The upsurge in drug-related violence in Mexico vividly illustrates the type of war that the United States and Mexico will have to continue waging against drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). As clashes between government forces and drug lords in Colombia helped close the Caribbean smuggling routes to the United States, Mexico has increasingly trafficked (and produced) the drugs that fuel America’s addiction. Success in Mexico, therefore, could cut off an important, illicit trade route and weaken the organizations that have terrorized the Mexican population and infiltrated their government. The nearly daily reports of casualties, however, testify to the difficulty of the struggle and the level of commitment that will be required by both the United States and Mexico to defeat the DTOs. Already, 40,000 have died in the current violence—with few signs of abating. A stable and prosperous Mexico represents a national security interest to the United States. The United States must therefore assist Mexican officials in purging government corruption, reforming the legal system, and providing the training and intelligence resources required to combat these violent organizations.
With the severe weakening of Columbian drug cartels, Mexico emerged as the most viable route for large-scale drug trafficking into the United States. This near monopoly on the drug trade has enriched Mexican DTOs and has allowed them to funnel bribes to American and Mexican officials. Drug proceeds of over $20 billion have been used to launder funds and purchase the weapons and equipment that DTOs use to fight the Mexican military, battle other armed gangs, and even dig the infamous smuggling tunnels across the U.S.-Mexico border. In addition, foreign powers, such as Iran, have taken advantage of the chaos to contract DTOs, most recently in the failed assassination attempt of the Saudi ambassador to the United States. Moreover, while a significant portion of the American population has suffered from drug addiction for decades, the DTOs increasingly fuel a Mexican drug problem since they pay some of their workers’ wages in drugs.
There are a number of measures that can be used to crack down on Mexican DTOs that have been operating with impunity across the region. The United States and Mexico have already begun to make strides in directly cracking down on the DTOs, but reforms and programs must be continued and improved to preserve gains . The “Mérida,” “post-Mérida,” and other American aid programs to Mexico have provided Mexican officials with the essential matériel and other equipment required to combat the DTOs. These programs are also working to build a strong and stable civil service in Mexico by retraining legal and law-enforcement officials in modern procedures and techniques.
A number of legal reforms in Mexico must be accelerated in order to combat DTOs as effectively as possible on home soil. Institutional reforms are working to move Mexico more toward an adversarial, transparent legal system with police forces that can both collect evidence and capture criminals. Overcrowding in prisons and multi-year pre-trial waiting periods should be addressed because it denies prisoners their rights and it exposes potentially innocent individuals to abuse and deprivation. The longer incarceration times also provide criminals an opportunity to escape, make it more likely for evidence to be lost or stolen, and increase the difficulty of convicting individuals. Mexican and American officials can also help increase the 1% conviction rate for drug-related crimes in Mexico by expanding extradition programs that separate dangerous drug lords from their criminal networks by transferring them to the United States, where they are tried and properly punished for their crimes.
While these kinds of reforms will assist in the long-term, immediate action must be taken against DTOs. Although the Mexican public and officials are generally suspicious of placing American troops and resources on the ground, equipment transfers and training for Mexican military and police forces are required to bring order back to the streets. The two nations have increasingly shared intelligence in recent years, and these programs must be expanded and maintained. For instance, American intelligence-gathering satellites can detect drug-running tunnels under the border, and pilotless drones can track smugglers trying to cross the border. Indeed, increased border patrols, especially so-called “parallel patrols” in which Mexican and American forces patrol their respective side, have proven effective in stopping the flow of drugs into the United States. While these types of patrols have been piloted in some parts of Arizona, they should be extended to include the high-flow areas south of California and Texas as well.
While Mexico and the United States continue to move in the right direction in pursuing reforms, it is essential to prevent drug-enforcement programs from becoming abusive toward civil society. Expanded intelligence gathering by both the United States and Mexico has alarmed some privacy rights organizations as having the potential to invade citizens’ rights. In addition, many concerned Mexicans are worried about the continued involvement of the military in traditional policing functions, and the issue is primed to become a topic of debate in the 2012 Mexican presidential election. In fact, the military may also be overstepping its bounds in public displays of force. Specific regulations must be adopted if they are to limit military involvement in traditional policing functions, and a system of redress for alleged violations should be instituted. The military has traditionally eradicated drug fields and other forms of drug production, but this mission has been increasingly overshadowed by the bloody fighting with the DTOs on the streets. As soon as Mexican federal police forces are trained properly and corrupt officers purged from their ranks, the military should return to its supportive role and withdraw from police communities around the country.
Continuing violence has burdened the Mexican people with constant fear and has damaged the Mexican economy. Because Mexico is the third-largest trading partner of the United States, its economy is highly intertwined with that of the U.S. Already, the violence has stopped and reversed foreign investment in some of the hardest-hit areas. While President Calderón’s infrastructure and social initiatives aim to build drug-free communities, continued conflicts between the DTOs and the Mexican government will further harm industries and keep tourists away from resorts for years to come. Without visible and lasting stabilization, Mexico can hardly expect to attract further foreign investment.
It is true that any long-term solution to these problems will necessarily involve tackling the demand side of DTOs’ operations as well. There are two primary approaches in accomplishing this: legalization of drugs or assistance for drug users. Legalization of drugs, as has been proposed by President Felipe Calderón and others, would be the more radical step but carries significant costs of its own. Regardless of the presumed merits, it is extremely politically contentious and unlikely in the short-term. It may be more practical to continue discouraging drug use and treating drug users in order to gradually deprive cartels of their clients, but this is a slow process. The focus for now should thus be on supply side solutions.
The drug problem has been a persistent cause of conflict in the U.S. and Mexico for decades. The recent crackdowns in Mexico present an opportunity to push harder and destroy the massive flow of illegal substances into the United States. Mexican military forces, law enforcement, and government officials must receive the vital support required to defeat the cartels. If the United States continues its assistance, Mexico will keep progressing toward the DTO-free nation that the Mexican people deserve. Ultimately, these efforts will curb a significant source of crime and corruption in both nations—and improve lives on both sides of the border.

