fact that Kenya’s people have been demanding constitutional reforms for the past 20 years. Also, this referendum was required as part of the 2008 power-sharing deal, not as an organic product of the political process in Kenya. While not necessarily a fatal flaw, this makes it much less likely that Kenya’s politicians will be motivated to swiftly enact the reforms people are demanding – especially as many of those laws will involve limiting their own power.

If this seems a pessimistic take on Kenya’s prospects, it ignores perhaps the most important takeaway from the recent referendum – that of peaceful and fair voting, which was anything but assured. While the specific reforms implemented in the new Constitution are extremely important, even more critical is the legitimization of elections, of the political leadership, and of the state itself. Without state legitimacy, supposed reforms will have no real power. The referendum’s greatest achievement, therefore, may simply be the precedent it has set for legitimacy in the voting process and the government as a whole.

A key reason the day of the vote was not tainted by violence or accusations of manipulated results was the Ushahidi program, which gave Kenyans the responsibility and effective means for monitoring their elections. The program, set up with assistance from the UN Development Program, gave Kenyans the ability to report any potential referendum-related problems by text message. The texts were received by both the Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security and an NGO overseeing the project.

The legitimacy stemming from the program helped overcome the stark divides in voting along ethnic lines. The Luo and Kikuyu regions in western and central Kenya voted almost exclusively “yes,” while the Kalenjin areas, also in western Kenya, voted uniformly “no.” When voting is so sharply ethnic, concerns over the legitimacy of the counting are natural, as was the case in 2007. And while Kenyans are becoming more conscious of the potential problems that accompany such strong ethnic politics, it seems this system will continue to be the norm, at least in the near future. Legitimizing measures like Ushahidi can therefore help negate some of the possible negative fallout from such ethnic politics.

Ushahidi is viable and sustainable as a means of monitoring corruption because it avoids placing the full burden on the international community. Rather than relying on outside assistance that invariably spawns cries of tampering and bias, the Ushahidi program gives the citizens primary responsibility while guaranteeing that if issues are reported, those with the power to act will be listening. Because the people themselves will have the direct ability to report whether the constitutional reforms are not proceeding as planned, any problems will likely be reported before international observers would have been able to identify them, ideally allowing for faster, easier fixes than those achievable by diplomatic means.

Kenya seems to be at a tipping point, where successful implementation of constitutional reforms could lead to real progress and promote stability in a troubled region. While the US should not repeat the mistake of turning away from events in Kenya too soon, as it did after the 2002 elections, the US should also not let international oversight backfire and stunt the developing democracy. Based on the role Ushahidi played in the achievement of a peaceful endorsement of the reformed constitution, a similar system designed for technology already in place and optimized for the way Kenyans use it could finally give citizens a way of making their government live up to the promises of the referendum. It may not be the standard approach, but it’s time the international community looked to unconventional methods to get uncommon results.

Google has long been an advocate of Internet freedom; unfortunately, China’s non-democratic government forced the company to make difficult concessions before entering the Chinese market. When Google entered China in 2006, agreeing to compromise with the government by censoring search results, the company faced what many called a decision between the lesser of two evils: compromising on freedom to offer users some information, or completely denying Chinese “netizens” Google’s information services.
Some argue that Google’s decisions had more to do with profit motives than with ideals. Google is indeed a profit-seeking corporation, but profit motive cannot fully explain its actions. Even if Google decided to leave China because it failed to obtain a dominant market share, a small percentage of the Chinese market would still have been highly profitable for Google. Economic analysts at Piper Jaffray, a U.S.-based investment banking firm, estimate that Google China, Google.cn, would produce about 2% of Google’s total revenue, or a little more than $400 million. While that may seem like a small percentage, analysts also note that Google China was growing faster than other areas of Google’s business. The profit would likely be more significant in the long term given that only 25 percent of the China’s population currently uses the Internet. Future profits were potentially very large.

