In the aftermath of the exchange, in which Israel freed Palestinians,imprisoned for everything from dissent to violence in return for the release of Gilad Shalit, an Israeli Defense Force soldier captured in the July War with Lebanon’s Hizballah, Israeli opinion is divided, but only slightly: according to polls taken immediately after the release, between 74 and 80 percent of the Israeli public support the exchange. Indeed, addressing concerns as to the inequality of the exchange, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu quoted from the Talmud: “He who saves one soul, it is as though he saved an entire world.” Meanwhile, Palestinians are jubilant at the prospect of having secured the release of so many, for what they consider so little. It seems that for once, a solution has been brokered in the endlessly intractable conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people that somewhat satisfies everyone.

Yet the prisoner exchange, seemingly a one-shot, no-strings-attached PR boon for the Israeli government and Hamas alike, will have far-reaching consequences for which neither party is prepared. The exchange, brokered in secret by Egypt between the two parties, failed to engage either the Israeli or Palestinian public in a way that would have given them a sense of future potential for open cooperation. The concept of negotiation between Israel and Hamas has been thrust upon both publics quite suddenly, giving them little stake in the talks or the possibility of others in the future. Moreover, as the initial joy fades, the exchange serves to remind both parties of the tense relationship that created the need to exchange such prisoners—captured in times of conflict, imprisoned for political dissent and terrorism—in the first place. Indeed, both sides view this act as one of just compensation rather than one of reconciliation. The impact it will have for both Israeli security prospects and Palestinian aspirations is minimal at best and costly at worst.

While the deal has received much praise from the Israeli public, it is mysterious that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other senior government officials dealing with the exchange would believe such a security risk to be wise. It seems illogical that, a government and, moreover, a nation so concerned with the threat of terrorism of which they consider Hamas a key breeder, would broker a deal that releases men and women whose involvement included but was not limited to a 2001 Jerusalem pizzeria bombing, the 2002 “Passover Massacre” in Netanya, and a 2004 shooting attack on the Trans-Israel Highway. To the Israelis, these incidents no doubt represent profound threats to their security, and the release of those who committed them seems an odd risk to take considering the importance they place on that existence. Israeli opposition leader Tzipi Livni, among others, has pointed out this discrepancy.

Yet while Israeli’s security interests have been imperiled by the prisoner exchange, Palestinians aspirations for statehood have been dealt a far greater blow. The release, while celebrated by those families whose loved ones had come home, some of whom had been imprisoned since 1987′s first intifada, was quickly hailed by Hamas themselves as evidence of the need to take more Israeli soldiers hostage since, clearly, it had proven effective. “The people want a new Gilad!” protesters chanted at a Hamas rally in Gaza City, shortly after the exchange. And while the capture of Gilad Shalit does appear to have paid dividends for Hamas, it has become painfully evident to Palestinians that violent action against the state of Israel only results in increased security measures and repression. Hamas’ citing of this exchange as a success, then, has the potential to derail the non-violent Palestinian opposition to Israel that has become more widespread in recent years.

Moreover, the exchange has increased the legitimacy and popularity of Hamas at the expense of the West Bank’s Fatah, whose influence has been called into question and weakened by the deal. Israel and the international community alike generally regard Fatah as the more legitimate Palestinian government; any substantive peace deal, therefore, would necessitate their involvement. Relations between Israel and Fatah, however, are tenuous at best, and an upsurge in violence by Hamas, by taking prisoners or using similar means would most likely reflect poorly on the Palestinian cause as a whole, and therefore Fatah by association. Moreover, historically, this sort of violence has led to increasingly repressive Israeli security measures, which would set Palestinian expectations back substantially.

Furthermore, even if Hamas’ rhetoric fails to derail the Palestinian cause, the deal they brokered with Israel has taken the spotlight away from the issues that concern Palestinians the most. While Shalit’s release and the role Hamas’ played in it has caused a stir in the media, little attention has been paid to the underlying causes of the conflict, dizzying in scope and, as of late, unaddressed by either party through negotiation. Any attempts at peace talks have stalled and a UN bid, while symbolically significant, has been doomed to failure. Palestinians continue to exist in an oddly bifurcated, quasi-independent non-state, which they view as imminently threatened by Israel’s persistent creation of “facts on the ground” in the form of illegal settlements. Yet international attention regarding the conflict has been distracted from the unabated settlement construction in East Jerusalem, supported by PM Netanyahu, among others, by a high-publicity event with little implication for the larger issues at stake.