Since its founding in 1923, the Turkish Republic has largely aligned itself with the West. A NATO member since 1952, the nation served as a lynchpin in American Cold War and Middle East policy. Turkey still provides essential logistical support to American forces in the Afghan and Iraq Wars by allowing American aid and cargo to pass through the country.

Recent developments, however, indicate that the country’s foreign policy has begun to shift away from the West as Turkey strengthens its relationships with rogue regimes, such as Syria and Iran. While there are many reasons for this realignment, one of the most pressing has been the lethargic pace of talks regarding Turkish accession into the European Union (EU). To counter these trends, European leaders need American backing in re-engaging Turkey and offering incentives to remain allied with the West, for a Turkish realignment would detrimentally affect the dynamics of the region.

The unsustainable status quo between Turkey and the EU could drive Turkey away from the American-European alliance. Although initially promising, the Turkish bid for full EU membership has become mired in controversy. The Union’s two most powerful members, France and Germany, have expressed reservations over full Turkish membership, fearing a flood of impoverished workers into Europe from Turkey. The Turkish occupation of Cyprus, in addition, places Turkey in conflict with several other EU members, including Greece. In fact, the conflict over Cyprus has already stalled negotiations on several of the 35 chapters that Turkey and EU states must agree upon before accession.

Public support for the EU in Turkey is also highly volatile and closely tracks domestic developments. Commitment to joining the EU has waned under the currently ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), and other foreign policy interests, those in the Middle East, have taken priority. Before negotiations completely collapse, both Turkey and the West must agree to change course.

The EU agreement, however, may be difficult. The Turkish have compromised on policies to appease the European Union, but some of these “reforms” have allowed AKP to consolidate its power over the government. For instance, while recently-passed constitutional amendments bar gender discrimination, AKP also pressed through a judicial reorganization that expands the size of the nation’s highest constitutional court — allowing the government to pack the courts with pro-AKP judges. As the courts have represented AKP’s main opposition (the constitutional court considered banning the party several years ago), AKP has cemented its power in the country. Unchecked, the government is free to depart from Turkey’s traditional foreign policy goals, drawing the nation ever closer to Syria and Iran.

If ties do not strengthen, Turkey’s increasing engagement with rogue regimes will damage American, European, and Israeli interests. A harbinger of the potential consequences of this shift can be seen in the recent Gaza flotilla incident. Historically, Turkey has maintained peaceful and relatively cooperative relations with Israel. The nations, in fact, have provided each other mutual assistance in the past: Israel has supplied arms to the Turkish military, the two countries have engaged in joint military exercises, and Turkey helped mediate Israeli-Syrian peace talks in 2008.

