Thailand is a nation with a long history of military coups and political drama. Yet the ongoing political theatre, sparked by a 2006 coup that deposed ex-Prime Minister Thaksin Sinawatra, is unprecedented. Since March, over 100,000 “red shirt” protesters—the core of Thaksin’s power base—have camped out in the streets of Bangkok, demanding that the government step down and hold new elections. The coup has taken a macabre twist with a blood-splattering stunt by protesters on the walls of current Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s house. A botched crackdown by the army that left 24 dead did little to calm the storm.

At the time of the coup, the military held that it was necessary to rid Thailand of Thaksin due to his gross abuses of power. What originally started as a movement to remove an individual politician, however, has since given way to a larger, more pressing national conflict between the Thai masses, known as the “red shirts”, and the Bangkok elite, or “yellow shirts”. Holding another round of elections for a new government (which has changed hands three times since the 2006 coup), will merely serve to perpetuate the conflict and discontentment on either side, as both refuse to accept the legitimacy of the other’s victory, let alone reconcile or negotiate. The urgency and acuteness of this political gridlock demands a new solution. Although it may be a controversial move, the monarchy must step in to bring all stakeholders to the negotiating table to hammer out a compromise.

One reason why the present standoff has taken such a different, agitated path is Thaksin’s role as a symbol of the popular vote and the masses (not to mention his ability to mobilize their anger). When in power, Thaksin instituted many populist-spending reforms that benefited the rural poor. This group constituted Thaksin’s main support base and now forms the core of the “red shirt” movement. While now a fugitive, Thaksin regularly grabs the political limelight, riling up his supporters through (video) calls for a “people’s revolution.”

In addition, the powerful Bangkok elite—comprising the military, business and aristocratic elite as well as the urban middle-classes—has consistently been hostile to the red shirts’ popular appeal. Their use of hard-handed tactics has only heightened tensions. For example, the yellow shirts staged a massive sit-in at Bangkok International Airport, paralyzing the country for days. This demonstration, along with convenient court rulings, helped to topple the Puea Thai party (a Thaksin proxy) after it was elected into power. It was in fact the yellow shirts who first set a precedent for large-scale protests, leading the red shirts to adopt similarly disruptive tactics, as evidenced by the large-scale protests that continue to erupt in Thailand today.

Hence, many describe Thailand as being polarized between the red-shirted rural poor in the northern provinces and the yellow-shirted entrenched urban elite, some who disdain the idea of a one-person-one-vote democracy as a poor method of political governance. The yellow shirts claim the tacit support of the military and the Thai royalty. They also appear to have the backing of the country’s political and judicial institutions. Past court rulings have not only indicted Thaksin and seized his assets, but also removed the popularly-elected Puea Thai party from power on grounds of fraud.

While still true to an extent, this analysis tends to oversimplify the current picture, especially as the protest movements have gained in momentum and scale over the past years. A significant population in Bangkok—most notably the urban lower-income groups such as taxi drivers and street vendors—identify with the red shirts, supporting the protests even at the expense of their disrupted livelihoods (many work in the tourist and commercial sectors). The protests do not even spare the army—a major player—of rifts. While support for Abhisit’s government has traditionally prevailed in the higher echelons of the military, many rank-and-file soldiers belong to lower classes, and share the discontent of the masses. There have been several reports of soldiers melting into the crowds of red shirt protesters, or failing to muster more than half-hearted attempts to rein in the protests as ordered by the government. Such divided loyalty was a key reason that recent efforts to capture red shirt leaders ended in an embarrassing failure for the government, with protesters escaping in blatant view. In fact, even some military top brass are privately urging compromise.

In late March, televised peace talks between Abhisit and red shirt leaders raised some hopes for a peaceful resolution, but both sides refused to budge over a timetable for elections. Abhisit proposed dissolving parliament in December 2010 (a year before he has to), but the red shirts are demanding new elections immediately. In addition, the Thai Supreme Court’s recent decision that the Abhisit government had been involved in accepting illicit campaign donations has given the red shirts a timely boost.

The current political environment is a lose-lose situation for Abhisit. While a further crackdown on protests would likely be ineffective and only serve to rile the masses further, ceding outright to their demands looks weak politically. Concession would also send the wrong message to the protesters that disruption and violence is the best way to achieve their goals. Clearly, the Prime Minister will have to step down sooner rather than later.

Merely working out an election timetable, however, is not sufficient. Such a piecemeal answer will merely continue the same cycle of violent political dramas and standoffs between the red and yellow shirts. The crux of the issue is that both sides must be willing to accept the election results, even if they are in favor of the other party. In order for the political system to function, no party should seek to subvert the results, whether in the form of open protests or by pulling strings behind the scenes.