Some will argue that the joy and relief that both sides have felt in the days following the exchange will promote a mutual spirit of goodwill, inciting reconciliation and future peace. Others argue that the negotiation necessary to cut the Israel-Hamas deal served to break the ice between the two parties, laying a path for future talks. “This is a sign of a good deal,” wrote Uri Dromi, former spokesman for previous Israeli PM’s Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, “when both sides walk away equally dissatisfied.” This might have been true if a deal containing any substance had been reached.

Yet the fact that talks that did not address the underlying issues concerning Palestinian statehood and its implications—for Jerusalem— water issues, the return of refugees and Israeli security, to name a few—yet still require outside mediation does not bode well for any future relationship. Furthermore, neither the Palestinian nor Israeli public saw the talks as such: to each side, the deal represented the long-awaited return of men and women, imprisoned by an unjust party for fighting a just cause. Indeed, the Israeli government did not even attempt to portray it as such. “I have brought your son home to you,” Netanyahu announced, upon bringing Shalit to his parents’ home in northern Israel. The bravado and simplicity of his statement brushed aside any acknowledgment of the complexity of the deal he had just made, as well as its implications for his nation and another’s future.

For Hamas, the prisoner deal seemed too good to be true. For the Israeli and Palestinian public, it is. If the exchange served any purpose, it was to remind people from both societies of another type of prisoner—the one that they themselves have become, held hostage by directionless leadership willing to make long-term sacrifices for short-term popularity.

To many within Brazil, Rousseff’s tenure will represent a continuation of da Silva’s time in office. Indeed, as a former advisor during Lula’s presidency, Rousseff does share his ideological spirit. Da Silva, anointed by some as the “Bill Clinton of South America” and one of the most popular regional figures of the last few decades, raised the living standards of millions of impoverished Brazilians and elevated the country’s stature  after years of stromg economic growth. Yet in order for Rousseff to truly distinguish herself, she will have to make a series of tough decisions unforeseen by those who expect her to be merely a continuation of her predecessor, particularly regarding how to address growing economic inequality and a foreign policy that allies with international pariah Iran.

In her 62 years, Rousseff has led a life that has intrigued international spectators, perhaps for its reflection of the rapid political and economic evolution of her country. Born to a middle class family in 1947, Rousseff became involved as a teenager with a Marxist paramilitary group that robbed arms stockpiles in an attempt to fight the then-ruling military dictatorship. After several years of participating in the organization, and a brief period of imprisonment, she trained as an economist and held bureaucratic positions within the government until 2003, when President da Silva appointed her as Minister of Mines and Energy, and later, as Chief of Staff.

Since then, though she has been one of da Silva’s closest and most influential advisors, many Brazilians are unfamiliar with her as a political leader. Indeed, many Brazilian citizens were unsure of her political abilities even as they voted for her. The single greatest force behind her popularity was the support of the charismatic President da Silva. Rousseff was able to take advantage of this and ride on the wave of his supporters. As Brazilian sociologist Demétrio Magnoli commented, “[Da Silva] treated this campaign as a re-election campaign.” Indeed, one voter affirmed, “If it were only about experience I would never vote for her. But she has a good team behind her. Today the country is much better off because of the Lula government.” With time, Rousseff’s backing by supporters led on by Lula’s charisma will subside. When this happens, she will have a harder time achieving political success, especially given that  many refer to her personality as aloof, brusque, and often intimidating. Additionally, her Worker’s Party owes substantial political favors to several other parties within their coalition, and those factions may cash in on their political capital to the detriment of her own agenda.