In the aftermath of the flotilla incident, however, relations have sunk to an historic low. Investigations have found that one of the boats was purchased with the assistance of the AKP-controlled Istanbul municipality, and AKP Turkish Prime Minister, RecepTayyipErdoğan, has been increasingly critical of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. Turkey also canceled Israel’s participation in new multinational military exercises due to concerns that Israel might be training for a strike against Iran.

On the other hand, Turkish-Iranian relations seem stronger than ever. By means of its nonpermanent seat on the UN Security Council, Turkey has attempted to undercut U.S. efforts to impose sanctions on Iran, weakening the international response to the Iranian nuclear program. The recently scuttled Turkish-Brazilian deal that would have allowed Iran to obtain enriched uranium in return for some of its less refined nuclear material would have legitimized Iran’s drive for nuclear weapons as well as further damaged American and European efforts to halt Iranian nuclear armament. Such a drastic shift in Turkish foreign policy underpins the nation’s increasing sense of estrangement with Europe and the West, with potentially devastating consequences.

A Turkish realignment would also affect American interests in the Middle East. NATO’s Incirlik Air Base in Southeast Turkey is a strategic regional location. U.S. forces have used this asset to supply American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, the base also served as a staging ground for the evacuations of Americans during the Israel-Hezbollah War of 2006.  In recent years, however, Turkey has increased restrictions on use of the base, for example denying American forces transit through the base during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Turkey’s continued alignment with Syria or Iran is expected to make such restrictions more common, depriving the U.S. of a necessary tool to supply forces in the Middle East and project U.S. power in the region.

A further cause for concern for the United States and Europe is Turkey’s strengthening relationship with China. Recently, the two nations performed joint air force maneuvers, worrying NATO members that China might gain access to their military strategies. In October, both nations announced a new bilateral partnership that would triple trade by 2015 and double it again by 2020. As China has been reluctant to support American policies in North Korea and the Middle East, Turkey might soon become a less helpful ally to the United States in the region if it increasingly cooperates with Beijing.

But how can the United States and Europe forestall a Turkish shift? One of the first, and by far the easiest, steps that the EU could take is to suspend accession talks. These negotiations have simply raised tensions among EU members and provided AKP political pretext to attack the secular Turkish military and judiciary under the guise of constitutional reforms. However, in economics and finance, both groups share common interests. The EU has effectively integrated the European continent—and Turkey’s four largest trading partners are in the EU.

Creating a broader customs or tariff union (only a limited agreement between the two groups has existed since 1996) with Turkey would be an effective foreign policy tool and open new markets in the region. Indeed, as Europe seeks to reduce its dependence on Russian natural gas resources, Turkey provides an effective route for a pipeline to the Caucasus nations. Such economic developments, importantly, will stabilize the country’s foreign policy,  providing the Turkish government an incentive to join in isolating rogue regimes, such as Iran and Syria, which threaten the economic interests of the U.S., Europe, and Israel.

Turkey has always been caught between the East and the West. Its role as a bridge between the two regions has and will continue to grant the nation importance in international relations. It is essential, then, that Turkey remains a firm Western ally. For the nation’s interests to remain aligned with those of the U.S., Europe, and Israel, efforts must be made to further integrate Turkey into the European and Western community. Economic engagement and coordination represent an essential first step to promoting Turkish welfare and protecting Western interests in the Middle East.

Beyond the tragic loss of life involved, the recent torpedoing of the Cheonan, a South Korean naval ship, by North Korea further exposed the inability of the United States, China, South Korea, Russia, and Japan to rein in Kim Jong Il. For nearly two decades, Pyongyang has vacillated between conciliation and brinkmanship in order to force concessions from the US and its allies. To break this cycle, the United States must reevaluate its policy toward North Korea.

Any new approach, though, must focus on China’s relationship with its reclusive neighbor. While officially allied with North Korea, China was embarrassed by the North’s seemingly random torpedoing of the Cheonan and is reassessing its relationship with Pyongyang. At this moment of diplomatic flux, the United States may have an opportunity to push Chinese policy towards North Korea in a more responsible direction. China’s immense leverage over Pyongyang in the form of food, energy, and other aid could be transformed into an asset in halting Korea’s belligerence and proliferation.