In this respect, the yellow shirted royalists must acknowledge the mandate and staying power of the red shirt movement. It is no longer just a motley rabble of Thaksin proxies and supporters. The red shirt protests have escalated beyond Thaksin, and they now represent a movement to give more voice to Thailand’s masses symbolizing a hope for future change in Thailand’s institutions. Abhisit and his powerful backers need to recognize that popular attitudes see the current government as an illegitimate front for the elite. Trying to maintain their grip on power without heeding the wishes of the people, as expressed through electoral votes, will impede any forward peaceful resolution in addressing the waves of discontent.

On their part, the red shirts must also have more realistic expectations. Declaring the streets of Bangkok to be their “final battleground” in an all-out war is scarcely a productive approach to achieving systematic empowerment for the people. Rather than making uncompromising demands, the red shirts must come to the negotiating table with an open mind. A victory would entail finding common ground that addresses the concerns of all parties rather than a radical upheaval.

Reconciliation, admittedly, is easier said than done, especially with the systemic mutual mistrust present between the people, elites, and the army. This is why the much-revered Thai King Bhumibol Adulyadej should step in. The King should use his influence to get the various parties together and broker a compromise. Although the Thai monarchy has historically stayed out of politics, Thailand’s current crisis is unprecedented and begets action rather than silence. To maintain its position above the murky realm of politics, the monarchy certainly should not be a partisan actor and must avoid taking sides. Nevertheless, the King should capitalize on the respect and influence he commands in the nation as leverage to force the different groups to the negotiating table. He should aim to work out an electoral timetable, a fair system that would take into account the interests of both the masses and the elite, and a mutual agreement to accept the results of a vote by the people.

The King should take action soon, especially in light of his ailing health. The uncertainty surrounding his political succession and the unpopularity of the Crown Prince as a successor would put the monarchy in a more difficult position in the future if it attempts to rally the people, army and opposing political leaders together. Furthermore, a silent monarchy will ultimately decrease its legitimacy (already seen to be tacitly backing the elite, who even call themselves the “royalists”) and increase the fragility of both the monarchy and the country’s political system. The existing electoral system has all but broken down. It needs a higher, respected authority to mend the fissures. For all the internal turmoil, the Thai people still accord great love and respect for the throne, believing the King to have their best interests at heart, and will thus be far more likely to listen to him than any perceived partisan actor.

Thailand’s harsh lèse majesté laws, which criminalize criticism and defamation of the monarchy, have greatly restricted debate about the King’s national role, and even about his possible death. But it is precisely because of the monarchy’s centrality that Thailand must reform and engage it in securing the foundations of a fair and democratic political system that represents the interests of the people. The King should look at avoiding the regular patronage of loyalists in the army and bureaucracy as well as reducing palace meddling in political appointments. Ultimately, this reform can build a stable, legitimate system that Thais trust without dependence on the King’s leadership and direction. It provides a hopeful, conducive environment for the various quarters in Thailand to thrash out their differences and come to a compromise.

With a dose of royalty sense, Thais would hopefully be able to look beyond the color of their shirts and towards their country’s best long-term interests.

President Obama’s recent state dinner with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the first such dinner of his Presidency, attracted significant international attention. Beneath the façade of pomp and grandeur, the President’s choice to host Indian leaders at such a momentous occasion is an important symbol of his commitment to strong bilateral ties between the world’s two largest democracies. Obama, however, has yet to fully harness the potential of this relationship—one that sags under the weight of numerous concerns including the global press’ preoccupation with a rising China. Although China grabs headlines as the rising power in Asia, India too is quickly becoming a regional power—one from which the U.S. can benefit. The U.S. can cooperate with India on a variety of fronts: including nuclear non-proliferation, extremist violence in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, and the maintenance of a stable balance of power in Asia. If President Obama wishes to truly strengthen the U.S.’s partnership with India, he must go beyond mere symbolism and focus on forwarding the U.S. and India’s shared goals.

In some sense, the state dinner was nothing new; past U.S. presidents have regularly hosted Indian leaders at state dinners. Indeed, in terms of policy substance, the Obama-Singh event is less important than Singh’s dinner with former President Bush in 2005, when they announced a civilian nuclear agreement between the two states. Nevertheless, the state dinner helped allay fears that the Obama administration might deprioritize relations with India in favor of strengthening ties with China. Despite the administration’s globetrotting agendas, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton bypassed India on her trip to Asia in February 2009, and Obama, too, declined to visit during his Asian tour en route to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Singapore in November. Although Clinton did visit India earlier in July, the Obama administration seems to interact with India within a more bilateral framework than one in which they acknowledge its rising power and aspirations on the global stage.