Domestic policy will undoubtedly be the top concern for Dilma Rousseff. Given Brazil’s simultaneously burgeoning economic potential and social inequality, there is no doubt that Rousseff faces a challenging task, as it will be difficult to follow da Silva’s impressive successes. Although he was derided by many as a leftist bent on instituting potentially damaging socialist economic reforms, da Silva exceeded the expectations of many by bringing the percentage of impoverished Brazilians down from 34% in 2002 to 23% in 2008 and lifting some 29 million of his countrymen from the working to the middle class in six years. Rousseff’s prospects will certainly benefit from the fact that Brazil suffered comparatively little and emerged relatively early from the recent financial crisis. The country currently maintains an annual growth rate of nearly 6.5% and is expected to become the world’s 5^th largest economy by 2026. Along with Russia, India, and China, Brazil is part of “BRIC”, a widely-acknowledged group of fast growing and economically powerful developing nations.

Even with its great economic potential, Brazil faces a series of challenges that Lula did not address during his tenure in office. Despite his efforts, Brazil remains one of the most socioeconomically unequal societies in the world. Much of the country’s wealth is located in the major coastal cities like São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, whereas the majority of central Brazil is still mired in poverty. Da Silva’s recent income redistribution program, La bolsa famila, is widely considered to have played a major role in lifting millions out of poverty, but new programs must be enacted in order to expand upon and monitor its progress. Furthermore, the nation’s taxation and pension systems, along with its union laws, are archaic and must be reformed to accommodate the rapidly growing new middle class.

Perhaps most importantly, Brazil’s business regulations must be reformed, if not overhauled entirely. Brazil has some of the most arcane and restrictive requirements for new businesses in the world. The country ranks quite poorly, particularly in comparison to other BRIC nations, when it comes to ease of doing business, length of startup time, ease of getting credit, and ease of employing workers, according to a 2009 World Bank report. Additionally, Brazil now faces the obstacle of continuing the booming economic growth that is expected of a developing nation while implementing the “green” environmental reforms that are especially expected from the caretaker of over half of the Amazon rainforest. While Lula came to power in an era where economic growth was valued above all other priorities, Rousseff enters her office as Brazil becomes an established economic power, with the heightened expectations that come with a more firmly entrenched global position. She must work within her party’s coalition in order to eliminate her country’s arcane business restrictions and provide the stimulus for the economic growth, something which she will most certainly need if she is to continue financing the welfare programs needed to deal with Brazil’s massive economic inequality.

While domestic policy will be paramount, it would be dangerous for Rousseff to ignore the implications of the very bold foreign policy decisions Lula made during his tenure. Rousseff, it seems, is not concerned with establishing a reputation in diplomacy. According to former Brazilian ambassador Rubens Barbosa, she “isn’t interested in international prestige; she doesn’t care if she is seen as a great world leader.” Yet in the final years of his tenure, Lula angered the international community by boldly brokering a uranium swap between Brazil, Turkey, and Iran, and by voting against a United Nations security council resolution to impose sanctions against Iran. Lula’s diplomatic leanings may make it impossible for his successor to push aside her country’s foreign affairs, as she will have to stem the fallout from Lula’s decisions to maintain relations with the western world while continuing to promote Brazilian interests abroad.

These are difficult times for the president-elect. At home, Rousseff faces economic and environmental problems that Lula swept aside during his term. Abroad, Rousseff carries with her the great responsibility of consolidating Brazil’s geopolitical position by clarifying the nation’s international outlook during her first few years in office. Faced with important domestic and international issues, Rousseff may be forced to focus on one at the expense of the other or else risk diluting the efficacy of her policies both at home and abroad. In the words of World Bank director Makhtar Diop, “Brazil is living in an exceptional moment.” To hold on to her country’s phenomenal streak, Rousseff must avoid simply maintaining the status quo of her predecessor, and also find the appropriate means to improve Brazil’s business environment and raise living standards while maintaining economic growth and expanding the nation’s influence worldwide.

These recent policy decisions have alarmed the West, prompting the EU and US to reaffirm their commitment to supporting Turkey in the hopes that the nation will nip its newfound turn away from the West in the bud. Turkey has overestimated the extent to which the West will tolerate Turkish assertiveness and has ignored the perils of the country’s new Middle Eastern partnerships. If Turkey continues to distance itself from its longtime, economically dominant allies and to further entangle itself in the fragmented and chaotic Middle Eastern political sphere, Turkey may soon find itself with few friends and unexpected enemies.