So far, China has been unwilling to take a tougher line on North Korea, arguing instead that diplomacy is effective enough. But even before the Cheonan incident, the Chinese argument was fraying. For years, engagement with North Korea has failed to produce lasting progress on the issue most important to regional and global security – proliferation of nuclear and ballistic technology. North Korea has restarted its uranium and plutonium enrichment facilities, expelled International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, and detonated two nuclear devices. Even more worrying, Pyongyang’s willingness to trade its weapons research has already transferred military technology to other dangerous states, such as Iran and Syria. North Korean cooperation with Iran on the Shahab-3 ballistic missile may give Tehran the capability to launch nuclear attacks throughout the Middle East and beyond – thus destabilizing a region of immense global strategic importance. Although the US and China both have an interest in a stable and peaceful Middle East, diplomacy has so far failed to secure the interests of either state.

What can the US and its allies do to ratchet up the pressure? At this point, not much, at least in economic terms. Unfortunately, America and its allies have exhausted nearly all of their non-military options to alter Pyongyang’s behavior. Japan already halted all trade with North Korea several years ago. South Korea has also curtailed many business ventures in the North, including the once profitable Kaesong Industrial Complex, which provides hard currency to the regime. To prevent weapons trading and hamper the regime’s efforts to raise revenue, the Treasury Department continues to crack down on North Korean financial transactions, and several armaments shipments have also been returned to port. While such actions have undoubtedly hurt the regime, Pyongyang has not been dissuaded from pursuing its present course.

China, however, retains strong leverage over its autarkic neighbor because its assistance plays such a critical role in the regime’s survival. Uninterrupted Chinese investment has allowed Pyongyang to ignore American demands for disarmament. While the US, Japan, and South Korea have recently halted food aid to the North, China continues to support its rogue neighbor. More importantly, unlike other nations, China does not monitor its aid, allowing Pyongyang to provide food to the nation’s “elites” (the military and apparatchiks) at the expense of ordinary North Koreans. In addition, China effectively provides North Korea credit to purchase Chinese goods, allowing the North to divert resources to its weapons programs rather than economic development. In addition, Chinese diplomats have routinely watered down Security Council resolutions and have resisted stronger sanctions against the North. China, indeed, provides the North Korean regime a vital lifeline that keeps the nation relatively stable and allows it to continue to defy the greater international community.

Beijing, though, has been reluctant even to curtail its aid to Pyongyang as it fears instability on the Korean Peninsula and desires an ally on its border. If the North Korean government were to collapse, South Korea would move to unify the peninsula under Seoul. To Beijing, a reunified Korea would bring the American nuclear umbrella—and American troops—to the Yalu River. This situation is unacceptable to Beijing, already uncomfortable with the American presence in South Korea. In addition, China feels it has to contend with a growing refugee problem from the North. Inevitably, the influx would become even worse if Pyongyang fell, potentially straining resources in northern China. These considerations provide Beijing an incentive to maintain the status quo and continue enabling the regime.

Continued support for the North, however, does not serve China’s long-term interests. While the North is currently friendly to Beijing, if Pyongyang fully develops its nuclear capabilities, not even China will have the leverage to influence the regime significantly; a nuclear North would pursue its own interests, not Beijing’s. Moreover, even if the North does not turn on China, continued belligerence from Pyongyang will lead to increased militarization on the Korean Peninsula and in the region. China has never been content with the American deployment in the South, but enabling North Korean aggression will only increase that presence. China, indeed, stands to lose if both South Korea and Japan draw closer together and bolster their military forces in response to Pyongyang’s threat. Already, Japan has acquired ballistic missile technology from the US and is expanding its submarine fleet. Moreover, there have been domestic political discussions in Japan on whether to revise its pacifist constitution. This increased militarization, then, hampers China’s efforts to assert itself as a regional and world power and needlessly increases the risk of armed conflict.