Some argue that multinational corporations like Google have been able to achieve more in terms of freedom of speech by working outside of China rather than within it. For example, despite Google’s withdrawal, its former users in China can access content through Google’s Hong Kong site, though still filtered by “The Great Firewall.” In addition, Google was also able to change the protocol it uses in Gmail from HTTP to HTTPS, a more secure version used in virtually all e-commerce transactions. This more secure connection prevents the Chinese government from tapping email accounts. Web experts point out that the Chinese government cannot eliminate HTTPS traffic without halting all e-commerce, a nonviable option. Google cannot, nonetheless, completely achieve Internet freedom without working with the Chinese government. China has the ability to shut down Google services if it should so choose. It is not the case that China does not have the ability to shut down Google services if it so chose. The fact that China has yet to block access to Google speaks more to the possibility that China would like to allow Google the potential for negotiating new terms with the government in the future,

From a broader perspective, because the Internet is a relatively new and constantly changing technology, there is little relevant precedent to guide Google in its actions. This is one of the first major cases where a prominent international corporation has pursued a policy agenda independent of its host country. Google and corporations like it have the potential to be powerful policy actors, but there is no guarantee that their actions will promote positive outcomes.

At the same time, the situation is not entirely new. Google can learn from Microsoft’s experience doing business in China. When Microsoft visited China in 1994, amid disputes between the corporation and the government over piracy and intellectual property rights, China decided to restrict Microsoft from selling Windows in China. Microsoft, rather than abandoning that market, concluded that it could in the end benefit from Chinese citizens using pirated versions of its Windows software and operating system. Microsoft executives invested in a long-term position in China, an investment that is now paying off—China is Microsoft’s second largest market. Censorship is a more fundamental violation of the affected party’s rights than is the restriction of access to computer software, but both Google and Microsoft faced a choice between compromising on issues important to them and abandoning a major market as well as their business and employees within that market. Microsoft offers an example of accommodation to China: developing long-term personal relationships with business partners and the government, and a willingness to accept less-than-ideal conditions initially while focusing on how to create the outcome Microsoft wanted over time.

Google will likely achieve Internet freedom if it creates the right incentives for freedom by finding areas of overlap with economic and productivity-enhancing online tools. The online productivity tools that Google is in the process of developing will make it easier for individuals around the world to collaborate online. Google can demonstrate that allowing citizens to access these tools is essential to conducting business with the rest of the world. Even if China’s government does not reduce censorship, China’s continued economic success requires a technologically connected population for both greater productivity and the ability to collaborate and compete globally. Google, by creating such incentives, stands a strong chance of putting the government’s interests in line with users’ interests and the company’s ideals. Google’s opportunity to engage with China’s government is rare and should not be easily disregarded for the sake of idealism.

The Xinjiang riots erupted after two Uighur men died in a racially charged brawl between Han Chinese and Uighurs in a Guangdong toy factory. The mass unrest following the dispute resulted in nearly 200 deaths, thousands of injuries, and 1,500 arrests. While Uighurs mounted the initial protests, Xinjiang’s Han Chinese responded with an armed counter-march a few days later. Twenty-five of those arrested have received death sentences, and although their ethnicities were not officially released, the BBC reported that their names indicate that all were Uighurs. Additionally, Human Rights Watch reported police sweeps rounding up Uighur men in Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang province. China is still dealing with the aftermath of this event; approximately 20 Uighur men who fled to Cambodia following the riots were deported back to China. No information on the men has been released, other than the fact that they are being or have been put on trial for what China considers criminal activities. Although it is less visible, the situation has not resolved itself in the months following the riots.

Ethnic tensions are not new in Xinjiang. During the 1990s, a separatist group known as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) was blamed for over 200 terrorist attacks. The goal of ETIM was to establish an Islamic state independent of China. While most Uighurs do not sympathize with the ETIM and do not in fact seek to establish an independent East Turkestan, they still resent both the Han population in Xinjiang as well as the Chinese government. Chinese development campaigns like “Open up the West” have brought massive infrastructure projects to the region, allowing more governmental control in the wake of ETIM attacks and strengthening ties to a region of great economic importance for China. But to foster these ties, the government has actively encouraged the migration of Han Chinese to Xinjiang. While Han made up just 5 percent of the Xinjiang population in the 1940s, today they account for approximately 40 percent. The massive influx of Han immigrants has increased competition for jobs and natural resources in the region. Furthermore, the Chinese government has placed tight controls on the practice of Islam. Although the Chinese government is not immediately at fault for the riots in Xinjiang, it set the stage for the violence.