Upon its rise from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire as a modern nation, Turkey began a political transformation that would orient it toward the West and away from the Middle East. In a series of reforms known as Kemalism, former military general Mustafa Kemal Atatürk radically altered the essence of Turkish identity, creating a Westernized, democratic and secular nation that broke the regional mold of authoritarianism. It quickly joined NATO as the Cold War began, cementing its position as an ally of the West by becoming the first Muslim-majority nation to recognize Israel and by sending troops to Korea during the Korean War.

As late as the mid-2000’s, Turkey still appeared to be heavily allied with the West. The majority of its trade still occurred with the United States, and in 2005 it began economic and legal preparations for its formal EU bid. Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan’s government has gone to extensive lengths to reform the country’s legal, economic, and political system to conform to EU standards. His Islamist political party has moderated its views, attempted to quell the influence of the military (modern Turkish history is rife with military coups), and spent countless visits to the EU and US attempting to convince them of Turkey’s very real economic potential. Yet Turkey’s dreams of EU membership are slipping away, due to the concerns of several powerful EU members, particularly France and Germany, who have articulated fears both real and imagined of the dangers of Turkish membership in the world’s most exclusive club of nations.

In addition to European hesitation about Turkey’s EU bid, two other events have greatly influenced Turkey’s turn toward the East. In late 2008, Turkey sponsored peace talks between Syria and Israel that many hoped would be the beginning of a multilateral regional peace agreement. The talks ended with the Turkish government believing the negotiations to have been somewhat successful; Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, however, failed to inform Turkey of the Gaza incursion that was to begin four days later. Upon hearing news of the raid, Erdoğan was reportedly furious; at the Davos Conference in January of 2009, he revealed what many have termed a hotheaded temper, referring to Israel’s actions in Gaza as “barbaric” and “a crime against humanity.” Relations between Israel and Turkey were further damaged in May of this year, when Israeli Defense forces stormed the Mavi Marmara, a Turkish aid ship intent on breaking the Israeli blockade on Gaza. Nine Turkish activists, including one with dual US citizenship, were killed, with Turkey claiming its activists were fired on indiscriminately and Israel claiming its own soldiers acted in self-defense. In the ensuing diplomatic crisis, the US angered many in Turkey with its tepid response; while the practical military arrangements of the Turkish-Israeli alliance remain largely intact, their diplomatic relationship is in tatters.

It is because of these events, along with the increasing Islamization of the Turkish government, promoted by Erdoğan’s own party, that Turkey has been led to pursue a foreign policy that not only corresponds more directly with Middle Eastern goals but also goes directly against its previously solid Western alliances. In June of 2010, the Turkish government claimed to have secured US approval to broker a nuclear swap deal between Turkey, Brazil, and Iran, in which the former two nations would exchange Iranian low-grade nuclear material with higher-grade fuel that could be used for research and other peaceful purposes. This agreement directly conflicted with a UN resolution placing further sanctions on Iran, which Brazil and Turkey were later the only two nations to vote against, showcasing the manner in which both nations had overplayed their diplomatic hands. Additionally, Erdoğan’s government has pursued closer political relations with Syria, Iran, and Sudan, and refused to acknowledge either the genocide charges against Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir, the countless acts of violent political repression committed by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. It has, however, simultaneously and hypocritically condemned the Israeli government for its treatment of the Palestinian people.

But if Turkey ventures much further into the Middle Eastern camp, it may find itself trapped in a quagmire of sectarian conflict from which it will not easily emerge. Turkey’s alliance with Iran, a nation many Middle Eastern states view as a greater long-term threat than even their eternal enemy Israel, has already disturbed Turkey’s Arab neighbors. Its alliances with Syria and Iran, when taken together, upset many Sunni nations, who see it as an attempt to establish a Shi’ite consensus that might rival their own majority Sunni sect. Yet if Turkey attempts to appease both East and West, it will find itself similarly trapped. Its alliance with the US will put it at odds with Iran should America or Israel attempt to strike militarily to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear capabilities. Its alliance with Israel puts it directly at odds with its newfound allies in Syria and Iran, neither of whom recognize Israel’s right to exist or appreciate Turkey’s longstanding practice of swapping military intelligence with the nation. Furthermore, the region in which Turkey borders Syria and Iran is dominated by the Kurds, whose main separatist group, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), has been in a civil war with the Turkish government since 1984. Should Turkey displease either nation, either would be in a prime position to support the PKK in its struggle against