The United States, thus, must reassure a wavering Beijing that a defeated North Korea does not harm China’s interests. The US, to allay Chinese fears, should assure Beijing that it would not bring the American troop presence farther north in the reunified state and promise to remove currently deployed nuclear weapons from the South if China joins in isolating the regime and Pyongyang collapses. The US and South Korea should additionally pledge that the South would address any refugee problem with international assistance following a potential collapse of the regime. South Korea also must outline a specific plan for reunification. Although President Lee Myung-bak has proposed a “reunification tax,” the United States and the international community must assist South Korea with the immense costs of reintegrating North Korea. To this end, the US should also press other nations, such as Japan, to resume trading once the regime falls in order to facilitate development in the impoverished region. By signaling the South and the US’s preparedness to efficiently and quickly embrace the North, the US can ease Beijing’s fears.

If such actions fail, however, the US must carefully but resolutely pressure China into joining the American effort. Banning (mostly Chinese) companies that do business with North Korea from operating in the US and other willing nations may provide an effective economic deterrent. Most affected firms cannot afford to forgo doing business in the US and other markets. The US could also be more aggressive in pursuing North Korean banking transactions originating from China. On the military front, the US command could increase its naval presence in the area and deploy additional anti-ballistic capabilities. This combination of “carrots and sticks” should encourage China to move from its current position on Pyongyang to concrete actions against the regime.

Bringing Beijing firmly into the fold would be especially auspicious at this time, as internal developments within the North indicate that the regime is contending with several problems. Recent riots against Pyongyang’s “currency reform,” which threatened to wipe out the wealth of many North Korean farmers, forced the regime to modify the program. These protests underscore a failing propaganda machine and an increasingly restive population. As more North Koreans learn about the outside world and their nation through smuggled radios, cellular phones, or South Korean television broadcasts, sanctions from Beijing could bring the regime to an end.

In less than fifty years, North Korea has transformed itself from a relatively prosperous state to one of the world’s poorest. Pyongyang has consistently refused to comply with international law even as the US and other regional powers have attempted to isolate the regime. As China begins to question its alignment with the North, the US must convince Beijing to join in international sanctions and further isolate the regime. By pressing to cut off Pyongyang’s last source of support, the US and its allies have an opportunity to end one of the world’s most belligerent regimes and ensure a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

Beyond the tragic loss of life involved, the recent torpedoing of the Cheonan, a South Korean naval ship, by North Korea further exposed the inability of the United States, China, South Korea, Russia, and Japan to rein in Kim Jong Il. For nearly two decades, Pyongyang has vacillated between conciliation and brinkmanship in order to force concessions from the US and its allies. To break this cycle, the United States must reevaluate its policy toward North Korea.

Any new approach, though, must focus on China’s relationship with its reclusive neighbor. While officially allied with North Korea, China was embarrassed by the North’s seemingly random torpedoing of the Cheonan and is reassessing its relationship with Pyongyang. At this moment of diplomatic flux, the United States may have an opportunity to push Chinese policy towards North Korea in a more responsible direction. China’s immense leverage over Pyongyang in the form of food, energy, and other aid could be transformed into an asset in halting Korea’s belligerence and proliferation.

So far, China has been unwilling to take a tougher line on North Korea, arguing instead that diplomacy is effective enough. But even before the Cheonan incident, the Chinese argument was fraying. For years, engagement with North Korea has failed to produce lasting progress on the issue most important to regional and global security – proliferation of nuclear and ballistic technology. North Korea has restarted its uranium and plutonium enrichment facilities, expelled International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, and detonated two nuclear devices. Even more worrying, Pyongyang’s willingness to trade its weapons research has already transferred military technology to other dangerous states, such as Iran and Syria. North Korean cooperation with Iran on the Shahab-3 ballistic missile may give Tehran the capability to launch nuclear attacks throughout the Middle East and beyond – thus destabilizing a region of immense global strategic importance. Although the US and China both have an interest in a stable and peaceful Middle East, diplomacy has so far failed to secure the interests of either state.

What can the US and its allies do to ratchet up the pressure? At this point, not much, at least in economic terms. Unfortunately, America and its allies have exhausted nearly all of their non-military options to alter Pyongyang’s behavior. Japan already halted all trade with North Korea several years ago. South Korea has also curtailed many business ventures in the North, including the once profitable Kaesong Industrial Complex, which provides hard currency to the regime. To prevent weapons trading and hamper the regime’s efforts to raise revenue, the Treasury Department continues to crack down on North Korean financial transactions, and several armaments shipments have also been returned to port. While such actions have undoubtedly hurt the regime, Pyongyang has not been dissuaded from pursuing its present course.