Considering the apparent repression that has occurred in Xinjiang, it is worth asking why there has been so little international interest in the conflict, especially compared to the worldwide outpouring of support for Tibet. On a basic level, the Uighurs lack an effective, recognizable leader. Although Rebiya Kadeer serves as a spokesperson for the group, she lacks the popular support enjoyed by, for one, the Dalai Lama of Tibet.

Of more fundamental concern is the fact that the Uighurs have yet to shake the implicit association with terrorism. ETIM’s attacks during the 1990s complicated outside views of the Uighur community. The Beijing government has used the presence of ETIM to justify its repressive tactics in Xinjiang. In the wake of 9/11, the US and other nations were willing to support that view. The United States labeled ETIM a terrorist organization, and 22 Uighurs from Afghanistan were held in Guantanamo Bay. All have since been cleared of any terrorist affiliation. However, China’s crackdown on ETIM appears to have worked. Experts have expressed doubt that it is still an active organization, although that is not to say that there is no threat. The Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), believed to be an offshoot of ETIM, organized bombings in the months leading up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Nevertheless, these attacks are rare, and much of the unrest in Xinjiang, like July’s riots, is not associated with terrorist activity. In fact, although China continues to link violence to ETIM, many Chinese experts doubt the extent of ETIM’s operations and believe the government relies on the threat of terrorism to mask its hard-line policies in Xinjiang.

Although initially China was praised for allowing journalists fast and fairly wide-ranging access following July’s riots, this may have simultaneously served to deflect attention from the restrictions put in place. Internet and text-ing service began to be reinstated only in January, travel restrictions remain stringent, and no information has been provided about the Uighur men who vanished following police roundups. While China has used counter-terrorism to justify its heavy-handed tactics in dealing with Uighurs before, the lack of activity on the part of ETIM clearly undermines that rationale in this case. The United States, therefore, has no excuse for ignoring the human rights abuses that have occurred in Xinjiang.

China’s repressive actions fail to address the real issues facing the Uighur population in Xinjiang. The Uighurs have legitimate grievances, and the cycle of violence and repression will undoubtedly be repeated. The United States has failed to acknowledge China’s repressive actions in Xinjiang in any meaningful way. In the aftermath, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs expressed regret for the loss of life in Xinjiang. US State Department spokesman Ian Kelly gave a slightly stronger answer, calling for the Chinese government to “act to restore order and prevent further violence.” Yet even this avoids the issue of determining what caused the violence and what actions need to be taken to redress the wrongs. The US Commission on Religious Freedom was much closer to giving a response that could have had real impact, with a call for an independent investigation of the riots and targeted sanctions, but its message was not echoed by those with the power to implement those ideas.

Human rights have not been a prominent issue on the Obama administration’s agenda in dealing with China. This is not the first time China has faced internal conflict. Events in Xinjiang are remarkably similar to the ongoing situation in Tibet. The fact that a violent response to human rights abuses has become a recurring phenomenon in China indicates that the US should make this more of a priority in its interactions with China. While the United States’ relationship with China is delicate and complicated, the United States should not have ignored China’s heavy-handed tactics in Xinjiang or any other region that is or that becomes a target. The US’s failure to act undermines the human rights values that the United States claims to uphold and sets a precedent of kowtowing to the Chinese. As China becomes a more assertive world power, both for human rights and its own foreign policy, it is important that the United States remains unafraid to be loudly critical of human rights abuses in China.

The Kimberley Process certification scheme tracks diamonds from the mine to the store by issuing certificates indicating the stones are conflict-free. The process relies on self-regulation by the member nations’ governments. Though an admirable ideal, the Kimberley Process has already shown that it is unreliable in practice. The conflict diamond trade declined in Sierra Leone and Angola following the ends of both countries’ civil wars, but the Kimberley Process acknowledges continued smuggling in both countries, which Human Rights Watch calls “rampant.” The Democratic Republic of Congo has been plagued by conflict diamond problems exacerbated by rising instability, despite the D.R.C.’s Kimberley Process membership.
These ongoing problems show that while the Kimberley Process has been a good first step, a stronger independent body composed of both exporters and importing firms is needed to regulate both sides of the diamond trade. If enforcement is reliable enough, the profits from the legal trade should be the only incentive needed to ensure participation.