Turkey for an independent breakaway state, creating a massive headache for the Turkish government and further jeopardizing its EU bid.
It seems that Turkey has been cornered into a diplomatic dead end. Yet these events are recent, and with a few deft diplomatic moves by the EU and the US, the nation might be encouraged to pursue a less aggressive, more beneficial foreign policy. For one, the US and Britain could use the potential predicaments Turkey faces in the Middle East as reasons why Turkey should turn away from its fast-paced foray into the East and focus on its alliance with the West. These nations can provide incentives for such a move by offering to continue to push for Turkey’s EU membership bid, even if that means convincing Germany and France that the Union is not, in fact, a “Christian-only” club, as they seem to believe. The US should work with the EU to encourage Erdoğan’s government to resolve Kurdish separatist violence in the southeast, as well as tensions that still exist with Cyprus and Turks of Armenian descent. The US might also nudge Turkey in the direction of the West by continuing to encourage Israeli-Turkish cooperation; despite recent diplomatic woes, the two maintain economic and military connections, and Israel’s nuclear capacity and military might continue to appeal to Turkey. Finally, the US should make clear the impossibility of a long-term Turkish alliance with both Iran and America. Between its dogged quest for nuclear capacity and its funding of Hezbollah in Lebanon and violent insurgencies in Iraq, Iran under President Ahmedinejad represents the greatest threat to both US interests and peace within the Middle East today. A single allying agreement with Iran will not severely damage Turkey’s relations with the West, but a long-term partnership will. Turkey is at a crossroads between continents and civilizations, yes, but between nations too. Hopefully Turkey will dismantle the ticking time bomb it has set for itself, and resolve its discordant foreign policy in favor of the West. If not, it may find itself, like many in the middle, alone.

Although Obama’s “new era of responsibility” has found many supporters, its vagueness has also created an opening for critics who view Obama as a better speaker than policymaker. The reality of the President’s spirit of international good will lends credence to such critics. While some of his popularity is certainly attributable to his rhetoric, the bulk of it is due to the basic phenomenon that other nations expect him to pursue policies in their own self-interest.

There is no more fitting example of this disconcerting fact than the difference between President Obama’s popularity in the Middle East and President Bush’s at the end of his second term in office. The president’s tone of cooperation and reconciliation with Arab states has led to higher support in states such as Egypt, where approval for the U.S. increased from 22 to 27 percent, and in Jordan, where it rose from 19 to 25 percent, according to the Pew Research Center. Yet support for America remains unchanged in areas such as the Palestinian territories and Pakistan, which have historically maintained distant relations with the United States throughout the terms of many presidents. Such opinions are unlikely to change despite President Obama’s election and new tone towards some Arab states. In Israel, on the other hand, America’s popularity has dropped from 78 percent in 2007 to 71 percent in 2009. This is attributable to several of President Obama’s statements and policies, both during his campaign and in office, that indicate he may be less willing to support all Israeli policies unconditionally than was the Bush administration. Obama’s speech in Cairo during the summer of 2009 and his insistence on the cessation of all settlement building have instilled doubts among Israelis that he will be as accommodating as his predecessor. Nor, for that matter, should he be; the region requires a mediator who will be unafraid to demand the termination of both Israeli settlement expansion and of many Arab countries’ funding and harboring of Islamist groups that wish to disrupt the peace process within the region.

The President may soon find that in other regions, as well as the Middle East, his political capital is based primarily on what foreign nations perceive as his commitment to their own best interests, rather than those of the global community. Many see Europe as the base of the President’s international support, an idea traced to then-senator Obama’s campaign foray into Germany the summer before he was elected. At the same time, Obama’s visit to Europe revealed that he is well aware of the true factors that lie at the root of his international support. In a speech, Obama appealed to the nation’s individual needs in articulating his political vision, saying, “The poppies in Afghanistan become the heroin in Berlin.” In this way, President Obama captured the essence of a more effective manner in which to leverage his extraordinary popularity: He appealed to individual nations’ self-interest in a way that gains their respect and helps Washington’s cause as well.