China, however, retains strong leverage over its autarkic neighbor because its assistance plays such a critical role in the regime’s survival. Uninterrupted Chinese investment has allowed Pyongyang to ignore American demands for disarmament. While the US, Japan, and South Korea have recently halted food aid to the North, China continues to support its rogue neighbor. More importantly, unlike other nations, China does not monitor its aid, allowing Pyongyang to provide food to the nation’s “elites” (the military and apparatchiks) at the expense of ordinary North Koreans. In addition, China effectively provides North Korea credit to purchase Chinese goods, allowing the North to divert resources to its weapons programs rather than economic development. In addition, Chinese diplomats have routinely watered down Security Council resolutions and have resisted stronger sanctions against the North. China, indeed, provides the North Korean regime a vital lifeline that keeps the nation relatively stable and allows it to continue to defy the greater international community.
Beijing, though, has been reluctant even to curtail its aid to Pyongyang as it fears instability on the Korean Peninsula and desires an ally on its border. If the North Korean government were to collapse, South Korea would move to unify the peninsula under Seoul. To Beijing, a reunified Korea would bring the American nuclear umbrella—and American troops—to the Yalu River. This situation is unacceptable to Beijing, already uncomfortable with the American presence in South Korea. In addition, China feels it has to contend with a growing refugee problem from the North. Inevitably, the influx would become even worse if Pyongyang fell, potentially straining resources in northern China. These considerations provide Beijing an incentive to maintain the status quo and continue enabling the regime.

Continued support for the North, however, does not serve China’s long-term interests. While the North is currently friendly to Beijing, if Pyongyang fully develops its nuclear capabilities, not even China will have the leverage to influence the regime significantly; a nuclear North would pursue its own interests, not Beijing’s. Moreover, even if the North does not turn on China, continued belligerence from Pyongyang will lead to increased militarization on the Korean Peninsula and in the region. China has never been content with the American deployment in the South, but enabling North Korean aggression will only increase that presence. China, indeed, stands to lose if both South Korea and Japan draw closer together and bolster their military forces in response to Pyongyang’s threat. Already, Japan has acquired ballistic missile technology from the US and is expanding its submarine fleet. Moreover, there have been domestic political discussions in Japan on whether to revise its pacifist constitution. This increased militarization, then, hampers China’s efforts to assert itself as a regional and world power and needlessly increases the risk of armed conflict.

The United States, thus, must reassure a wavering Beijing that a defeated North Korea does not harm China’s interests. The US, to allay Chinese fears, should assure Beijing that it would not bring the American troop presence farther north in the reunified state and promise to remove currently deployed nuclear weapons from the South if China joins in isolating the regime and Pyongyang collapses. The US and South Korea should additionally pledge that the South would address any refugee problem with international assistance following a potential collapse of the regime. South Korea also must outline a specific plan for reunification. Although President Lee Myung-bak has proposed a “reunification tax,” the United States and the international community must assist South Korea with the immense costs of reintegrating North Korea. To this end, the US should also press other nations, such as Japan, to resume trading once the regime falls in order to facilitate development in the impoverished region. By signaling the South and the US’s preparedness to efficiently and quickly embrace the North, the US can ease Beijing’s fears.

If such actions fail, however, the US must carefully but resolutely pressure China into joining the American effort. Banning (mostly Chinese) companies that do business with North Korea from operating in the US and other willing nations may provide an effective economic deterrent. Most affected firms cannot afford to forgo doing business in the US and other markets. The US could also be more aggressive in pursuing North Korean banking transactions originating from China. On the military front, the US command could increase its naval presence in the area and deploy additional anti-ballistic capabilities. This combination of “carrots and sticks” should encourage China to move from its current position on Pyongyang to concrete actions against the regime.

Bringing Beijing firmly into the fold would be especially auspicious at this time, as internal developments within the North indicate that the regime is contending with several problems. Recent riots against Pyongyang’s “currency reform,” which threatened to wipe out the wealth of many North Korean farmers, forced the regime to modify the program. These protests underscore a failing propaganda machine and an increasingly restive population. As more North Koreans learn about the outside world and their nation through smuggled radios, cellular phones, or South Korean television broadcasts, sanctions from Beijing could bring the regime to an end.