In 2007, a Kimberley Process team was sent to Zimbabwe to review allegations of smuggling, illegal mining, and human rights abuses by the military supervising the mining. The team publicly reported that Zimbabwe was in compliance with the Kimberley Process’s minimum standards. However, a confidential report from the Kimberley team, as well as accounts from Human Rights Watch and other humanitarian organizations, paint a different picture. Miners interviewed by the team said the military attempted to cover up corruption and committed violent acts against workers, including children. The Kimberley Process team’s confidential report also expressed concern over serious discrepancies in Zimbabwe’s statistical data on diamond production. Because many firms will not buy conflict diamonds directly from their country of origin, the diamonds are often smuggled into, and sold by, secondary countries. Conflict diamonds from other countries such as the Congo could easily be mixed in with Zimbabwean diamonds and certified as legal. Although Zimbabwe’s share of the global diamond market is small, the threat to the legitimacy of the Kimberley Process, and therefore to the entire diamond trade, is real.

Obtaining Kimberley Process certificates is the only way to legally trade in diamonds, so there should be a powerful incentive to comply with the process’s requirements. However, there are many opportunities for both importing and exporting nations to evade the rules. Governments looking for extra revenues through increased diamond sales would not find it difficult to pass off smuggled diamonds as legitimate — the governments control the certification process. While companies importing diamonds are legally obligated to purchase only certified, conflict-free stones, Global Witness reports that many firms are known to work around the process.

When corruption and smuggling are suspected, the Kimberley Process requires a consensus of the 75 represented countries to act, making it less likely that abuses will be addressed. Despite a Kimberley Process report stating Zimbabwe did not seem to be complying with the minimum standards for membership, Zimbabwe was allowed to remain a member, provided it adhered to a work plan created by the country itself. Instead of encouraging compliance, this sends the message that abuses will be tolerated.

Under the current system, it is also very difficult to target firms that import diamonds without certificates. The system calls for action by the country, but one cannot reasonably blame a government for one firm’s corruption. The World Diamond Council, the industry’s representative, also cannot be held at fault. The Kimberley Process has few tools to deal with corruption among diamond importers beyond asking governments to implement stricter industry regulations.

This flaw also means that the Kimberley Process currently has almost no way to stop the flow of conflict diamonds from rebel groups. Limiting the rebels’ opportunities to sell the diamonds deters them from creating conflict diamonds. One way to achieve this would be to require diamond-importing firms, as well as the nations that host them, to join the Kimberley Process and trade legal, certified diamonds.

The Kimberley Process would be more powerful and more reliable if it were not self-regulated but run instead by an independent regulatory group needing only a majority to act. Under this system, nations and importing firms would be far more likely to incur effective penalties, such as suspension from the Kimberley Process, if they failed to prevent the proliferation of conflict diamonds. An independent regulatory agency would also encourage more accurate record-keeping, making it more difficult to introduce smuggled diamonds into the legal market and harder for importers to knowingly purchase tainted diamonds. Because the Kimberley Process is the sole way to legally trade diamonds, a reintroduction process for suspended countries would be essential. This tool would ensure that these countries would not simply sell their diamonds to less exacting importers and enter the illegal diamond trade.

Although difficult, obtaining diamond producers’ participation in an organization capable of penalizing them is essential. If diamond traders concluded that the only profitable path was compliance, the legal diamond industry would free itself from the taint of conflict diamonds. An end to these concerns would increase consumers’ demand and increase profits for both importers and exporters. These benefits would reinforce commitment to keeping conflict diamonds out of the legal trade.

The inevitable question is where the responsibility for this independent regulator will fall. The United States is certainly in a position to exercise leadership by showing its commitment to stricter regulations. Yet the credibility of the Kimberley Process would be jeopardized if one nation, particularly one with such a significant share of the imports, took charge. The US cannot monitor the entire diamond trade; this is not one nation’s responsibility. The World Trade Organization is a logical candidate for this role. Its status as the accepted authority on global trade and experience monitoring trade issues would benefit a Kimberley Process group. Both governments and industry members could still be involved through an already-existing organization.

Although the conflict diamond trade may never be entirely eradicated, we should not dismiss the potential for improvement. As a more powerful regulatory agency, the Kimberley Process could harness its strengths to change the incentive structure for trading in diamonds, creating a lasting decline in conflict diamonds, greater revenues for diamond-exporting nations, and an end to the human rights abuses tied to the “blood diamonds.”