The President should stop focusing on maintaining his popularity as an end in and of itself and start making substantive policy decisions even if they disappoint some members of the international community. The recent Copenhagen Climate Summit in December of 2009 represents a perfect example of the way in which President Obama’s wish to satisfy all members of the international community led to intangible progress toward policy goals. Widely regarded as what the EU termed a “great failure,” the Climate Summit ended in various participants reaching a nonbinding political agreement that advocated emissions cuts and other environmental reforms at standards far below those hoped for by environmental experts. At the end of the conference, who was to blame for what and why—with the EU unhappy with China and China unhappy with the U.S.—was more publicized than the conference’s actual accomplishments. The idea of gathering any number of nations into a room and hoping that America’s newfound popularity in the world will inspire cooperation apparently has its limits.

Some might argue that President Obama, by brushing aside international criticism, puts himself in danger of falling into the same trap as the previous administration. Yet in doing so, one assumes that President Obama and the previous administration have a similar attitude toward foreign relations. They do not. President Bush treated the idea of diplomacy as a one-dimensional spectrum, expecting support for his forays into Iraq and Afghanistan while disregarding recommendations made by the United Nations and other international organizations. Yet President Obama has demonstrated a vision of the world in which the global community has substantial importance at various levels; he is familiar with international relations and cites Cold War diplomats George Marshall and George Kennan, supporters of a multilateral foreign policy, as sources of influence. The President embodies a combination of intellectual idealism and pragmatism that distinguish him ideologically from his predecessor.

It is clear that both Europe and the Obama administration share a spirit of cooperation and dialogue. But, to quote former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, “America does not have friends; it has interests.” President Obama will inevitably have to make tough decisions that will alienate global citizens whose support he once enjoyed. In order for President Obama to gain the respect he lacks as a relatively inexperienced leader, he must be willing make such decisions publicly and forcefully, or face appearing subservient to the political desires of other countries. As President Obama enters into his second year in office, his popularity is dampened but not expired; he still enjoys a fairly clean slate regarding foreign policy as a whole and has maintained a great deal of his international popularity. He can use this advantage as an opportunity to address more contentious issues and gain the respect—not just the popularity—of the international community.

Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s recent statement regarding the violent conflict between Israel and Palestine alludes not only to the lack of progress from negotiations in recent months, but also to the partisan political moment into which President Obama’s administration has entered with regard to its policies in the Middle East. Lieberman’s comments suggest a lack of initiative within the Israeli government to work toward a lasting peace settlement; indeed, over the last few months, violent conflict surrounding the city of Jerusalem and the failure of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to articulate more than rhetorical support for a “two-state solution” have added to fears that the region has turned its back on negotiation. Most importantly, Israel’s continued settlement building in the West Bank has delegitimized its more conciliatory gestures and will impede negotiations until expansion is frozen.

Under these circumstances, it is no wonder that President Obama and his Cabinet have shied away from addressing this ongoing crisis directly. The contradictory way in which the President has addressed Middle Eastern issues at various speaking engagements has led to a sense of confusion as to the extent to which he will support or reject recent Israeli stances. During his June 2008 appearance before the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee, a powerful pro-Israel lobby group, then-Senator Obama assured the audience that his administration would continue to assist Israel to the tune of roughly $30 billion over the course of ten years – reaffirming a commitment from President George W. Bush. Furthermore, Obama insisted that the U.S. “must never force Israel to the negotiating table.” At his speech in Cairo a year later, however, President Obama condemned Israel’s continued expansion into the occupied territories, declaring that “it is time for these settlements to stop.” It is difficult to imagine how the president can expect settlement expansion to stop without pressing Israel to take part in any form of negotiations.