In less than fifty years, North Korea has transformed itself from a relatively prosperous state to one of the world’s poorest. Pyongyang has consistently refused to comply with international law even as the US and other regional powers have attempted to isolate the regime. As China begins to question its alignment with the North, the US must convince Beijing to join in international sanctions and further isolate the regime. By pressing to cut off Pyongyang’s last source of support, the US and its allies have an opportunity to end one of the world’s most belligerent regimes and ensure a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

Iran’s nuclear program has been a major concern for the West since the beginning of the millennium. Iran has repeatedly violated both UN and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sanctions, suggested that Israel be wiped off the map, and supported terrorism based in Iraq, the Gaza Strip, and Lebanon. The United States’ unilateral strategy of negotiations and sanctions has been unsuccessful in achieving a sustainable settlement.Washington should consider other options in order to successfully deal with the crisis. To move negotiations forward, the U.S. should proceed with a regimen of multilateral sanctions to put pressure on Iran to negotiate seriously. Sanctions, along with focused and serious negotiations, are America’s best chance to disarm Iran and prevent military action.

The United States should study its previous attempts to end the Iranian nuclear crisis before moving forward. Under the Bush administration, the U.S. applied unilateral financial and economic sanctions against Iran, but with limited success. In the past, countries such as Russia and China provided many of the financial services that the U.S. sanctions denied Iran, and a number of international oil companies continue to do business with Iran in spite of the sanctions. Moreover, China, who seems driven foremost by its concern for feeding its massive appetite for oil, continues to invest in Iran’s energy and refining infrastructure.

Similarly, UN sanctions on weaponry and weapons technology were largely ineffective because Russia and China refused to meaningfully cooperate. In 2008, Russia negotiated a contract to sell Iran advanced anti-aircraft missile battery system—though Russia has yet to deliver the system—insisting that it was for defensive purposes and did not violate the sanctions. While in theory it is indeed a defensive system, the delivery of such weaponry can only harden Iran’s position in the negotiations because it enhances Iran’s ability to defend its nuclear facilities. In sum, for Russia and China, security and proliferation concerns take a back seat to economic gain.

Negotiations have been largely ineffective as well. While many in the West have praised the “agreement in principle” reached at recent talks in Vienna as a step forward, Western countries should be cautious of this perceived success. Under the Vienna Agreement, Iran would ship its stock of enriched uranium to Russia. The Russians and the French would then enrich the uranium into a form that could not be easily re-processed into weapons-grade material but could be used for non-military purposes. This plan, however, is subject to the approval of Ayatollah Khameini, the Iranian Supreme Leader, who is rumored to be against the agreement. In addition, many close to him, including the speaker of the Iranian Parliament, have criticized the framework as an attempt to deceive Iran.

Nonetheless, even if the Vienna Agreement were approved, the accord would still not prevent Iran from enriching uranium. If Iran chose, it could restock its supplies of enriched uranium again within a year. The agreement also does not prevent Iran from continuing research and development of its delivery capabilities. In addition, the agreement does nothing to address the fundamental question, which is how to alter incentives such that it is not in the current regime’s best interest to develop nuclear weapons. If adopted, the proposal would simply provide a temporary stopgap. The Vienna Agreement would give Iran the chance to stall and continue developing nuclear weapons, taking the West back to square one.

Even if a deal could be reached, a simple agreement with Iran will not be enough. The Iranian regime has a history of neither adhering to its international obligations nor cooperating with international authority. Iran, as a signatory nation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, is obligated to report to the IAEA any intention to build any nuclear facility. The regime did not report its uranium enrichment facility in Natanz until 2002, after it was fully operational. Iran likewise did not report the facility in Qom to the IAEA until Tehran realized that Western governments had discovered the facility’s existence. Furthermore, the regime has refused to allow its nuclear scientists to be questioned by the IAEA. If the U.S. and its allies are serious about preventing Iranian proliferation, they must insist on an enforceable agreement with a robust inspections regime.

The unsuccessful attempts at preventing Iran from continued development of nuclear weapons indicate that any response to Iran requires unified, international support. This summer’s election riots have presented the West with new options. The regime’s leaders appear not to want to confront external pressure and internal threats simultaneously. While Tehran has used negotiations to buy time, this new, unstable situation might make the regime amenable to meaningful settlement, especially if it faces multilateral pressure. There are a number of options available to entice and pressure the Iranians to submit to the will of the international community.