New Delhi has been fretting over the U.S.’s apparent acquiescence to growing Chinese clout and in particular, the recent joint Obama-Hu statement calling for closer “cooperation [between the U.S. and China] on issues related to South Asia.” The statement seemed to open the door to China’s involvement in the longstanding sensitive rivalry between India and Pakistan. Furthermore, the ongoing economic downturn has fueled protectionist tendencies in America, especially with a Democrat-controlled Congress. Obama recently spoke of anti-outsourcing measures and criticized current tax policies which favor companies outsourcing to lower-cost countries like India. Hence some political watchers are predicting some strain in U.S.-India relations on Obama’s watch.

Officials such as U.S. Under Secretary of State William Burns and Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Robert Blake have nonetheless firmly reiterated America’s commitment to a partnership with India. Prime Minister Singh’s status as the first state guest of honor can be seen as a reaffirmation of the continued strength of U.S.-India ties and a strategic move by the White House to reassure their nervous Indian friends. The pageantry of a state dinner cannot, however, be a replacement for progress toward substantive issues. The Obama administration has been dragging its heels in the implementation of the much-heralded nuclear cooperation agreement, with the President showing little inclination to push through the final modalities and procedures.

Obama is right to engage more closely with China, but sticking too closely to a G2-style “Chimerica” script would risk overemphasizing Chinese influence at the expense of American leverage. China and America are more often than not at loggerheads with each other, from China’s resentment over its past subjugation under Western imperial powers to present-day tensions over Taiwan, Tibet, yuan undervaluation, and ideological differences over human rights and democracy. If Obama realistically wants to realize his grand visions of multilateralism and global cooperation, he needs as many allies on board as possible. An increasingly aggressive and confident China is an unlikely first candidate.

India can serve as a useful counterweight to China’s assertive and occasionally hostile presence in Asia that ensures that the much-touted ‘Asian century’ does not belong exclusively to the Chinese. While it would be overly simplistic to claim that India and the U.S.’s shared traits of being populous multiethnic democracies automatically renders easy cooperation, the fact that India is more likely to have a similar outlook as the U.S. can ease Western fears of a potentially unfriendly Asia-Pacific region based on Chinese-driven values and models. The U.S. should not try to forcefully impose American ideas on Asia, but with India as an ally the U.S. can ensure that its interests in Asia are not compromised. Most of the Southeast Asian countries, being poor and relatively small, are highly susceptible to China’s “checkbook diplomacy”—using its wealth to buy allies. For the U.S., India’s partnership may be more important than its partnership with Japan, as that country, a traditionally staunch U.S. ally, becomes increasingly distant from the U.S. after the recent shift in power to the Democratic Party of Japan under Yukio Hatoyama. India is also keen to work with the U.S. as protection against China. Supporting India’s emergence as a major power need not constitute an antagonistic containment strategy directed against any supposed “China threat.” Instead, it is a reasonable policy designed to ensure that the interests of all players are accommodated to preserve geopolitical stability and inclusiveness in a crucial region of the world.

The U.S. has to make sure it recognizes India’s interests while balancing its own agenda. Unfortunately, relations have been soured by India’s frustrations with America’s perceived reluctance to strongly crack down on Pakistan, which harbors several extremist groups that have targeted India. India is suspicious of ramped-up American military assistance to its neighbor, fearing that Pakistan will channel those resources toward aggression in the disputed Kashmir region and along the Indo-Pakistan border, rather than toward combating Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Obama also flamed controversy early in 2009 when he suggested that resolving the Kashmir dispute would be central to addressing the problems of instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. South Asian politics have long proven to be complex and messy, and tensions have become even more strained in the wake of the 2008 Mumbai bombings by Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). Washington needs to balance its interests in working with both India and Pakistan, as well as Afghanistan, all crucial fronts in the battle against terrorism. During the state dinner, Obama wisely adopted a policy of non-involvement, issuing a neutral statement that “it is not [America’s] place” to get involved in the India-Pakistan conflict. Pakistan and India are partners that the U.S. can ill afford to lose; Washington should tread carefully.

Although the two nations have been increasingly close partners, there remains much potential for closer cooperation on counterterrorism efforts, particularly in the realms of intelligence sharing, joint training, improved institutional frameworks, and enhanced security enforcement measures and responses. India’s previous successful efforts against Sikh terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s were due in no small part to the sharing of intelligence with the U.S. and other countries, and a similar approach may be adopted with regard to global terrorism today. While terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda and the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) do have different objectives, they all cause conflict beyond Pakistan’s borders. A U.S.-India partnership in combating terrorism would underline India’s leadership both regionally and globally and would highlight international commitment to stopping terrorism and increasing stability.

Although President Obama’s ceremony and symbolic gestures are well-intentioned, building a stronger partnership with India will require further action. While China must be considered, the U.S. must engage more deeply with India on the many issues and interests that the two nations share to glean the potential economic and strategic rewards.