President Obama’s relative reticence regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict presents him with an unprecedented opportunity to devise a specific and comprehensive policy in the coming months. Furthermore, two very recent events have left the Middle East a far more vulnerable region, which would make a resumption of active peace negotiations with an American presence all the more timely. First, in September, the United Nations Human Rights Council issued the so-called Goldstone Report, condemning Israeli actions within the Gaza strip during its offensive last winter. Although formally dismissed by both the Israeli government – Prime Minister Netanyahu referred to it as “a mockery of history” – and the United States Congress, its endorsement by the United Nations General Assembly suggests that the report will not be so easily set aside. Defenders of the report argue that it speaks to the extent of Israeli human rights violations in the Gaza strip, while its critics contend that it fails to fully address atrocities committed by Hamas. Yet, in holding both Israeli and Palestinian leaders accountable, the Goldstone Report has helped shed critical and objective light on the seemingly endless regional violence. Obama’s refusal to acknowledge the report has hurt his standing among many Arab nations in which he is usually viewed favorably, or at least more favorably than President Bush. If Obama wishes to attract Arab support for peace negotiations, he must speak publicly about – and in doing so legitimize – the report, even if he temporally weakens him politically.

In another significant regional development, Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas recently announced that he will not seek re-election in January 2010. Although the U.S. has regarded Abbas as a moderate in the region, his performance has been dissatisfactory to the Israeli leadership and to many Palestinians, who now criticize his wavering commitment to end the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Hamas, the dominant political player within Gaza, has opposed his decision to hold presidential and parliamentary elections next year. Obama’s presence in talks or negotiations could determine whether a moderate or militant leader replaces Abbas. Yet with the elections looming, time is not on the President’s side.

The nature of President Obama’s early forays into the Middle East will no doubt set the tone for his entire tenure in office. If his goal is nothing more than to continue supporting Israel at all costs, then little shift in policy from that of the previous administration is needed. If, however, his goal is to negotiate a peace settlement that will protect Israel’s sovereignty and security while creating a truly autonomous nation for the Palestinians, a more nuanced strategy is essential. The Obama administration has continuously wavered between pressing for an end to settlement construction in the occupied territories and accepting a resumption of peace talks while allowing the Israelis to continue construction. Yet until all settlement building ceases, negotiation will remain a dead-end as the “facts on the ground” continue to compromise Palestinian hopes for a state. As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said, the administration “wants to see a stop to settlements, not outposts, not ‘natural growth’ exceptions.”

The United States, unfortunately, has a history of empty threats against the Israeli government. If the U.S. really wants an end to settlement construction, it must be willing to withhold some material support from the Israeli government. In 1990, during the first Intifada, the Israeli government began building settlements at an unprecedented rate. James Baker and others in the first Bush Administration perceived these settlements as an obstacle to much-publicized peace negotiations going on in Madrid at that time. The U.S. threatened to withdraw some financial support if the Israel government did not desist. Again in 1992, the United States refused to approve a $10 billion loan viewed by Israel as essential to meeting their increasing infrastructure demands. While this resulted in temporary bilateral tensions, the Israelis soon rejected then Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir’s approach and elected more moderate leadership. The settlements were temporarily frozen, the peace negotiations went on, and the loan was eventually granted.
The strategy employed by the Senior Bush administration did not result in a total halt in settlement construction, but the U.S. won considerable concessions by exploiting Israel’s financial dependence as bargaining leverage.

Some might argue that the cessation of all terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians, mostly perpetrated by Hamas and the militant Shiite group Hezbollah, is the first necessary step to achieving a formal compromise in the region. Yet particularly since January, Hamas leadership has signaled a willingness to negotiate a cease-fire treaty with Israel and went on record in 2006 as agreeing to participate in talks working toward a two-state solution. While their recent concessions in no way compensate for their violent actions, they are a necessity to the peace process, and they must be brought to the table for their to be any hope of a lasting peace.

Others claim that pressuring Israel to accept compromise will deter it from participating in formal peace negotiations. Yet the U.S. managed to win a temporary settlement freeze in the early 1990s that coincided with a series of secret negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). These clandestine talks resulted in Oslo I, the first attempt to synthesize a plan for both Palestinian autonomy and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories.

The events of 1990-92, therefore, provide a viable model for the way in which President Obama can negotiate successfully with a Likud-controlled Israeli government. While the President certainly should not discard our history of cooperation with Israel, he must also take into account the degree to which Israeli survival depends on American financial support and our nation’s interest in maintaining stability in the Middle East as a whole. If President Obama wishes to encourage moderate Palestinian leadership and the renewal of negotiations, he must spend his political capital in a manner that reflects the true urgency of the region’s political situation and does not assume, as Mr. Lieberman says, that the region has “learned to live with” violent conflict.