In the political sphere, the U.S., through Radio Farda—a Persian-language radio station based in Washington, D.C. and Prague—could amplify the voices of dissent with programming that provides a platform for Iranian exiles and expatriates. Internally, dissidents could be supplied with communication equipment not susceptible to jamming and other interference (such as satellite phones and sophisticated encryption equipment). The importance of communication within Iran is validated by the behavior of the theocratic regime—which moves swiftly to disrupt cellular and Internet communications at any sign of unrest.
In the economic sphere, multilateral leverage has significant potential. It is no secret that Iran’s economic situation is dire: It faces high unemployment (12 percent, according to the Iranian government), rampant inflation (28 percent, according to the Iranian government), corruption, and a lack of basic services. Iran’s economy depends heavily on petroleum exports, but without Western technological expertise, Iran’s oil production has steadily declined. According to a 2007 National Academy of Science study, Iran’s consumption of refined petroleum will outstrip its production of crude oil by 2015, effectively halting petroleum exports altogether. Furthermore, Iran lacks the capacity to refine petroleum and, as a result, imports 40 percent of its petroleum. The U.S. House of Representatives has already passed the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act, which would limit Iran’s ability to import gasoline. The Senate will likely approve the legislation in coming weeks. The U.S., through similar restrictions, should strengthen economic sanctions by convincing others to jump on board. European nations such as France, Germany, and Britain have expressed interest in such sanctions. In addition, Iran’s recent agreement to supply Turkmenistan with natural gas, which will ultimately supply all of Europe, competes with the Russian monopoly on gas, giving the Russians an incentive to support sanctions. This agreement would also give the Europeans more economic leverage over Tehran. Finally, a multilateral regimen of sanctions would force companies and financial institutions that do business in Iran to choose between continuing their transactions with Iran and doing business in the U.S. and in whichever European nations sign on to sanctions and few companies can afford to choose the former. While some have argued that enhanced sanctions might rally the Iranian people around the regime, only the opposite has happened thus far, as Iranians have blamed their regime for the country’s economic woes.

While proceeding with this new approach to Iran, however, the United States must try to ensure China and Russia’s support. While Chinese-Iranian economic interests are substantial, Chinese-U.S. economic ties are even more vital. China could be amenable to enforcing sanctions against Iran, as Beijing does not wish to deal with the economic consequences of a potential war between the U.S. and Iran that could result if the Iranian nuclear program is not stopped. In addition, the Russians, who are anxious about NATO, may be willing to enforce sanctions against Iran if the U.S. provides concessions on Russian security interests. A recent controversial overture by the U.S. to scale back missile shield deployment in Poland could be responsible for Russian officials more vocally supporting sanctions against Iran. Securing Chinese and Russian support for sanctions should be a top priority for the U.S.

Of course, the U.S. has never taken the military option off the table, and Israel has strongly hinted that it would consider using military force against Iran as well. Air strikes on Iran’s nuclear targets present a difficult tactical challenge, however. Iran’s nuclear facilities are distributed across the country, with some installations hidden underground, heavily fortified. Moreover, Iran has military assets throughout the Middle East with which it could retaliate against such a strike. In Iraq, Iran would almost certainly intensify support for the insurgency, endangering American troops and the already unstable democracy. In Gaza, Hamas could, at Iran’s instigation, unleash missile strikes into densely populated areas of Israel. Indeed, Iran itself has ballistic capability and could retaliate with its own missile strikes. Additionally, Iran could, in retaliation, finally make good on its threat to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40 percent of the world’s sea-transported oil and 90 percent of the Gulf’s oil output flows. Even if the U.S. were able to open the straits quickly, insurers would refuse to cover oil tankers passing through a conflict zone, effectively closing it to international commerce. Thus, superior firepower simply may not provide an effective solution to this problem, and could provoke a harsh response from the international community against the U.S. or Israel. As such, it is imperative that multilateral economic and political sanctions be applied instead of a military option.

To persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear program, the United States must employ multilateral cooperation and sanctions to convince Iran’s leaders that it is highly disadvantageous to continue nuclear development. A combination of economic, political, and social pressures could finally push Iran to accept an agreement. Iran has always used negotiations to stall because the price for delaying a negotiated settlement was significant but not crippling. The U.S. should make the price for stalling unacceptably high for Iran, in economic and political terms.